Frege and Russell’s Referential theory of meaning.
INTRODUCTION
Language has suffered abuses which
have greatly affected the conveyance of meaning; leading to opacity, ambiguity,
indeterminacy, confusion and outright dislocation of meaning. However, language
is relevant insofar as it helps to accomplish its task of understanding the
world. Language is intended to have relation to fact and to facilitate dealings
with the environment. Thus, to gain knowledge of the world through the study of
language, Russell states that one must also first construct an ideal or logically
perfect language. Such language will help to avert the irrelevancies that arise in our use
of language.
However,
Gottlob Frege, in his referential theory of meaning of language, holds that in
order for a linguistic expression to have meaning, there must be something to
which it refers.[1] According to Russell, language is a medium
for knowing the world and communicating such knowledge. Language is by its very
nature related to something outside itself, and that is meaning. So, if it does
not relate to something outside itself, it thus becomes meaningless for it
would then convey nothing and communicate nothing out there in reality,
therefore, language can never be an end in itself.
Thus
this essay shall be concerned with a comparative study of Frege and Russell’s
Referential theory of meaning. We shall look at Frege's notion of sense and
reference and Russell's theory of description. We shall also look at a
comparison of both philosophers ideas and the insight from Wittgenstein and
Locke.
FREGE’S NOTION OF SENSE AND REFERENCE
Before
we proceed to discuss Frege’s notion of sense and reference, it pertinent that
we know what Frege considers as referential theory of meaning.
Referential Theory of Meaning
The
Referential theory states that a term is meaningful if it stands for an object
and that terms which stand for the same object have the same meaning since the
meaning of a term is simply the object for which it stands.[2]It also states that an
expression means what it refers to or designates.[3] It presupposes that all our linguistic
expression is directed at some referential end.[4] Language is taken to be
constitutive of names and what they designate, what they refer to. The lesser meaning
of an expression is that to which the expression refers.[5] This first theory of
meaning draws a direct link between a word and object, a direct ostensive
reference. The more sophisticated view is that the meaning of an expression is
to be identified with the relation between the expression and its referent; the
deferential connection constitutes the meaning.[6]
The
first form of the theory can easily be shown to be inadequate by virtue of the
fact that two expressions can have different meanings but the same referent.
The morning star and the evening star refer to the same extra linguistic
entity, but they do not have the same meaning. If they did one could know the
morning star is the same entity as the evening star just by understanding the
meaning of the terms, but this is not the case.[7]
Sense and Reference
The
sense of a term is the way that term references its referent.[8] Frege used the notion of
sense to give an account of the meaning of propositional attitude ascription,
which are sentences involving propositional attitude verbs such as “believes”,
“doubts”, and “knows”. Sentence represents the world because they are made up
of words and phrases that stand for objects, events, concepts, and
propositions. Since meaning is representational it may seem that what these
expressions stand for (refer to) is what they mean. Thus Frege distinguishes
meaning from reference. The distinction involves explaining why substitution of
co-referential terms in a sentence sometimes changes meaning. For example, in
the two expressions:
1. Chinua
Achebe is the author of Things Fall Apart
2. Chinua
Achebe was Chinua Achebe
The
two expressions differ only in the substitution of co referential terms.
The
meaning or sense of “Chinua Achebe” here in the sentence is something like the
property of being the author of “Things
Fall Apart”. Its referent is whatever has this property of being the author
of “Things Fall Apart”.
The sense of each referring
expression offers a mode of representation of its referent. The sense of an
expression may serve as an item of information about a description of, or a
means of picking out referent. Frege’s contention is that something may have
the same referents but different senses. The view that a sentence is to be
explained somehow in terms of the conditions under which the sentence is true
is a view which was first stated by Frege in his “Basic Laws of Mathematics.”
He introduced a formal language, in terms of which he aimed to express
arithmetical propositions.[9] His plan was then to drive
the true arithmetical propositions, expressed in his formal language, from what
he took to be laws of logic.[10]
However, Frege’s crucial insight was
that the sense of an indicative sentence is given by the conditions under
which, according to his reference rules, it is true or denotes truth. He
writes, “Not only has a denotation, but also a sense, appertained to all names
correctly formed from signs. Every such name of a truth-value expresses a
sense, a thought. Namely, by our stipulation it is determined under
what-conditions the name denoted the true. The sense of this name is the
thought that these conditions are filled.[11]
Furthermore, the sense of a basic,
atomic expression is the contribution it makes to the sense of complete
sentences in which it occurs. Now the sense of a complete sentence is given by
the condition under which it is true. Those conditions in turn are determined
by the references of the component expressions from which the sentence is built
up. It follows that a fundamental statement of the conditions for a component
expression to have a particular reference can be regarded as a specification
also of its sense. Sense does not merely, together with the way the world is,
determined reference. Rather, the sense of an expression is individuated by
stating the condition which something must meet to be its reference. [12]
As to the relation of sense to
reference, we can say that it is “many-one”: a given reference can be picked
out by many senses, but a sense can have at most one reference. More
controversially, we might argue that there can be referenceless senses: we may
grasp a condition that picks out at most one object, for example, the “the
president of Britain, but the world might fail to supply an object satisfying
the condition
RUSSELL’S THEORY OF DESCRIPTION
Against Fregean Notion of Sense
Russell
focuses on the anomalies of improper reference. Russell distinguished two sorts
of descriptions namely; indefinite description of the sort, “a so-and –so”.
Example, ‘a certain man accosted me on the way’; and definite description of
the sort “the so-and-so”. Example, ‘the man in blue shirt accosted me on the
way’. Indefinite article is used in the first one and definite article is used
in the second one. The expression “a certain man accosted me on the way” is not
specific and definite about the person that accosted me, but when I say, “the
man in blue shirt accosted me, I am specific and definite.[13] Such phrases as “Golden Girdle” and “Queen
of England” are definite descriptions.
Russell’s problem with the
referential theory is that every description gives the impression that it
refers, when actually they don’t. The expression, “the present queen of
Nigeria”, a person not at home with the political system in Nigeria will
believe that there is a queen in Nigeria. All description of the so-and-so
should be done away with. The only proper refereeing terms are logically proper
names, that is, the indexical or pronouns. Such words like a unicorn (the
flying horse), the golden mountain, the centaur, the round square are in
indefinite description which describes nothing; as such it has no meaning in
the context of reality and of this world.[14] The theory of description is concerned with existence,
reality and reference; whatever in the world is a particular, definite and
real. And names are symbols which are supposed to directly designate these
individual entities. When names fail to serve this function, they rise to
multiple problems and hinder meaning.
Basic
in Russell’s theory of meaning is a fundamental distinction between proper
names, example, “Scott” and description, example, “the author of Waverly”. A
proper name is a simple symbol; it denotes an individual directly; that
individual is its meaning; and it has this meaning independent of all other
symbols.[15]
A description is a complex symbol and, because it does not designate an
individual directly, is an incomplete symbol: that is, symbol that has no
meaning in isolation but can be given a meaning in a context, such as, ‘The
author of Waverly was Scotch’, and analyzing the whole context in such a manner
that the grammatical subject disappears, to be replaced by other symbols.[16] Thus in dealing with
propositions, we are dealing in the first instance with symbols, and if we
attribute significance to group of symbols which have no significance, we shall
fall into the error of admitting unrealities,
in the only sense in which this is possible, namely, as objects described. In
the proposition, “I met a unicorn”, the words together make a significant
proposition, and the word “unicorn” by its significant, in just the same sense
as the word “man”. But the two words “a unicorn” do not form a subordinate
group having a meaning of its own.[17]A unicorn is an indefinite
description which describes nothing.
Russell’s Theory Of Description
Russell’s theory of meaning emerged
from his desire to account for our ability to think about infinite class of
objects, despite our inability to survey an infinite domain.[18] What accounts for our
ability to grasp propositions that are about an infinite class of objects is
the fact that such propositions contain denoting concepts. He writes, “A
concept denotes when, if it occurs in a proposition, the proposition is not
about the concept, but about a term connected in a certain peculiar way with
the concept. If I say, ‘I met a man’, the proposition is not about a man; this
is a concept which does not walk the streets, but lives in the shadowy limbo of
the logic-book. What I met was a thing, not a concept, an actual man”[19].
In his, principia Mathematica,
Russell maintains that the symbols for classes are incomplete symbols. Class is
what Frege used to denote the world. There uses are defined, but they
themselves are not assumed to mean anything at all.[20] That is to say, the
symbols for classes, undoubtedly, possess a definable use or function in
sentences, but, taken by themselves, they do not denote entities. Rather are
they ways of referring to other entities. In this respect the symbol of classes
are like those of description.[21]
Futhermore,
Russell used the word acquaintance for the epistemologically special
relationship one must have to the constituents of a proposition in order to
grasp the proposition. The only object one could have acquaintance with are
according to him sense-data and perhaps oneself.[22] Russell theory of meaning
differs from Freges’ in that it involves no notion of sense, no way of thinking
about a thing. Russell is propositions are composed of objects and properties
(universal), not the way of thinking of them.[23]
A Comparison
Of Betrand Russell And Gottlob Frege On Meaning
Russell sees language as a medium for knowing
that world and communicating knowledge. For him, language is by its very nature
related to something outside itself, and that is its meaning. And if it does
not relate to something outside itself, it becomes meaningless for it would
then convey nothing and communicates nothing. Language for Russell, can never
be an end in itself, the moment it becomes an end in itself, it automatically
becomes meaningless and useless. On the other hand, Frege’s
views on definite descriptions are contained
much exclusively and Frege strove to make definite descriptions be
singular terms, by which we mean that they are not only syntactically singular but
also that they behave semantically likes such paradigmatic proper names.
Furthermore,
Frege holds that as the names express a sense that specifies the condition that
must be met to count as the referent. Russell rejects Frege’s views, arguing
that the postulation of intermediaries between word and referent creates rather
than solves problems. Russell’s view is premised on a firm distinction between
the following two sorts of term:[24]
1. a
name, which is a simple symbol, directly designating an individual which is its
meaning, and having this meaning independently of all other words;
2. a
description, which consists of several words, whose meanings are already fixed,
and from which results whatever is to be taken as the ‘meaning’ of the
description.
EVALUATION
According to Frege, to grasp an
expression thus includes grasping its sense; grasping of senses is an
ingredient of understanding. To grasp the sense of an expression is to grasp a
way of determining its reference. Grasp of sense consists in knowing what is
relevant to determining reference. It need not complete the grasp of meaning,
for Frege allows that there may be other aspects of meaning- for example, when
he calls the “colour” or “tone” of expressions- which are excluded. For
instance, cur and dog have the same sense (we do precisely the same to check
whether an object is cur or a dog), but they clearly differ in tone.
On the contrary, Russell used the
word acquaintance for the epistemologically special relationship one must have
to the constituents of a proposition in order to grasp the proposition. The
only object one could have acquaintance with are according to him sense-data
and perhaps oneself.[25] Russell theory of meaning
differs from Freges’ in that it involves no notion of sense, no way of thinking
about a thing. Russell is propositions are composed of objects and properties
(universal), not the way of thinking of them.[26]
In addition to the discourse of
meaning, Wittgenstein, in his picture theory emphasizes that language is a true
picture of reality just as a picture has all things in common with what it
pictures so does the language in relation to reality. He says that what a
picture has in common with what it pictures is the logical form, and the
logical form is the unspoken, unexpressed relationship that exists between the
pictures ( language) and what it pictures(reality). The logical form is to
stand outside language to be able to picture it.[27] A picture does not
contain the picture of itself.[28]
Consequently, Lock in his Essay
Concerning Human Understanding, (1960) articulated the ideational theory of
meaning. He explained that words should be seen as sensible mark of ideas and
these ideas should be seen as the proper and immediate significance of their
corresponding words.[29] Language is an instrument
of communication of thought. The mind focuses on ideas while thinking and
speaking. [30]
The use, then of words is to be the sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas they
stand for are proper and immediate signification.[31] “Man, though he has great
variety of thought, and such, for which others, as well as himself, might
receive profit and delight, yet they are all within his own breast, invisible
and hidden from others. The comfort and advantage of society was not without
communication of thought, it was necessary that man should find out some
external sensible signs, whereof those invisible ideas, which his thoughts are
made up of, might be made known to others.”[32]
CONCLUSION
Philosophical Investigations gives a
radically different account of what philosophy is and does. The analysis of
proposition to set out their correct logical form is no longer relevant. The
idea of a correct form of a proposition was tied to the idea of its depicting a
fact. And when there is no longer any logical form of a fact to depict, there
is no standard or norm to establish the correct form of a proposition. In order
words, the concept ‘correct form’ has lost its meaning. Every sentence is in
order as it is. The philosopher’s task is not to correct the proposition; but
to understand it. And to understand it means to know not what it pictures, but what
it does, what function it performs. Sentences do innumerable jobs.
Frege’s idea was that it may be a
property of a singular term as an element of a public language that in order to
understand utterances containing it, one must not only think of a particular
object, its meaning but on think of that object in a particular way, that is,
every competent user of the language who understands the utterances will think
of the object in the same. On the other hand, Russell is a
direct reference theorist. Reference is direct in that there is no third term
mediating the word referent relation. The meaning of a logically proper name is
its referent. However, for the reasons illustrated by (1a-b) and (2a-b) above,
Russell argues that ordinary proper names (such as ‘Hesperus’ or ‘Aristotle’)
belong in the category of descriptions, not of logically proper names. He holds
that it is not possible for co-referential logically proper names to differ in
meaning “For the name itself is merely a means of pointing to the thing … so
that if one thing has two names, you make exactly the same assertion whichever
of the two names you use.”[33]
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Russell Bertrand. Encyclopaedia of
philosophy, 1967ed, S.V.”Russell Bertrand Arthur Williams” by p. Alston.
Strawson P. F, On Referring in Readings in Philosophy of Language,
edited by Jay Rosenberg and Charles Travis. Englewood Cliff New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1971.
Ozumba G. O, Introduction to Philosophy of Language. Ibadan: Hope Publication.
2004.
William
Alston, Philosophy of Language. London:
Prentice-Hall International, Inc. 1964.
The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5, edited by Paul Edwards. London:
Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1972.
A. C.
Grayling and Bernhard Weiss, Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, in Philosophy 2 edited by A. C. Grayling.
Oxford: University Press. 1998.
Cf.
Gottlob Frege, The basic Laws of
Mathematics: Exposition of the System, translated and edited by Furth
Montgomery. Berkeley: University of California Press. 1965.
Morris
Weitz, Twentieth-Century Philosophy: The
Analytic Traditions. New York: The Free Press. 1966.
Coplesotn Fredrick, A History of Philosophy, Volume 8: Bentham
to Russell. Well Wood: Borns& Oates. 1966.
Bertrand
Russell Bertrand and Whitehead Alfred, Principia
Mathematica. Cambridge: University Press. 1996.
Bertrand
Russell Bertrand "Descriptions." In Introduction
to Mathematical Philosophy. London: George Allen and Unqin Ltd 1919.
Alexander
Mascow Alexander, A Study in
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. Loss Angele: University of California Press loss.
1961.
[1] Bertrand
Russell. Encyclopaedia of philosophy, 1967ed, S.V.”Russell Bertrand Arthur
Williams” by p. Alston
[2]Cf. P. F. Strawson, On Referring in Readings in Philosophy of Language,
edited by Jay Rosenberg and Charles Travis (Englewood Cliff New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 188.
[3] Cf. G.O Ozumba, Introduction to Philosophy of Language
(Ibadan: Hope Publication. 2004), p. 51.
[4] G.O Ozumba, Introduction to Philosophy of Language
(Ibadan: Hope Publication. 2004), p. 51.
[5] Alston William, Philosophy of Language (London:
Prentice-Hall International, Inc. 1964), p. 11.
[6] Alston William, Philosophy of Language (London:
Prentice-Hall International, Inc. 1964), p. 11.
[7] The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 5, edited by Paul Edwards
(London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1972), p. 234.
[8] Cf. The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 5,
Paul Edwards (ed.) (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1972), pp. 231-234.
[9] A. C. Grayling and
Bernhard Weiss, Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, in Philosophy 2 edited by A. C. Grayling (Oxford: University Press.
1998), p. 708.
[10] A. C. Grayling and
Bernhard Weiss, Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein, in Philosophy 2 edited
by A. C. Grayling (Oxford: University Press. 1998), p. 710.
[11]Cf. Gottlob Frege, The basic Laws of Mathematics: Exposition of the System, translated
and edited by Furth Montgomery( Berkeley: University of California Press.
1965), p. 32.
[12] Cf. Gottlob Frege, The basic Laws of Mathematics: Exposition of
the System, translated and edited by Furth Montgomery( Berkeley: University
of California Press. 1965), p. 76.
[13] G.O Ozumba, Introduction to Philosophy of Language
(Ibadan: Hope Publication. 2004), p. 144.
[15] Morris Weitz, Twentieth-Century Philosophy: The Analytic
Traditions (New York: The Free Press. 1966), p. 145.
[16] Morris Weitz, Twentieth-Century Philosophy: The Analytic
Traditions (New York: The Free Press. 1966), p. 145.
[17] Morris Weitz, Twentieth-Century Philosophy: The Analytic Traditions (New York:
The Free Press. 1966), p. 148.
[18]Cf. Fredrick Coplesotn, A History of Philosophy, Volume 8: Bentham to Russell (Well Wood:
Borns& Oates. 1966), pp. 464-466.
[19] Bertrand Russell and
Alfred Whitehead, Principia Mathematica
(Cambridge: University Press. 1996), p. 53.
[20]Bertrand Russell and
Alfred Whitehead, Principia Mathematica
(Cambridge: University Press. 1996), p. 71.
[21] Bertrand Russell and
Alfred Whitehead, Principia Mathematica
(Cambridge: University Press. 1996), p. 71.
[22] Cf. Fredrick Coplesotn,
A History of Philosophy, Volume 8:
Bentham to Russell (Well Wood: Borns& Oates. 1966), pp. 455-470.
[23]Cf. Fredrick Coplesotn, A History of Philosophy, Volume 8: Bentham
to Russell (Well Wood: Borns& Oates. 1966), pp. 455-470.
[24]
Bertrand Russell "Descriptions." In Introduction
to Mathematical Philosophy, (London: George Allen and Unqin Ltd 1919),p.
283.
[25] Cf. Fredrick Coplesotn,
A History of Philosophy, Volume 8:
Bentham to Russell (Well Wood: Borns& Oates. 1966), pp. 455-470.
[26]Cf. Fredrick Coplesotn, A History of Philosophy, Volume 8: Bentham
to Russell (Well Wood: Borns& Oates. 1966), pp. 455-470.
[27] Alexander Mascow, A Study in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
(Loss Angele: University of California Press loss. 1961), 6.
[28] Alexander Mascow, A Study in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
(Loss Angele: University of California Press loss. 1961), 6.
[29] G.O Ozumba, Introduction to Philosophy of Language
(Ibadan: Hope Publication. 2004), p. 55.
[30] John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, section 1 chapter 2 book 3
[31] John Lock, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
[32] John Lock, An EssayConcerning Human Understanding.
[33] Cf.
Bertrand, Russell. The philosophy of
logical atomism. In Marsh, R.C. (ed.). Logic
and Knowledge. (London: Unwin Hyman, 1956),p.245.
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