ARISTOTLE CONCEPT OF CAUSALITY.

1.1       Introduction

The quest for knowledge about the nature of being through science and nature has been of paramount importance to man for the past centuries. Taking stock from the observation of the natural world; it is eminent that our physical world is fashioned in a way that nothing remains constant. Everything as it were is continually in motion. In the course of our findings, we observe that these changes do not just spring up out of nothing without some form of relationship to some other thing(s).  This relationship as it were, could yield other results or beget other responses.

            We have also observed that the relationship of things in motion does not occur in a vacuum but is usually connected to some causes which trigger their occurrence. Every natural thing is either in motion or at rest, and if at rest, suffices to say it was at some point in motion and therefore, has the propensity to initiate another motion.

Aristotle recounts that there are certain things that come to be necessarily, there are others that come to be normally and there are still those that come to be for the sake of something in nature. When events that are outside the realm of the necessary and normal come to be incidentally, we say they happen by chance. In other words, when indeterminate events occur among events which are done for the sake of something, we say, it happened by chance. These necessary relationships that we find between objects, events, conditions, or other things and instances at a given time and those of later times are then termed causal laws[1].

            In this paper, we shall first of all clarify some basic terms, discuss the modes of causality, look at Aristotle’s view on the cause and chance, then finally consider the modern application and relevance of chance in the causal world.

2.1       Clarification of Terms

For easy understanding of this paper, t is imperative for us to define certain terms such as nature, motion, cause, the law of causality, and efficient causes.

2.1.1    Nature

Nature is the principle of motion or rest in those things in which it is per se and not per accident. According to Aristotle, some are things formed by nature, while others are by causes. Those formed by nature, we may refer to as plants or animals or water, fire or earth. These, however, differ from things not constituted by nature, but which are result of art, such as a chair or a table. Hence, they have within themselves a beginning of movement and rest, whether the movement is the motion, growth or decline or a qualitative change, which is not the case with things like beds and clothes. He further distinguished on what it is to be by nature and to happen according to nature. For instance, the upward motion of fire neither is nor has a nature, but happens according to nature.

2.1.2    Motion:

Motion can be defined as the fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially. In terms of the mover and the moved being in contact, motion can be defined as ‘the fulfilment of the movable qua movable’, Thus, it is neither  the potency of a thing existing in potency, for some things are actually in potency, nor the act of a thing in act. Motion can also be seen simply as action in the mover and passion in the moved.   Therefore, it is the act of a thing in potency where the word “act” designates it’s relation to a prior potency and the words of a thing in potency. This implies that only things in act can bring others from potentiality to actuality consequently, motion is as such necessarily contingent upon a subject’s lack of certain form (privation), which it is capable of receiving and an agent possessing the perfection it is about to produce. 

2.1.3    Efficient Cause of motion

For different philosophers and scientists, there are different causes of motion. Some posit that Force is the cause of motion, others have Mind as the cause, yet others have the Free will as the ultimate cause of motion. Aristotle has a view different from all these other views. In his postulation of series of motion, he later adds that there cannot be an eternal series of motion because basically, there will be a first mover and a first moved in the series. Though there are different causes of motion in the series, there is an ultimate cause of motion which though causes motion but is itself uncaused and unmoved. This uncaused cause he calls the Prime Mover, the Unmoved, the Mover of the first principle, which for Aquinas is God.

So, for Aristotle and Aquinas, ‘The Unmoved Mover’ is the first mover in the series of movers. He is not in motion but imparts motion, and as such, he is the ultimate Cause of motion. And if he does not act, there will be no motion as he is the initiator of motion.

2.1.4    Cause

Causality is used with several different shades of meaning. We shall try to and sum them up in definitions particularly the definitions given by Aristotle.

Aristotle identified four senses in which the term cause can be used. In one sense, it is that from which, as a constituent, something is generated; for example, the sand is the cause of the building, and the fire the cause of the smoke or ashes. In another sense, cause would mean the form or pattern, this being the formula of the essence and also the general of this; for example, in the case of the octave, the ratio 2:1, and, in general, a number and the parts in the formula. In another sense, it means that from which change or coming to rest first begins; for example, the carpenter is the cause of the chair, the father is the cause of the baby, and in general, that which is acted upon, that which brings a change is the cause of that which is being changed. Finally, it can mean the end, and this is the final cause (that for the sake of which); for example, walking is for the sake of health.

In simple terms, cause simply means ‘that which produces an effect; a person or thing that makes something happen. Again, it may mean ‘the reason for something; a factor that justifies something; an aim, a principle or a movement that is strongly defended or supported.

According to Aristotle, it means anything which contributes to the constitution of a thing, whether it be that on which the thing depends or that in which it consists[2].  It can also be viewed as the fulfilment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially. In terms of the mover and the moved being in contact, motion can be defined as ‘the fulfilment of the movable qua movable’, the cause of the attribute being in contact with what can move, so that the mover is also acted upon.

In his view, Kenny opined that to be acquainted with natural science, the knowledge of the sequence in order of procedure is needed which consists of principle, cause and element. He emphasised causes, identified them as four with their meaning thus;

(i) Material cause: This explains what a thing is made of.

(ii) Formal cause: Explains the form a thing assumes

(iii) Efficient cause: Explains the process by which a thing came into being. They are prior conditions, entities or events considered to have caused a thing. They are the primary source of change (motion) or rest. It is that which brings something about. They explain the process by which a thing came into being.

(iv) Final cause: Explains the purpose a thing serves, that for the sake of which the efficient cause acts. The intention of the agent.

2.1.5    Efficient Causes:

These are prior conditions, entities or events considered to have caused a thing. They are the primary source of change (motion) or rest. It is that which brings something about. They explain the process by which a thing came into being.

            Of the four causes, the efficient cause seems to correspond to the usage of cause nowadays. As it were, it is the nature of efficiency/production that the problem of causality is centred on. Causality is seen as the relationship between two events, one being the cause and the other the effect. It is thus the relationship between cause and effect. The effect as it were is the consequence of the cause. This relationship between events is not a necessary one. The presence of contingences makes it conditional. These contingencies lead to Chance which are the possibilities that exist outside a particular context of discussion. The nature of contingencies is not defined, because they share in the properties of things within the context in question.

3.1       Aristotle on the Cause and Chance

3.1.2    On The Causes:

Aristotle identified four senses in which the term cause can be used. In one sense, it is that from which, as a constituent, something is generated; for example, the wood is the cause of the table, and the glass the cause of the mirror. In another sense, cause would mean the form or pattern, this being the formula of the essence and also the genera of this; for example, in the case of the octave, the ratio 2:1, and, in general, a number and the parts in the formula[3]. In another sense, it means that from which change or coming to rest first begins; for example, the carpenter is the cause of the chair, the father is the cause of the baby, and in general, that which is acted upon, that which brings a change is the cause of that which is being changed. Finally, it can mean the end, and this is the final cause (that for the sake of which); for example, walking is for the sake of health[4].

Furthermore, Aristotle went on to mention other forms that the causes can be classified into. One of which includes the moods of the causes. He explains that, since the causes are spoken of in different ways, within a given situation, one cause may be prior or subsequent to another cause. For example, the cause of food is the cook or the flames (fire) or the farm. Again of the causes there are those that we can refer to as proper and those said to be accidental, some are causes in the sense of potentiality and others in the sense of actuality. For example, the cause of a patient to be treated is the doctor, and of the patient that is being treated, the doctor who is treating.

3.1.3    On Chance

            Chance is defined as the accidental cause of exceptional or unintended results of choice or acting nature for another purpose. It is called fortune or luck when it concerns human beings and can be reduced to efficient cause. According to him, many things are existence through luck or chance.           Inquiring into the manner luck and chance are causes; Aristotle dismisses some claims, notions and believes of some philosophers. To those philosophers who doubt the existence of Luck and Chance, alluding it to a definite cause, he responds that even to those causes said to happen by luck or chance there is always a definite cause, which is definitely not luck, for it would be strange if luck is something. For example, if Shanu were to come to class and met by luck someone who he wished but did not expect to meet, the cause of this meeting is the wish to come to class. From another perspective, he argues against the notions of those who claim that both heaven and all that is ordered by the universe was brought about by chance and those who view chance as a cause, but say it is something divine, not revealed to man.

            To investigate whether or not luck and chance are the same or different, and to know what each of them is, our starting point would be to observe how things come to be. There we notice that some things are in existence because of other things, while some others do not. Now, in the case of those that come to be because of something, there are those that exist by choice and there are other that do not, however they both exist for the sake of something else. From this we can say that, apart from those things which exist by necessity, there are others to which final cause belong. For those things that belong to the end cause, some may be done by thought or by nature, when such things done by thought or nature come to be by accident, we say they do so by luck. For as being exists essentially and accidentally, so too we can say have cause. Example, in the case of a man, that which is essential is the art of living, but schooling, travelling, teaching etc. are accidental. Although Aristotle, went on to make some distinctions between “Chance” and “luck”, we shall not be going into that for now. Therefore, for the purpose of this paper, we shall consider both as the same since in terms of its application we shall not be making such a distinction.

On the issue of chance, some argue that there is nothing like chance but attribute everything to predetermined causes; others say everything happens by chance while others added that chance is by divine reason i.e. divine providence. But for Aristotle, chance is anything exceptional to the rule. Things in nature are regular acting in the same way unless impeded, but chance is unintended, unforeseen and exceptional. Chance is defined as the accidental cause of exceptional or unintended results of choice or nature acting for another purpose. It is called fortune or luck when it concerns human beings and can be reduced to efficient cause. Some things around us are natural, others are artificial otherwise they are designated by chance. Impediment of nature results to chance. Aristotle’s view on chance is that once you hold that everything is by chance, there cannot be science.

4.1       Modern Application/Relevance

4.1.2    The Causes:

            By carefully noting the similarities and dissimilarities that exists between the things that we come across every day, we acquire knowledge. This is possible because, as we see these things, we learn from them. When we come across a new thing, there is always the tendency of wanting to know more about that thing, in doing so; the human mind tries to relate these new thing/things that it has seen to some other familiar things that it has seen in the past that show similar characteristics to the particular one that is been observed. Through this method, the mind tends to use the things we know to understand things that are unknown to us. This act we have just analysed we can call analogy or model. This process will be of great assistance to us, especially as it concerns concept that have to do with nature.

            The model used in explaining and discoveries has two referents that can serve to expound on its function. Firstly, there has to be something that is more know, from this the model is taken, then to that that is less know, the model taken from the more know is applied. While we may refer to the more known as the origin of the model, the less know factor is its application. “Thus the model is taken from one thing, its original, and is used to understand another, its application.”[5]

            The first model as introduced by William Wallace is the causal model. This model according to Wallace has its root in the world of artefacts, but can be freely applied to nature. This model is an explanatory one which helps the philosopher of nature identifies four basic factors which in the world of artefacts are called causes (not all in the same sense since each functions distinctly to provide a causal explanation). Although we have mentioned that, the causes as it were, are originally applied to the world of artefact, a good reflection and observation of how these causes are used and applied to understanding artefacts will however enable the nature philosopher through analogy understand nature. “It is in this understanding that nature may be modelled from artefacts, for things we make are quite intelligible to us and so can cast light on nature that is less obvious to our intellects.”[6]

            Usually, the four factors of causal model are identified as Matter, Form, Agent and End. In some way, causes as we know them in relation to artefacts correspond to these factors as material, formal, efficient, and final causes respectively. In any case, whether or not we should or should not explicitly add the causes to these factors, anything to which they are applied gives us an explanation of what that thing is, for each of the factors explains the reason behind how the things to which they are applied happened to be the way they are. This makes them principles. Principles used to understanding entities in the order of becoming and in the order of being as well. Again, there are two parts to these factors, the internal and the external. In analysing a statue for instance, it is quite easy to apply the first two principles of matter and form. These two principles are internal, thus when applied, they explain to the nature philosopher the internal causes or rather the structure in the order of being of that thing which in this case is a statue, the matter is bronze, and the form the shape imposed on the bronze, probably the head of some past hero. The other two principles as it were deals more with external factors; they explain mainly the how and the why of the statue. The how is the agent, the blacksmith, and the why is the goal, the end for which the statue was made, which could be to make income, or to decorate a place or some other thing. The external principles deal more with issue regarding the order of becoming than the order of being.

The nature philosopher finds in the explanatory model meaning to nature. The causal model when applied to things, gives clarification as to the understanding of nature.

4.1.3    Chance Events

The major characteristic of contingencies/chance is that, by their very nature, they cannot be defined, or as it were conditional solely in terms of the properties of things within the context in question. To bring out more clearly in detail what we mean by chance we may consider a typical chance event as presented by David Bohm in his book Causality and Chance in modern physics.

Now it is evident that just where, when and how a particular accident takes place depend on an enormous number of factors, a slight change of any one of which could greatly change the character of the accident or even avoid it altogether. For example, in a collision of two cars, if one of the motorists had started out 10 seconds earlier or 10 seconds later, or stopped to buy cigarettes, or slow down to avoid a cat that happened to cross the road, or for any one of an unlimited number of similar reason, this particular accident would not have happened; while even a slightest different turn of the steering wheel might have changed its character completely, either for the better or for the worst.[7]

            In every field, we find the behaviour above in very wide range. This ranges from irregularities, fluctuations, variations in the behaviour of individuals, objects, events and nature, the detail of which are not predictable within the particular context of discussion in this paper.

5.1       Conclusion

In the above discussion, we have been able to get a clear picture of Aristotle’s explanations on what “cause” and “chance” really are. Similarly, we have also discussed briefly the modern implication of these two positions of causes and chance trying to identify in what way they are relevant to us today.

            The whole idea of causes is the result of reflections on motion. It was in trying to explain changes in things that Aristotle applied the causes to give us a rational explanation to motion. The material, formal, efficient and final causes, has proved very helpful in analysing changes in our world. It is indubitably true that many areas of human endeavours have applied this principle in their various disciplines with no exception of the philosopher of nature. In philosophy of nature as we have mentioned, the causes are seen as a model which modern nature philosopher uses to explain and find answers to the issues bordering on nature as it concerns our today’s world.

           

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[1] David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1987). pg. 2

[2] Cf. D.J.B Hawkins, Causality and Implication. (London:.Sheed and Ward 1937). pg. 17

[3] Cf. Hippocrtaes G. Apostle and Lloyd P. Gerson, Aristotle Selected Works. (Ginnell, Iowa: The Peripatetic Press 1982)pg.185

[4] Ibid. pg.186

[5] William Wallace, The Modeling of Nature. (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 1996). pg. 6

[6] William Wallace, The Modeling of Nature. (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press 1996). pg. 6

[7] David Bohm, Causality and Chance in Modern Physics. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1987). Pg. 21