BERTRAND RUSSELL’S THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS

BERTRAND RUSSELL’S THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS

            Bertrand Russell’s theory of descriptions demonstrates an attempt to correctively react to the flaws inherent in Alexius Meinong’s theory of objects, in which whatever can be conceived and talked about is considered something real. The theory of descriptions has been generally an interesting subject in the philosophy of language. Ordinarily, language aids us in offering appropriate descriptions. It is supposed to report facts, state of affairs and phenomena in general. Proceeding from this point, we see that in giving descriptions, naming is important. Naming, according to John Locke, enables us to demarcate explicatively different objects. We differentiate a mango tree from a palm tree by giving them names. From Frege, we began to see names as descriptions or descriptions as names. Descriptions that have reference are said to name what they refer. Ever since the time of Frege, the question of descriptions has been controversial. The height of its controversy is associated with the Russellian treatment of this subject.

Russell, in his theory of descriptions, talked about definite and indefinite descriptions. The primary focus of his theory of descriptions is on the anomaly of improper reference. This however affects his entire theory of meaning. For Bertrand Russell, we have two sorts of descriptions. The first is definite description of the sort ‘the so-and-so’. The second description is called indefinite or ambiguous description of the sort ‘a so-and-so’. The distinguishing marks are that in the first, the definite article ‘the’ is used while in the second, the indefinite article ‘a’ is used. If I say ‘a certain man accosted me on the way’, I am not specific and definite about the person that accosted me, but when I say ‘the man in blue shirt accosted me’, I am definite and specific. The problem with indefinite descriptions is that they are ambiguous and confusing in matters of reference. There is a difference between casual and authentic expression of a sentence. Mere expression of the so-and-so does not refer necessarily, but the active expression necessarily refers to an object indicated either by pointing or specifying the reality of the object referred to.

Bertrand Russell discovered that albeit every definite description gives the impression that it refers, not every definite description actually refers. When one says, ‘the present queen of Nigeria’, any person not at home with the political system in Nigeria will believe that Nigeria has a queen because of the use of the definite article ‘the’. It is taken for granted that nobody who knows the rule governing the use of the definite article ‘the’ will use it in a sentence, and for an entity that does not exist. But, in our use of language, Russell draws our attention to the fact that there are many suppositions, making it necessary to scrutinize every sentence of the definite description, in order to ascertain whether they actually refer or are misleading statements masquerading as properly referring statements.

In order to take care of such misleading statements, Russell opines that all descriptions of ‘the so-and-so’ should be done away with. The only properly referring terms are what he calls logically proper names, that is, the indexicals or pronouns. This is because, for him, these indexicals are used in such a way as to indicate what is being referred to. Russell argues that since names are about persons, things, place and so on, they are disguised descriptions, and like most descriptions, are susceptible to the same pitfalls of being ambiguous and misleading.

While people like Meinong think that merely conceiving abstract entities like Unicorn is capable of conferring existence on them, Russell thinks this is only a dubious way of using the term ‘existence’. According to Russell, a ‘unicorn’ is an indefinite description which describes nothing, and as such, has no meaning in the context of reality. Though a significant statement could be made using unicorn, unicorn does not by that fact constitute part of the reality of the statement. Things do not just become real by being incorporated into a significant statement.

Russell’s theory of definite descriptions therefore refers to the use of the definite article ‘the’ in our expressions. ‘The’ connotes definiteness but does not guarantee existence. How then do we take care of the problem of using the definite article in expressions that actually do not refer? Is it through the application of certain verifiability criteria or, as suggested in logic, through the employment of quantifiers? We have universal and existential quantifiers, (x) and (Ex) respectively. For Russell, universal quantifiers guarantee that there is something that exists to which we are attributing a given quality or describing or referring to in our expression. Whatever is in the world is a particular, definite and real. Names are symbols, which are supposed to directly designate these individual entities. When names fail to serve this function, they give rise to multiple problems and hinder meaning. A name is said not to be part of the fact asserted or of falsehood if our expression is false. It is rather part of the symbolism by which we express our thought. A name must name something and whatever name that does not name something, says Russell, is a false name.

Furthermore, Russell argues that the descriptions of ‘a so-and-so’ and ‘the so-and-so’ when analyzed will show whether the name names something. That means that every description tells us something about something. There must be the object of our reference if the description is to be significant. Russell, however, concludes that all descriptions, whether definite or indefinite (of the type “the present king of France is bald”) is not a name but a complex symbol. A name is a simple symbol. But then, there are names that feature as descriptions on their own. For example, when we ask whether Homer existed, we use Homer as an abbreviated description to refer to the author of the Iliad and the Odyssey. This is the case with all so-called proper names. This is why Russell opts for what he calls logically proper names.

On the whole, when a description asserts of a non-existent entity that it has a given quality, it is false because the subject does not exist. This is called primary utterance. But if we assert of a non-existent entity that it does not have a given quality, it is true because after all the subject does not exist in the first place and because it does not exist, everything about it is negative. This is called secondary utterance. For example, ‘the present king of France is bald’ and ‘the present king of France is not bald’: Russell, therefore, views with disgust the expression of any statement that does not contain reality. He sees it as offending that feeling for reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract studies.

CRITIQUES OF RUSSELL’S THEORY OF DESCRIPTIONS

            Peter F. Strawson is one key figure who attempted to show the untenability of Russell’s submissions. According to Strawson, Russell was wrong to think that the mere mentioning of a definite description is all there is in determining its meaning, reference and truth-value. Descriptions are put to different uses and it will be wrong to conclude that if an expression is meaningless in one aspect of its use, that it is for that reason meaningless whenever it is used. For instance, the pronoun ‘I’ as an expression that uniquely refers does not refer to anybody when it stands alone. It must be used in a sentence, and, in the sentence, it acquires its meaning and also refers properly. ‘I’ as an expression when used by different people carry different imports because of the dimension of utterance.

            Others like Keith Donnellan aver that Russell’s theory could be refuted by using what Donnellan calls the referential-attributive distinction. According to Donnellan, Russell’s theory of descriptions accords well with the referential but not with the attributive. Not every mentioning is referential. Some could be attributive. Attributive use is intentional while referential is supposed to be literal. We can attribute, that is assign meaning-reference depending on our intention. And in this case, mentioning is not referring.