EARLY AND LATER WITTGENSTEIN


Introduction

Ludwig Josef Johann Wittgenstein(1889 - 1951) was an Austrian philosopher and logician, and has come to be considered one of the 20th Century's most important philosophers, if not the most important.[1]Both his early and later work (which are entirely different and incompatible, even though both focus mainly on the valid and invalid uses of language) have been major influences in the development of Analytic Philosophy and Philosophy of Language. [2]His significance has been primarily in the areas of Logic, Metaphysics, Epistemology, the Philosophy of Mind, the Philosophy of Language and the Philosophy of Mathematics. However, his influence has extended beyond what is normally considered philosophy, and may be found in various areas of the social sciences (including social therapy, psychology, psychotherapy and anthropology) and the arts.[3]
By showing the application of modern logic to metaphysics, via language, he provided new insights into the relations between world, thought and language and thereby into the nature of philosophy. It is the later Wittgenstein, mostly recognized in the Philosophical Investigations, who took the more revolutionary step in critiquing all of traditional philosophy including its climax in his own early work. The nature of his new philosophy is heralded as anti-systematic through and through, yet still conducive to genuine philosophical understanding of traditional problems.[4] In this paper, we shall discuss in details, the life of Wittgenstein, his early and later work, similarities and differences between his early and later works, before giving a final conclusion.

Biographical Sketch


Wittgenstein was born on April 26, 1889 in Vienna, Austria. In 1908 he began his studies in aeronautical engineering at Manchester University where his interest in the philosophy of pure mathematics led him to Frege. In 1911 he went to Cambridge to study under Bertrand Russell.[5]
During his years in Cambridge, from 1911 to 1913, Wittgenstein conducted several conversations on philosophy and the foundations of logic with Russell, with whom he had an emotional and intense relationship, as well as with Moore and Keynes. He retreated to isolation in Norway, for months at a time, in order to ponder these philosophical problems and to work out their solutions. In 1913 he returned to Austria and in 1914, at the start of World War I (1914-1918), joined the Austrian army. He was taken captive in 1918 and spent the remaining months of the war at a prison camp. It was during the war that he wrote the notes and drafts of his first important work, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. After the war the book was published in German and translated into English.[6]
In 1920 Wittgenstein, now divorced from philosophy (having, to his mind, solved all philosophical problems in the Tractatus), gave away his part of his family’s fortune and pursued several ‘professions’ (gardener, teacher, architect, etc.) in and around Vienna. It was only in 1929 that he returned to Cambridge to resume his philosophical vocation, after having been exposed to discussions on the philosophy of mathematics and science with members of the Vienna Circle, whose conception of logical empiricism was indebted to his Tractatus account of logic as tautologous, and his philosophy as concerned with logical syntax. During these first years in Cambridge his conception of philosophy and its problems underwent dramatic changes that are recorded in several volumes of conversations, lecture notes, and letters (e.g., Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle, The Blue and Brown Books, Philosophical Grammar). this period heralds a rejection of dogmatic philosophy, including both traditional works and the Tractatus itself.[7]
In the 1930s and 1940s Wittgenstein conducted seminars at Cambridge, developing most of the ideas that he intended to publish in his second book, Philosophical Investigations. These included the turn from formal logic to ordinary language, novel reflections on psychology and mathematics, and a general skepticism concerning philosophy’s pretensions. For a few more years he continued his philosophical work, but this was marked by a rich development of, rather than a turn away from, his second phase. He traveled during this period to the United States and Ireland, and returned to Cambridge, where he was diagnosed with cancer. Legend has it that, at his death in 1951, his last words were “Tell them I’ve had a wonderful life”.[8]

Early work

Wittgenstein's work falls into two very distinct periods: an early period, culminating in the publication of his ground-breaking Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus in 1921; and a later period of largely unrelated (and indeed incompatible) work, which was written over many years but not published until two years after his death as "Philosophische Untersuchungen"("Philosophical Investigations").[9] These were major contributions to twenty century philosophy of language.
His early work on the foundations of Logic and his philosophy in general were deeply influenced by Arthur Schopenhauer and Immanuel Kant, as well as by the new systems of Logic put forward by Bertrand Russell and Gottlob Frege.
Clearly, tractatus addresses the central problems of philosophy which deal with the world, thought and language, and presents a ‘solution’ (as Wittgenstein terms it) of these problems that is grounded in logic and in the nature of representation.[10]
The "early" Wittgenstein worked closely with Russell and shared his conviction that the use of mathematical logic held great promise for an understanding of the world. In the tightly-structured declarations of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein tried to spell out precisely what a logically constructed language can (and cannot) be used to say. Its seven basic propositions simply state that language, thought, and reality share a common structure, fully expressible in logical terms.[11]
The "Tractatus" attempted to define the limits of Logic in understanding the world. It claimed that the world consists of independent atomic facts (existing states of affairs) out of which larger facts are built, an idea that later became known as Logical Atomism and was further developed by Bertrand Russell. Language too consists of atomic (and then larger-scale) propositions that correspond to the facts of the world by sharing the same "logical form".[12]
the world consists entirely of facts. Human beings are aware of the facts by virtue of our mental representations or thoughts, which are most fruitfully understood as picturing the way things are. These thoughts are, in turn, expressed in propositions, whose form indicates the position of these facts within the nature of reality as a whole and whose content presents the truth-conditions under which they correspond to that reality.[13]
Wittgenstein argued for a representational theory of language. He described this as a ‘picture theory’ of language: reality (‘the world’) is a vast collection of facts that we can picture in language, assuming that our language has an adequate logical form. ‘The world is the totality of facts, not of things’, Wittgenstein claimed, and these facts are structured in a logical way.[14] Wittgenstein understood language to be akin to the "picture-theory" of composition. In other words, words are symbolic to some physical thing in the world and there is a strict correspondence between words and the objects they represent. [15]
language is meaningful because its logical form mirrors the logical form of reality. The relationship between the words we use reflects the relationship between that which the words describe — between objects in the real world.[16]
The key to understanding the "Tractatus" is Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning. He drew an analogy between the way that pictures represent the world and the way that language (and sentences it is made up of) represent reality and states of affairs, and he asserted that thoughts, as expressed in language, "picture" the facts of the world. Furthermore, the structure of language is determined by the structure of reality, and we are able to talk about reality not just because we have words that stand for things, but because the words within a sentence have a relationship to each other that corresponds to the relationship things have to each other in the world. Indeed, Wittgenstein claimed that, unless language mirrored reality in this way, it would be impossible for sentences to have any meaning.[17]
Propositions correspond to the world and reality. For instance one would say, "There is a black wooden table outside" this statement would picture a black wooden table which is outside at this present moment. The names within the sentence picture actual objects in the world and the whole statement pictures reality as it is. According to Wittgenstein they are the facts which make up the world, not things, and these facts are state of affaires. He believes that the state of affairs determines the proposition and that the proposition is a picture of what reality really is. By analyzing the picture-proposition one can derive meaning from reality. Wittgenstein's so-called picture theory of language brings the thought that there is a strong connection between sense and verification.  Words in a sentence only make sense in relation to the whole sentence and the context itself. For Wittgenstein all propositions are either true or false and he is trying to show what can be correctly stated as meaningful language. He says that values, ethics, and religious claims are not in the world. "Ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental".[18]


Later work

By the time Wittgenstein returned to Cambridge in 1928, however, he had begun to question the truth of his earlier pronouncements.[19] Wittgenstein became increasingly dissatisfied with his account of the way language operates, discovering more and more different types of sentences that didn't seem to work in the way assumed in his picture theory.[20]
Wittgenstein’s shift in thinking, between the Tractatus and the Investigations, maps the general shift in 20th century philosophy from logical positivism to behaviourism and pragmatism. It is a shift from seeing language as a fixed structure imposed upon the world to seeing it as a fluid structure that is intimately bound up with our everyday practices and forms of life. Wittgenstein adjusted his previous view that language could be reduced to its most basic parts, and instead said that language was a relationship. Language, for Wittgenstein, was an active force, that bonded people to one another. [21]
For later Wittgenstein, creating meaningful statements is not a matter of mapping the logical form of the world. It is a matter of using conventionally-defined terms within ‘language games’ that we play out in the course of everyday life. ‘In most cases, the meaning of a word is its use’, Wittgenstein claimed, in perhaps the most famous passage in the Investigations. It isn’t what you say, it’s the way that you say it, and the context in which you say it. Words are how you use them.[22] Communication, on this model, involves using conventional terms in a way that is recognized by a linguistic community.
Language for Wittgenstein is just language-games, thus the only way to understand language is to understand its language game. Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of language is defined on how it is used in any particular language-game. However the use of a word, is not given to any sort of constructive theory building, as in the Tractatus. Rather, when investigating meaning, the philosopher must "look and see" the variety of uses to which the word is put and such looking is done with reference to particular cases, not thoughtful generalizations. "The meaning of a word is its use in the language". For instance the word materialism has two different meanings in different language-games. In metaphysics it means that the basic substance of reality is completely material, but in political theory and economics, materialism is defined as the obsession with wealth and material things such as money, homes or cars. The understanding and meaning is different in each situation, thus one needs to understand the meaning of the word in its context.[23]
Wittgenstein’s view of language as social practice is instructive for anyone who seeks to communicate clearly and effectively. Writers and communicators are always told to think about the audience that they are speaking to and to craft their communiques accordingly. Wittgenstein’s philosophy pushes this point of view beyond linguistics into ethnography. In order to communicate with a social tribe, listen to how they play with language. In many cases, slang, banter, and jokes are not poorly structured ‘secondary’ forms of communication, but a coded means of crafting pointed exchanges within a community.[24]

Wittgenstein’s work can be summarized as follows:

Early work
  • Univocity for each word
  • Picture theory of meaning with an assumption of isomorphism
  • Essentialism, Universal grammar, Logical structure behind all language and the world
  • Referential understanding of language
  • Prescriptive orientation: need to reform language[25]

Later work
  • Equivocity of most words
  • Language games that connect words with activities
  • Non-essentialism/functionalism, Family resemblances, Rejection of the Socratic notion of universal definition and forms
  • Functional understanding of language
  • Descriptive orientation: accept language as it is[26]

Similarities of the earlier and later work.


Wittgenstein maintains in all his early and later works that philosophy is an activity of clarifying propositions and preventing us from being led off track by the misleading appearances of ordinary language. His view of language-games seems to completely go against the logical positivist's view of language. He preferred ordinary language over philosophical language because philosophical language in itself creates problems of definitions. [27] He discussed language in his earlier and later work.

Differences of Wittgenstein earlier and later work

Wittgenstein was not referring to ordinary everyday conversational language, in his early work but to the "elementary sentences" which underlie ordinary language, and which can be distilled out of everyday language by analysis. Thus, Wittgenstein claimed that we can analyze our thoughts and sentences to "express" (in the sense of "show", not "say") their true logical form, but those we cannot so analyze cannot be meaningfully discussed, and so should not even be spoken of. He believed that the whole of philosophy essentially consists of no more than this form of analysis, and that non-factual concepts such as those in the fields of Ethics, Religion and Aesthetics were effectively unsayable and meaningless.[28]
In the "Philosophical Investigations", Wittgenstein moved away from the picture analogy and towards a "tool" or "use" analogy. He claimed that words should be thought of as tools and that, in most cases at least, the meaning of a word is just its use in the language. Thus, completely contrary to the picture theory of meaning, the structure of language determines what we think of as reality. Also, although a picture can only give one representation of reality, a tool can have many different uses (and so, therefore, can words, particularly when used in different circumstances or in different types of conversation). He likened the various different meanings a word could have to family resemblances, which can have common features, criss-crossing similarities or overlapping relationships but nevertheless remain distinct and unique.[29]

Conclusion

From the discussion so far, it is obvious that the difference between the earlier and later Wittgenstein, lies in the method employed to clarify propositions. The earlier method of philosophy was to analyze propositions in order to reveal their hidden logical structure, however the later Wittgenstein, while still maintaining that the task of philosophy is to critique language, and states that the method to clarify propositions is to show how they are applied in language games. This later method is concerned with the grammar of language and how language is used; it has nothing to do with criticizing the nature of language. [30]

Reference

Block, Irving (ed.), 1981, Perspectives on the Philosophy of Wittgenstein, Oxford: Blackwell
Hacker, P. M. S., 1996, Wittgenstein’s Place in Twentieth-century Analytic Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell.
Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations Recorded by Friedrich Waismann (VC), 1979, B. F. McGuinness (ed.), Oxford: Blackwell.
Ludwig Wittgenstein: Public and Private Occasions, 2003, J. Klagge and A. Nordmann (eds.), Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
Malcolm, N., 1958, Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Philosophical Investigations , 1953, G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees (eds.), G.E.M. Anscombe (trans.), Oxford: Blackwell.
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (TLP), 1922, C. K. Ogden (trans.), London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Originally published as “Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung”, in Annalen der Naturphilosophische, XIV (3/4), 1921.
Biletzki, Anat and Matar, Anat, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
Garth Kemerling, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Analysis of Language. http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/6s.htm, 2011
http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/wcgay/plearlylatewitt.htm
Luke Mastin, The Basics of Philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein. www.philosopybasics.com/philosophers_wittgenstein.html
Oneguy2008, Ask philosophy. 2015 https://www.google.com.ng/amp/s/amp.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/2zo9so/explain_to_me_like_the_difference_between_late/
Reverendlovejoy25, Answers Home. https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20071126085616AAWCJKn
Timrayner, Philosophy for change https://www.google.com.ng/amp/s/philosophyforchange.wordpress.com/2014/03/11/meaning-is-use-wittgenstein-on-the-limits-of-language/amp/
Uk Essays, 2015. https://www.ukessays.com/essays/philosophy/compare-and-contrast-wittgenstein-early-and-later-conception-philosophy-essay.php


[1] Luke Mastin, The Basics of Philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein. www.philosopybasics.com/philosophers_wittgenstein.html
[2] Ibid.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Biletzki, Anat and Matar, Anat, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
[5] Biletzki, Anat and Matar, Anat, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
[6] Ibid.
[7] ibid
[8] Biletzki, Anat and Matar, Anat, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
[9] Luke Mastin, The Basics of Philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein. www.philosopybasics.com/philosophers_wittgenstein.html
[10] Biletzki, Anat and Matar, Anat, “Ludwig Wittgenstein”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2016 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
[11] Garth Kemerling, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Analysis of Language. http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/6s.htm, 2011
[12] Luke Mastin, The Basics of Philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein. www.philosopybasics.com/philosophers_wittgenstein.html
[13] Garth Kemerling, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Analysis of Language. http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/6s.htm, 2011
[14] Timrayner, Philosophy for change. https://www.google.com.ng/amp/s/philosophyforchange.wordpress.com/2014/03/11/meaning-is-use-wittgenstein-on-the-limits-of-language/amp/
[15] Reverendlovejoy25, Answers Home. https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20071126085616AAWCJKn
[16] Oneguy2008, Ask philosophy. 2015 https://www.google.com.ng/amp/s/amp.reddit.com/r/askphilosophy/comments/2zo9so/explain_to_me_like_the_difference_between_late/
[17] Luke Mastin, The Basics of Philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein. www.philosopybasics.com/philosophers_wittgenstein.html
[18] Uk Essays, 2015. https://www.ukessays.com/essays/philosophy/compare-and-contrast-wittgenstein-early-and-later-conception-philosophy-essay.php
[19] Garth Kemerling, Ludwig Wittgenstein: Analysis of Language. http://www.philosophypages.com/hy/6s.htm, 2011
[20] Uk Essays, 2015. https://www.ukessays.com/essays/philosophy/compare-and-contrast-wittgenstein-early-and-later-conception-philosophy-essay.php
[21] Reverendlovejoy25, Answers Home. https://answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20071126085616AAWCJKn
[22] Timrayner, Philosophy for change https://www.google.com.ng/amp/s/philosophyforchange.wordpress.com/2014/03/11/meaning-is-use-wittgenstein-on-the-limits-of-language/amp/
[23] Uk Essays, 2015. https://www.ukessays.com/essays/philosophy/compare-and-contrast-wittgenstein-early-and-later-conception-philosophy-essay.php
[24] Timrayner, Philosophy for change https://www.google.com.ng/amp/s/philosophyforchange.wordpress.com/2014/03/11/meaning-is-use-wittgenstein-on-the-limits-of-language/amp/
[25] http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/wcgay/plearlylatewitt.htm
[26] http://www.philosophy.uncc.edu/wcgay/plearlylatewitt.htm
[27] Uk Essays, 2015. https://www.ukessays.com/essays/philosophy/compare-and-contrast-wittgenstein-early-and-later-conception-philosophy-essay.php
[28] Luke Mastin, The Basics of Philosophy, Ludwig Wittgenstein. www.philosopybasics.com/philosophers_wittgenstein.html
[29] Ibid.
[30] Uk Essays, 2015. https://www.ukessays.com/essays/philosophy/compare-and-contrast-wittgenstein-early-and-later-conception-philosophy-essay.php

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