metaphysics

Irrefragably, physics is an empirical science that seeks to explain certain basic and ubiquitous phenomena in the natural world, that is, in the realm of things that exist in spatio-temporal quantifications. To explain these perceptible phenomena, physics appeals to putative causal laws, for example, the law of electromagnetism (which causally explains the motion of electrically charged objects) and to the law of gravitation (which causally explains the motion of passive objects).

While the concerns of metaphysics and physics converge in that they are concerned with the nature of things that exist in space and time and with causation, they also diverge in the following respects:

Ø  Metaphysics is not an empirical science.

Ø  Metaphysics is concerned not only with the nature of things that exist in spatio-temporal regions, but also with the nature of things that might not exist in space and time. For instance, metaphysics is concerned with the nature of so-called abstract entities, entities such as numbers, sets, and propositions.

Ø  Even when metaphysics is concerned about the nature of things that exist in space and time, these things need not be a part of the proper subject-matter of metaphysics (as it is in physics). For example, metaphysics (but not physics) is concerned with the nature of persons, with the nature of minds, and with the nature of social or political groups.

From all of the above, metaphysics is a non-empirical enterprise that is concerned with, among other things, causation, the nature of abstract objects, the nature of persons and minds, and the nature of social or political groups.

Along these lines, as Lowe says, metaphysics has its central concern ‘the fundamental structure of reality as a whole.’ Its investigations are hence not confined or circumscribed to the realm of living things (as are biologys’ investigations) or to the realm of mental states (as are psychology’s) or even to the realm of the physical (as are physics’). Metaphysical investigations are constrained only by the shape of reality as whole, and not by the shape of any particular part of reality. This predisposes metaphysics to the achievement of an objective view of other disciplines- to step outside of them, as it were- in order to investigate the relationships between those other disciplines. For example, metaphysics seems to be in a good position to determine whether the subject-matter of one discipline, say biology, is properly subsumed under that of another, say, physics. In fact, by asking such questions as the relationships between disciplines with purportedly different subject-matters, we are doing metaphysics. At this juncture, let us be reminded of this conception of metaphysics,

“Metaphysics is an enterprise whose central concern is the fundamental structure of reality as a whole, and whose investigations are constrained only by the shape of reality as a whole and not by the shape of any particular part of reality.”

The Legitimacy and Worthwhileness of the Metaphysical Enterprise

Firstly, a faction of scholars aver that the legitimacy of metaphysics rests on a controversial thesis that truth is as Lowe puts it, ‘single and indivisible.’ In other words, that truth is universal, and non-relative. Another faction denies this thesis by maintaining that what is true for one culture or historical epoch might not be true for another. Again, that different cultures and historical epochs might have, or find themselves in, different and even incommensurable realities. The legitimacy of metaphysics is precisely found here, namely, that this sort of disagreement is metaphysical one: because, to have this sort of dispute is to have a dispute over the fundamental nature of reality. Prior to the settlement of the dispute, the very emergence of the dispute presents us with the very fact that we are even doing metaphysics and as such, metaphysics is both legitimate and worthwhile.

 Secondly, some say that the legitimacy of metaphysics is undermined by Quine’s proposal of naturalized Epistemology. According to the submissions of naturalized epistemology, knowledge (including metaphysical knowledge) must be compatible with our status as natural creatures. And as such, any inquiry into the nature of knowledge must be a part of a more general natural scientific- hence, empirical- inquiry into our cognitive capacities. Perhaps, as the proponents of this might think, there is no room for metaphysical knowledge here, inasmuch as, metaphysical knowledge is acquired via purportedly non-empirical knowledge, and, such knowledge is incompatible with our status as natural creatures. However, aside the fact that the correctness (and even legitimacy) of naturalized epistemology is itself controversial, the preceding controversy is itself a metaphysical one. Because, this sort of dispute is ultimately a dispute about the fundamental nature of reality which is metaphysical. Hence, metaphysics is both legitimate and worthwhile.

How then do we acquire Metaphysical knowledge?

This question is given rise to by the debate surrounding naturalized epistemology. This is how metaphysical knowledge can possible be acquired.

Stage 1: Hypothesizing

We might begin by reflecting on the concept of a number for instance. This reflection might involve, at some point, our having a certain intuition, for example, that numbers are abstract entities- they exist, but not in space and time like trees and rocks. It might also involve our arriving at the same idea through a process of reasoning.

Stage 2: Experimenting and Confirming

Our idea, no matter how we arrive at it, is then scrutinized. One defends the idea, or criticizes it, with arguments meant to show that the idea coheres nicely, or fails to cohere, with other, perhaps, less controversial ideas. The idea, if it survives this initial round of scrutiny, can (and, if philosophers have nothing to say about it, will) be subjected to further scrutiny. If the idea holds up, we have reason to then think it is true.