THE CONCEPT OF FREE WILL IN THOMAS AQUINAS
Introduction
The basic problem
of free will centres on the notion of moral responsibility. Bob Doyle puts it
better when he opines that the problem of free will has been intimately
connected with the question of moral responsibility.[1] we think of people as
morally responsible for what they do freely; and we do not blame them for the
things they were forced or coerced to do. We can only be morally responsible
for what we do freely from our own choice. In this paper, we shall discuss in details,
the concept of free will in Thomas Aquinas, to achieve that, we shall give a
general background of free will, its historical development, Aquinas discuss of
free will, before we give a final conclusion.
Free will
Free will has been
conceived as the ability of a rational being to exercise his own volition and
intention among various alternatives.[2] This suggests the freedom
of choice. In this vein, free will is the ability to choose between different
possible courses of action.[3] Most of the ancient Greek
thinkers hold that free will is an ability characterizing man in the voluntary activity
of choosing or not choosing a limited good when it is presented to him. It is
the basis for asserting man’s unique dignity among other creatures, as well as
for maintaining that he is a person.[4] Additionally, Mark
Pontifex opines that “the human person is often called free in the sense that
he is said to be able to choose between two or more courses of action without
being forced to choose one or the other by anything except his own will.”[5] The concept of Free will
is closely linked to the concepts of responsibility, praise, guilt, sin and
other judgments which apply only to actions that are freely chosen.
Historical Development Of Freewill
Free
will is a notion inherited from antiquity. The Greeks generally believed that
inanimate things, as well as human beings and the gods themselves, were subject
to fates.[6] But these thinkers did not
attempt to change the order of things. They sought to live in harmony with the
rest of the universe. In this period, freedom was viewed more in a political
than in a metaphysical perspective. The free man was one who could participate
in the political order, and unlike the slave, was not ruled by someone as an
inferior or sub-human to the ruler. Nevertheless, among these ancient
positions, certain philosophies contained some suggestion of human free choice.
It was with Socrates that the Greek notion of human freedom shifted
emphatically from a political concept to the psychological notion of individual
subjective freedom.[7]
Socrates stress the need for internal self-control.[8] For Socrates, no man does
evil knowingly, and since man’s future depends upon what he knows, man must
possess some degree of freedom.[9] Aristotle stresses that
although we have a natural capacity for right behaviour, we do not act rightly
by nature.[10]
He believed that, our life consists of an indeterminate number of
possibilities. Goodness is in us potentially. But unlike Socrates and Plato,
who thought that to know the good was sufficient to do what is good, Aristotle
argues that there must be a deliberate choice in addition to knowledge. Thus,
there cannot be right choice without reason.[11] So, by virtue of our
rational power, the human person is capable of willing freely as well as making
a choice.[12]
With the introduction of Christianity into
the mainstream of western thought, the problem of free will came to be studied
in detail. It is interesting to know that two teachings of the Christian
religion influenced this development: Firstly, that man was created by God and
commanded to obey a divine moral law: at the same time, he was promised an
eternal reward or punishment. But reward or punishment implies that a man has
free choice, for otherwise such sanctions are meaningless. Secondly, that man incurred
original sin and, as a result, needed redemption by grace.[13] Writers like Augustine,
Aquinas and others made their own remarkable contributions to the problem of
free will. Thus, with them, free will assumes a theological dimension.
Augustine,
in his discourse on free will, states that human beings have absolute power and
autonomous control over their will. No one, unwelcomed, can usurp man’s power
over his own will.[14] “man have will-power over
his will”;[15]
and “there is nothing so completely in our power as the will itself.”[16]
Thomas Concept of
Will
Thomas Aquinas
defined the will as a rational appetite, that is, a desire consequently to
knowledge, and what directs the will is the reason which is the formal cause of
willing.[17]
For the will to move, there must be an aim or rationale behind it. The will
does not just move, rather it is moved by something, which is an object
specified to it by the mind. Once the mind specifies an object for will which
is something good, fulfilling and perfective, the will desires it. In other
words, the will always desires that which is good fulfilling and perfective.
The will cannot will goodness itself, if the mind know an object that realize
perfectly the notion of Goodness, the will would necessarily love that object.[18] In other words, Aquinas
is of the view that man wills by necessity.
Does a man have free
choice in his actions or does he choose necessarily?
Thomas presented twenty four arguments that seems that
man chooses necessarily and not freely. We shall only discuss ten of it.
Firstly, Thomas
made reference to the book of Jeremiah 10:23, which said “the way of a man is
not his, neither is it in a man to walk and direct his steps”. With the above
quotation from Jeremiah he concluded by saying; “it seems that man actually
doesn’t have free choice of his way or of his acts”.[19] Secondly, Thomas said
that Man is moved by something inside him, an inner instinct which is more
powerful than him, which directs his wills and his ways, and that this inner
instinct, is God himself. He therefore concluded that man cannot be said to
have free choice in his actions because he is being moved to act by something
inside him. [20]
Thirdly, Thomas mentioned that Man contributes nothing to his actions, because
the cause of his actions is external, and what is acted upon contributes
nothing. With this, he drew a conclusion, saying, “it therefore seems that the
will is moved by violence and necessity, therefore, it does not have free
choice of its act”.[21] Fourthly, Thomas made
reference to St Augustine, where he said, “it is impossible for man’s will to
be out of harmony with God’s will; either man does what God wills or God
fulfils his will concerning him, which implies that, all human choices proceed
from an unchangeable choice. [22] Fifthly, he stated that
the will is necessarily moved by the appetite, the appetite moves the will. In
other words the appetite is the mover and the will, the moved, and so, man is
not free to will, or not to will. Man does not have power over his will. Sixthly,
Thomas said that the will desires that which the mind specify to it, which is
something good, fulfilling and perfective, and that object becomes the end for
which the will is moved to. Thereby, to attain it, it would seem to be
necessarily moved to those things which are for the end.[23] Seventhly, he stated
that, the good is in the thing and the true the intention, and thus the good
has more character of a mover than does the will, therefore the good
necessarily moves the will.[24] Eighthly, Thomas
mentioned that Nothing can move itself by itself, that is Nothing can be the
cause of its being moved, therefore the will cannot move itself, but is
necessarily moved by another. The will is moved by another and whatever is
willed by another receives necessity from that other. He concluded, saying that
the the will wills necessarily and not freely.[25] Ninthly, he stated;
“Multiform is reduced to the uniform. The human acts are various and of many
forms, therefore they should be reduced to the uniform movement of the heaven
as to their cause. But whatever is caused by the movement of the heavens comes
about necessarily, because a natural cause will produce its effect necessarily
unless something impedes it. But nothing can impede the movement of a celestial
body such that its effect would not be produced, since the acts of the impeding
cause would itself have to be reduced back to some celestial principle as its
cause”. This implies that everything can be reduced to the uniform movement of
the heaven as its cause, Therefore the human movements comes about necessarily,
not from free choice.[26] Tenthly, Thomas Aquinas
said that when one has free choice, he does what he wishes and does not do
otherwise; He who does what he does not wish to do, does not have free choice.
Man according to Romans 8:16, does what he does not will,” The evil that I
hate, I do”. Therefore a man does not have free choice in his actions.[27]
Thomas concept of
Freewill
Thomas
Aquinas in his Summa presented arguments to show that man has freedom of
choice. Firstly, he made reference to Ecclesiasticus 15:14, where it is said
that God made man from the beginning,
and left him in the hand of his own counsel, with this he thereby concluded
that man has free choice of his action.[28] Secondly, he made
reference to the philosopher in ethics 3, “a man is lord of his acts and he has
it in him to act and not to act”, which implies that man can decide to act or
not to act. He has the power and capacity to make his decision and go by it.
Man has free choice in his acts.[29]
In respect to exercise of the will, he
said that the will is moved by itself, for just as it moves other powers, so
does it move itself. So by the fact that a man actually wills something, he moves
himself actually to will something else; for example, because he wills health,
he moves himself to want to take his medicine. For the fact that he wants
health, he begins to deliberate about what health requires and having fixed on
it by deliberation; he wants to take the medicine. Thomas quoting the
philosopher on the soul said that it is impossible that the power of a
celestial body should move the will directly. This implies that the will is not
directly moved by the celestial body, but by other things which may be as a
result of the actions of the celestial body.[30] Thomas, stated,” as
Aristotle concludes in the chapter on good fortune, that what first moves the
will and intellect is something above the will and intellect, namely; God, who
since he moves everything in a way appropriate to what is moved, as the light
upward and the heavy downward, moves the will too according to its condition,
not by necessity, but as relating indeterminately to many”. Therefore it is
evident that if the movement of will be considered on the side of the exercise
of its act, it is not moved necessarily. This implies that God has giving man
many choices and man can decide out of his own free will to make his choice.
The movement of the will according to what
is offered to it can come in three ways; Firstly, when one aspect is more
important or paramount, then the will is moved according to reason. for
example, when a man chooses that which is useful to health because it is useful
for pleasure. Secondly, insofar as it thinks of one particular circumstance and
not another, and this often happens because something occasions the thought
either from within or without. Thirdly, from a man’s disposition, because, as a
person is, so does the end appear to him. Hence the will of an angry man is
differently moved to something, than is a calm man’s, because the same thing is
not suitable to both. So then, with respect to some things the will is
necessarily moved on the side of the object, but not with respect to
everything, but on the side of exercise of its act it is not moved necessarily. [31]
Furthermore, Thomas said that man’s will
is discordant with the will of God, because, as it wills something that God
does not want it to will, as when it wills to sin; though God does not want the
will to will this, but if it does wills it, God brings it about, for whatever
it wills the lord does.[32]
Finally, Thomas Aquinas stated that not every
cause brings about its effect with necessity, even if it is an efficient cause,
because a cause can be impeded so that sometimes its effect does not follow.
For example, natural causes, which do not produce their effects with necessity
but only for the most part, because they can sometimes be impeded. Therefore,
the cause that makes the will to will something, need not do this with
necessity, because the will can raise an impediment to it, either by putting
aside the consideration which induces it to will or by considering the
opposite, namely, that which is propose as good is in some respects not good.
Conclusion
Man has free-will:
otherwise counsels, exhortations, commands, prohibitions, rewards and
punishments would be in vain. man acts from judgment, because by his
apprehensive power he judges that something should be avoided or sought. But
because this judgment, in the case of some particular act, is not from a
natural instinct, but from some act of comparism in the reason, therefore he acts
from free judgment and retains the power of being inclined to various things.[33] Aquinas holds that in a
person, the will, in collaboration with the power of reason, consummates the
human act; and that an act is human only when it is free. Thus, for him, freedom
is possible only where there is knowledge of alternatives and the power of the
will to make choices.[34]
REFERENCE
Aristotle,
the Nicomachean Ethics, in Tom Griffith (ed.) (London: Wordsworth Edition Limited,
1996), Bk. 1.
Augustine,
De Libero Arbitrio.
Bob
Dolye, free will: scandal in philosophy (Cambridge:i-phi press, 2011).
Thomas
Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1.
Joseph
M. Boyle, Germain Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, Free choice: A self-Referential
Argument (London: university of Notre Dame press, 1976).
Mark
Pontifex, Freedom and Providence (New
York: Hawthorn Books Publishers, 1960).
Nolan,
“free will” (ed.), New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. VI, 1967 edition. New York:
McGRAW-Hill Book Company.
Samuel
E. Stumpf, philosophy: History and Problem,
Fifth Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994).
Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998).
Timothy
O’Connor, Free Will, the standard encyclopedia of philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/freewill/.
[1] Cf. Bob Dolye, free will: scandal
in philosophy (Cambridge:i-phi press, 2011), p. 153
[2] Cf. Timothy O’Connor, Free Will,
the standard encyclopedia of philosophy,
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/freewill/.
[3] Cf. Joseph M. Boyle, Germain
Grisez, and Olaf Tollefsen, Free choice: A self-Referential Argument (London:
university of Notre Dame press, 1976), p. 12.
[4] Cf. p. Nolan, “free will” (ed.),
New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. VI, 1967 edition. New York: McGRAW-Hill Book
Company. P. 89
[5] Mark Pontifex, Freedom and Providence (New York:
Hawthorn Books Publishers, 1960), p.12
[6] Cf. p. Nolan, “free will” (ed.),
New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. VI, 1967 edition. New York: McGRAW-Hill Book
Company. P. 89
[7] Cf. p. Nolan, “free will” (ed.),
New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. VI, 1967 edition. New York: McGRAW-Hill Book
Company. P. 89
[8] Cf. Samuel E. Stumpf, philosophy: History and Problem, Fifth
Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), p. 28
[9] Cf. Samuel E. Stumpf, philosophy: History and Problem, Fifth
Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), p. 42-43
[10] Cf. Samuel E. Stumpf, philosophy: History and Problem, Fifth
Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), p. 102
[11] Cf. Aristotle, the Nicomachean
Ethics, in Tom Griffith (ed.) (London: Wordsworth Edition Limited, 1996), Bk.
1, 1107a, 5.
[12] Cf. Samuel E. Stumpf, philosophy: History and Problem, Fifth
Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), p. 102
[13] Direct quotation Cf. p. Nolan,
“free will” (ed.), New Catholic Encyclopedia, vol. VI, 1967 edition. New York:
McGRAW-Hill Book Company. P. 89
[14] Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, II,
18, 48
[15] Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, II,
14, 37
[16] Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio,
III, 8
[17] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 22.
[18] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 22.
[19]Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 552, no. 1.
[20]Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 552, no. 3.
[21] Cf.
Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on
human choice. disputed question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 552, no. 3.
[22] Cf.
Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on
human choice. disputed question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 552, no. 5.
[23] Cf.
Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on
human choice. disputed question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 552, no. 7.
[24] Cf.
Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on
human choice. disputed question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 554, no. 12.
[25]Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 555, no. 20.
[26] Cf.
Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on
human choice. disputed question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 555, no. 21.
[28]Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 556, no 1.
[29]Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 556, no. 3.
[30]Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 559.
[31]Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 560
[32]Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed
question on evil, 6.(penguin books 1998) p. 561
[33] Direct quotation. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, 1, q. 83. a. 1.
[34] Cf. Samuel E. Stumpf, philosophy: History and Problem, Fifth
Edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1994), p. 190-198
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