THE RIGHT TO SELF TERMINATION
Introduction
Throughout history, suicide has evoked an astonishingly
wide range of reactions—bafflement, dismissal, heroic glorification, sympathy,
anger, moral or religious condemnation—but it is never uncontroversial. Suicide
is now an object of multidisciplinary scientific study, with sociology,
anthropology, psychology, and psychiatry each providing important insights into
suicide. Nonetheless, many of the most controversial questions surrounding
suicide are philosophical. For philosophers, suicide raises a host of conceptual,
moral, and psychological questions. Among these questions are: What makes a
person’s behaviour suicidal? What motivates such behaviour? Is suicide morally
permissible, or even morally required in some extraordinary circumstances? Is
suicidal behaviour rational? [1]
This paper shall discuss in details, what suicide is, the historical reflection
of suicide, the different stands of various philosophers and schools of thought
regarding suicide, then will finally move to the primary article, the right of self-termination,
by Velleman, before giving a final conclusion.
Definition Of
Suicide
Suicide is the act of one taking his/her
own life, voluntarily and deliberately.[2] It is an action which the
doer does to bring about his/her own death.[3] Suicide is an attempt
to inflict death upon oneself and is intentional rather than
consequential in nature.[4]
The History Of
Reflection Of Suicide
The western record of discussion and
dispute about the morality of suicide began almost four millennia ago with a
rather personal dialogue between a man and his soul, a dialogue dating from the
middle kingdom of ancient Egypt. Writing on suicide continues with the early
Hebrew texts that record- without ethical comment- a handful of figures who
caused their own deaths, among them Samson (who pulled the temple down upon
himself, as well as the philistines), Saul, and Saul’s armour bearer. [5]
In a different culture, ancient Greece,
Socrates was of the view that we are put in a sort of guard post, from which we
must not release our self or run away. The gods are our keepers, and we are
their possessions. It is unreasonable that we put an end to ourselves until the
gods sends death.[6]
Plato developed a somewhat inchoate
classification of acceptable and unacceptable suicides, including those subject
to burial restrictions and those that were not. [7] Plato claimed that suicide
is disgraceful and its perpetrators should be solitary; they must have no companions
whatsoever in the tomb. Further, they must be buried ignominiously in a waste
and nameless spots, and the tomb shall be marked by neither headstone nor name. [8] Later, in the Laws,
He gave four exemptions:
·
when one’s mind is morally corrupted and
one’s character can therefore not be salvaged (Laws IX 854a3–5)[9]
·
when the self-killing is done by judicial
order, as in the case of Socrates
·
when the self-killing is compelled by
extreme and unavoidable personal misfortune
·
when the self-killing results from shame
at having participated in grossly unjust actions (Laws IX
873c-d).[10]
Suicide under these circumstances can be
excused, but, according to Plato, it is otherwise an act of cowardice or
laziness undertaken by individuals too delicate to manage life’s vicissitudes..[11]
Aristotle took suicide generally to damage
the state. Aristotle reinforced the platonic prohibition against suicide,
asserting that man belongs not to himself but to the gods and the state. In the
Nicomachean ethics, he writes:
The
law does not expressly permit suicide, and what it does not expressly permit it
forbids… he who through anger voluntarily stabs himself does this contrary to
the right rule of life, and this the law does not allow; therefore he is acting
unjustly. But towards whom? Surely towards the state, not towards himself. For
he suffers voluntarily, but no one is voluntarily treated unjustly. This is
also the reason why the state punishes; a certain loss of civil rights attaches
to the man who destroys himself, on the ground that he is treating the state
unjustly. [12]
Herodotus wrote:
"When life is so burdensome, death has become for man a sought-after
refuge". Schopenhauer affirmed: "They tell us that suicide is the
greatest act of cowardice... that suicide is wrong; when it is quite obvious
that there is nothing in the world to which every man has a more unassailable
title than to his own life and person."[13]
Schopenhauer
denied that suicide was immoral and saw it as one's right to take one's life.
In an allegory, he compared ending one's life, when subject to great suffering,
to waking up from sleep when experiencing a terrible nightmare. However, most
suicides were seen as an act of the will,
as it takes place when one denies life's pains, and is thus different from
ascetic renunciation of the will, which denies life's pleasures.[14]
In the following centuries, the Greek and
Roman Stoic came to celebrate suicide as the act of the wise man, while the
Christian church fathers, like the Jewish rabbis, though developing teaching
that celebrated martyrdom, at the same time increasingly vigorously condemned
suicide as sin. [15]
Scripture writers recount several
instances of justifiable self-killing. Saul, the first king of Israel, kills
himself after the philistines defeat his army, kill his sons, and wound him:
“therefore Saul took a sword, and fell upon it. “in the case of Samson’s
suicide, also occasioned by defeat, the motive is revenge. In the biblical
Jewish thought, as in Greco-Roman thought, self-killing in the interest of
divine will is morally justified.[16]
Roman law expanded the criteria that made
suicide morally acceptable. For example, when one feels he has had enough of
life; was a justification for suicide. However, roman law prohibited the
suicide of slaves, because they destroyed not themselves but their masters’
property; and of defendants accused of crime, because their deed prevented the
law from determining whether they were guilty or not. If their deed was
interpreted as signifying guilt, the law required that their corpse be denied
ritual burial and their property be confiscated. Christians cannon law adopted
the practice of denying religious burial to the suicide’s corpse, and medieval
English criminal law reinstated the penalty of forfeiting the suicides
property. [17]
Christian doctrine has by and large held that suicide is
morally wrong, despite the absence of clear Scriptural guidance regarding
suicide. the early church fathers opposed suicide, St. Augustine is generally
credited with offering the first justification of the Christian prohibition on
suicide. He saw the prohibition as a natural extension of the fifth
commandment: [18]
St. Thomas Aquinas later defended this prohibition on three
grounds.
·
Suicide is contrary to natural self-love, whose
aim is to preserve us.
·
Suicide injures the community of which an
individual is a part.
·
Suicide violates our duty to God because God has
given us life as a gift and in taking our lives we violate His right to
determine the duration of our earthly existence. [19]
Schools Of Thought
Liberialism
Libertarians typically believe that we have a
natural right of self-ownership[20]
they asserts
that one's life belongs only to himself, and no other person has the right to
force their own ideals that life must be lived. Rather, only the individual
involved can make such a decision, and whatever decision he make should be
respected.[21]
A popular basis supporting a right to suicide is the idea
that we own our bodies and hence are morally permitted to dispose of them as we
wish. On this view, our relationship to our bodies is like that of our
relationship to other items over which we enjoy property rights: Just as our
having a right to a wristwatch permits us to use, improve, and dispose of it as
we wish, so too does our having a right to our bodies permit us to dispose of
them as we see fit. Consequently, since property rights are exclusive (i.e.,
our having property rights to a thing prohibits others from interfering with
it), others may not interfere with our efforts to end our lives. [22]
Thomas
Szasz goes further, arguing that suicide is the most basic right of
all. If freedom is self-ownership—ownership over one's own life and
body—then the right to end that life is the most basic of all. If others can
force you to live, you do not own yourself and belong to them.[23]
Stoicism
most
famous stoics—Seneca the Younger, Epictetus,
and Marcus Aurelius—maintain that death by one's own
hand is always an option and frequently more honorable than a life of protracted
misery.[24]
the Stoics held that whenever the means to living a naturally flourishing life
are not available to us, suicide may be justified, regardless of the character
or virtue of the individual in question. Our natures require certain “natural
advantages” (e.g., physical health) in order for us to be happy, and a wise
person who recognizes that such advantages may be lacking in her life sees that
ending her life neither enhances nor diminishes her moral virtue.[25]
The
Stoics accepted that suicide is permissible for the wise person in
circumstances that might prevent them from living a virtuous life.
Suicide could be justified if one falls victim to severe pain or
disease, but otherwise suicide would usually be seen as a rejection of
one's social duty.[26]
Consequentialism
The consequentialist
framework looks to the potential consequences of suicide to
determine whether it is forbidden, permissible or obliged.[27]
Deontology
Deontology is of the view that suicide is necessarily wrong
because human life is sacred. According to this ‘sanctity of life’ view, human
life is inherently valuable and precious, demanding respect from others and
reverence for oneself. Hence, suicide is wrong because it violates our moral
duty to honor the inherent value of human life, regardless of the value of that
life to others or to the person whose life it is. The sanctity of life view is
thus a deontological position on suicide. [28]
CONCEPT
OF SUICIDE BY DAVID VELLEMAN, IN THE RIGHT TO SELF TERMINATION.
J. David Velleman is a professor of
philosophy at New York university. He primary works in the areas of ethics,
moral psychology, and related areas such as the philosophy of action, and
practical reasoning. He is a co-editor with Stephen Darwall of Philosophers
imprint, an on-line, peer-refereed philosophy journal. He wrote classically on
suicide in his work, The Right To Self-Termination.
Do We Have The Right
To Self-Termination
David
Velleman painted an imagery of one who is suffering from cancer. The pain and
sorrows he goes through, which obviously only him can feel. This he did to show
that one has a better knowledge of his life.[29] The claim of the right to
live or die he mentioned, lies in ones convictions about why his/her life is
valuable and where its value lies.[30]
There are two principles velleman believe
which would settle the issue which concerns whether we have the right to self-termination
or not. First; that a person has the right to make his own life shorter in
order to make it better, that is if doing so is a necessary means or
consequence of making it a better life on the whole for him, and secondly, that
there is a presumption in favour of deferring to a person’s judgment on the
subject of his own good. Together, these principles imply that a person has the
right to live and die, in particular, by his own convictions about which life
would be better for him.[31]
In
most of the cases for which assisted suicide is advocated, shortening a
patient's life is intended as a means of making it better, because the continuation
of the patient's life would detract from its overall value for him. This is in
accordance with the first principle mentioned earlier, the assertion of a
patient's right to end his life on the grounds that it is no longer worth
living. Velleman rejected this first principle, and sees it as mistaken, while
he accepted the second principle. He is of the view that we generally ought to
defer to a person on the question whether his life is worth living, since the
living worthiness of a life measures the extent to which the continuation of
that life would be good for the person living it. The person living a life is
the best judge of the value that its continuation would afford him, but not an infallible
judge, but usually more reliable than anyone else. Indeed, his judgment of this
value is to some extent self-fulfilling, since his merely liking or disliking
aspects of his life can to some extent make them good or bad for him.[32]
The
reasons for deferring to a person's judgment about his good velleman held, goes
beyond his reliability as a judge. Respect for a person's autonomy may require
that we defer to his considered judgment about his good even when we have
reason to regard that judgment as mistaken. Letting him live his own life may
sometimes entail letting him make his own mistakes about what's good for
him-including, perhaps, mistakes about whether it would be good for him to go
on living. Forbidding a person to make such mistakes can be objectionably
paternalistic, because it would usurp his role as the primary agent of his own
affairs.[33]
Thus,
if a person had the right to end his life on the grounds that it wasn't worth
living (in accordance with the first principle, above), then he would have the
right to be guided by his own judgment on that score (in accordance with the
second principle).
Velleman
reject the principle that a person has the right to end his life solely on the
grounds of the benefits he will thereby obtain or the harms he will avoid. One
reason for rejecting this principle is that a life confers benefits and harms
on people other than the person living it. Does a person have the right to
deprive his children of a parent simply because life isn't worth enough to him?
[34]
Dignity Of Human
Person In The Kantian Perspective
The great german philosopher Immanuel kant
thought that human beings occupy a special place in creation.[35]Kant’s concept of human
dignity designates a value that has no equivalent- i.e. that which is beyond price.[36] A value of this kind,
which a person has in himself but not for anyone, is the basis of
Kantian moral theory. Kant's term for this value is 'dignity', and he
attributes dignity to all persons in virtue of their rational nature.
What
morality requires of us, according to Kant, is that we respect the dignity of
persons. The dignity of a person is a value that differs in kind from his
interest. Unlike his interest, for example, his dignity is a value on which his
opinion carries no more weight than anyone else's. Because this value does not
accrue to him, he is in no better position to judge it than others. Similarly,
respect for a person's autonomy does not require deference to him on questions
of his dignity, as it does on questions of his good. On the contrary, respect
for a person's autonomy just is an appreciation of a value in him that amounts
to a dignity, in Kant's sense of the term, precisely because it commands
respect. If a person denies embodying such a value, he can hardly claim that we
should defer to him out of an appreciation for a value such as he denies. He
cannot claim, in other words, that out of respect for his autonomy we should
defer to his judgment that he possesses nothing worthy of our respect. Nor is
it paternalistic to challenge a person's judgment about his dignity, as it is
in the case of his good. Challenging a person's judgment about his good is
objectionable because it undermines his role as the agent of his own affairs;
but his value as a person is not just his affair. Although his good is a value
that accrues to him alone, in the first instance, his value as a person inheres
in him among other persons. It's a value that he possesses by virtue of being
one of us, and the value of being one of us is not his alone to assess or
defend. The value of being a person is
therefore something larger than any particular person who embodies it. That's
what If a patient decides to die, he is waiving his right to live. By waiving
his right, he releases others (perhaps a specific other person) from a duty not
to kill him.[37]
This
can't be right. It portrays morality as protecting a person's options without
protecting the person himself, except insofar as his own existence is one of
his options. Surely, however, options are worth protecting, not for their own
sake, but for the sake of the person whose options they are.[38]
Are People Morally
Permitted To End Their Existence Solely Because They Find It Unrewarding
Francis
Kamm is of the view that when life involves such unbearable pain that one’s
whole life is focused on that pain, in such circumstance, one could decline the
honour of being a person. The great value of being a person may be
acknowledged, and yet allow that some bad conditions may overshadow its very
great value[39]
Hill thinks that even a Kantian could embrace the
permissibility of suicide in specific cases. He mentions three
·
where one’s
future life will involve a complete loss of rational autonomy due to some degenerative
disorder (rational autonomy being an essential precondition for Kantian moral
reasoning)
·
where
it helps to avoid gross irremediable pain
·
where
it is the only way to avoid a future that is degrading and contrary to one’s
deepest values.[40]
Kant
was right according to velleman, to say that trading one's person in exchange
for benefits, or relief from harms, denigrates the value of personhood, respect
for which is a criterion of morality. It's in that regards velleman held that
suicide is immoral when committed on the grounds that life isn't worth living.[41]
Regarding the question of if people are
morally permitted to end their existence solely because they find it
unrewarding; velleman held that people are not morally permitted to end their
existence, on the ground that they would be violating their own
interest-independent value as persons. One’s death cannot be justified on the
grounds that its good for him, while also denying the existence of another
value, embodied in him.[42]
The
idea that dignity can justify a person's death may seem incompatible with the
Kantian conception of dignity as a value inhering in the person. Dignity is
what Kant called a "self-existent" a value to which we are obliged to
respond only when it already exists, and then only by paying it reverence or
respect. The value of persons does not oblige us to maximize the number of
people in existence; it obliges us only to respect the people who do exist. And
respecting these people is not necessarily a matter of keeping them in existence;
it is rather a matter of treating them in the way that is required by their
personhood-whatever way that is. The
Kantian objection to suicide, then, is not that it destroys something of value.
The objection is not even to suicide per se, but to suicide committed for a
particular kind of reason-that is, in order to obtain benefits or escape harms.
And the objection to suicide committed for this reason is that it denigrates
the person's dignity, by trading his person for interest-relative goods, as if it
were one of them. This interpretation of the objection to suicide leaves open
the possibility that a person's dignity may justify suicide in other contexts,
if suicide would constitute an appropriate expression of respect for one's
person. Kantianism would then be able to endorse the notion of dying with
dignity.[43]
Actually,
the phrase 'dying with dignity' is potentially misleading. Velleman held that a
person's death is not morally acceptable if he can carry it off with dignity.
Rather, a person's death is acceptable if he can no longer live with dignity.
The operative concept is undignified life, not dignified death. When a person
cannot sustain both life and dignity, his death may indeed be morally justified.[44]
What Constitutes The
Loss Of Dignity For A Person.
The
dignity in question has nothing to do with being dignified, with keeping up
appearances, or with sustaining any particular social status. It has nothing to
do with what people ought to admire or esteem in one another, or with what they
actually respect. It is rather what they ought to respect, in the way that they
can manifest only by treating one another morally. According to Kant, what
people ought to respect in this way is one another's rational nature.[45]
Kant's
view is borne out by Kamm's example, in which "life involves such
unbearable pain that one's whole life is focused on that pain." Kamm
assumes that this case invites us to weigh the disvalue of pain against the
value of being a rational agent. Kamm described a case in which pain is more
than painful, since it not only hurts the patient but also becomes the sole
focus of his life. Pain that tyrannizes the patient in this fashion undermines
his rational agency, by preventing him from choosing any ends for himself other
than relief. It reduces the patient to the psychological hedonist's image of a
person-a pleasure-seeking, pain-fleeing animal-which is undignified indeed. And
Kamm is clearly envisioning that this severely reduced condition of the patient
can be ended only by his death.[46]
Velleman
held, then, that if euthanasia seems justified in Kamm's example, the reason is
not that relieving the patient's pain is more important than his dignity as a
person; rather, that pain has already undermined the patient's dignity, and
irretrievably so. The example thus supports dying for the sake of dignity, not
for the sake of self-interest.[47]
Conclusion
To
find pain unbearable is to find it thus destructive not just of one's
well-being but of oneself.
a patient in unbearable pain is no longer
his rational old self. If his pain is truly unbearable, then he isn't his rational
self any longer: he is falling apart in pain. Suicide can only be justified, if
, and only if, it is an Kamm calls it, unbearable. What justifies death is the unbearableness
of the pain rather than the painfulness.
REFERENCE
John Danaher, Philosophical Disquisitions. The
Ethics Of Suicide: A Framework. http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com.ng/2014/05/the-ethics-of-suicide-framework.html
Aristotle Trans. Nicomachean Ethics W. D. Ross,
Cholbi,
, M., “Kant and the Irrationality of Suicide”, History of Philosophy
Quarterly, 17(2): 159–176. 2000
Durkheim,
E., 1897, Le Suicide, Paris: G. Baillière.
Ed. Margaret Paabst Battin, The Ethics Of Suicide: Historical Sources.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) Pg 3
Fairbairn,
G., 1995, Contemplating Suicide: The Language and Ethics of Self-Harm,
London: Routledge.
Human dignity and bioethics: Essays
Commisioned by the president’s council on Bioethics.
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dignity/chapter13.html
J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999).606
James Rachels, Kantian Theory: The Idea Of Human Dignity. January 1990.
https://www.google.com.ng/amp/s/www.researchgate.net/publication/262159263_Kantian_theory_the_idea_of_human_dignity/amp
John Danaher, Philosophical Disquisitions. The
Ethics Of Suicide: A Framework. http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com.ng/2014/05/the-ethics-of-suicide-framework.html
Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M.
Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, (Indiana Polis/Cambridge: Hacket Publishing
Company, 1997).
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theological, Vol. 2, Trans.
Fathers Of The English Domimican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1925):
“Whether It Is Lawful To Kill Oneself”, Part 2, Question 64. P. A5
Thomas Szasz. The Ethics And Politics Of Suicide, Fatal Freedom. (Praega:
Syracuse University Press 2002).pg 12
[1] Cholbi, Michael,
“Suicide”, the Stanford Enclyclopedia of philosophy (2017 edition), ed Edward
N. Zalta.
[2] Page 2
[3] Durkheim, E.,
1897, Le Suicide, Paris: G. Baillière.
[4] Fairbairn, G.,
1995, Contemplating Suicide: The Language and Ethics of Self-Harm,
London: Routledge.
[5] Ed. Margaret Paabst Battin, The Ethics Of Suicide: Historical Sources.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) Pg 3
[6] Ed. Margaret Paabst Battin, The Ethics Of Suicide: Historical Sources.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) Pg 10
[7] Ed. Margaret Paabst Battin, The Ethics Of Suicide: Historical Sources.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) Pg 3
[8] Thomas Szasz. The Ethics And Politics Of Suicide, Fatal Freedom. (Praega: Syracuse
University Press 2002).pg 12
[9] Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M.
Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, (Indiana Polis/Cambridge: Hacket Publishing
Company, 1997).
[10] Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M.
Cooper and D.S. Hutchinson, (Indiana Polis/Cambridge: Hacket Publishing
Company, 1997).
[11] Cholbi, Michael,
“Suicide”, the Stanford Enclyclopedia of philosophy (2017 edition), ed Edward
N. Zalta.
[12] Aristotle Trans. Nicomachean Ethics W. D. Ross,
[15] Ed. Margaret Paabst Battin, The Ethics Of Suicide: Historical Sources.
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015) Pg 3
[16] Thomas Szasz. The Ethics And Politics Of Suicide, Fatal Freedom. (Praega:
Syracuse University Press 2002).pg 12
[17] Thomas Szasz. The Ethics And Politics Of Suicide, Fatal Freedom. (Praega:
Syracuse University Press 2002).pg 12
[18] Cholbi, Michael,
“Suicide”, the Stanford Enclyclopedia of
philosophy (2017 edition), ed Edward N. Zalta.
[19] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theological, Vol. 2, Trans. Fathers
Of The English Domimican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1925): “Whether
It Is Lawful To Kill Oneself”, Part 2, Question 64. P. A5
[20]
John Danaher, Philosophical
Disquisitions. The Ethics Of Suicide:
A Framework. http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com.ng/2014/05/the-ethics-of-suicide-framework.html
[22] Cholbi, , M.,
“Kant and the Irrationality of Suicide”, History of Philosophy
Quarterly, 17(2): 159–176. 2000
[25] Cholbi, Michael,
“Suicide”, the Stanford Enclyclopedia of philosophy (2017 edition), ed Edward
N. Zalta.
[27] John Danaher, Philosophical Disquisitions. The
Ethics Of Suicide: A Framework. http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com.ng/2014/05/the-ethics-of-suicide-framework.html
[28] Cholbi, Michael,
“Suicide”, the Stanford Enclyclopedia of philosophy (2017 edition), ed Edward
N. Zalta.
[29] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999).606
[30] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). 607
[31] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). 607
[32] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). Pg 608
[33] Ibid.
[34] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). Pg 606
[35] James Rachels, Kantian Theory: The Idea Of Human Dignity.
January 1990. https://www.google.com.ng/amp/s/www.researchgate.net/publication/262159263_Kantian_theory_the_idea_of_human_dignity/amp
[36] Human dignity and bioethics:
Essays Commisioned by the president’s council on Bioethics.
https://bioethicsarchive.georgetown.edu/pcbe/reports/human_dignity/chapter13.html
[37] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). 611-613
[38] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). 612
[39] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). 613
[40] John Danaher, Philosophical Disquisitions. The
Ethics Of Suicide: A Framework. http://philosophicaldisquisitions.blogspot.com.ng/2014/05/the-ethics-of-suicide-framework.html
[41] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). 613
[42] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). 615
[43] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). 616
[44] J. David Velleman, A Right of Self-Termination?
Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, Apr.,1999). 617
[45] ibid
[46] J. David Velleman, A Right of
Self-Termination? Ethics, Vol.109,No.3. (Chicago: Chicago University Press,
Apr.,1999). Pg. 618
[47] ibid
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