THE TECHNIQUE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL FORCING

THE TECHNIQUE OF EPISTEMOLOGICAL FORCING

            ‘Epistemological Forcing’ in using a modest version of foundationalism intends to limit the range of possibilities within which the sceptical challenge can achieve success. It is based on the principle of reasonableness of doubt. A reasonable doubt (not a mere possible doubt) is one based on reason and common sense, one that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act. Doubts which are reasonable have the epistemic warrant to be answered, while those that are unreasonable do not. It is a strategy; a trendy way of confronting the sceptics and constraining sceptics maneuvers within an appropriate range of situations/worlds, who have cited prima facie error possibilities as some of the most devastating arguments against the claims to knowledge.

            Scepticism etymologically comes from the Greek word, skeptesthai which means to examine; it is the philosophical view that it is impossible to know anything with absolute certainty, or to know the world as it really is. It further implies a general reluctance to accept anything on face-value without sufficient proof. Scepticism is one of the most formidable challenges to all our epistemic efforts. It is the philosophical attitude that questions either the possibility of obtaining any sort of knowledge, or of offering any indubitable justification for knowledge claims. In general terms, scepticism in philosophy is the view that we cannot know anything; that nothing is certain, and, that everything is open to doubt. The sceptical challenge shows us that we suffer an epistemic plight, namely, that we can have the best possible evidence for believing some propositions and yet be wrong. The sceptical challenge requires the epistemist to defend the foundation (s) of his knowledge in an indefeasible way, that is to say, to justify the justifiers of his knowledge indefeasibly. However, in giving in to the demand for justifications, one gets involved in a “begging-the-question-fallacy”, since one is appealing to the same foundations as “justifiers” of one’s foundations. This initiates a slippery slope in one’s argumentation, which could go on ad infinitum. Therefore, there is need to carefully resist, or free oneself from the “justificationist addiction.”

            The heuristic principle of epistemological forcing is this: whenever knowledge claims are challenged by alleged possibilities of error, the strategy is to show that the possibilities of error fail to be genuine in the relevant sense. We could do these by appealing to certain pre-philosophical intuitions, or spontaneous convictions which the sceptic holds, unquestioned, and without which it would be extremely difficult to embark on any rational enquiry. An instance of epistemological forcing, which is a response to the sceptical challenge to resolve the demand for indubitable justification, is offered by Thomas Reid. Reid contends that scepticism is the inevitable commitment to the erroneous theory that the immediate object of thought is always some idea or image in the mind, and consequently, all knowledge of the external world is mediated through these ideas. He lays the groundwork for his positive epistemology by arguing that consistency requires that we regard all our cognitive faculties as equally trustworthy (or untrustworthy). Thus, it is illegitimate for the sceptic to use one faculty to attempt to confute another faculty. Since we all do trust our faculties, we all do implicitly regard them as trustworthy. He contends that knowledge has a foundational structure which is ultimately grounded in the first principles of our constitution, which confer justification on the beliefs that they give rise to. Reid’s epistemological forcing is plausible since doubting that nothing can be known with certainty originates from one’s cognitive faculty, confuting this same cognitive faculty which projects trustworthy or untrustworthy knowledge is a miss-application of our cognitive faculty, an error in itself. Hence, the skeptical challenge is self-inherently incoherent, because, in raising their challenges, sceptics still make use of the very intellectual faculties and methods from which they are raising doubts. The skeptical arguments presupposes general reliability of these faculties and methods, and hence, it is incoherent for the sceptic to still entertain the idea that these same faculties and methods might be generally unreliable.

            Classical foundationalism as an epistemological forcing is the contention that in the knowing process, there are certain unshakeable starting points that are not justified by any other propositions. It made claims to strong justification, epistemic incorrigibility and indubitability, but it failed to satisfy those standards, and that is why it crumbled: it simply could not provide “non-question-begging guarantees” for the robust claims it made. Rationalizing explanations which is the argument-by-argument approach to the sceptical challenge used by classical foundationalism proves a huge failure, especially when we can no longer provide further reasons within an inferential chain of justification. This aspect accounts for the implausibility of classical foundationalism as an epistemological forcing.

            On the contrary, modest foundationalism makes claim to certainty in epistemic justification, but, such certainty is neither definitive, infallible nor non-revisable. This model accommodates the concerns or epistemic anxieties of the anti-justificationist and anti-foundationalist (such as the sceptics and fallibilists) about knowledge. It does this by characterizing the foundations of knowledge and justification in a manner that is of interest and relevance to the sceptics. It acknowledges both the certainty and fragility of the very foundations upon which human knowledge and its justification rest. In doing so, its claims are kept modest, and not exaggerated. Here, certainty is not the preclusion of all possibilities of error, but the contextual absence of doubt. This approach is also “paradoxical”, but has the advantage of limiting the range of possibilities within which the sceptical challenge can achieve success. This is the technique of epistemological forcing, and it is based on the reasonableness of doubt (a reasonable doubt is one based on reason and common sense, one that would make a reasonable person hesitate to act.) This makes it a plausible philosophical method of disputation.

            Furthermore, Kant considered the failure to refute scepticism as a scandal to philosophy. His notion of epistemological forcing is that if the sceptic asks us justify our knowledge claims, we do so by setting out these facts about how our experience is constituted. Kant maintains that the very concepts which the sceptic seeks justification for, are constitutive features of the human capacity to have any experience at all. He thus advises that the best way to respond to scepticism is not by attempting to refute it on an argument by argument basis, but by showing how we come by justification for what we believe. A challenge to justify is neither a claim nor a theory, and cannot be refuted, but can only be accepted or ignored.

            In Conclusion, scepticism can never be totally eliminated or refuted. It is a clinical condition which the most sophisticated talk-therapy cannot cure. But, scepticism can at least be limited through the technique of epistemological forcing which has the advantage of minimizing the range or set of possibilities over which the sceptical challenge and maneuver can thrive. It is the purpose of epistemology to test the validity of our spontaneous convictions, to see whether they are justifiable before the bar of rational criticism. If they are vindicated after a thorough investigation of their ultimate grounds and causes, they become reflex and philosophic truisms that can rest upon a firm scientific basis. If, however, a critical examination reveals that such spontaneous convictions are blind assets of the mind, or the result of some compulsory internal mechanism of the human mind, their truth-value will either be disproved, or remain forever in doubt.

One cannot simply doubt all things and principles, not even in a speculative way. Thus, even the most confirmed sceptics do possess certitude about some things (like the certain reliability of their cognitive faculties), even if they outwardly deny that such is the case. The sceptic cannot lead a consistent human life without denying his sceptical theory all day long in his conduct, which is practically impossible and unachievable.