THOMAS AQUINAS CONCEPT OF HUMAN FREEWILL
Introduction
Thomas
Aquinas in the disputed question on evil, wrote extensively on the human free
will. He presented two views, He first of all presented arguments that has a conclusion
that seemed that man has no free will, but act by necessity and finally
countered the first view by presenting arguments that showed that man actually has
a free will. In his first view, he gave twenty-four reasons why it seemed that
man has free will, after which he gave a contrary view and concluded with a
response.
Man
wills by necessity.
Talking
about the will, Thomas Aquinas stated that the will is a rational appetite,
that is, a desire consequently to knowledge, and what directs the will is the
reason which is the formal cause of willing.[1]
He
further stated that; for the will to move, there must be an aim or rationale
behind it. The will does not just move, rather it is moved by something, which
is an object specified to it by the mind. Once the mind specifies an object for
will which is something good, fulfilling and perfective, the will desires it. In
other words, the will always desires that which is good fulfilling and
perfective. The will cannot will goodness itself, if the mind know an object
that realize perfectly the notion of Goodness, the will would necessarily love
that object.[2]
Thomas
here concluded that God is goodness, that in this life, we do not see God as he
really is, consequently we see God as a good with negative and positive
characteristics and we can prefer creatures to God. (This is Thomas definition
of sin), but when we see God as he is, the will will necessarily love him.[3]
Does
a man have free choice in his actions or does he choose necessarily?
It seems he chooses
necessarily, not freely.
Here
Thomas presented twenty four arguments to support the above answer, but we will
be taking the basic ones.
Firstly,
Thomas made reference to the book of Jeremiah 10:23, which said “the way of a
man is not his, neither is it in a man to walk and direct his steps”. With the above
quotation from Jeremiah he concluded by saying; “it seems that man actually
doesn’t have free choice of his way or of his acts”.[4]
Secondly,
Thomas said that Man is moved by something inside him, an inner instinct which
is more powerful than him, which directs his wills and his ways, and that this
inner instinct, is God himself. He therefore concluded that man cannot be said
to have free choice in his actions because he is being moved to act by
something inside him. [5]
Thirdly,
Thomas mentioned that Man contributes nothing to his actions, because the cause
of his actions is external, and what is acted upon contributes nothing. With
this, he drew a conclusion, saying, “it therefore seems that the will is moved
by violence and necessity, therefore, it does not have free choice of its act”.[6]
Fourthly,
Thomas made reference to St Augustine, where he said, “it is impossible for
man’s will to be out of harmony with God’s will; either man does what God wills
or God fulfils his will concerning him, which implies that, all human choices
proceed from an unchangeable choice. [7]
Fifthly,
he stated that the will is necessarily moved by the appetite, the appetite
moves the will. In other words the appetite is the mover and the will, the
moved, and so, man is not free to will, or not to will. Man does not have power
over his will.
Sixthly,
Thomas said that the will desires that which the mind specify to it, which is
something good, fulfilling and perfective, and that object becomes the end for
which the will is moved to. Thereby, to attain it, it would seem to be
necessarily moved to those things which are for the end.[8]
Seventhly,
he stated that, the good is in the thing and the true the intention, and thus
the good has more character of a mover than does the will, therefore the good
necessarily moves the will.[9]
Eighthly,
Thomas mentioned that Nothing can move itself by itself, that is Nothing can be
the cause of its being moved, therefore the will cannot move itself, but is
necessarily moved by another. The will is moved by another and whatever is
willed by another receives necessity from that other. He concluded, saying that
the the will wills necessarily and not freely.[10]
Ninthly,
he stated; “Multiform is reduced to the uniform. The human acts are various and
of many forms, therefore they should be reduced to the uniform movement of the
heaven as to their cause. But whatever is caused by the movement of the heavens
comes about necessarily, because a natural cause will produce its effect
necessarily unless something impedes it. But nothing can impede the movement of
a celestial body such that its effect would not be produced, since the acts of
the impeding cause would itself have to be reduced back to some celestial
principle as its cause”. This implies that everything can be reduced to the
uniform movement of the heaven as its cause, Therefore the human movements
comes about necessarily, not from free choice.[11]
Tenthly,
Thomas Aquinas said that when one has free choice, he does what he wishes and
does not do otherwise; He who does what he does not wish to do, does not have
free choice. Man according to Romans 8:16, does what he does not will,” The
evil that I hate, I do”. Therefore a man does not have free choice in his
actions.[12]
On
the contrary
Thomas
Aquinas here presented arguments to show that man has freedom of choice.
Firstly, he made reference to Ecclesiasticus 15:14, where it is said that God made man from the beginning, and left him
in the hand of his own counsel, with this he thereby concluded that man has
free choice of his action.[13]
Secondly,
he made reference to the philosopher in ethics 3, “a man is lord of his acts
and he has it in him to act and not to act”, which implies that man can decide
to act or not to act. He has the power and capacity to make his decision and go
by it. Man has free choice in his acts.[14]
Response
In
the response, it was said that the will is not moved with necessity, this he
said is seen when we consider the movement of the will in respect to the
exercise and with respect to the determination of its act, which is from the object.
In respect to exercise, he said that the will is moved by itself, for just as
it moves other powers, so does it move itself. So by the fact that a man
actually wills something, he moves himself actually to will something else; for
example, because he wills health, he moves himself to want to take his medicine.
For the fact that he wants health, he begins to deliberate about what health
requires and having fixed on it by deliberation; he wants to take the medicine.
Thomas
quoting the philosopher on the soul said that it is impossible that the power
of a celestial body should move the will directly. This implies that the will
is not directly moved by the celestial body, but by other things which may be
as a result of the actions of the celestial body.[15]
Thomas,
stated,” as Aristotle concludes in the chapter on good fortune, that what first
moves the will and intellect is something above the will and intellect, namely;
God, who since he moves everything in a way appropriate to what is moved, as
the light upward and the heavy downward, moves the will too according to its
condition, not by necessity, but as relating indeterminately to many”.
Therefore it is evident that if the movement of will be considered on the side
of the exercise of its act, it is not moved necessarily. This implies that God
has giving man many choices and man can decide out of his own free will to make
his choice.
The movement of the will
according to what is offered to it can come in three ways;[16]
Firstly,
when one aspect is more important or paramount, then the will is moved
according to reason. for example, when a man chooses that which is useful to
health because it is useful for pleasure.
Secondly,
insofar as it thinks of one particular circumstance and not another, and this
often happens because something occasions the thought either from within or
without.
Thirdly,
from a man’s disposition, because, as a person is, so does the end appear to
him. Hence the will of an angry man is differently moved to something, than is
a calm man’s, because the same thing is not suitable to both. So then, with
respect to some things the will is necessarily moved on the side of the object,
but not with respect to everything, but on the side of exercise of its act it
is not moved necessarily.
Furthermore,
Thomas said that man’s will is discordant with the will of God, because, as it
wills something that God does not want it to will, as when it wills to sin; though
God does not want the will to will this, but if it does wills it, God brings it
about, for whatever it wills the lord does [17]
Consequently, he mentioned that when there is
only one way to reach the end, there is the same reason for willing the end and
the means, but that is not the way it is in the example, for one can reach
happiness in many ways. Therefore, although a man necessarily wills happiness,
he does not necessarily will the things that lead to happiness.
Finally, Thomas Aquinas stated that not every
cause brings about its effect with necessity, even if it is an efficient cause,
because a cause can be impeded so that sometimes its effect does not follow.
For example, natural causes, which do not produce their effects with necessity
but only for the most part, because they can sometimes be impeded. Therefore,
the cause that makes the will to will something, need not do this with
necessity, because the will can raise an impediment to it, either by putting
aside the consideration which induces it to will or by considering the
opposite, namely, that which is propose as good is in some respects not good.
Conclusion
Though, it may seem that man does not have
free will, but acts by necessity, but man actually has free will and can decide
to act or not to act. God has giving man free will and freedom of act.
[1] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed question on evil, 6.(penguin
books 1998) page 22.
[2] Ibid,
page 22.
[3]Cf. Thomas Aquinas, selected writings, on human choice. disputed question on evil, 6.(penguin
books 1998) page 551.
[6] ibid
[7] Ibid,
page 552, number 5
[8] Ibid,
page 552, number 7
[9] Ibid,
page 554, number 12
[11] Ibid,
page 555, number 21
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