TRADITIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY AND GETTIERS PROBLEM.
INTRODUCTION
Man desires to know; he is an
inquisitive being. Epistemology as a branch of philosophy, inquires into the
nature, limits, and requirements of knowledge. It inquires into what justifies
a belief, and what we mean when we say that a claim is true. As it were, there
are problems and issues that can be raised about knowledge. First, what does it
mean to say that we know the things we claim to know? What conditions must be
satisfied for such a claim to be true? Secondly, how do we know the things we
claim to know?
Epistemology in the context of
Western philosophy is often thought to have begun with Plato, especially in the
Theaetetus, where knowledge is first
formulated as justified true belief (JTB); but as a self-conscious area of
inquiry and as a coherent, developing conversation, it is usually dated from
Rene Descartes (Meditations). For the last few years, epistemologists have
shifted towards more delimited questions, especially those concerned with
problem of justification, the organizational structure of knowledge, the
meaning of epistemic terms, and the psychology of belief formation.[1]
Edmund Gettier, a contemporary epistemologist is one of such. He challenged the
traditional epistemology and formulated a problem that a fallibilistic theory
of epistemic justification is possible,[2]
and that the traditionalist's conditions are insufficient for knowledge.
This article, therefore, will
provide a systematic overview of the problems that the questions above raise
and focus in some depth-on issues relating to the structure and the limits of
knowledge and justification, especially as proposed by Gettier. Our first task
then, would be to explain the term "epistemology," as seen in the
traditional sense, i.e as Justified True Belief. Thereafter, we shall examine
the Gettier problem, and its corresponding responses. This would, however, lead
us to the structure of justification, and finally, the conclusion.
EPISTEMOLOGY
Defined narrowly, epistemology is
the study of knowledge and justified belief. As the study of knowledge,
epistemology is concerned with the necessary and sufficient conditions of
knowledge, its sources, its structure, and its limits. As the study of
justified belief, epistemology aims to answer questions such as: How we are to
understand the concept of justification? What makes justified beliefs
justified? Is justification internal or external to one's own mind?
Understood more broadly,
epistemology is about issues having to do with the creation and dissemination
of knowledge in particular areas of inquiry. Meanwhile, there are different
kinds of knowledge. One is procedural knowledge, sometimes called 'know-how'.
Another kind of knowledge is called acquaintance knowledge. However,
Epistemology do not focus on procedural or acquaintance knowledge, instead
preferring to focus on propositional knowledge. A proposition is something
which can be expressed by a declarative sentence and which purports to describe
a fact, or a state of affairs, such as "Dogs are mammals" or "It
is wrong to murder innocent people for fun."[3]
Propositional knowledge then can be called knowledge-that. We can also
distinguish different types of Propositional knowledge, based on the source of
that knowledge. Non-empirical or a priori
knowledge is possible independently of, or prior to any experience, and
requires only the use of reason. Empirical or a posteriori knowledge is possible only subsequent to certain sense
experience.
Having narrowed our focus to
Propositional knowledge, we must now ask ourselves what exactly, constitutes
knowledge. What does it mean for someone to know something? Epistmologists have
usually undertaken this task by seeking a correct and complete analysis of the
concept of knowledge, in other words, a set of individually necessary and
jointly sufficient conditions which determines whether someone knows something.
TRADITIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY
The prime concern of epistemology is
found in Plato’s dialogue Theateatus, where Plato exposited a definition of
knowledge, by distinguishing it from ignorance and opinion.[4]
That justified true belief is knowledge, is not a definition on which Plato had
faith, justified by sufficient reasons. From Platonic dialogue to present day
philosophical concern, still this area beg unending debate to answer this
classic question. But there is a paradigm shift, explicitly diversified
philosophical endeavor to find a satisfactory answer to several questions like
what knowledge is, how we can know something or about justification of
knowledge etc.
So a traditional epistemology stemmed
from skeptic challenge in Greek age, turned to be analytic and psychoanalytic
one in modern age. Philosophers from Vienna circles and analytic philosophers
extended area of epistemology and methods to justify knowledge.
Traditional epistemology is defined
as an epistemic enterprise concerned with the object we know, which was
initiated by Plato and continued till the age of Descartes. In fact, Cartesian
skepticism was a vigorous attempt to justify knowledge in traditional school.
KNOWLEDGE AS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF
Having established that
Propositional knowledge is of epistemological interest, we shall then refer to
such knowledge using he schema; ‘S knows that p ’, where ‘S’ stands for the
subject who has knowledge and ‘p’ for the proposition that is known. Our
question will be: What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for S to
know that p? We may distinguish, broadly, between a traditional and a non-
traditional approach to answering this question. According to the traditional
approach, knowledge that p is, at least approximately, justified true belief
(JTB). False propositions cannot be known.[5]
Therefore, knowledge requires truth. A proposition S that doesn't even believe
can't be a proposition that S knows. Therefore, knowledge requires belief.
Finally, S’s being correct in believing that p might merely be a matter of
luck. Therefore, knowledge requires a third element, traditionally identified
as justification. Thus we arrive at a tripartite analysis of knowledge as
Justified True Belief (JTB): S knows that p if and only if p is true and S is
justified in believing that p. According to this analysis, the three conditions
— truth, belief, and justification — are individually necessary and jointly
sufficient for knowledge. Initially, we may say that the role of justification
is to ensure that S 's belief is not true merely because of luck. On that, the
Traditional and Non Traditional approach are in agreement. They diverge,
however, as soon as we proceed to be more specific about exactly how justification
is to fulfill this role. According to the traditional approach, S's belief that
p is true not merely because of luck when it is reasonable or rational, from S
's own point of view, to take p to be true. According to evidentialism, what
makes a belief justified in this sense is the possession of evidence. The basic
idea is that a belief is justified to the degree it fits S 's evidence. Non
Traditional approach, on the other hand, conceives of the role of justification
differently. Its job is to ensure that S's belief has a high objective
probability of truth and therefore, if true, is not true merely because of
luck. One prominent idea is that this is accomplished if, and only if, a belief
originates in reliable cognitive processes or faculties. This view is known as
reliabilism.[6]
CRITIQUE OF THE TRADITIONAL EPISTEMOLOGY
Traditional Epistemology may in many
ways seems to enunciate an attractive and indeed necessary project for the
pursuit of rational cognitive enquiry, even if not quite in the manner
conceived of by Descartes; there are also many philosophers today who would
concur in such an assessment. The view of most who would call themselves
naturalists, however, is that it suffers from irredeemable problems of diverse
kinds, and that a priori norms do not
and cannot constitute, contrary to first impression, a necessary foundation for
our substantive world-knowledge. The chief problems with Traditional
Epistemology can be seen as falling into three main classes:
(a) There seems to be no viable way
of justifying norms purely a priori,
nor do there seem to be plausible candidates for such norms (the
epistemological problems).
(b) We cannot make sense of the
nature of the truths that would constitute the objects of the assumed, purely a priori apprehension, nor of the mental
act that would be involved in grasping them (the metaphysical problems).
(c) It is unclear that we can even
make sense of the need for epistemic norms, or motivate particular proposals
about what these norms should be, without assuming a good deal of substantive
scientific knowledge (the methodological problems).[7]
Of these three classes, (b) is
probably the most contentious standing alone, whilst, in a broad sense of
'methodological', (c) is perhaps the most fundamental.
THE GETTIER PROBLEM
For some time, the justified true
belief (JTB) account was widely agreed to capture the nature of knowledge.
However, in 1963, Edmund Gettier published a short but widely influential
article which has shaped much subsequent work in epistemology. Gettier had
shown that the tripartite analysis of knowledge as justified true belief has
been shown to be incomplete.[8]
There are cases of justified true belief that do not qualify as cases of
knowledge. Justified true belief, therefore, is not sufficient for knowledge.
Cases like that — known as Gettier-cases — arise because neither the possession
of evidence nor origination in reliable faculties is sufficient for ensuring
that a belief is not true merely because of luck. Consider the well-known case
of barn-facades: Henry drives through a rural area in which what appear to be
barns are, with the exception of just one, mere barn facades. From the road
Henry is driving on, these facades look exactly like real barns. Henry happens
to be looking at the one and only real barn in the area and believes that
there's a barn over there. Henry's belief is justified, according to
Traditional Knowledge, because Henry's visual experience justifies his belief.
According to Non Traditional Knowledge, his belief is justified because Henry's
belief originates in a reliable cognitive process: vision. Yet Henry's belief is
plausibly viewed as being true merely because of luck. Had Henry noticed one of
the barn-facades instead, he would also have believed that there's a barn over
there. There is, therefore, broad agreement among epistemologists that Henry's
belief does not qualify as knowledge. To state conditions that are jointly
sufficient for knowledge, what further element must be added to justified true
belief? This is known as the Gettier problem.[9]
According to Traditional Knowledge, solving the problem requires a fourth
condition. According to some Non Traditional Knowledge theorists, it calls for
refining the concept of reliability. For example, if reliability could suitably
be indexed to the subject's environment, reliabilists could say that Henry's
belief is not justified because in his environment, vision is not reliable when
it comes to discerning barns from barn-facades. Some Non Traditional Knowledge
theorists bypass the justification condition altogether. They would say that,
if we conceive of knowledge as reliably produced true belief, there is no need
for justification. Reliabilism, then, comes in two forms: as a theory of
justification or as a theory of knowledge. As the former, it views
justification to be an important ingredient of knowledge but, unlike Traditional
Knowledge, grounds justification solely in reliability.[10]
As a theory of knowledge, reliabilism asserts that justification is not
necessary for knowledge; rather, reliably produced true belief (provided the
notion of reliability is suitably refined to rule out Gettier cases) is
sufficient for it.
RESPONSES TO THE GETTIER PROBLEM
Gettier's problem has attracted a
range of responses. The different directions that these responses have taken
are constrained by the structure of Gettier's argument: if knowledge is solely
justified true belief, then there cannot be any cases of justified true belief
that are not also cases of knowledge; but Gettier claims that his
counterexamples are cases of justified true belief without being cases of
knowledge.[11]
Therefore, in this account, one is to either accept Gettier's conclusion — and
elucidate a new conceptual analysis for knowledge — or else deny one of
Gettier's two claims about his counterexamples (that is, either deny that
Gettier cases are justified true beliefs, or else accept that Gettier cases are
knowledge after all). One response, therefore, is that in none of the above
cases was the belief justified: it is impossible to justify anything which is
not true. Under this interpretation the JTB definition of knowledge survives.
The problem is now not to define knowledge but to define justification.[12]
No-False-Belief Condition
Some people argue that knowledge
involves certainty. One way of expressing
this is to claim
that a belief
is not justified unless you
can be certain of
it. ‘Certainty’ here doesn’t mean a
psychological feeling (which
could vary from one person to
another), but refers to
the belief being certain.
We could use this view of justification
to argue that Gettier cases
demonstrate that we cannot be certain
of our beliefs in
normal cases. Because we can’t tell
whether we are in a normal
case or a Gettier case, then
our beliefs in normal cases
are not certain, and so
are not justification.[13] Gettier doesn’t show that knowledge is not
justified true belief. What he shows is
that our beliefs are rarely justified. However, it is rare that our evidence
rules out the leads to skepticism possibility of error. So
infallibilism can object that a belief
can be justified without being
true. good evidence.[14]
It seems pointless, though, to insist on the infallibility of belief precisely
because we believe what we do because we believe that what we believe is true
and we divest ourselves immediately and involuntarily of a belief when we come
to believe that that belief is false.
Alvin Goldman's Theory of Knowing
The causal theory of knowing is one
of the early versions of externalism, introduced by Alvin Goldman and conceived
primarily as a response to the Gettier problem. It states that in order for
there to be knowledge, there must be a causal chain, however complex, between
the individual’s belief in some proposition, and the truth of the proposition
itself. So, we might insist that to constitute knowledge, a belief must be both
true and justified, and its truth and justification must be connected somehow.
This notion of a connection between the truth and the justification of a belief
turns out to be difficult to formulate precisely, but causal accounts of
knowledge seek to capture the spirit of this proposal by more significantly
altering the analysis of knowledge.[15]
Such accounts maintain that in order for someone to know a proposition, there
must be a causal connection between his belief in that proposition and the fact
that the proposition encapsulates. This retains the truth condition, since a
proposition must be true in order for it to encapsulate a fact. However, it
appears to be incompatible with fallibilism, since it does not allow for the possibility
that a belief be justified yet false.
Lehrer-Paxson's Defeasibility Condition
Keith Lehrer and Thomas Paxson
proposed another response, by adding a defeasibility condition to the JTB
analysis. On their account, knowledge is undefeated justified true belief —
which is to say that a justified true belief counts as knowledge if and only if
it is also the case that there is no further truth that, had the subject known
it, would have defeated her present justification for the belief. (Thus, for
example, Smith's justification for believing that the person who will get the
job has ten coins in his pocket is his justified belief that Jones will get the
job, combined with his justified belief that Jones has ten coins in his pocket.
But if Smith had known the truth that Jones will not get the job that would
have defeated the justification for his belief.) However, many critics (such as
Marshall Swain ) have argued that the notion of a defeater fact cannot be made
precise enough to rule out the Gettier cases without also ruling out a priori cases of knowledge.[16]
Fred Dretske's Conclusive Reasons
Fred Dretske is an epistemologist
who proposed in his 1971 essay "Conclusive Reasons," that evidence,
grounds, and reasons should be considered as justifications for beliefs. He
says that we can say of any subject, S, who believes that P and who has
conclusive reasons for believing that P, that, given these reasons, he could
not be wrong about P or, given these reasons, it is false that he might be
mistaken about P. Suppose, then, that
(1) S knows that P and he knows this
on the basis (simply) of R entails
(2) R would not be the case unless P
were the case.[17]
The latter formula expresses a
connection between R and P which is strong enough, we can say that if (2) is
true, then R is a conclusive reason for P. For if (2) is true, we are entitled,
not only to deny that, given R, not-P is the case, but also that, given R,
not-P might be the case. That is to say, (2) eliminates R and not-P as a
possible (joint) state of affairs and, when we are given R, it eliminates not-P
as a possible state of affairs. This is so because (2) entails the falsity of,
(3) Although R is the case P might not be the case. But how can Dretske's claim
that the evidence, grounds, or reasons must be "conclusive"
strengthen the case for knowledge? He admits there are many examples of
mistaken knowledge claims, one where the thermometer used is known to stick at
readings above 98.6 degrees and another example of mistaken testimony.[18]
Robert Nozick' Truth-Tracking Condition
A tracking theory of knowledge is
one that describes knowledge as a belief that tracks the truth in a reliable
way. The tracking theory of knowledge was created by Robert Nozick as an
attempt to deal with Gettier counterexamples to the previous definition of
knowledge — that knowledge is justified true belief. Nozick describes four
conditions for how a person, S, can have some knowledge of a proposition, P. In
order for S to know P, Nozick says that these conditions must be met:
1. P is true
2. S believes that P
3. If it were not the case that P
(i.e., if ¬P), S would not believe that P
4. If it were the case that P, S
would believe that P[19]
Nozick's definition is known as a
truth-tracking one. Knowledge is such because it tracks the truth —
justification of a belief is only valid insofar as it reliably keeps track of
what is true. Nozick's third and fourth conditions are counter factuals. He
called this the "tracking theory" of knowledge. Nozick believed the
counterfactual conditionals bring out an important aspect of our intuitive
grasp of knowledge: For any given fact, the believer's method must reliably
track the truth despite varying relevant conditions. In this way, Nozick's
theory is similar to reliabilism.
Richard Kirkham's skepticism
Richard Kirkham has proposed that it
is best to start with a definition of knowledge so strong that giving a
counterexample to it is logically impossible. Whether it can be weakened
without becoming subject to a counterexample should then be checked. He
concludes that there will always be a counterexample to any definition of
knowledge in which the believer's evidence does not logically necessitate the
belief. Since in most cases the believer's evidence does not necessitate a
belief, Kirkham embraces skepticism about knowledge. He notes that a belief can
still be rational even if it is not an item of knowledge.[20]
However, most contemporary
epistemologists accept Gettier's conclusion. Their responses to the Gettier
problem, therefore, consist of trying to find alternative analyses of
knowledge. They have struggled to discover and agree upon as a beginning any
single notion of truth, or belief, or justifying which is wholly and obviously
accepted. Truth, belief, and justifying have not yet been satisfactorily
defined, so that JTB (justified true belief) may be defined satisfactorily is
still problematical, on account or otherwise of Gettier's examples.
THE STRUCTURE OF JUSTIFICATION
Every belief is based on
assumptions, and those assumptions are based on other assumptions, which are
based on others, and so on, until we are left with assumptions that we simply
accept even though we have no justification for doing so. This is known as the
'regress' argument, and there are several ways to resolve it. Firstly, we could
suggest that the regress stops at unjustified beliefs. This would be
epistemological nihilism - a denial of genuine justification.[21]
A second option is to say that the regress stops at intrinsically justified (or
'self evident') beliefs. This is called foundationalism. According to foundationalism, our justified
beliefs are structured like a building: they are divided into a foundation and
a superstructure, the latter resting upon the former. Beliefs belonging to the
foundation are basic. Beliefs belonging to the superstructure are non-basic and
receive justification from the justified beliefs in the foundation. The final
option is to never stop the regress.[22]
This is called Coherentism. According
to coherentism, the foundationalism metaphor gets things wrong. Knowledge and
justification are structured like a web where the strength of any given area
depends on the strength of the surrounding areas. Coherentists consider the
structure of justification to be circular rather than linear. Quine speaks of a
mutually-reinforcing 'web of beliefs', where every belief is justified to the
extent that it coheres with all the others.[23]
Contextualism refers to the position that the truth-conditions
knowledge-ascribing and knowledge-denying sentences (sentences of the form “S
knows that P” and “S doesn’t know that P” and related variants of such
sentences) vary in certain ways according to the context in which they are
uttered. In his influential paper, “A Contextualist Theory of Epistemic
Justification,” David Annis presents what he calls “contextualism” as an
alternative to both foundationalism and coherentism in the issue of the
structure of justification. Now, some
Epistemologists think that even Annis’s “contextualism” is not a structural
alternative to those two theories, but is rather best construed as a form of
foundationalism. But the vital point to
be made now is that “contextualism” as construed here, is certainly not a
thesis about the structure of knowledge or of justification. It is, in fact, consistent with either
foundationalism or coherentism.
CONCLUSION
In this essay we have examined the
concept of epistemology - as the theory of knowledge and justified belief,
which inquires into the source, limits and nature of knowledge. In his Republic Plato describes knowledge as
"what is," and inerrant. Whereas in his Theaetetus, he sees knowledge as true belief that is tied down
(justified). Thus we have a tripartite Theory of knowledge - justification,
truth, and belief. This would, however, imply a Propositional dimension to
knowledge.
Through his counterexamples, Edmund
Gettier argues that there are cases of beliefs that are both true and
justified—therefore satisfying all three conditions for knowledge on the JTB
account—but that do not appear to be genuine cases of knowledge. Thus a fourth
condition (JTB+G) is required. Gettier's point is based on justification. For
not providing a solution to this problem, Gettier has made it attract a range
of responses - Alvin Goldman's causal condition, and Lehrer - Paxson's
defeasibility condition. Others include the revision of the JTB responses like
the Fred Dretske's Conclusion Reasons, Robert Nozick's truth-tracking, and
Richard Kirkham's scepticism. Moreover, before Gettier's paper, there is no
structure of justification. Most epistemological discourses, however, agree on
foundationalism, coherentism, and contextualism (i.e the Regress problem)
making up the structure of justification.
Subsequently, while this article
provides an overview of the important issues, it of course leaves the most
basic questions unanswered; epistemology will continue to be an area of
philosophical discourse as long as these questions remain.
REFERENCE
Audi, Robert. The Structure of
Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1993
Bonjour, Laurence. 1985. The
Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Bonjour
Lawrence. Epistemology: Classical
Problems and Contemporary Responses (2nd ed.). New York: Rowman and Little
field Publishers, Inc., 2010.
Chisholm, Roderick. 1989. Theory of
Knowledge. 3rd edition. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.
Chisholm, Roderick. 1982. The
Foundations of Knowing. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Dretske, Fred. 1970. “Epistemic
Operators.” The Journal of Philosophy, 67: 1007–23.
Haack, Susan. Evidence and Inquiry.
Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology. . Oxford: Blackwell 1993.
Huemer, Michael. Skepticism and the
Veil of Perception. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000.
Lehrer, Keith. 1990. Theory of
Knowledge. Boulder: Westview Press.
Nozick, Robert. 1981. Philosophical
Explanations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Sosa
Ernest. “The Raft and the Pyramid,” in Linda Alcof (ed.), Epistemology: The Big Questions I. Massachusetts: Blackwell
Publishers Ltd, 1998.
Sosa, Ernest. Knowledge in
Perspective. Selected Essays in Epistemology. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991
Steup, Matthias and Sosa, Ernest
(eds). Contemporary Debates in Epistemology. Malden (MA): Blackwell, 2005.
Steup,
Matthias, "Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring2014Edition),EdwardN.Zalta(ed.),URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/epistemology/>.
Truncellito David A. Epistemology. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005.
Plato,
Meno and Theaetetus, In Complete
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Williams, Michael. Groundless Belief. Pinceton: Princeton
University Press 1999a
[1]
Lawrence Bonjour, Epistemology: Classical
Problems and Contemporary Responses (2nd ed.), (New York: Rowman and Little
field Publishers, Inc., 2010), p. 154.
[2] Keith
Lender, "The Better Problem and the Analysis of Knowledge," in The Analysis of Knowledge, p. 17.
[3] David
A. Truncellito, Epistemology, (Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005).
[4]Cf.
Plato, Meno and Theaetetus, In
Complete Works, J. Cooper, (ed.), (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company,
Inc., 1997), p. 186.
[5]Steup, Matthias,
"Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2014
Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/epistemology/>.
[6] Steup,
Matthias, "Epistemology", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
(Spring 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/epistemology/>.
[7]Ernest
Sosa, “Knowledge in Perspective”, Selected Essays in Epistemology, (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 54.
[8] Michael Huemer, Skepticism and the Veil of Perception,
(New York: Rowman and Littlefield,2000), p. 345.
[9]Susan Haack, “Evidence and Inquiry,”
Towards Reconstruction in Epistemology,
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), p. 67.
[10] Matthias Steup and Ernest Sosa,
(eds), Contemporary Debates in
Epistemology, (Malden (MA): Blackwell Press, 2005), p. 45.
[11] Roderick Chisholm, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd ed.
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentyice-Hall, Inc., 1997), p. 117.
[12]
Lawrence Bonjour, Epistemology: Classical
Problems and Contemporary Responses (2nd ed.), (New York: Rowman and Little
field Publishers, Inc., 2010), p. 159.
[13]Cf. Ernest Sosa, ‘Knowledge in
Perspective’, Selected Essays in
Epistemology, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 231.
[14] W. V Quine, “Epistemology
Naturalized.” In: Ontological Relativity
and Other Essays, (New York: Columbia Press, 1969), p. 70.
[15]Cf. Alvin Goldman, “Discrimination
and Perceptual Knowledge, ” The Journal of Philosophy1976, 73:
771–791.
[16] Keith Lehrer, Theory of Knowledge, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 121.
[18] Roderick Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing, ( Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press, 1982) p. 98.
[21] Cf. Laurence Bonjour, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge,
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 98.
[22] Robert Audi, The Structure of Justification, (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1993)p. 154.
[23] Ernest Sosa, “The Raft
and the Pyramid,” in Linda Alcof (ed.), Epistemology:
The Big Questions I(Massachusetts: Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998), p. 195.
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