WHAT IS JUSTIFICATION , WHY DOES IT MATTER IN EPISTEMOLOGY, THREE THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION.

WHAT IS JUSTIFICATION , WHY DOES IT MATTER IN EPISTEMOLOGY, THREE  THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION.

            Plato in the Thaetetus makes a distinction between knowledge and true belief. He argues in this dialogue that knowledge is not similar to true belief, and as such argues against the identification of knowledge as true belief simply on the grounds that a jury for instance may believe truly that a defendant is guilty, but not have strong evidence to claim knowledge to this effect. Something, then, is required for knowledge than mere true belief alone. From the Thaetetus, all that is needed for true belief to become knowledge is the right to believe or the justification of such a belief. It is this third condition that makes a true belief knowledge. A true belief, then, must be justified in order to be referred to as knowledge.

            Justification, then, in epistemology is a methodic speech act in which we advance or adduce reasons either in favour of or against any given motion. Justification could be either via positive or via negativa; it could also be inferential if a set of premises are needed in order to arrive at some justification or non-inferential if no premises are needed in order to arrive at some justification. Justification could also be prima facie which is based simply on face-value or ultima facie which is absolutistic (which we avoid in epistemology). Justification could also be synchronic (applicable to a certain expanse of space-time) or diachronic (traversing many regions of space-time slices). It could also be deontological (offered perfunctorily) or non-deontological (offered non-perfunctorily).

Why does Justification matter in Epistemology?

Justification matters a lot in epistemology because, it is imposed to rid of accidentally true beliefs or lucky guesses. It is a source of stability for beliefs.

Again, justification matters because it is part of the three (3) conditions that are necessary for knowledge since epistemology is the study of knowledge, precisely propositional knowledge which means ‘knowing that such and such.’ Knowledge without justification is incomplete. It is justification, true belief tied down to an account, that makes true beliefs attain the status of knowledge.

On the first condition of knowledge: Whereas knowledge entails beliefs in the sense that if a person knows something he/she must believe it, knowledge is not the same as belief. In Plato’s clarification, while belief is unstable and uncertain, knowledge is stable and certain. While knowledge is based on conclusive evidence, belief is not.

On the second condition of knowledge: Since knowledge cannot be referred to as belief, this leads to the second condition of knowledge, that is, truth. For a belief to be qualified as a knowledge claim, it must be true. But, belief even if it turns out to be true is not knowledge, unless, we have the right to believe it or that the true belief is justified (tied down to an account). This shows why justification is matters in epistemology. It is justification that confers epistemic status on our true beliefs. Akin knows that A if and only if 1) A is true 2) Akin believes that A and 3) Akin is justified in believing that A.

            Justification makes our true beliefs to be explained or defined in some philosophically convincing way. It really matters in epistemology because its absence greatly minimizes the legitimacy of one’s epistemic claims. It is a necessary condition for knowledge. It transforms mere true beliefs into knowledge and excludes beliefs arrived at via lucky guesses. Although one cannot have knowledge of a belief without justification, one can be justified in believing something which is false. But, despite these, justification still matters as its absence, makes epistemic utterances bereft of worth.

THEORIES OF JUSTIFICATION

            Three theories of justification are:

Foundationalism: Foundationalism is the epistemological view which holds that there exists privileged non-inferentially given and basic propositions whose truth and certainty can be obtained through direct and unmediated experience, and which confer justification upon all the other empirical non-basic propositions which are justified for a person. This tenet of foundationalism, is called the traditional notion of grand-totalizing narratives. These basic propositions are self-justifying and incorrigible. They are incorrigible not solely because they are infallible but because it is logically impossible to disprove them. From the above, the justified basic beliefs are like the substructure upon which the superstructure of non-basic beliefs rests and receive justification.

Two facts become clear, namely, first, foundationalism holds that there are justified basic beliefs. Second, foundationalism holds that all justified non-basic beliefs depend ultimately for their justification on justified basic beliefs.

Foundationalism is relevant to ideal life situations. Suppose for example, taking into account the stance of fallibilist foundationalism, someone says that a certain basket has four (4) oranges, and is asked how one knows. One would say that two oranges were there, and one just added another two. If asked why one is justified that they are four, one will say that the fact that two plus two is four, justifies one’s belief. This belief is the foundation upon which other beliefs rests. Foundationalism is the therapy that helps to cure the clinical condition which tries to sceptically posit the possibility of an infinite regress of justifications.

Coherentism: Coherentism is typically defended and defined by attacking foundationalism as a viable alternative. Coherentism, contra foundationalism, avers that knowledge and justification are structured like a web where the strength of any given area depends on the strength of the surrounding areas. Coherentists, then, deny that there are any basic beliefs and also deny that non-doxastic experiences can be sources of epistemic justification.

Coherentism makes justification an interconnection between beliefs. A belief derives its credibility from it playing a role in a larger system of beliefs. Coherentism is not atomistic but holistic. To be justified, a belief must fit in a justified system. The system is justified on how well it hangs together considered as a whole. Justification brings specific evidence for or against a specific claim.  Coherentists hold that whether a belief is justified depends on how well it fits or coheres with one’s beliefs.  Thus, the belonging of a belief to a coherent web of mutually supporting beliefs, confers a justificatory status on it. For this reason, coherentism is sometimes called a doxastic theory of justification. Such a theory holds that the only things that can justify beliefs are other beliefs, and the only things that can serve as reasons or grounds for a belief are other beliefs.

Coherentism is relevant to ideal life situations since, many of our beliefs seem to be reasonable or justified in virtue of the fact that they cohere or fit with our other beliefs. Suppose for example, a detective forms the belief that Smith stole some missing objects on the basis of his beliefs that Smith’s fingerprints were found at the scene, that a witness saw Smith in the area at the time of the crime, and that the stolen object was found in Smith’s room. His belief that Smith stole the object fits or coheres with the rest of his beliefs. In cases as this, the fact that a belief fits or coheres with the rest of one’s beliefs makes it reasonable and justified to hold such a belief.

Reliabilism: Reliabilism holds, roughly, that whether a belief is epistemically justified is a function of its being the product of a reliable belief-forming process. Reliabilism maintains that beliefs enjoy some epistemic status, ‘justification’ or ‘aptness’, in virtue of being the product of some truth conducive source, e.g. a reliable process. Alvin Goldman (1967), a reliabilist, argues that a belief is justified, or counted as knowledge only “if it is produced by processes that typically yield a sufficiently high ratio of true or false beliefs.” There has to be an appropriate causal connection between the knowledge claim and the appropriate belief, according to Goldman, and no claim should be made if such a connection does not hold. Thus, for a true belief to qualify as knowledge, it must be the product of some reliable belief-forming process. It is the reliability of our cognitive process that obliterates epistemic guesses, sheer lucks, and turns a true belief into knowledge. For reliabilists, some examples of such reliable cognitive processes include sense experiential processes, as well as cognitive processes like introspection, memory and rational intuition.

Reliabilism is relevant to ideal life situations. Suppose for example, a coffee in your cup tastes sweet to you. What makes this justified is not the possession of some evidence, but the fact that the processes in which they originate, perception, introspection, memory and rational intuition, are reliable.

            In conclusion, justification is widespread in ordinary thought, and is useful as it applies to plans, decisions, actions, hopes, wishes, fears, policies, judgements in a court of law and many other things. Justification is the only tool with which the epistemologist combats the sceptic, asserting the dual possibility of knowledge and justification of knowledge.