approaches and stages attempted by philosophers of science in grasping the progressive nature of science
INTRODUCTION
The
progression that takes place in scientific study is actually what makes science
different from other field of study. Getting the fuller knowledge of this is
the quest of striving to know what progress in science entails and its method
of progression. Karl Popper used “development-by-accumulation”
method to determine the progress in science. On the contrary Thomas Khun argued
against cumulative nature of scientific progression giving the reason that
there was a time of which conceptual continuity in science were interrupted by
periods of revolutionary science.
This
paper contains the discussion of those approaches and stages attempted by
philosophers of science in grasping the progressive nature of science which
includes the epistemic approach, semantic approach and the
functional-internalist approach and the orthodox, normal science and the
revolutionary stages. We shall be more concern with Kuhn’s approach to
scientific progress.
ORTHODOX
THEORY
Basic
to the Logical Reconstructionist, philosophy of science is a claim concerning
the theory-independence of observation reports. Orthodox theorists assumed that
the truth or falsity of observation reports can be decided directly without
appeal to sentences of the theoretical level. It was the orthodox position that
theory-independent sentences of the observational level provide bona fide tests
of theories. It was also the orthodox position that the sentences of the
theoretical level acquire empirical meaning from the sentences of the
observational level. Thus the theoretical level is parasitic upon the
observational level.[1]
Paul
Feyerabend suggested that the dependence had been misconstrued. It is
observation reports that are parasitic on theories. Feyerabend concluded that
the interpretation of an observation-language is determined by the theories
which we use to explain what we observe, and it changes as soon as those
theories change.[2]
One consequence of Feyerabend’s thesis is that the observational term–theoretical
term distinction is context-dependent. Peter Achinstein provided additional
support for this consequence.
ORTHODOX
VIEW OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
In
considering the disagreements between Karl Popper and the logical positivists,
it is clear that they all shared various similar views about the nature of
science[3]:
first, Science is said to be cumulative, which means that scientists build on
the endowment and success of their predecessor (increase in knowledge or
truth), Second, Science is unified in the sense that there exist only one set
of fundamental methods for all the sciences and that all natural sciences are
reducible to physics (reductionism) since everything in the world is made up of
the same basic stuff in their complex combination. Third, there is a
demarcation between context of discovery and context of justification. Fourth, there
is an underlying logic of confirmation or falsification implicit in all
scientific evaluations of the evidence for some hypothesis and such evaluations
are value-free, that is independent of the personal non-scientific view of the
scientists. Fifth, there is a definite difference (demarcation) between
scientific theories and other types of belief system. Sixth, there is a distinction
between observation terms and theoretical terms, and also between theoretical
terms and those that describe the result of experiment and seventh, Scientific
terms have fixed and precise meaning.
NORMAL SCIENCE
However,
what constitutes a science for Kuhn is a Paradigm, “A mature science is
governed by a single paradigm”[4]
The Paradigm sets the standards for legitimate work within the science it
governs. It orders the ‘puzzle-solving’ activity of the group of normal
scientists who work within it. The distinguishing characteristics of science
from non-science for Kuhn, is a paradigm capable of supporting a normal
science.[5] It
is embedded in the nature of a paradigm to belief precise definition. Normal
science involves:
1.
Increasing the precision of agreement between
observations and calculations based on the paradigm;
2.
Extending the scope of the paradigm to cover additional phenomena;
3.
Determining the values of universal constants;
4.
Formulating quantitative laws which further articulate the paradigm; and
5.
Deciding which alternative way of applying the paradigm to a new area of
interest is most satisfactory.
Kuhn
declared that: “normal science ultimately leads only to the recognition of
anomalies and crises. And these are terminated, not by deliberation and
interpretation but by a relatively sudden and unstructured event like the
Gestalt switch.”[6]
COMPONENTS OF A PARADIGM
Among these include the
explicitly stated fundamental laws and theoretical assumptions. Paradigms will
also include standard ways of applying the fundamental laws to a variety of
types of situation. A typical example is the Newtonian paradigm which include
the methods of applying Newton’s law to planetary pendulums, motion and
billiard-ball collisions etc. Another important component of paradigms includes
some general, metaphysical principles that guide the method and how works are
being carried out within a paradigm. Consequently, all paradigms contain
general methodological prescriptions.[7]
Moreover, according to
Alan, “normal science involves detailed attempts to articulate a paradigm with
the aim of improving the match between it and nature.”[8] .
These paradigms can be theoretical or experimental in nature. Using the
paradigms of Newton as an instance, theoretical puzzles involve devising
mathematical techniques for dealing with the motion of a planet subject to more
than one attractive force and developing assumptions suitable for applying
Newton’s laws to the motion of fluids. On the other hand, experimental puzzles
include the improvement of the accuracy of telescopic observations and the
development of experimental techniques capable of yielding reliable
measurements of the gravitational constant.[9]
REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE
Scientific revolution
means those non-cumulative developmental episodes in which an older paradigm is
explained in whole or in part by an incompatible new one. Kuhn rejected the
notion that scientific progress is cumulative, and argued that there are
periods in which such conceptual continuity in normal science were interrupted
by periods of revolutionary science[10]
Kuhn maintained that
logic of falsification is not applicable to the case of paradigm rejection. A
paradigm is not rejected on the basis of a comparison of its consequences and
empirical evidence.[11]
Rather paradigm rejection is a three-term relation which involves an
established paradigm, a rival paradigm, and the observational evidence. Science
enters a revolutionary stage with the emergence of a viable competing paradigm.
It might seem that what is required at this stage is a comparison of the two
paradigms and the results of observations. But such a comparison could be made
only if there is available paradigm-independent language in which to record the
results of observations. [12]
Given
a particular problem, two paradigms may differ with respect to the types of
answer deemed permissible. For example, in the Cartesian tradition, to ask what
forces are acting on a body is to ask for a specification of those other bodies
that are exerting pressure on that body. But in the Newtonian tradition, one
may answer the question about forces without discussing action-by-contact. It
suffices to specify an appropriate mathematical function.[13]
It
is important to note that for Alan, “Once a paradigm has been weakened and
undermined to such an extent that its proponents lose their confidence in it,
the time is ripe for revolution.”[14]
In this vein, Alan posits that, the level of commitment of a scientist from a
paradigm to an incompatible alternative is likened by Kuhn to a ‘gestalt
switch’ or a ‘religious conversion’. Again, there will be no purely logical
argument that demonstrates the superiority of one paradigm over another and
thereby compels a rational scientist to make the change. His reason for these
includes the fact that varieties of factors are involved in a scientist’s
judgment of the merits of a scientific theory. The second reason stems from the
fact that proponents of rival paradigms will subscribe to various sets of
standards and metaphysical principles.[15]
According to Kuhn, “the kinds of factors that do prove effective in causing
scientists to change paradigms is a matter to be discovered by psychological
and sociological investigation.”[16]
“A scientific revolution corresponds to the abandonment of one paradigm and the
adoption of a new one, not by an individual scientist only but by the relevant
scientific community as a whole.”[17]
The revolution will be successful if there is a spread which will include the
majority of the relevant scientific community, leaving only a few dissenters.[18]
Still on this, “The replacement of a degenerating program by a progressive one
constitutes Lakatos’s version of a scientific revolution.”[19] Several critics had complained that, in the
first edition of The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions, Kuhn had presented a caricature of
science. Watkins, for instance, thought that Kuhn had depicted science as a
series of widely spaced upheavals separated by lengthy dogmatic intervals.[20]
THE COPERNICAN
REVOLUTION.
A
good example of revolution is that of Copernican.
Ladyman posits that, initially Copernicus’ theory was no more accurate
than its Ptolemaic predecessor. The evidence on either side was never
conclusive, and there was much that the old paradigm could account for better
than the new one. Copernicus’ theory also faced formidable arguments that
seemed to refute it. One of the most compelling was the ‘tower argument’, which
goes as follows: consider what should happen if the Earth is moving and if a
stone is dropped from a tall tower. The base of the tower will move some
distance while the stone is falling, so the stone ought to land some distance
away from the base of the tower. Yet if such an experiment is performed the
stone is observed to land the same distance from the bottom of the tower as it
was from the top of the tower when it was released. Hence the Earth cannot be
in motion. Similarly, if the Earth is moving, why aren’t the objects on the
surface of the Earth thrown off as grains of sand placed on the rim of a wheel
are thrown off when the wheel is spun?
All of these arguments were known to
advocates of heliocentrism, and yet none could be satisfactorily answered
during the early stages of the Copernican revolution. So, as well as solving
some problems, the new theory raised all manner of new ones. Having explained
Kuhn’s ideas, James Ladyman now directed his attention on two philosophical
problems that have been widely discussed following his work.[21]
Even
though, Copernicus introduced revolution,
personalities like Kepler, Galileo, Descartes and others decided to embark on a
new paradigm, Copernican paradigm was not developed fully, and when it faced
many unresolved issues, this is when Isaac Newton went in to systematically
finish the Copernican revolution by giving a consistent physical explanation
that exposes the fact that the planets are ordered in their orbits by the
familiar force of gravity.
Kuhn’s evaluation of the Copernican revolution shows that, accurate
predictions of celestial event were not gotten, such as the position of the
planet, compared to the Ptolemaic system.
INCOMMENSURABILITY.
Speaking
on Incommensurability he posits that, it is a term from mathematics
which means ‘lack of common measure’. It
was adopted by Kuhn and another philosopher, called Paul Feyerabend, both of
whom argued that successive scientific theories are often incommensurable with
each other in the sense that there is no neutral way of comparing their merits.
The idea that competing paradigms are incommensurable is supported by the
theory-ladenness of observation; if it is true that all observations are
contaminated by background theories then the merits of each paradigm cannot be
compared by subjecting them to experimental test because the proponents of the
competing paradigms will not necessarily agree about what is observed. Theories
within different paradigms are incommensurable, in the sense that the terms and
concepts of scientific theories in different paradigms are not mutually
intertranslatable; this is called ‘meaning
incommensurability’. This seems to imply that there is no one way the world
is, but that rather the world we live in is an artefact of our theories about
it. Consequently, we cannot say that Copernicus discovered that Ptolemy and
earlier philosophers were wrong to think that the Earth revolves around the
Sun, because for Copernicus’ Earth is literally a different object from
Ptolemy’s.[22]
However,
Kuhn says that the agreement of the community is the greatest medium of
comparing theories, also in choosing between two paradigms is the decision
among incompatible modes of community life.[23]
He made comparison between scientific revolution and political revolution
stating that there is no legal way in determining which of the two competing
sect in a political revolution should be the superior, the same thing applies
as there is no rational medium to determine whether which paradigms in a
scientific revolution should be adopted. Thus, there is no perfect method
adopted by the verificationists in
the quest of making a choice between conflicting theories, because
it belongs to the very paradigms of which they seek to compare.[24]
In addendum, those observations that are proposed for the falsification of a
statement contains in one of the paradigms of which is to be compared, thereby
making it inappropriate for the quest. Kuhn’s arguments have been used by many in
support of relativism about scientific knowledge, their position is that
‘truths’ of scientific theories are determined in whole or part by social
forces.[25]
PROGRESS IN SCIENCE
For Kuhn, progress in
science is thus, “pre-science to normal science to crisis to revolution to new
normal science and then crisis…”[26]
What Kuhn is saying is that, the normal scientists articulate and develop their
paradigms in an attempt to account for the behaviour of some important aspects
of the real world as revealed through the results of experimentation. In doing these, they will unavoidably
encounter difficulties and apparent falsifications. These difficulties, if not
properly managed, a crisis state emerges. [27]
Furthermore, Kuhn believes that at cumulative acquisition of new
knowledge is rare and also not likely to happen in principle. Rather he
maintained that when a scientist sets out to solve a problem, he knows what he
is looking for. He gets unexpected knowledge that occur only when what he
captured about the world and his instruments for the analysis turn out wrong[28]
Thomas identified three (3) types of phenomena about which new theories
can be developed[29]
viz
I.
Phenomena already well
explored by existing paradigms.
II.
Phenomena whose nature is
indicated by existing paradigms, but whose details can be understood only
through further theory articulation.
III.
Phenomena that cannot be
assimilated to existing paradigms.
Thomas maintained that
the first of phenomena rarely provide a platform for theory construction.
Scientist focus more on the second type of phenomena they concern the
articulation of existing paradigms. The third type is the result following from
the failure of the second type. Once the paradigm cannot be fixed into existing
paradigm, thus occurs the birth of new theories. It is the opinion of Kuhn that
a successful new theory necessarily displaces the old in the process of
assimilation. Example, the principle energy conservation emerged from a tension
between the position of Newton and the position of Caloric theory of heat. The
principle of conservation of energy came to stay only after the rejection of
Caloric theory has been accepted as science.[30]
IMPORTANT APPROACHES USED IN DETERMINING SCIENTIFIC
PROGRESS
We
consider three approaches that have been used by philosophers of science to
define scientific progress:
1. The epistemic approach; the epistemic
approach indicates the progress in science gotten from the accumulation of
scientific knowledge, meaning that an era in science is said to be progressive
when there is discovery of new knowledge at end of such era. This view was held by logical empiricists like
Rudolf Carnap who sees scientific advancement as the discovery of higher-level
laws or theories which deductively entail lower-level ones.[31]
2. The semantic approach; the semantic
approach explains scientific progress in a manner of accumulation of true
scientific belief and thus not increasing knowledge. According to Karl Popper,
verisimilitude is a representation of the ways leading to the comprehensive
truth. He believed that even with the falsifiability of theories, they can
still be useful if they are tending towards the truth than their opposition.[32]
3.
The functional-internalist approach; this last approach was a deviation from
the other two approaches; Thomas Kuhn is one of the forerunners of his approach.
He believes that progress is achieved when a development in sciences is able to
accomplish a particular task (giving a solution to scientific challenges)[33]
Kuhn rejects the cumulative notion of progressive science held by both the epistemic
and semantic approach.
KUHN
VIEW ON ORTHODOX THEORY AND PROGRESS IN SCIENCE.
The
numerous criticisms of orthodoxy had a cumulative effect. Many philosophers of
science came to believe that something vital is lost when science is
reconstructed in the categories of formal logic. It seemed to them that the
proposed orthodox analyses of ‘theory’, ‘confirmation’, and ‘reduction’ bear
little resemblance to actual scientific practice.
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of
Scientific
Revolutions was a widely discussed alternative to
the orthodox account of science. Kuhn formulated a “rational reconstruction” of
scientific progress, a reconstruction based on his own interpretation of developments
in the history of science. But Kuhn’s reconstruction is not simply another
history of science. Rather, it includes a second-order commentary—a philosophy
of science—in which he presents normative conclusions about scientific method.
Kuhn developed this emphasis into a model of scientific progress in which
periods of “normal science” alternate with periods of “revolutionary science.”
For Kuhn, there exists a
similarity in characteristic between the historical studies of paradigm change
with the evolution of science[34].
He maintained that a new phenomenon might indeed occur without destructively
reflecting upon any sort of past scientific procedure, that is “a new theory
does not have to conflict with any of its predecessor.” He opined that as science
evolves, ignorance is replaced by knowledge and not replacement of one sort of
knowledge by another.[35]
As
mentioned above, Kuhn rejected the positions of the orthodox philosophers on
the progressiveness of science. Concerning the first position his argument is
that in the accumulation of knowledge
the history of science is not found but what is found is the neglected past
theories. [36]
Kuhn rejection to the second view was achieved by positing that a theory-testing
is not as straightforward as implied because, the conflicts between
experimental theories with scientific theory, Even though observation and
experience holds back scientific beliefs, they do not on their own determine
them. Kuhn refutation of the third, fourth and sixth views by explaining that
the evaluation of theories depends on local historical circumstances, and also
analysed the relationship between theory
and observation which suggests that theories infect data to a degree that no
means or method of putting observations together can ever be a neutral theory
and objective. His work entails that the worth of science helps in identifying
how each scientists develop new theories, and also to know which theories the
scientific community recognised as justified. An example is, Einstein (a realist)
never accepted quantum mechanics (product of instrumentalism), while many other
scientists did, and the dispute between them is not about the empirical
evidence in support of the theory, but about what is to be valued in scientific
theories. Kuhn made it known the important roles of psychological and
sociological factors in choosing or adopting a paradigm by a scientist.[37]
Kuhn’s
refutation of the fifth view is that in producing other beliefs system methods
and reasons that are of the same kind which leads to scientific knowledge could
be used. Concerning the seventh view he says fixed meaning are given to
scientific term meaning that theories within different paradigms are incommensurable,
this is to say that terms and concepts of scientific theories in different
paradigms are not mutually intertranslatable;
scientific terms is understood in accordance to their position in the
structure of a whole theory (Kuhn assumption). For example, is the different
meaning of ‘mass’ in Newtonian theory and Einstein’s relativity theory.[38]
CONCLUSION
“Since the 1960s it has
become common to conclude from this that a more adequate account of science
must proceed from an understanding of the theoretical frameworks in which
scientific activity takes place.”[39]
Theories in science are viewed as structures based on the history of science.
Hence Alan posits that “Historical study reveals that the evolution and
progress of major sciences exhibit a structure that is not captured by the
inductivist and falsificationist accounts.”[40] It is important to note that for Thomas Kuhn,
the traditional accounts of science do not bear comparison with historical
evidence, hence, his account of science developed to provide a theory in
accordance with historical situations as he saw it. His theory emphasized the
revolutionary character of scientific progress in which case, revolution
involves the abandonment of one theoretical structure and it been replaced by
another.
There are three stages in getting to this
scientific revolution this are pre-scientific stage, the normal science stage
and the scientific revolution stage itself, arrival to a scientific revolution
(adopting a new paradigm) is as a result of an anomaly faced by a paradigm in a
normal science which solution is not given thereby resulting in crisis, This
new paradigm is not compatible with the older ones.
Bibliography
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Chalmers,
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Craig. Scientific Progress.
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Kuhn,
Thomas. The Structure of Scientific
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Ladyman,
James. Understanding Philosophy of Science.
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Niiniluoto,
Ilkka (2011). “Scientific Progress”, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
[1] Cf. Cf. John Loose, An Introduction to the Philosophy of
science (4th edition
New York: Oxford University press, 2001) p 356-7
[2] Cf. Paul
K. Feyerabend, ‘An Attempt at a Realistic Interpretation 1 of Experience’ Proc.
Arist. Soc. 58 (1958), p 160–2
[3] Cf. James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science (New
York: Routledge Publisher, 2002), p. 96.
[4] Alan Chalmers, What is
This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), p.100.
[5] C.f. Alan Chalmers,
What is This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990) ,
p.101.
[6] Thomas
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 1 Revolutions,
1st edn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962). P. 121
[7] C.f. Alan Chalmers,
What is This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990),
pp. 101-102.
[8] Alan Chalmers, What is
This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), p.102.
[9] C.f. Alan Chalmers, What is This Thing
Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), p.102.
[10]Cf. International encyclopedia of unified
science, the structure of scientific
revolutions. P.92
[11] Thomas
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 1 Revolutions,
1st edn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).p. 147
[12] Thomas
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 1 Revolutions,
1st edn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.p.94
[13] Thomas
Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific 1 Revolutions,
1st edn. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).p. 147
[14] C.f. Alan Chalmers,
What is This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990),
p.106.
[15] C.f. Ibid. P.107-108.
[16] Alan Chalmers, What is
This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), p.108.
[17] Ibid. p.109.
[18] C.f.
Alan Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University
Press, 1990), p.109.
[19] Alan
Chalmers, What is This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University
Press, 1990), p.126.
[20] John
Watkins, ‘Against “Normal Science”’ in I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave (eds.), Criticism
and the Growth of Knowledge (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press,1970),p.31
[23] Cf. Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions
(Chicago: Uni. Of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 148. p. 94.
[24] Cf. A. F. Chalmers, op. cit., p. 94.
[26]C.f. Alan Chalmers, What
is This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), p.100.
[27] C.f. Alan Chalmers,
What is This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), pg.101.
[28]Cf. International
encyclopedia of unified science, the structure of scientific revolutions, pg.92
[29]Cf. International
encyclopedia of unified science, the structure of scientific revolutions. pg 97
[30] Cf. International encyclopedia
of unified science, the structure of scientific revolutions. pg. 98
[31] Cf. Craig Dilworth, Scientific Progress (Netherlands:
Springer Publisher, 2007), p. 19.
[32] Cf. Ilkka Niiniluoto
(2011), “Scientific Progress”, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2011/entries/scientific-progress/ (15th April
2015).
[33] Cf. Alexander Bird, loc. cit.
[34] Cf. International encyclopedia of unified
science, the structure of scientific revolutions, pg 94
[35]Cf. .
International encyclopedia of unified science, the structure of
scientific revolutions, p.95
[36] Cf. James Ladyman, op. cit., p. 97.
[39] Alan Chalmers, What is
This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), p.97.
[40] Alan Chalmers, What is
This Thing Called Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990),pg 97
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