Aristotle’s idea of moral virtue as expressed in the Nicomachean Ethics


Introduction
The choice of human conduct has been one of great importance to humankind since the beginning of existence. This is because human beings desire to be happy. There is possibly, a general agreement that the pursuit of happiness is that which drives every human action. However, there is no agreement as to what kind of human actions bring about happiness. Interestingly, one of the trends in contemporary society suggests that when one acts the way one feels like or engage in merely pleasurable human actions, it gives the person happiness. On the contrary, Aristotle, in his NicomacheanEthics, posits that happiness is found in acting in accordance to virtue.[1] Put differently, the happy life is the virtuous life.
Consequently, we purpose in this essay to attempt a critical exposition of Aristotle’s idea of moral virtue as expressed in the NicomacheanEthics by systematically presenting the contemporary relevance to our society. In doing this, we shall present Aristotle’s conception of virtue and the doctrine of the mean; afterwhich, we shall look briefly into his distinctions on the types of virtue and streamline our discussion to moral virtue. Thereafter, we shall highlight its contemporary relevance; then ageneral evaluation and critique of Aristotle’s concept of virtue shall follow afterwards.
1.0              The Meaning of Virtue
The book I of Aristotle’s ethics lays a ground work for what is known as the “virtuous character.” He explains that all human actions are aimed at some end or some good. However, since there are many apparent ends, the only end that meets the criteria for completeness is happiness since it is always chosen for itself and never because of something else. Hence, the ultimate good is Happiness.  The role of virtue comes to the fore as he explains that Happiness is acquired by virtue and it requires both complete virtue and complete life.[2]
The prelude to Aristotle’s teaching on virtue is in his recognition of the end (goal) of human existence. He identifies that the highest good of humans is Eudaimonia which is translated to happiness;[3] and opines that happiness is neither a gift of the gods to humans nor something acquired by chance.[4] But, Aristotle defines happiness as “an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.”[5] Hence, this definition inevitably leads us to the concept of virtue. Since virtue is regarded by him as an activity of the soul and so important for the attainment of happiness which is considered as the end of every creature, it is equally necessary for us to know how he defines it and how it can be attained.
According to Aristotle, “virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is as the prudent man would determine it.”[6]Thus, virtue is a state of the soul from which choice of action emanates. It is a trained faculty or habit of choice. With this definition and by the statement “virtue… consisting essentially in the observance of the mean”, Aristotle invariably hinges the understanding and practice of virtue to the understanding of the ‘mean’.The question before us then is: what is this ‘mean’?
1.1       The doctrine of the “Mean”
            Since the passions are capable of a wide range of action, from too little to too much, and virtue is concerned with our various feelings and actions, then, there is need to discover the proper meaning of excess and defect and thereby discover the appropriate mean. Hence, Aristotle tries to expatiate on this doctrine to enable a proper discussion on virtues.           
Explaining this doctrine, Aristotle employs the use of the concept of ‘mean’ first as merely a mathematical image but, he has no intention of invoking a mathematical meaning for it. He adds that the ‘mean’ can be said to be the ‘locus’ of value (virtue), while the extremes of excess and defect are the ‘loci’ of disvalue (vice). Hence, the doctrine of the mean presupposes that an excellence of character is a state often flanked by two vices, one of excess and one of defect, that is, of too much and too little. Courage, for instance, is the ‘mean’ state between rashness and cowardice. Hence, he lists twelve virtues flanked by their contrary vices.[7] He considers therefore,that “excess and deficiency are a mark of vice, and observance of the mean a mark of virtue.”[8]
            Aristotle asserts that “By the mean of a thing, I denote a point equally distant from either extreme, which is one and the same for everybody; by the mean relative to us, that amount which is neither too much nor too little, and this is one and the same for everybody.”[9] Consequently, in defining virtue, Aristotle was careful to say that in choosing among actions and feelings, the mean is individually determined. In fact, the mean is not the same for every person, nor is there a particular mean for every act. Each mean is relative to each person inasmuch as the circumstances vary. It is virtuous for instance, a woman selling “Garri” to make her sales at the end of the day and from her gain, gives a portion to beggars around her. It is vicious, however, for her to give to the detriment of her children at home. Hence, Aristotle holds the view that true virtue is found in the mean.In this regard, what is ‘mean’ to one person, may be an ‘excess’ or ‘deficiency’ for another.[10]Nevertheless, the concept of the mean presents an idea of a standard choice that each moral agent has to refer to.Therefore, the true character of a mean is that:
Ø  it is not a mean for everybody; not an arithmetical proportion. It is a mean for this or that person.
Ø  the mean is universal in the sense that it should be seen to be a mean for anybody in that situation; it should agree with the nature of the mean.[11]
The central theme of this doctrine is that right conduct is incompatible with excess or deficiency in both feelings and actions, for it is in the nature of moral goodness that they are destroyed by excess or deficiency but preserved by the ‘mean’. These entire attempts to understand the doctrine of the ‘mean’ is to enable us understand what Aristotle means by virtue since the ‘mean’ shows the true nature of virtue and how virtue is practiced. Meanwhile, applying this to his idea that happiness consists in an activity of the soul in accordance to virtue, we can rephrase this statement as follows; happiness consists in acting in accordance to the mean of two vices, as dictated by right reason.[12] To have a better understanding of practical virtue, let us consider the types of virtues.
2.0              Types of Virtue
From our story of the NichomecheanEthics, it is evident that Aristotle’s investigation into the nature of virtue is closely tied to his discussion on the nature of human soul such that it is illogical to successfully distinguish between different types of virtues without first investigating into the faculties of the soul. For Aristotle, the soul is part rational and part irrational.[13] The irrational part is further subdivided into the nutritive and the appetitive soul. The nutritive soul is the cause of growth or reproduction while the appetitive soul is inclined towards the emotions; though it (appetitive part) can be controlled by reason and thus, considered rational. Hence, it is to this appetitive part that ethical virtues and vices belong.
Moreover, the rational part of the soul is also subdivided into the speculative (scientific) soul and the practical (calculative) soul. The speculative soul aims simply at knowing while the practical soul is geared towards particulars and contingent realities and aims at actions or productions.[14] However, the attainment of truth is the task of both the scientific and calculative parts of the rational soul.
With these distinctions on the faculties of the soul, Aristotle hereby adds that “virtue, too, is divided into classes in accordance with this differentiation of the soul. Some virtues are called intellectual and others moral…”[15] With this, he makes a clear distinction between two types of virtue, virtue of thought (Intellectual virtue) and virtue of character (moral virtue). Intellectual virtue is acquired through learning or instructions. They are qualities of the mind such as wisdom, understanding, judgement. Moral virtues consist in the habit of always choosing the golden mean between two extremes, directed thereto by the intellectual virtue of prudence or practical wisdom.
To begin with, it must be noted that virtue here for Aristotle refers more particularly to the moral virtues such as generosity and temperance. That is, virtues which are more practical than theoretical, like the intellectual virtues of wisdom and intelligence. As it were, Aristotle considers the moral virtues as having a more direct influence on our happiness than the intellectual virtues.[16] Since our topic is limited to Moral virtue, our discussion shall proceed with it.
2.1       Moral Virtue
            Aristotle defines moralvirtue alongside its corresponding opposite, vice, as “… a quality disposing us to act in the best way when we are dealing with pleasure and pain, while vice is one which leads us to act in the worst way when we deal with them.”[17] For him, to act in the best way is simply to act in accordance with reason and to act in the worse way is to deviate from the dictates of reason. Hence, for Aristotle, a harmonious interplay of emotions and reason leads to an excellence of character. With this, Aristotle seems to have placed on reason a mark of infallibility as though reason does not lead one to error or act viciously once ones emotions are played out in accordance with reason, for reason moderates the emotions.In addition, it is necessary to have the right disposition to the right things and for the right actions.
Notably, habituationis the process through which one receives the constant disposition to act virtuously;and it is given prime importance in moral virtues, because ethical excellence arises from habituation. These moral excellences are not born with humans nor are they developed by nature, but are rather “adapted by nature to receive them and are brought to perfection by habituation.”[18] Aristotle however, insists that moral excellences are necessarily built up by repetition of individual acts as in acquiring art: “we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts…”[19] It is only by behaving in the right way, that we train ourselves to be virtuous.  For him, we all are born with the potential to be morally virtuous. Just as a musician learns to play musical instrument, we learn virtue by constant imitation of a virtuous person/act, practicing or repetition, until we reach our perfection through habit.  When through habituation, one becomes a just person, which is as a result of the repetition of a particular response in the past; he/she equally attains the disposition to the same response in the future. In other words, if an individual’s acts are constantly just, the individual develops the moral excellence of justice, which is a fixed disposition to respond in a just way in all situations. This is, however, different from the case of an individual who is occasionally just. Such a person cannot be said to possess moral excellence of justice. This obviously poses a fundamental question; how can merely imitating a virtuous person result to being virtuous? We can say that Aristotle tried to answer this question when he explained that merely doing as a virtuous person does is not sufficient for us to be virtuous. Rather, one must do what a virtuous person does in the way he does it.[20]
            Similarly, moral evil or vice develops in the same way, by habituation, for one is said to be vicious, if the person has a consistent and persistent disposition to act viciously, that is, missing the ‘mean’ and inclining always either to the excess or defect of a particular action or emotion. The same powers of emotion and action which produce good acts also produce evil acts to develop corresponding vices as Aristotle will put it: “it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly in every art.” In fact, the goal of moral virtues is to rationally organize the human passions.
            For those who presume that a particular virtuous act makes them virtuous, Aristotle explains that to act virtuously is different from being virtuous. Consequently, he proposes three criteria for making a distinction between acting virtuously (by accident) and being virtuous:
Ø  the person must know that he/she is doing virtuous actions, that is, proper knowledge
Ø  he/she intends toact virtuously for its own sake, that is, it is chosen deliberately
Ø  he/she does the actions from a well-established habit, firm and certain  disposition[21]
In addition, Aristotle goes further to discuss the role of pleasure and pain in moral excellence. In a strictly Aristotelian sense, the pleasures or pains that an action causes in the moral agent may serve as an index of moral progress, since good conduct consists in a proper attitude towards pleasure and pain. Expatiating, Aristotle gives this example:
A man who abstains from bodily pleasures and enjoys the very fact of so doing is temperate; if he finds it irksome, he is licentious. Again, the man who faces danger gladly, or at least without distress, is brave; the one who feels distressed is a coward.[22]
3.0       Contemporary Relevance of Aristotle’s Idea of Moral Virtue to Our Society
Aristotle’s views as we have exposed so far are obviously of high esteem and relevant in our situation today than it ever was. Virtue ethics for its part carries with it the legacy of Aristotle’s work. Although, action is also very important, but it is what motivates the action (disposition) that is basically emphasized in virtue ethics.Hence, we shall consider its relevance from the perspective of the individual, family and state.
Aristotle’s idea that the moral virtues are formed via habit, as are the corresponding vices is still relevant today especially to a moral agent. By virtue of his/her exceptional quality of deliberating well, the agent through free choice, is capable of the right management of his/her own acts with a view to his/her personal uprightness. Due to the consistent moral propriety of their actions, they become an epitome of moral conduct so that those who lack virtues look up to them so as to learn to act according to right conduct. Also, since habituation plays an important role in moral life, we experience daily, through their way of life, the distinction between a virtuous person and a vicious person. We also see in some of our daily encounters that some habitsa person manifests repeatedly in most cases, become difficult to stop, for example; smoking, lying, and drinking. Consequently, the emphasis on the importance of forming good habits out of virtuous actions becomes more relevant.
In addition, moral virtue is also relevant in the families. It has to do with right administration or proper direction and ordering of the affairs of a family. The moral agent due to his/her inestimable moral worth, coupled with his/her rich repertoire of experience in life is able to order the moral lives of the members of the household.
Moreover, moral virtues provide to political leaders, the rightful management of the affairs of the state. By virtue of the moral agent’s ability to deliberate well and to marshal the right means to their appropriate end, the leader is able to regulate the conduct of the people through good laws and their executions. In the Nigerian context for example, where many of the citizens drift in the direction of utilitarianism, egoism, and selfish interests; where many of the political leaders consider the rightness of what they do based on the gains they are able to make, regardless of the number of fellow citizens that suffer from their acts, where corruption has become the bane of the day, the relevance of Aristotle’s virtue ethics here cannot be overemphasized since it aims at ordering the state, not just in their virtuous acts, but that which involves the right disposition to do what is good. Hence, Aristotle posits that “the best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself, but he who exercises it towards another.”[23]When virtuous leaders are elected and good policies are made, it positively affects the citizens also. Hence, since it is the individuals that make up the society, it is impossible to have a bad society if the individuals are virtuous.
On the other hand,MacIntyre also sees the importance of Aristotle’s idea of Virtue when he makes the connection between Aristotle’s theory and western religious traditions,viz:
No doctrine vindicated itself in so wide a variety of contexts as did Aristotelianism in Greek, Islamic, Jewish and Christianity. Hence, when modernity made its assaults on an old order world, its most perceptive exponents understood that it was mostly Aristotelianism that had to be overthrown.[24]
This simply implies that the connection was (and still is) very tight between Aristotle’s notions and the many doctrines of the western religions.
4.0       General Evaluation and Critique of Aristotle’s Concept of Virtue
Moral virtues enable humans, in the light of their conception of the good life in general, to perceive what, say generosity, requires of them, or more generally, what virtue requires of them in the particular case, and it motivates them to act accordingly. Thus, moral virtue will save a person from giving too much or too little through the doctrine of the mean; or even to the wrong causes, in particular instances (where the act of charity is concerned).
One hallmark objection that is often cited against Aristotle’s ethics is Immanuel Kant. An aspect of Kant’s views is his claim that virtue is not a "free skill" unless it is free acts of moral will which in adopting a rule, also declares it to be a universal law.[25] Whereas Aristotle sees the mean as individually determined, Kant sees moral virtue as universal. Moral virtue is considered the same way no matter the circumstance and personality. Though Aristotle considers it both universal and individual, but the question we can ask is: can moral virtue be considered only as relative?
Be that as it may, the fact that Aristotle’s concept of moral virtue is that which must not elude anyone interested in living a meaningful moral life does not mean that the concept is sacrosanct. One of the problems considered against Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean is that it may sometimes be difficult to objectively identify a person of virtue because one will have to consider the frequencies of the person’s virtuous acts, disposition, and most importantly, reason for action which is hard to ascertain. We know of cult leaders and political leaders, who are revered and followed by many in Nigeria today. They sing their praises and sometimes hold them in high esteem because of some infrastructures, they may have provided, whereas their motives most times are not genuine. Is this not a vicious act under the disguise of virtue?
Furthermore, if virtue is associated with constant disposition to act rightly; could it not be said that former South African President, Nelson Mandela orMother Theresa of Calcutta, and other respected people of virtue could have changed before death? Hence, objective identification of people of ‘consistent’ virtue is a problem in Aristotle’s virtue ethics. Also, in the whole concept of virtue, there is a glaring omission of the importance of education by reasoned instruction.[26] Thus, if the good is always necessary, how can one without formal education identify it?
Conclusion
Our aim from the beginning was to carry out a critical exposition of Aristotle’s idea of moral virtue as expressed in the NicomacheanEthics. In order to achieve this,we presented Aristotle’s conception of virtue and the doctrine of mean; afterwards, we looked briefly into his distinctions on the types of virtue, streamlined our discussion to moral virtue, considered the contemporary relevance anddid a general critique of Aristotle’s concept of virtue.
From our study and analysis of Aristotle’s virtue ethics, we have learned that moral virtue is both in the rational and appetitive part of the soul, but they are present in different manners. They consist in the habit of always choosing the golden mean between two extremes, directed therefore by the intellectual virtue of prudence or practical wisdom.
By and large, despite the Criticisms leveled on Aristotle’s ideas, it is clear to us that his views are not to be regarded as out dated or irrelevant in our time and society, for if the individuals try to live a life of virtue, not just exteriorly, but with a right disposition from the interior, we will find ourselves in a better society. Hence, it is imperative that we think about situations in terms of virtues. Rather than ask, ‘could everyone do this?’ (as Kant suggests); we can ask a better question: ‘would this action be kind, courageous or loyal?’ If we think of actions as expressions of virtue, this could be very helpful practically. Thus, we can simply state that in the light of Aristotle’s concept of virtue, contemporary society may never find happiness until it begins to seek virtue rather than vice and deception.


[1] Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 7, 1098 b2- 30.
[2] Cf. Ibid., Bk. I, Ch. 9, 1100 a5.
[3] Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 7, 1097 b2-21.
[4] Cf. Ibid., Bk. I, Ch. 9, 1199a32- b20.
[5]Ibid.,Bk. I, Ch. 9, 1099 b21-1100a9.
[6]Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 6, 1106b24-1107a21.
[7]Cf. Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 7, 1107b18-20.
[8]Cf. Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 6, 1106b24-1107a21.
[9] Cf. Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 6, 1106a27-b24.
[10]Cf. Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 6, 1107b18-20.
[11]Jude O. Mbukanma, MoralEducationInAristotle (Ibadan: Newborne Enterprise, 2000), p. 73.
[12] Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, 1107 a, 5.
[13]Cf.Ibid., Bk. I, Ch. 13, 1102a 17.
[14]Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 6, Ch. 2, 1139a16-b2.
[15]Ibid.,Bk. I, Ch. 13, 1102b28-1103a10.
[16] Cf. Ibid.,Bk. I, 1103 a, 5- 1103 b, 30.
[17]Ibid.,Bk. II, Ch. 3, 1104b20-1105a9.
[18]Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 1, 1103a14-b1.
[19]Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 1, 1103a14-1103b1.
[20] Cf. Ibid., Bk. II, 1105 a, 5.
[21] Cf. Ibid., Bk. II, 1105 a, 30.
[22]Ibid., Bk. II, Ch. 3, 1104a33-b20.
[23]Ibid., Bk. VI, Ch. 6, 1134a23-b8.
[24]Alasdair  MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), p. 118.
[25]Cf. Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, third edition, translated byJames Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), pp. 66 – 67.
[26] Cf. Jude O. Mbukanma, MoralEducationInAristotle, p. 70.

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