CAUSES OF NATURE. PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE.

INTRODUCTION

Philosophy of Nature is concerned with universal causes or principles of motion in the natural world. Having treated the universal principles of motion, the definition of nature, causal explanations in the science of nature, the character of motion in general, the infinite, place, time, kinds and divisions of motion, we now take a look at the cause of motion, i.e. ‘the efficient cause’ of motion.

In the course of our discussions, some basic questions or problems will be encountered. Such questions include; Is there a universal efficient cause of mobile being? Who or what is the prime mover? What is the relationship of the movers? Is there an infinite series of movers essentially subordinated to each other? If not, is there a first mover?

We shall examine this topic following closely the order of thought by Aristotle in Book seven of his Physics.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

In order to avoid ambiguities in the course of the presentation, we shall define certain terms used in the work:

Motion: It can be defined as the fulfillment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exists potentially. In terms of the mover and the moved being in contact, motion can be defined as ‘the fulfillment of the movable qua movable’, the cause of the attribute being in contact with what can move, so that the mover is also acted upon.

Cause: It simply means ‘that which produces an effect; a person or thing that makes something happen. Again, it may mean ‘the reason for something; a factor that justifies something; an aim, a principle or a movement that is strongly defended or supported.

Efficient Causes: They are prior conditions, entities or events considered to have caused a thing. They are the primary source of change (motion) or rest. It is that which brings something about. They explain the process by which a thing came into being.

KINDS OF MOTION AND THEIR MOVERS

There are three kinds of motion- local (locomotion), qualitative (alteration), and quantitative (growth). There are also three kinds of movers- that which causes locomotion, that which causes alteration and that, which causes growth.

Locomotion: This is the motion, which results to a change of place in so far as the object is capable of changing place. It is the movement of a thing from one place to another. For instance, the motion of Johnson from class to the chapel.

Alteration: This is the qualitative change of a thing or a body. For example, the alteration of water from cold to hot. It is the mutation of a quality.

Growth: This is the quantitative motion, which leads to an increase of the subject, which suffers growth.

CATEGORIES OF MOBILE MOVEMENTS

In a series of moved movers, mobile objects are moved simultaneously, at the same time and are continuous which makes them seem to be infinite in number. Since everything that is moved is moved between two termini, the motion of the infinite mobile objects is finite and one in number. The motion must be one in different ways considering the termini. Motion can be generically the same, specifically the same or numerically the same.

It is generically the same if it belongs to the same category e.g. substance or quality.

It is specifically the same if it proceeds from something specifically the same to something specifically the same e.g. from white to black or from good to bad which is not of a kind specifically distinct.

It is numerically the same if it proceeds from something numerically one to something numerically one in the same period of time and the mobile object must be numerically the same e.g. from a particular white (one in number) to a particular black (one in number) or from a particular place to a particular place in a particular period of time.

INFINITY OF MOTION

Views held by earlier philosophers

Democritus held that the world came to be by the chance aggregation of atoms, which are per se indivisible and always mobile. Things he asserts came into existence as a result of atoms combining and others passed out of existence as a result of the same atoms disintegrating. Democritus and other philosophers of the same school of thought assert the infinity of motion.

Anaxagoras held that there was a time whereby everything was ‘stand-still’ resulting from things mixed together and therefore at rest for an infinite past until mind separated things from one another.

Empedocles also denied the infinity of continuous motion, positing that motion has alternated with rest in cycles.

Aristotle’s Arguments

‘Everything that is in motion must be moved by something’. He also maintains that “motion always existed”

In a series of movers where one moves another there is no actual infinite series. Why? Because there must be a prime mover, which is the primary cause of motion.  In a series that are only accidentally subordinated to each other, an actual infinity is possible e.g. a chicken comes from an egg, an egg from another chicken and the other chicken from yet another egg. In this kind of unending series where the movers operate in succession (i.e. not together) they are accidentally subordinated to one another since as in the case of the chicken, the parent chicken need not be here and now influencing the hatching of an egg; in fact it may even be dead.

In movers essentially subordinated to each other, the mover is here and now influencing another. For instance, in the collection of water with a bucket from a well, there is only an accidental subordination of the bucket to the hand and in fact the agent may no longer be alive when his bucket is still being in use. Yet there is an essential subordination of the rope to the hand that is here and now pulling the bucket. If there is no actual infinity in the series of causes here and now operating in such movers as the pulling of water from a well, the blowing of a leaf, or the evaporation of water, then the series of movers, being actually finite must come to an end. This means that there must be a prime mover, which is the primary cause of motion.

Therefore, in a series of movers where one moves another, there is actually no infinite series, and so there must be a first mover, which is unmoved. If there is then a first mover which is unmoved, it follows therefore that before the first mover acted, there should be no motion. How then does he propound that motion has always been?

Aquinas critique of Aristotle (Motion has always been and will never cease)

In trying to modify Aristotle’s view of the cause of motion, Aquinas disagrees with him on the issue that ‘motion has always been’, but agrees with him that motion ‘will never cease’ in so far as some men still remain.

On the former (motion has always been), Aquinas deems it entirely contrary to the faith, for faith holds that “the substance of the world indeed began”, yet so as never cease. On the latter (motion will never cease), faith agrees with this, especially in men who will always remain, living an unceasing life either in happiness or misery. On the former, motion has always been, he opines that:

·         Mobiles and the movers at one time came into existence. They did not always exist but began to exist from the universal cause of all existence. But that presupposes another change with movers and mobiles, since nothing comes from nothing, Only the first mover always existed. Or saying

·         That they are eternal. The mobiles were not previously in that disposition in which they now are, because previously they did not exist. Then motion could never begin without some change in the mobile or the movers, disturbing the rest of all things. Their existence came through a coming forth from the first principle of things..

Thus, motion is destined always to be. This is because, from something never comes nothing. Every change comes from a subject and results to something else, matter being indestructible.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE MOVER AND THE MOVED

Since it is already a well-established fact that ‘quid movetur, ab alio movetur’ (whatever is moved, is moved by another), we will be discussing here, the relationship or simply the contact between the mover and the moved. This principle (of contact/relationship) explains that everything in motion requires a cause, for if the moved has not the source of its motion itself, it is then necessary that something else causes its motion.

One may ask and rightly too: how does the mover cause or impart motion on the moved? In answer to this, it is good to inform us that for a mover to impart motion, there is a link, a relationship, a sort of contact between the mover and the moved. In fact, according to Aristotle, it is just natural that the moved and the mover be in contact especially as they lie adjacent to each other. Motion being defined as the fulfillment of the movable qua movable, the cause attribute must be in contact with what can move so that the mover is also acted upon. This contact is distinct in the instance of an efficient cause whereby the agent must necessarily be in contact with the material in use.

Particular Cases of Contact between the Mover and the Moved

Before we move on to give our arguments in support of the contact between what is moved and what causes it, it is important we know that there are some exceptional cases where there is no direct contact between the mover and the moved. Such exceptions include final cause, which can be distant, gravitational motion, motion imparted by magnet, and the motion of a projectile after it has been thrown. But we can still say that there is an initial contact between the mover and the moved as in the case of a projectile.

In the case of a magnet, one can still argue that there is a contact since the object will not be moved unless it is within the magnetic field with the force attracting it to the body of the magnet.

Bearing this in mind, we can now move a step further in the proof and explanation of the contact between the mover and the moved in the different kinds of motion-local, qualitative and quantitative.

Contact in Local Motion:

The principle of contact of the mover with the moved is evidently clear in local motion since everything in local motion moves itself or is moved by something else.

In the things that are moved by themselves, they are moved primarily and per se and have in themselves the principle of motion. It is a fact that the moved and the mover are together, for they contain within themselves their first movers so that there is nothing in between. One part, i.e. the soul moves the other part, i.e. the body showing that even in those things which seem to move itself, it is still moved by another.

The other things which do not have within themselves the principle of its own motion, but this principle is extrinsic, it is clear that they are moved by another. The motion of things that are moved by something else must proceed in one of four possible ways that correspond to the four kinds of locomotion caused by something other than that which is in motion. These kinds of locomotion are: pulling, pushing, carrying and twirling. All forms of locomotion are reducible to these; thus

Pulling is a situation when a thing or body moves another towards itself and not separated from that which it pulls. Place pulls that which is naturally moved to a place e.g. when pleasure attracts a man, magnet attracts iron, gravitational pull of a body, assimilative processes of the body is a sort of pulling while all the excretive processes of the body are examples of pushing

Pushing on is a form of pushing whereby the cause of motion follows that which it pushes as far as it continues to push the object away from itself.

Pushing off is a situation whereby the mover does not follow up the thing it has moved. This could be said to be pushing apart. The mobile object breaks off from the mover and continues

Throwing which is more violent than natural locomotion is reducible to pushing off since the mover causes the motion away from itself. In this case, the thing moved continues its processes so long as the motion imparted to it controls it; an example is the motion of the bullet from a gun.

Carrying and twirling can also be reduced to pulling and pushing. Whatever is carried is in motion accidentally, because it is in or upon something that is in motion per se and that which in motion is being either pulled or pushed or twirled, thus carrying belongs to the other three kinds.

Twirling by its own nature is a compound of pulling and pushing because that which is twirling a thing must be pulling one part of the object and pushing another part since it impels one part away from and another part towards itself.

If therefore, it can be shown that, that which is pushing and that which is pulling are adjacent respectively to that which is  pushed and that which is pulled, it will be evident that in all kinds of locomotion, there is nothing intermediate between the moved and the mover so that there is contact between the two.

Contact in alteration:

To understand this section, it is good that we call to memory the definition of alteration given earlier on (as the mutation of a quality of an object). The argument that there is no intermediate between that which causes alteration and that, which undergoes alteration, (and as such, contact between the two) can be proven by simple induction.

Things that undergo alteration are altered in virtue of their being affected in respect of their affective qualities, since that which is of certain quality is altered in so far as it is sensible, and the characteristics in which bodies differ from one another are sensible.

Bodies differ from one another in possessing a greater or lesser number of sensible qualities, or in possessing the same sensible quality in greater or lesser degree. Thus, we can say that two different black shirts contain different degrees of black pigment; or that two different buckets of hot water contain the quality of hotness in different degrees- one is the hotter and the other is less hot.

The alteration of that which undergoes alteration therefore, is caused by the above mentioned characteristics, which are affections of some particular underlying quality. This is to say that things are altered as they appeal to the senses. We refer to things as being altered in respect to our sense perception, bearing in mind our sense organs. Thus, we say that a thing is altered by becoming hot, sweet, thick, dry, white, etc. The flavor for example is adjacent to the sense of taste so that the sense of taste is altered from bitterness to sweetness. We know that the salt can never alter the taste of the soup if there is no coming together of the two. In hearing, the primary mover in respect to the moved (sound waves) is air, and we cannot hear anything if the sound waves do not come in contact with the ear drums; and the same in smelling.

So, inductively, from the above argument, we say that there is also a contact between what causes and what undergoes alteration.

The figure and shape of a thing cannot be altered because it does not have regard to a thing’s affection. When a thing has been affected or altered, we cannot call it by a new name e.g. we do not call the statue ‘bronze’ or the table ‘wood’, rather we speak of the thing (the altered thing) as being bronze or wood; being dry or hard or hot.

Acquired States: Acquired states whether of the body or soul are not alterations. Some are excellences i.e. perfection of a thing’s nature and others are defects i.e. perishing of or departure from a thing’s perfection. Excellences and defects depend upon particular relations. Bodily excellences therefore such as health and a good state of body, we regard as consisting in blending of hot and cold elements within the body in due proportion in relation either to one another or to the surrounding atmosphere. Relatives are not subjects of alteration or of becoming or in fact any change whatever.

Neither states nor processes of losing or acquiring states are alterations though it may be true that their becoming or perishing is necessarily the result of the alteration of certain other things on which the states primarily depend. Excellences dispose its possessor to be unaffected by these influences or to be affected by those that ought to be admitted while defects dispose its possessor to be affected by them or to be unaffected by those that ought to be admitted.

States of the soul: The states of the soul are not alterations; neither can the processes of losing or acquiring them be so, though their becoming is necessarily the result of an alteration of the sensitive and the intellectual parts of the soul. The sensitive part is altered by sensible objects. Those that depend upon action are determined by sense perception and those that depend upon memory or anticipation are traced also to sense perception.  Pleasures and pain are alterations of the sensitive part of the soul. Loss and acquisition of these states must be the result of alteration of something else. Though their becoming (i.e. loss and acquisition) is accompanied by an alteration they are not themselves alteration.

The intellectual part of the soul: It is much more true of the possession of knowledge, that it depends on particular relation. That which is potentially possessed of knowledge becomes actually possessed of it not by being set in motion itself but by reason of the presence of something else- the senses. ‘Knowing’ and ‘Understanding’ shows that the intellect has reached a state of rest and then come to a fixed and there is fixed and there is no becoming that leads to a state of rest.

Alteration or being altered occurs only in sensible things and in the sensitive part of the soul and only accidentally in anything else.

Contact in quantitative motion:

This section sets out to prove also that between what suffers and what causes increase, there is no intermediate. Whatever causes increase does so from the fact that it attaches itself to that which suffers increase and the two become one. So also is decrease, caused by a part of the thing becoming detached. So, that which causes increase, and that which can decrease must be continuous with that which suffers increase and that which suffers decrease respectively. E.g. in the case of growing, what is added to an organism by way of nourishment, must be in contact with the organism before it can be assimilated. And if two things are continuous with each other, there can be nothing intermediate between them.

CAUSE OF MOTION

For different philosophers cum scientists, there are different causes of motion. Some posit that Force is the cause of motion, others have Mind as the cause, yet others have the Free will as the ultimate cause of motion. Aristotle has a view different from all these other views. In his postulation of series of motion, he later adds that there cannot be an eternal series of motion because basically, there will be a first mover and a first moved in the series. Though there are different causes of motion in the series, there is an ultimate cause of motion which though causes motion but is itself uncaused and unmoved. This uncaused cause he calls the Prime Mover, the Unmoved, the Mover of the first principle, which for Aquinas is God.

So, for Aristotle and Aquinas, ‘The Unmoved Mover’ is the first mover in the series of movers. He is not in motion but imparts motion, and as such, he is the ultimate Cause of motion. And if he does not act, there will be no motion as he is the initiator of motion.

MODERN SCIENCE APPLICATIONS OF EFFICIENT CAUSE OF MOTION

Rationalist’s application: Descartes and Spinoza argues that efficient causes are necessary and sufficient to account for the workings of the world. Spinoza was perhaps the most straight forward defender of the view that necessitation means implication. Causes logically necessitates their effects and conversely, they are themselves logically necessitated by effects which Newton sees as being inherently symmetrical as illustrated in his laws of motion.

Spinoza made a distinction between ‘Free causes’ and ‘Necessary causes’. Whereas Free causes act from the necessity of their own nature (and therefore the initiators of a change), Necessary causes are necessitated by other causes. God is the only Free cause by which is meant that, though He simply had to create what He did, He was not forced to do this by some external cause. He alone exists and acts from the necessity of his own nature. Only God is a genuine cause, other movers either necessitates or are necessitated.

Empiricist’s application: Notable among them is John Locke. Basic to Locke’s approach to the concept of causation is the idea of power. He held the Aristotelian belief that causes are substantial powers put to work; power being the source from whence all Action proceeds. The substances wherein these powers are when they exert this power into Act are called Causes and the substances with thereupon are produced are called Effects. This principle was used in Newton’s second law of thermodynamics to differentiate causes from their effects.

Modern Physics application: Modern day Physics shall go into extinction without the application of motion; and the meaning of motion cannot be grasped without its causes. Newton in his first law of motion states that “every object continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line unless acted upon by an external force”.  Having established that everything in nature moves and is moved by something, modern physics in agreement to this states that there must be a mover which acts upon a thing before it moves and this mover in modern physics is called Force. Without this efficient cause, “Force” on a thing, there is no motion. Motion is like the body of Physics while the cause of motion is like the soul since it affects every part and topic in physics which deals with movement. Newton in the interpretation and application of the laws of motion adopted the efficient cause. Applying it to this equation, F= ma, F being the applied force which is the efficient cause on a mass m of an acceleration a. This is also the guiding principle in electromagnetism. Once the object enters into the field of the electromagnetic object, the force within the field attracts the object to itself. That force is efficient cause.

CONCLUSION:

From the above discussion on the cause of motion as expounded by Aristotle, having exposed his views on the efficient cause of motion and the deductions which led him to posit that motion has been and will never cease. Coupled with its subsequent critique by Aquinas, a great enlightenment has been given especially about the mover and the moved which are in contact in locomotion, alteration and growth.

Thus, a body which is cold becomes warmed; an inert body is moved locally. What is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot, but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore, impossible that in the same respect, a thing should be both mover and the moved simultaneously. Whatever is moved must be moved by another consecutively unto the first unmoved mover who is God.

One must critically and affirmatively too, endorse that the philosopher has really improved our knowledge of the science of nature. In this regard, it is left for us to avail ourselves of this opportunity of building on an already laid foundation for the harmony between nature and us.