CERTITUDE AND SKEPTICISM
v 10/10/2011
F Abstract
Since the dawn of modernity, skepticism
has been a recurrent issue in the unfolding of philosophical consciousness in
the philosophical tradition. The presence of skepticism in this context
provokes diverse response.
Epistemology as First Philosophy express
an ideal of philosophy which takes as its primary task the justification of
knowledge and by proxy the defense of the ideal of philosophy as love of
wisdom. This orientation, that is, the ideal of Epistemology as First
Philosophy defines the odyssey of philosophical consciousness from Descartes to
Hegel. The presence of skepticism in philosophy generates a destructive
influence as far as the status of Epistemology is concerned. The problematic
status of Epistemology in contemporary time is the ideal of justification.
The failure of the ideal of justification
is the failure of Epistemology itself. This ideal of philosophy, seeing philosophy
as love of wisdom, invites a deconceptualisation of the nature of philosophy.
The negative influence of skepticism is a factor in the emergence of
philosophical current in the 20th century such as Phenomenology,
Deconstructionism, and Existentialism. All these philosophical current thrives
in philosophical skepticism.
On the one hand, the presence of
skepticism in philosophy encourages a massive development of systematic
philosophy but in the contemporary settings, the problem of skepticism provides
a pivot for systematic philosophy which renders the nature of philosophical
consciousness low.
Now our task in this course having said
all this is to explore the various reactions generated by the presence of
skepticism in relation to the status of epistemology as it relates to
philosophy itself. Specifically, we shall focus on such theories as Kant,
Rorty, MacDowell, and Maritain. In exploring their various contributions to the
problem of knowledge presupposes the entire development from Descartes to Hume.
After the preliminary attempt, we shall
turn our attention to the brief discussion or the brief situation before Kant
focusing on the Cartesian and reaching its consummation in Hume. We shall focus
on Kant, Bradley, MacDowell; Maritain shall be attended to respectively. We
shall also consider the general implications for their various positions on the
nature of philosophy.
F Course outline
1.
Preliminaries
2.
The problem of
justification in context.
3.
The Cartesian initiative
and its consummation in Hume
4.
Reid’s critique of the
ideal system
5.
Kant and the External
World
6.
Hegel and the External
World
7.
Bradley and the External
World
8.
Rorty and External World
9.
MacDowell and the
External World
10.
Maritain and the Problem
of Knowledge
11.
Epistemology,
Justification and the Nature of Philosophy
12.
Conclusion, Revision and
Examination
F Bibliography/
Sources
1.
Class lectures and notes
2.
Bradley F. A: Writings of
Logic
3.
Collinson: 50 Major
Philosophers
4.
G.W.F. Hegel:
Phenomenology of Spirit
5.
Kant Immanuel: Critique
of Pure Reason
6.
Rorty Richard: Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature
7.
Stumpf S.E: Element of
Philosophy
8.
Woolf Robert: About
Philosophy
F
Term Paper submission:
After Christmas break – Not more than 300 words.
v
14/10/2011
F
The
Problem of Justification in Context.
We need
to engage in a preliminary discussion in order to situate in context the
problem of justification. This preliminary discussion on justification is to
set the stage for addressing the problem of skepticism as found in the history
of modern philosophy in terms of some representative thinkers like Kant and
Hegel, Bradley and Rorty, McDowell and Maritain.
Before
this, there is the need for us to say something about the problem of knowledge.
Certitude and skepticism is another variation of the problem of knowledge. The
problem of justification is a problem in Epistemology as regards the nature of
knowledge and the central point in the definition of knowledge, what are the
nature and condition of knowledge. What is the essence of knowledge? It is in
the context of the defining the nature of knowledge that the problem of
justification emerges. Since the issue is to define the nature of knowledge,
there is a correlation between Epistemology and the problem of justification; with
the understanding that knowledge is Justified True Belief, knowledge.
If
knowledge is Justified True Belief, the task of epistemology could be concerned
to provide a justification which implies providing a proof. To justify
something is to provide reasons or grounds of which this reason could be
accepted. In the case of knowledge, what is required is reason or proof.
Epistemology is a discipline that provides grounds for accepting that there is possibility
of knowledge.
This
preliminary is that the problem of justification arises in the context of
skepticism which demonstrates that we cannot know anything with certainty. It means
that doubt cannot co-exist with knowledge. It means that in any attempt to
justify knowledge, epistemology would resort to the search of certitude, that
is, truth beyond doubt. From the foregoing, we can already see the influence of
skepticism in the context of justification. Thus skepticism is what gives rise
to the need to justify knowledge in the face of the challenge of skepticism.
The problem of epistemology can therefore be construed as the problem of
justification.
The
concept of justification implicates the concept of epistemology and skepticism.
There are constellations of concepts that arise in the concept of skepticism.
Epistemology must provide the possibility of knowledge. If epistemology is able
to provide such justification, it means that epistemology will be able to
defend certainty in knowledge and refute skepticism but if otherwise, it means
that skepticism will triumph. Epistemology tries to provide justification for
knowledge and epistemology must be seen to fail in its effort to defend
knowledge if it fails to contend the challenge of skepticism.
At this
juncture, it is important to know that a certain understanding of knowledge is
presupposed, namely, the understanding of knowledge as Justification. On this
view, we can equate knowledge with justification and this equation is still
very much under the influence of skepticism since in the skeptics’ denial, there
is an implicit desire for the knowledge that knowledge cannot coexist with
doubt. If we are not sure about our knowledge claim, this will be sufficient to
invalidate such knowledge claim.
The
epistemologist understands the argument of the skeptics if the possibility of
knowledge must be sustained. This is the implicit standard for knowledge. Does
that mean epistemology accepts the philosophical cogency of the attack of the
skeptics on knowledge? Of course it does namely, that knowledge cannot coexist
with doubt. This is the position of the skeptics. If we must justify knowledge,
we must demonstrate that which we know with certainty. If we cannot know with
certainty, we have no claim.
The
skeptic’s attack on knowledge is unsustainable. This means that for both the
skeptic and the epistemologist there is a common premise that agrees on which,
on the one hand, the standard plays a deconstructive role on the position of
the skeptic on knowledge. On this view, the stipulated standard cannot be
realized. The conclusion is the negation of the possibility of knowledge. The
epistemologist on the other hand, affirms that the standard can be realized. In
view of this consideration, the major task of epistemology in its campaign
against skepticism is to prove that knowledge cannot coexist with doubt. The
standard plays a constructive role for the epistemologist since the argument is
to defend the possibility of knowledge.
As we
have seen, the standard that knowledge cannot coexist with doubt is shared by
both the skeptic and the epistemologist. For the skeptics, the standard plays a
deconstructive role in that for them, we cannot have certain and indubitable
knowledge. For the epistemologist on the other hand, the standard plays a
constructive role in that for the epistemologist, certain and indubitable
knowledge is possible. The epistemologist accepts the standard and uses it to
make a case for the possibility of epistemology. If epistemology can find a
justification that measure up to this standard of knowledge, then, it can rejoice
against the attack of skepticism.
Skepticism
therefore sets the agenda for epistemology and this could be seen in a way that
the project has been concerned particularly in the case of justification. We
are familiar with the classical definition of knowledge as Justified True
Belief. The goal of epistemology is to portray a different situation, that is,
to suggest that it is possible to know something with certainty and it does
that by not focusing on skepticism’s denial of the possibility of knowledge.
What epistemology does in order to secure knowledge is to provide a definition
for knowledge and in doing so it sees the possibility of knowledge against the
position of the skeptics
Epistemology
attacks this knowledge constructively while the skeptics attack it
deconstructively. The preoccupation of epistemology is on what is knowledge and
in doing that, epistemology analyses knowledge
into its basic components. The skeptics say that knowledge is not possible. If
knowledge is possible, what then is knowledge? The approach of the
epistemologist to the issue is positive. Yes, knowledge is possible and as such
they set out to define knowledge to meet the requirements as set by the
skeptics.
The main agenda of the skeptics is to analyze
knowledge as not possible. Traditionally, in attempt to provide a
definition of knowledge, epistemology has engaged in the analysis of knowledge
with the hope that a clear analysis of the content of knowledge would enable us
to understand the true nature of knowledge. This has led to the three
components of knowledge, namely; Justification, Truth, and Belief.
Belief
is necessary for knowledge but that is not sufficient. Something more is needed,
and that is Truth. This implies that for a belief to pass as knowledge, that
belief must be true. In other words, it is not sufficient to believe something.
Mere belief will not amount to knowledge. Yet as necessary as truth is, when we
apply truth to what we believe, can we say that that is sufficient for
knowledge? If not, then, it cannot be a case for knowledge. For something to
qualify as knowledge, that thing must be true.
Furthermore,
for a thing to be true there must be evidence (justification) to show that such
is the case. This then is what has been regarded as the classical definition of
knowledge namely, Justified True Belief. The most important aspect of this
definition is justification (evidence). If we believe something and such is
true, it is still possible to say that we do not have a knowledge claim. There
must therefore be evidence to substantiate our knowledge claims. When we have
these three components attached to our knowledge claim, then we can say that
our knowledge is justified in that context. If we have belief and the belief is
not true, it is not possible to regard such belief as a case of genuine
knowledge. We can claim to have knowledge if and only if what we claim to know
is supported with evidence or justification.
In
approaching this matter, the epistemologist is accepting the importance of
justification. It accepts this consideration but the question is whether the
evidence is sufficient. If the evidence is not sufficient, can we talk of
knowledge? We have evidence but the
evidence is not sufficient according to the skeptics. The fundamental question
is whether the evidence we have is sufficient to sustain our knowledge claim.
This was what Gettier discovered in his argument against the traditional
definition of knowledge as justified true belief. In so far as the evidence is
not sufficient, one is still vulnerable to the challenge of skepticism and the
only way to deal with that is to discover enough evidence to substantiate our
knowledge claims. Of course epistemology does take all these into account.
Since
epistemology is to fight the problem of skepticism, the epistemologists can
make concessions that not all evidence are sufficient. As such, setting for
himself the task of meeting the requirements of knowledge and he does this by
searching for justification for our knowledge claims. To overcome the challenge
of skepticism, epistemology must provide a sufficient ground to substantiate
what we claim to believe. So the burden of proof is on the epistemologist to
show an adequate evidence for believing what we claim to be the case.
F Representation and the External World
Our
preliminary discussion has tried to cast light on the problem of justification.
We have seen some of the problems of justification already in terms of the
classical definition of knowledge as justified true belief. We shall now
present the matter alternatively between representation and the external world.
The correlation between belief, truth, and evidence (justification) can be seen
in terms of the issues arising from the question of the relationship between
representation and the external world. The issue remains the same except that
it presents itself uniquely and there is basis for arguing for the possibility
of knowledge.
Knowledge
concerns the knower and the known; subject object relationship. Knowledge
always involves the relationship that goes beyond the subjective domain to the
objective domain. From the standpoint of the problem of justification, we have
the basis of affirming the relationship between the external world and representation.
There is a relationship between representation and the`` external world or the
objective domain of reality.
Knowledge
presupposes that objectivity and not subjectivity. Knowledge includes we
guarantee a sustainable evidence that is subjective rather than objective. Clearly,
what needs to be investigated is the nature between representation and the
external world which is objective rather than subjective. The possibility of
knowledge has been justified whether or not if we do not have the relationship
between the representative and the external world.
It is
easy to see the issue of the nature of the relationship between representation
and the external world as to the problem of justification. The problem of
justification between representative and the external world is a reformation of
the classical definition of Justified True Belief. We transcend the domain of
mere belief to the domain of subjectivity. The case is that what we believe is
not only in the domain of the subjective belief but we need to add truth to it.
You
cannot sustain that P is true unless you have a ground to back-up that P is
true. What guarantees that is that we have sufficient claim which is the
evidence. If we add justification to what we believe, then it is no more
subjective thing but can be seen objectively. If you cannot move beyond the
domain of mere belief, it means that skepticism is true. But if we move beyond
mere belief, then skepticism is not true.
The
problem of a reformulation of knowledge is that the challenge of skepticism
remains the same and have caused comes the relationship between the subject and
the object. It is a task of epistemologists
to be able to show that the relationship between representation and the
external world is not only subjective but objective as well. The focus is
on the connectivity of representation and the external world. For the skeptic
say that the connectivity cannot be objective but the epistemologists says the
connectivity cannot be subjective but more than subjective. If this is so,
then, skepticism is overturned. There is a correlation between the challenges
of epistemology and that of the skeptics in relation to the problem of
justification.
The
task of epistemology is that representation is subjective but more importantly,
is to say that representation is also objective. Two definitions of knowledge
can be seen from the classical definition of knowledge as Justified True
Belief; and the relationship between representation and external world which is
to accentuate the problem of justification and the challenge of skepticism.
v 17/10/2011
We have
tried to present the basic issues involved in the problem of justification that
knowledge is possible. We presented this in two basic formulations: first, the
classical definition with the analysis of knowledge as belief, truth and
evidence (Justification). Second, the problem of the relation between
representation and the external world. Having engaged in this clarification,
the next point to consider is the implication of this scenario for the nature
of epistemology as you know very well, that epistemology is not a new
discipline. It is as old as philosophy itself.
Many
ancient philosophers were preoccupied with the nature of knowledge. Thanks to
Plato in analyzing knowledge into its basic component of Justified True Belief.
We can remember that the sophists provoked Plato to discuss the problem of knowledge.
The mode of its manifestation is not the same. Its mode of manifestation has
witnessed different configuration and the new evidence is the declassification
in the modern period. This however, is being propelled by the skeptics. Plato
did not dwell on that justification as a sufficient consideration for
knowledge. It is only at the start of the modern period that this point became
definitive and this means that knowledge becomes justification and without
justification, we cannot talk of knowledge. Meaning that without it we cannot
accent the possibility of knowledge. And the need to insist by that point was
motivated by the problem of skepticism.
It is in
this context that epistemology becomes first philosophy. This is what defines
the peculiarity or manifestation of epistemology in the modern period. Evidence
is seen as the sufficient means for knowledge. What do we mean by epistemology
as First Philosophy? Epistemology as First Philosophy implies that the problem
of knowledge assumes precedence over the problem of reality or metaphysics. This
is because before we cannot fail to address the problem of reality without
addressing of knowledge. The problem of knowledge becomes a precondition for
the problem of metaphysics
If the
problem cannot be solves, there is no need to attempt to solve the problem of
reality. What is the point of investigating the nature of reality? If this is
to be done, we need to be sure that it is possible to know and if it is not
possible to know, then, we cannot conduct anything on the nature of reality
itself. This means that philosophy is in trouble.
If it is not doubtful whether or not we can actually know, such
enterprise as epistemology is not worth the trouble. What we are trying
therefore is to accentuate the importance of epistemology as First Philosophy.
The idea of epistemology as First Philosophy is tailored by addressing the
problem of skepticism.
The skepticism is not only attacking knowledge but also metaphysics.
The skeptic is saying that we cannot truly know and that all our knowledge
claims belong to the domain of belief and as such, belief cannot give us
certain knowledge. Our claim to know is not objective therefore. If this is
correct, the implication for all branches of philosophy is evident.
Epistemology is seen as the defender of knowledge. According to the
skeptics, the epistemologists are……………way positive and that is why epistemology
is called First Philosophy; showing to the skeptics that there is
possibility to know otherwise if this is not possible then, philosophy is
sufficient.
The
problem of knowledge on the view of epistemology as First Philosophy, the most
fundamental problem that require to be out is the problem of knowledge before
any other thing because epistemology is said to be First Philosophy. It is
important to see the image of epistemology because it is seen as savour of
knowledge and by extension, of philosophy as well. Epistemology serves
knowledge and also philosophy as well.
At the
beginning of the modern period, the common assumption is that we have to
address the problem of knowledge before addressing that of metaphysics. This
then becomes a point of departure for addressing the problem of metaphysics.
That was a heavy investment in the history of philosophy since what needed to
be overcome is skepticism. The status of metaphysics and philosophy as such in
presenting itself as First Philosophy epistemology does so in full
consciousness as a threat to the whole of philosophy. And in addressing philosophical
problems, epistemology takes into account the logic of the skeptics that
knowledge cannot co-exist with doubt and as such, knowledge is equated with
certitude.
Epistemology
is aware of the logic but in other to upset the logic, the epistemologist will
accept the demand for certainty. If the requirement for certainty could be
obtained, then it will allow epistemology to argue for the possibility of
knowledge. What does that have do with the status of philosophy. The
epistemologists are saying that the requirement for certitude which according
to the skeptics cannot be obtained, but which according to the epistemologists
becomes a search for certitude in other to satisfy the requirement for
knowledge. If the requirement is satisfied, then, the logic of skepticism is
invariably nullified.
Epistemology
is therefore preoccupied with the search for certainty but also in the broader
context it is in search of the problem of justification. This whole
understanding of epistemology as First Philosophy designed to address the
problem of skepticism will be viewed with scrutiny and the definition of epistemology
as Justified True Belief will be questioned as well as the idea of epistemology
as First Philosophy.
Skepticism
motivated the challenge of epistemology as First Philosophy. Without the
challenge of skepticism it won’t have been necessary to know epistemology as
First Philosophy. By addressing the problem of justification for the present
purpose, it suffices to know whether it is a manifestation for the search for
certitude.
v Conclusion
By way
of conclusion, there are three broad positions which include:
1.
The position of the skeptics that it is
not the case that we can find justification between representation and the
external world. Knowledge does require absolute certitude. In actual fact,
according to the skeptics, we cannot find total certainty.
2.
The position of epistemology with skeptics
is that epistemology share the idea of absolute certitude. The epistemologist
argues for the possibility of knowledge that we can provide successful
justification for the relationship between representation and the external
world. The modern era also attempted to grapple with the challenge of
skepticism.
3.
The final position is association with
contemporary philosophy whether we really need epistemic justification in the
search for knowledge. On the one hand, the epistemologists say that a
successful justification of knowledge is possible but the protagonists say it
is not possible. To gain knowledge, we need to bring to the fore the
relationship between representation and the external world.
Epistemology
purportedly provides an understanding of knowledge in a positive way as
Justified True Belief. The claim of the epistemologist is to invoke that
evidence becomes a mode for acquiring knowledge.
v
21/10/2011
F The Cartesian Initiative and its
consummation in Hume.
·
Introduction.
Having
completed our preliminary discussion on the problem of justification, we should
see immediately the entire discussion for the rest of what will follow in the
course especially the Cartesian initiative and its consummation in Hume. For
our discussion, epistemology is defined in terms of the quest for justification
and the concrete result is that in the domain of epistemology, there are
several theories of justification with each theory claiming to defend the
possibility of knowledge against the attack of skepticism. Such theory began
with Descartes and includes such thinkers as Locke, Berkeley and Hume.
Our
purpose is to examine these theories especially the inner logic that drives the
unfolding of the overall argument of epistemology on behalf of knowledge from
Descartes to Hume. In considering these theories, two issues needs to be kept
in mind:
First, it is important to know that is it
one thing to claim we have justification for the possibility of knowledge and
the other, to claim that theory is successful. Of course both are open to
inspection, that is, whether it is an authentic claim to availability of
justification we can find out if this is the case or not. We can find out if
the possibility of justification is actually successful with regards the
possibility of knowledge. If the project of epistemology cannot be said to be
successful, this means that the challenge of skepticism remains successful. The
struggle between skepticism and epistemology is therefore like a ding-don
affairs in the modern context.
Most epistemologists will claim success
for this theory of justification and it is good to know whether they are
successful actually and if they are not, then we have to look for a better
theory of justification.
F Cartesian Initiative.
The
term Cartesian is an adjective of Descartes just as Kantian is an adjective of
Kant. Cartesian is something attributed to Descartes. Since Descartes is
regarded as father of modern philosophy and as such the father of modern
epistemology. Strictly speaking, modern philosophy is epistemology.
Epistemology as First Philosophy involves an accentuation of the problems of
knowledge such that the problem of knowledge is said to be a precondition for
philosophy. Descartes is at the very center of the epistemological term that is
why it is proper to regard him as the father of modern epistemology.
Having
said that, I do not think that there should be any equivocation regarding the
relationship between Descartes and the ideal of epistemology as First
Philosophy. If Descartes is the father of modern epistemology, and if he is
successful to the ideal of epistemology as First Philosophy, it means that much
of what we said under the topic: the topic of epistemology in its correlation
with the problem of justification in response to the challenge of skepticism
should be applicable to Descartes since he ascribe the ideal of epistemology as
First Philosophy.
For
that reason, what should be paramount is to try immediately to establish the
nature of the Cartesian initiative. In trying to clarify the nature of
Cartesian initiative, we do not need to repeat that it is in respect to the
challenge of skepticism and Descartes is foremost in providing such response to
the challenge of skepticism and this response id paradigmatic to the challenge
of skepticism that is why it is called Cartesian initiative before reaching its
consummation in Hume.
In
clarifying the nature of Cartesian initiative, the whole idea is to indicate
that subsequent attempts is derived from this initiative noted for the problem
of knowledge and this will enable us to see how ideas get inspiration from that
of Descartes.
The
first point regarding the nature of Descartes’ initiative is his recognition
that knowledge cannot coexist with doubt. Put differently, if our knowledge is
infested with any iota of doubt, it means that the authenticity of that
knowledge is undermined. It means that the phenomenon of doubt plays a pivotal
role. Descartes will begin by allowing that the position of the skeptic is
right. Descartes will agree with the skeptics in other to overturn the position
of the skeptics. This is what he did in his universal methodic doubt.
In the
first meditation, he attempted to doubt everything in an attempt to finding
something indubitable – that is, the belief that there is something beyond
doubt. He agreed with the skeptics that knowledge cannot coexist with doubt in
other to attain certain and indubitable knowledge. The idea is that if indeed
there is one and if only that thing is resistant to doubt, Descartes believed
that that implies that a standard of knowledge as absolute certitude can be
fulfilled. In other to do this, he was forced to conduct an experiment of
doubting everything he comes across that is doubtable.
There
are several moments in Descartes’ methodic doubt. Descartes eventually came to
a point that something cannot be doubted and that is the truth of his own
existence. The discovery of the cogito marks an important moment in the
challenge of skepticism. It brings about the application of the universal
methodic doubt. The truth of truth cogito is the foundation upon which
Descartes is to build the entire edifice of knowledge.
We have
moved from Descartes’ response to the challenge of skepticism via the nature of
the universal methodic doubt to the notion of the cogito upon which we can rest
the entire edifice of knowledge.
BR.
PASCHAL’S NOTE
We
should begin by looking at Descartes response to the challenge of skepticism as
a prelude to how his initiative later consummates in Hume. In order to do this,
let us quickly consider Descartes relationship to the ideal of epistemology as
First Philosophy. In view of our previous discussion, if Descartes is an
epistemologist, we should expect that he should subscribe to all the
correlations we established earlier, that is, the correlation between
epistemology and skepticism, between justification and skepticism and
epistemology on the one hand and the representation and external world on the
other hand, Descartes indeed is regarded as the Father of Modern Epistemology,
meaning in effect like many epistemologists still do, Descartes recognizes the
threat that skepticism constitutes to knowledge. Consequently, if knowledge
were to be shown to be possible in response to the position of the skeptics,
the test of epistemology becomes inevitable. How does Descartes go about
dealing with the challenge of skepticism?
With
the assumption that we are not dealing with Descartes for the first time, we
need to presuppose certain grounds before hands. The point we need to keep in
mind as a point of departure is that Descartes recognizes that skepticism is a
philosophical position as we pointed out earlier. If it is a philosophical
position, it means that the position is predicated on a premise and then the
premise leads to a certain conclusion, namely the negation of the possibility
of knowledge. So in his challenge to the response of skepticism, Descartes will
take into account the logic that permeates the argument of the skeptic. He
wants to see whether the conclusion that harnesses to the premise is correct.
Of course at the offset the heart of the
premise informing the skeptic argument against the possibility of knowledge is
the phenomenon of doubt. The assumption that doubt cannot coexist with
knowledge, which means that the condition of knowledge is absolute certitude.
Descartes appreciates this point of the skeptic in saying that doubt cannot
coexist with knowledge, that certitude is the condition for knowledge, yet the
question remains whether doubt should necessarily warrant the negation of
knowledge. If doubt necessarily implies the negation of knowledge, then, it
means that the skeptic will be right but if it were possible to pass through
the root of doubt to knowledge by way of overcoming doubt with doubt, then, it
will imply that perhaps the skeptics have not properly articulated the true
nature of the relationship between doubt and knowledge. That is what Descartes
will try to do. He will try to show that even though doubt cannot coexist with
knowledge, as the skeptic says, it is still possible to arrive at certain
knowledge
Take
note that in saying that doubt cannot coexist with knowledge and thereby
legislating for an implicit standard of knowledge, the skeptic is saying that
if any belief is infested with any iota of doubt, then we cannot sustain any knowledge
claim with respect to the belief in question. Put differently, the skeptic
argues that it is impossible to be totally free from doubt with respect to any
belief we entertain. Then if that is the case, it means that it is not possible
to entertain certain knowledge in any circumstance, since in any case our
beliefs are always infested with some degree of doubt and if doubt cannot
coexist with knowledge and our beliefs suffers for certain doubt, then it means
that we cannot guarantee the possibility of knowledge in any circumstance. But
Descartes wants to prove precisely the opposite because the skeptic is saying
that we can know nothing with certainty.
It
means we cannot guarantee the possibility of knowledge in any circumstance
whatsoever. However, Descartes wants to prove precisely the opposite because the
skeptic is saying we can know nothing with certainty deriving from the nature
of doubt in his relationship with knowledge. Knowledge is synonymous with
certitude this is the implicit standard the skeptic legislates. The skeptic
argues that this requirement could not be meet and to that extent, it means
that knowledge is not possible.
If
it were possible to satisfy the condition, it means that the position of the
skeptics would be overturned. If you could show that, there is one thing that
could be known with certainty that will be sufficient to disprove the position
of the skeptic. Therefore, it means that the phenomenon of doubt plays a
pivotal role in the position of the skeptics. If we are to understand the
philosophical nature of the argument of the skeptics, we need to understand the
status of the phenomenon of doubt in that argument.
Descartes
appears to be aware of this. He knows that the argument of the skeptics is a
philosophical argument. He knows that the argument is predicated on the
phenomenon of doubt and the role it plays in the skeptic strategy. He knew that
there is a correlation between doubt and skepticism in the argument of the
skeptic. He knew that if epistemology is to take on the challenge of
skepticism, epistemology will need to take into account the logic of skepticism
given that it is a philosophical argument. Epistemology would not respond
adequately unless the response is philosophical and for the response to be
philosophical and adequate to the matter, it means that response has to follow
the logic of the argument.
This
means that for epistemology to defeat skepticism, it has to study skepticism
thoroughly with respect to the structure of its argument and when epistemology
thoroughly understands the structure of the argument, and then it can
counterattack and possibly overturn that position in favour of an affirmative
position of the possibility of knowledge. To do this implies that one is ready
to confront the skepticism on its very ground, meaning that the battle would be
fought on the issue of the nature of doubt ad how to correctly perceive its
relationship with knowledge. Descartes will confront skepticism on its own
ground and for this reason; he will begin by allowing the possibility that the
skeptic is right in saying that doubt cannot coexist with knowledge.
In
other words, the logic of the standard of knowledge is certitude but were he
will disagree whether of not we can find anything that is certain and how we
can find it, if such a thing exists. Of course, Descartes believed that there
is something that is certain. However, it is one thing to believe that there is
something cetin and another to prove it. The skeptic requires a proof and not
just a belief or convictions. The skeptic requires a demonstration of the validity
of one’s conviction that something can be known with certainty. A person can
believe that something can be known with certainty but without demonstrating
it. In this respect, the person has not actually responded philosophically to
the argument of the skeptics. This implies that Descartes will begin by
agreeing with the skeptics that we can know nothing without certainty.
But
while provisionally going along with the skeptic that we cannot accept any
knowledge claim as authentic if it is infected with an iota of doubt, Descartes
would want to show that we can know something with certainty. In other words,
he would want to overturn the position of the skeptic by precisely going along
with him by doubting (provisionally), anything that is doubtable.
That
is a concession to skepticism but that is a very tricky concession because by
granting that very concession, he wants to use that very process to overturn
the position of the skeptics y showing that in the process of doubting all that
is doubtable, one discovers that there is something that is indubitable. This
is largely what he does under the heading of Universal Methodic Doubt – that is
Descartes’ preoccupation in the First Meditation.
Here
he attempts to doubt everything that is doubtable and his overall motivation is
to find something that is indubitable. It is as though Descartes believes
fundamentally that there is something that is beyond doubt. However, the fact
that he agreed to doubt everything that is doubtable does not make him a
skeptic. If he is a skeptic in any sense, then we have here a case of
Methodological Skepticism and indeed his universal Methodic Doubt is a form of
Methodological Skepticism, a skepticism that seeks to affirm the possibility of
knowledge by exploring the root of doubt. This method is therefore a strategy
used to discover knowledge and to disprove the position of the skeptics. It
means the alliance with the skeptic is only provisional and not ultimate.
As
a strategic measure then, Descartes would provisionally agree with the skeptic
in doubting everything that warrants the least doubt as means of attaining that
which is indubitable. The idea is that if indeed there is one thing that proves
resistant to doubt, then, it means that the position of the skeptics cannot be
sustained. Descartes therefore believes
that that implicit standard of knowledge as absolute certainty can be
satisfied. But in order to show that that condition can be satisfied, Descartes
is forced to conduct a thought-experiment that takes him through a process of
doubting everything. This process eventually uncovered that which is
indubitable. In other words, one uses doubt to arrive at that, which is
certain. That is the motivation of Descartes’ Universal Methodic Doubt.
We
do not need to dwell too much on the various ramifications of Descartes’
methodic doubt but one thing is clear. There are several moments in Descartes’
application of the methodic doubt. All his beliefs were subjected to doubt. He
divided his beliefs into various categories:
1.
Beliefs deriving from the sense, this is
divided into two categories.
(a)
Belief in objects that are distance from
you but are nonetheless accessible to observation. Example: the auditorium from
this point is a distant object; the secretariat is even a more distanced object
from this point but you are not a distant object because you are very close but
the cassette even close than you and my cassock is very closer to me than the
table but they are all examples that are close to you.
Therefore,
the object can be distant but nonetheless accessible to observation. It could
also be close. The one that is easier to doubt is the distant object while the
closer objects are less doubtable but they are nonetheless doubtable. This is
what Descartes would try to show in addressing the second category of the
object of doubt.
Correlating
with those two categories of beliefs deriving from the sense is the argument
from sense deception. This applies to distant objects like a sunny-day you are
driving on the street and think that there is water on the road but as you get
closer, you discover that there is no water, that it I a mirage, an appearance
but not reality. That is argument from sense deception to prove that belief s
deriving from the senses is doubtable. They can be doubted but he is looking
for one thing that cannot be doubted in other to overturn the position of the
skeptics. The methodic search therefore for that one thing that could not be
doubted and the first moment of his methodic doubt is to see whether the
beliefs deriving from the senses can be doubted or not. Nevertheless, the one
that is less doubtable is nonetheless doubtable.
The
third one is the mathematical and geometrical beliefs; that is, beliefs
relating to mathematical and geometrical realities for example 2+2= 4. The
angles of the right angle add up to 80. The question is, can that be doubted?
For Descartes, it can be doubted. In applying the methodic doubt, he concluded
to doubt because it is very possible that an evil genius is manipulating you
and that correlates with an evil genius hypothesis. Those are the several
moments in Descartes’ application of the Methodic Doubt and in all of this, he
is genuinely searching for something that could not be doubted, something that
can resist doubt and serve as a foil to the skeptics’ position.
Descartes
continued to apply the methodic doubt even after submitting that geometrical
and mathematical beliefs are not immune from doubt. And to that extent cannot
yield certain knowledge as demanded by the skeptic, but he continued searching
for the one thing that that will prove resistant to doubt. Eventually he came
to the point when he discovered that there is something that could not be
doubted namely, the truth of his own existence. That is, that in the very
process of trying to doubt whether he exists or not proved that he did exists.
So in doubting that he existed, he came to the affirmation that he could not
doubt that he existed. This is what is famously regarded as the discovery of
the Cogito that is the sudden realization that the very process of doubting can
uncover something that is indubitable. This was a fundamental moment in
Descartes’ response to the challenge of skepticism.
It
is an important moment because at this point he has proved to the skeptic that
he understood the logic of his argument, thus that they should accept the
outcome of his methodic doubt. This means that somebody can begin with doubt
and arrive at knowledge but the skeptics were saying that with doubt, that
there is no knowledge. This implies that the relationship between doubt and
knowledge is something complex. It is not a single relationship such that you
will say that whenever there is doubt, that you will negate the possibility of
knowledge. However, Descartes is showing that in certain situations, that doubt
actually leads you to discover the possibility of knowledge.
The
discovery of the Cogito is therefore an important moment in Descartes’ attempt
to address the challenge of skepticism because it bought to an abrupt halt the
application of universal methodic doubt. Descartes is searching just for a
single proof that would counteract the claim of the skeptics that we cannot
know anything with certainty. Once this proof is found, then, the position of
the skeptic is thereby nullified. What Descartes is saying in effect is: now
let us agree that we can doubt everything. I want to apply that to all the
beliefs I have ever entertained and all he beliefs I can possibly entertain. It
is a thought experiment. If I go through that process of application and I do
not find any of the beliefs that can resist doubt then, it means that you are
correct. In the course of applying this methodic doubt however, if he discovers
just one thing that roves resistant to doubt, then he need not continue to
apply it. It means that he does not just doubt for the sake of doubting but in
other to find something that can be known without doubt and once he has found
it, then the universal methodic doubt becomes needless.
Therefore,
the discovery of the cogito marks an important moment in Descartes’ attempt to
respond to the challenge of skepticism because it effectively brought to a halt
the application of the universal methodic doubt. It means that in an attempt to
apply that provision to the truth of the self, the attempt to apply the
methodic doubt to the truth of the self proves the self-resistant to doubt and
for that reason Descartes comes to the resolution to adopt it as the foundation
upon which to rebuild the entire edifice of knowledge.
·
The Cartesian Initiative and its
consummation in Hume
·
The Methodic Doubt and Descartes’ response
to the challenge of skepticism
·
The discovery of the Cogito and the task
of reconstruction of the edifice of knowledge
We
have been considering an aspect of that topic that deals with Descartes’
response to the challenge of skepticism. That is one way to deal with the issue
of the nature of the Cartesian initiative. To this end, we been exploring
Descartes’’ methodic doubt. We have the various moments of his application of
the methodic doubt and indeed, it has emerged that the end result of the
application of the methodic doubt is the emergence of the cogito or if you like
the discovery of the cogito as one truth that can be known without doubt or one
belief that is indubitable. The discovery of the truth of the cogito as
indubitable as we noted earlier brought to an end the application of the
universal methodic doubt. Thus it signaled a provisional victory over
skepticism since the argument of the skeptic is that knowledge cannot coexist
with doubt.
If
knowledge cannot coexist with doubt and if we cannot know anything with
certainty it means we cannot justify the possibility of knowledge. But having
now discovered through the application of the methodic doubt that there is one
truth that can be known with certainty, namely, the truth of the self, it means
that the position of skepticism becomes problematic since at least there is now
one thing that can be known with certainty even if we do not know any other
thing with certainty because they are dubitable. The fact that we can know the
truth of the self indubitably implies that the skeptic cannot hold his ground
against epistemology. That is the first point with regard to the significance
of the discovery of the cogito.
There
is much more than this at stake within the environment of the discovery of the
cogito. The point is that with the discovery of the cogito there is still the
need to reconstruct the entire edifice of knowledge. We cannot take for granted
this provisionary victory epistemology secures over skepticism. This
provisional victory may not be sufficient or secure so long as Descartes is
unable to move beyond the truth of the cogito to other possible truths. There is
need to connect the world of the cogito to the world beyond the cogito. So
unless the world of the cogito can be connected with the world beyond the
cogito it remains to be seen whether the provisional victory that this
discovery brings about will be enough to keep skepticism perpetually at bay.
So
Descartes is fully aware of the shaky nature of this provisional victory and he
needs to do something to ensure that the victory becomes a total victory such
that skepticism is perpetually defeated. Otherwise, the purported victory may
soon dissolve into its opposite. He has to ensure that it is not just the world
of the cogito that can be known with certainty but that the world beyond the
cogito can also be known with certainty in one form or the other. Descartes
will pay close attention to the truth of the cogito in attempt to reconstruct
the entire edifice of knowledge.
You
will remember that in the process of applying the methodic doubt, Descartes
resolved to doubt everything that could not be known with certainty, the truths
and beliefs deriving from the senses and the truth deriving from reason. So in
attempt to reconstruct the entire edifice of knowledge, Descartes would have to
rehabilitate these beliefs that are provisionally discarded as doubtable beliefs
because they could not be known with certainty. However, how precisely he is
going to pursue this agenda of rehabilitation is a different matter altogether.
His pursuit of this project of rehabilitation of his previous beliefs is not
unconnected with the credentials of the cogito. So far the cogito if you like,
is the saviour of epistemology. It has given epistemology some hope in its
battle against skepticism, that there is at least one thing that can be known
with certainty. So in attempt to reconstruct the entire edifice of knowledge,
Descartes will pay at close attention to the structure of the truth of the
cogito in n attempt to address the issue of the foundation of knowledge and
secondly to address the issue of the edifice of knowledge.
Note
that every building has a foundation and a superstructure. The case of
knowledge is no different and Descartes is approaching knowledge in terms of
the architectural model, meaning that knowledge has a foundation and a
superstructure this is why Descartes is regarded as a fundationalist.
Relating
al this to his discovery f the cogito, the first requirement is to search for a
foundation that is sure upon which the entire edifice of knowledge could be
erected. The quest for such foundation is an integral part of his response to
the challenge of skepticism and the emergence of an indubitable truth is an
important moment in that endeavourer of responding to that challenge of
skepticism. Having discovered the cogito, Descartes made it the foundation on
which to reconstruct the entire edifice of knowledge for the simple reason that
the cogito is indubitable.
What
recommends the cogito is the fact that it is perceived clearly and distinctly.
This quality of distinctness and clarity of perception becomes the criterion of
truth for Descartes. In other words, anything that approximates the cogito in
distinctness and clarity by which it is perceived, such a thing or such a
belief must be regarded as truth. The definition of truth becomes therefore
that which is perceived clearly and distinctly. The cogito then not only
functions as a foundation but also functions as a criterion for truth. With
this development, it becomes easier for Descartes to pursue his project of
reconstructing the entire edifice of knowledge because it means that he can now
reexamine his former beliefs in terms of the model of the truth of the cogito
and then try to rehabilitate them as much as possible.
The
major challenge here however, has to do with the connectivity between the
foundation and the superstructure. The foundation is the cogito, the
superstructure refers to the other beliefs that may not necessarily be
indubitable but nonetheless can be accepted as true because of the affiliation
with the foundation. So if the foundation is such, it will carry the rest. If
the foundation is certain, then, it means the rest of the building will share
in the fruit of the certainty of the foundation. So that is what it means to
say that Descartes is a foundationalist because it means that even though the
faith of the superstructure may not be affirmed directly but it can nonetheless
be affirmed indirectly so far as we recognize that we can make an inference
from the foundation to the superstructure. And if the foundation is ok, it
means that directly the superstructure is also ok. This is the logic of
foundationalism which is the rehabilitation and also the project of
reconstruction. So the project of reconstruction itself is dependent on the
discovery of the cogito.
So
for the victory secured by the discovery of the cogito to be sure, there has to
be a way to reconstruct the entire edifice of knowledge such that the edifice
of knowledge is guaranteed by the foundation of knowledge. But there is a
problem here. So for Descartes, this logic of foundationalism is excellent,
that the foundation should guarantee the superstructure given that the
foundation is indubitable we can also say that inference that the
superstructure is also indubitable. So if he can do that, then it means that
the provisional victory is no longer provisional victory, rather it is a
victory that is perpetually secure so there is no need to be afraid of
skepticism again.
But
the question is: can he do that? Can he claim to have done that? The problem
here has to do with the nature of the cogito as a subjective truth. So the
cogito is an indubitable truth because it is perceive clearly and distinctly.
So it means you cannot doubt whether the self exist or not. But it is one thing
to say the knowledge is indubitable, but is the knowledge also objective? For
the knowledge to be objective, it means that the reference must not be just to
the cogito but to something that is objectively…… So you can ask whether the
certitude with which the cogito is known also implies that the cogito is known
objectively. So unless we can say that the knowledge is not just indubitable
but it is also objective. Then there is a problem with regards moving from the
foundation to the superstructure if you do not have the justification for the
transition from the foundation to the superstructure.
So
if the foundation is subjective to put it differently, it means that
connectively between the foundation and the superstructure is in trouble if the
foundation is merely subjective. But if the foundation is more than subjective
then it can serve as a bridge that leads you without any problem. But by the
very nature of the cogito, it is a subjective truth. So if is a subjective
truth and not also objective, then there is a big problem because it means that
the cogito can be easily trapped in his own world. The cogito is certain but
beyond the certitude with which the cogito is known, you could not say anything
truly exist beyond the world of the cogito. So you are confronted with what you
might call a solipsistic cu de sac (dead end). It means that the cogito cannot
connect to any other thing except the self. But for the cogito to connect to
any other thing than itself it means that the cogito has to be objective.
It
is the objectivity that opens it to other things beyond its own world. So
unless that can be done, it means this project of rehabilitation is in trouble
and unless that project succeeds, it means that that provisional victory
collapses. Put differently, unless he can connect the cogito to something other
than the cogito objectively, there is a problem. To connect it subjectively
raises no problem because if you believe in indubitablility, you cannot be
wrong. So Descartes needs to justify the connectivity between the cogito and
the superstructure if the cogito is to guarantee the superstructure. So
Descartes seems to have recognized the subjective nature of the cogito as far
as the whole project of rehabilitating the rest of knowledge is concerned and
for that reason he know he could not vouch for the existence of any other thing
apart from the self.
Unless
he could demonstrate that the cogito is more than subjective truth, so he knew
that he could not say that any other thing exists. That is why it is the case
of solipsistic cu de sac. So he could affirm the existence of the self but the
self is not alone in the world. So what is the connection between the self and
the world? The self is certain but the connectivity of the self to the world.
So the moment you mention the self, you mention the world. So what is the
connection between the self and the world? The self is certain but the
connectivity of the self to the world, you could say is not certain.
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