Criticism of Logical Positivism
Criticism
of Logical Positivism
As it has to do with verifiability
criterion, Bertrand Russell criticize Logical Positivist by positing, "that
a statement is proof to be true, is the
statement itself proof to be true. Because to say that all the future outcome of
a general statement are true is itself a general statement of which the
instances cannot be enumerated, and no general statement can be established on
purely empirical evidence except one applying to a list of particulars all of
which have been observed.[1]
Furthermore,
the very criterion of meaning or cognitive significance embraced by logical
positivists is their self destruct or bane
of logical positivism. It has been widely argued against them that empirical
science, which they sought to set free from the webs of the high sounding
language of metaphysics, dies with the verifiability principle. As indeed, the
scientific method taken by the logical positivists stressed the meaningfulness
of propositions, it left the propositions of science vulnerable to the same
criterion. Bruce Caldwell interpretation of Popper’s critique which one could
not agree with. Thus for Popper, "flying horse exist." This sentence
can be proved to be true by finding a flying horse. But it cannot prove to be false,
even if it is false: If a flying horse could not be found, that doesn't mean it
is not in existence or none exists. If verifiability is used as the demarcation
criterion, the statement "flying horse exist" would have to be
considered a part of science.[2]
Moreover, since scientist posit that all statement are of universal form:
e.g All Ys are x, the critics argues that such proposition are not empirically
proof to be true.
The Logical Positivist seeing that this criterion of
verifiability is self destroying to logical positivism, alterations were made
by some logical positivists leading to the drop-off of the hold on rigorous
verification through experience. This appears in the work of Rudolf Carnap, an inexorable
disciple of logical positivist tradition.
It does then follow as Thomas Uebel puts it that, "while Carnap's focus on the diminution of descriptive terms
allows for the conclusive verification of some statements, it must be noted
that his criterion also allowed universally quantified statements to be
meaningful, provided they were syntactically and terminologically correct.[3]
Afterwards, the verifiability criterions were reduced
to what is just confirm or what is just testify with Carnap. Thus, a
proposition should at least be testable for it to pass as scientific.
[1] Bertrand Russell
“Logical Positivism” Revue Internationale
de Philosophie, p.12
[2] Bruce J. Caldwell
“Clarifying Popper” Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), p.2
[3] Uebel, Thomas, "Vienna Circle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
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