HISTORY AND THEORIES OF METAPHYSICS


v    6/10/2009

F    Abstract:

The focus of this course is the history and theories of metaphysics. The history of metaphysics is coterminous with the history of philosophy. The history of metaphysics is defined by the emergence and by the dialectical supposition of various theories which purports to account for the nature of existence. These metaphysical theories express various philosophical persuasions such as Idealism, Materialism, Existentialism, Pragmatism and Naturalism. Our concern is to explore the history of metaphysics by considering these theories.

In considering them, we shall concentrate on representative thinkers on each of the epochs of the history of philosophy with the aim of understanding the dynamics behind the formation and unfolding of the history of metaphysics. We will consider the views of such thinkers as Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle as representing the Ancient period of the history of metaphysics. We shall also consider Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas as representing the medieval period. We shall equally consider Berkeley, Kant and Hegel as representing the modern period while Heidegger, Whitehead and Collingwood represents the contemporary period

A critical look at these phases of the list of metaphysical thinking reveals an important point, namely; that in each phase mentioned, we can single out a fundamental issue behind the unfolding of metaphysical thinking. In ancient period for instance, the central issue which unifies the various epochs is the problem of substance. This problem which has its humble beginning in the cosmological speculations of the pre-Socratics, reached it climax (apogee) in the philosophy of Aristotle. Although the medieval phase of the history of metaphysics significantly built on the resources of the preceding phase, the metaphysical thinking here was between faith and reason the various reasons were articulated in the philosophy of Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas. All of these bear the trace in Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy – two paradigms that defined the Ancient philosophical inheritance.

In modern period, the focus shifts to the question of the nature of Reason. Here we find various attempts to develop different accounts of the nature of reason that legitimatise the possibility of metaphysics. However, in contemporary phase, the reverse is the case. The focus remained the problem of Reason but with a new emphasis with regards to developing ideas that allows for the deconstruction of metaphysical enterprise at least as traditionally understood as the science of Being qua being. It is deconstructive because with the clarification of the problem, we can say that there is nothing like metaphysics. The history of metaphysics is made up of theories of the nature of existence.

·                     The question of the structure of modern thinking:

1. Berkley and metaphysics – Reality and Mind
2. Kant and metaphysics – Reality and Reason
3. Hegel and metaphysics – Reality and Dialectic

·                     The structure of the question of contemporary metaphysics.

1. Heidegger and metaphysics – Being and Reason
2. Whitehead and metaphysics – Reality and Reason
3. Collinwood and metaphysics – Reality and Reason

F    Summary of Abstract:

- The history of metaphysics is coterminous with the history of philosophy
- History of metaphysics is made up of theories which claim to explain the nature of existence.
- Representatives thinkers from each of the phases of the history of philosophy

- Issues: The development of metaphysical thinking in each of the phases.
- Problem of substance
- Problem of faith and reason
- The nature of reason and justification of metaphysics
- Nature of reason and deconstruction of metaphysics.

F    Course Outline

·                     Preliminaries (Abstract)
·                     The nature of metaphysics
·                     Metaphysical thinking and its development

-                    From the Pre-Socratic to Aristotle: Substance ( Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle)
-                    Question of the beginning of metaphysical thinking
-                    From Thales to Parmenides
-                    From Parmenides to Plato from Plato to Aristotle

·                     Medieval metaphysics: God, Faith and Reason (Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas)

-                    The question of the structure of medieval thinking
-                    Augustine and metaphysics
-                    Anselm and metaphysics
-                    Aquinas and metaphysics

·                     Modern metaphysics: Reality and Reason(Berkeley, Kant and Hegel)

-                    The question of the structure of modern thinking
-                    Berkeley and metaphysics (Reality and Mind)
-                    Kant and metaphysics (Reality and Reason)
-                    Hegel and metaphysics (Reality and Reason)

·                     Contemporary metaphysics: Reason and Reality (Heidegger, Whitehead, Collinwood).

-                    The question of the structure of contemporary thinking.
-                    Heidegger and metaphysics (Being and Reason)
-                    Whitehead and metaphysics (Reality and Reason)
-                    Collinwood and metaphysics (Reality and Reason)

v    12/10/2009

·                     The nature of metaphysics.

There is need to return to this point as a way of recapitulation in order to lay the grounds for the treatment of the history and theories of metaphysics. The central issue here is to recapitulate the meaning of metaphysics. Metaphysics is the science of Being qua Being. It has as it central focus the question of what there is – the question as to the nature of ultimate reality. In our previous discussion, we have seen the various ramifications of this fundamental concern of metaphysic. We have explored it in terms of the various considerations such as the:

·                     Etymological meaning of metaphysics
·                     The Populist’s meaning of metaphysics
·                     Editorial meaning of metaphysics
·                     Chronological meaning of metaphysics
·                     Philosophical meaning of metaphysics

In all these, we came to the conclusion that where one has to be determined by way of clarification of the concept of metaphysics is the meaning of “Meta”, and its overall significance for our understanding of the preoccupation of metaphysics. There is no need to repeat all of that but it is certainly important to keep them in mind for it reminds us of what the emphasis is with regards to the concept of metaphysics namely: that metaphysics generally understood is a form of discourse on the nature of reality, a form of thinking, meaning, stepping aside from the issue of how to define the meaning of “Meta” in that philosophical presentation of metaphysics. Metaphysics is a form of thinking that is preoccupied with the nature of reality. It is not just philosophizing in the air, it is philosophising about “What there is”, it relies on reason as it resource. Thus there is a correlation between Reality and Reason as far as the concerns of metaphysics are employed.

Metaphysical concern is to understand the question of “what there is”. To do this, it relies on a certain form of reason. Thus to explicate it, we can resolve the issue to the nature of metaphysical thinking. If we can understand this metaphysical thinking, we can claim to understand the nature of metaphysical thinking. To understand the nature of metaphysical thinking is to set it apart from other forms of thinking. Thus, we should consider what sets it apart from other forms of philosophical thinking. Therefore, it brings us to the dynamics of metaphysics since it is the dynamics that brings to fore, the nature of metaphysical thinking.

As we have seen earlier, the beginning, the process and the terminus of metaphysical thinking helps us to understand the peculiar nature of metaphysical thinking. And by the nature of metaphysical thinking, it is explicable that we understand the nature of metaphysics.

With regards to the beginnings, by its very nature, metaphysical thinking begins with wonder. Though it begins with wonder, metaphysical thinking does not stop at this point. Wonder is a necessary condition but not sufficient. Thus, there is need to graduate from wonder to something greater. This moves us into the domains of process. And the way it proceeds from wonder is the raising of questions that hither to the object of wonder - the object of raises question about the reality in question. In order words, the reality in question raises problem from the mind. In its perplexity, the mind asks questions because it is unsettled by the reality before it. This is an indication that the mind in turn as part of its response to the problematic responses to the reality before it must search for the solution to the questions probed by reality. And to recall the reflection that ensues from this conversation between the mind and reality assumes two basic forms; namely, the analytic which attempts to break down questions into simple contents.

As part of the mind’s attempt to struggle in probing the questions raised by reality, it tends to analyse and break it further into simple questions. Analytic sort of thinking is a part and an important factor.

Of course, a part from analysis, there is also the synthetic movement which is not only at the service of understanding the matter at stake but above all, it attempts to draw from various sources before the matter at hand. Synthesis tends to bring ideas together to form one unified mode. In this moment, the metaphysician tends to think together and this reality before him is more understood. By its very nature, metaphysics proceeds by way of questions and answer. Questions provoked by wonder in the mind and the mind analysing and synthesising is also able to come to know what reality I behind it. There are certain dialectical questions and answers implicated in the dynamics of metaphysical thinking.

It is important for us to see that in approaching the question of the nature of metaphysics in this stand point of the dynamics, this approach is not mainly theoretical but over and above all, it is concrete and practical in the sense that it allows us to know how metaphysics operates in practice. In approaching the concept of the nature of metaphysics, our overall concern is to know how metaphysics has always proceeded in practice – now and the future. To understand how it has proceeded, how it proceeds and how it will proceed later.

Metaphysical thinking has various moments – all the three moments are important. They throw light on the meaning of metaphysics or perhaps they cannot be separated from one another. Though they cannot be divorced from one another, from our standpoint however, the most important moment is the terminus because it is the goal for which the whole process began. The entire quest for answers removes or resolves the dissatisfaction provoked by the reality before the mind. The mind is restless until it finds the adequate explanation or answer to the questions provoked by the object of reality.

·                     19th , 20th  and  27th October 2009

v    Metaphysical thinking and its development

-                     From the Pre-Socratic to Aristotle: Substance ( Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle)
-                     Question of the beginning of metaphysical thinking
-                     From Thales to Parmenides
-                     From Parmenides to Plato, from Plato to Aristotle

In approaching this topic, we should quickly remind ourselves that the history of metaphysics is coterminous with the history of philosophy. The history of philosophy is divided into four broad divisions – Ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary. Part of the consequence of the thesis that the history of metaphysics is coterminous with the history of philosophy is that we can trace the history of metaphysics to these four epochs of the history of philosophy. It means that we can associate the history of metaphysics respectively into the ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary era.

In considering metaphysics in the light of these four epochs, our cardinal objective is to access if there is a development in the history of metaphysical thinking. We can throw light on some peculiar nature that affects metaphysics and how metaphysics tend to resolve its problems and finally the dynamics of metaphysics – how metaphysics access itself concretely. It should be possible for us to trace from ancient development to contemporary era of the history of metaphysics.

In considering this project, it is evident that we are immediately confronted with the question of the beginning of metaphysical thinking. Can we say that metaphysical thinking has a beginning? How can we characterise that beginning and in terms of what can this beginning be located. It is clear that the question here is a purely historical question. It does not necessarily refer to how metaphysics is done in practice. We have addressed that ontological question in the dynamics of metaphysics.

When the question is asked then, we are asking rather whether the beginning of metaphysical thinking can be associated with any historical point of the human consciousness. If man is rational, then we can easily say that given the fact that A and X, if they are human beings that is rational and is able to employ the use of its rational ability. Metaphysics is said to exist wherever there are human beings. The answer to the question whether metaphysics can be found in any of the four epochs is therefore unequivocal affirmation. Wherever human being exists, there is metaphysics because human beings are rational. It is one thing to have reason and another to put it in practice.

It is usual to associate the beginning of metaphysical thinking with the early Milesian thinkers of western tradition. Specifically, the beginning of metaphysical thinking like the beginning of philosophy itself is associated with Thales of Miletus. With this association, it means that metaphysics or philosophy began in the west. This fact does not suffice to account for the beginning of metaphysics given the fact that it is associated with a particular tradition – western. African philosophers will take issues with this thesis and argue that the history of metaphysics and philosophy has a much earlier beginning and should not be dated with the early Greek thinkers. The argument for this being that metaphysics or philosophy is not the prerogative of any specific culture or tradition but rather, that it has a universal character of being found in any place. This argument seeks to problematise the question of the nature of metaphysics.

Metaphysical thinking can also be as a result of other cultures. However, it is important to understand the reason of ascription of the beginning of metaphysical thinking. The important consideration is the issue of recorded evidence for such phenomenon. It is not enough to claim that our for-fathers also had their own forms of metaphysics. In philosophy, we look for evidence and justifications for our claims. It is not sufficient therefore to cite oral tradition as accounting for metaphysical thinking because it is clearly limited in nature.  The only way is to appeal to recorded evidence. Consequently, it is on the score of recoded evidence that the beginning of metaphysics is traced back to the ancient Greek thinkers.  As far as written tradition is concerned, the earliest form of metaphysics is associated with Thales because there were written evidence that supported the claim that he was involved in metaphysical thinking.

The importance of recoded evidence should not be underestimated in the ascription of the beginning of metaphysical thinking to the early Greek philosophers. Even if we care to look at the theory that metaphysics could be found anywhere, why then associated it with a particular culture? There are objective criteria for this ascription. At this period, something happened that witnessed to the emergence of metaphysical consciousness. Consciousness has many ramifications. Man is a social, religious, political, philosophical, economic, metaphysical, technological being. And so we can speak of man as having social consciousness, religious consciousness, political consciousness, philosophical consciousness, economic consciousness, metaphysical consciousness, and technological consciousness. All these consciousness are implicit in man but are not all developed at the same time. They are therefore evolutionary - Something prompted philosophical consciousness. Without prejudice to other cultures, the beginning of metaphysical consciousness is ascribed to Thales because of written evidence.
The Greek tradition can be said to be a transitional way of looking at things – it is the way of ‘Logos.’ The term is derived from Greek for “word” or “reason” and was used in ancient and medieval philosophy and theology. The 6th-century bc Greek philosopher Heraclitus was the first to use the term Logos in a metaphysical sense. He asserted that the world is governed by a fire-like Logos, a divine force that produces the order and pattern discernible in the flux of nature. He believed that this force is similar to human reason and that his own thought partook of the divine Logos. Contrasted with this is the idea of mythos which was the old way of explaining things.
In the 6th century bc, however, Greek thinkers began to question the validity of their culture’s traditional tales, and the word mythos came to denote an implausible story. Greek philosopher Xenophanes, for example, argued that much of the behaviour that the poets Homer and Hesiod attributed to the gods was unworthy of divine beings. By the 5th century bc, serious Greek thinkers tended to regard the old myths as naive explanations for natural phenomena or simply to reject them altogether. Nevertheless, myths retained their cultural importance, even after they had come under attack from philosophers. The ancient Greek tragedies, which remained central to civic and religious life in Athens through the end of the 5th century bc, drew their subject matter largely from myths.
Mythos and cosmogony were the predominant way of explaining reality in the ancient Greek society. It takes the form of appealing to myths in order to explain natural events. This form of thinking was supplanted by what Thales and his companions practiced which is the way of Logos which explains reality in terns of their inner reason that drives them. Cosmogony is associated with superstition, mythology and the gods. The gods that people appealed to in mythology in order to explain nature is Olympus and Zeus.
The transition from the cosmogonic/mythological approach to reality marked the beginning of philosophical approach to reality in the world. To understand the nature of the beginning of metaphysical thinking, we have to talk of mythos and logos. We can amplify this discussion by interrogating further the specific contribution of Thales to the beginning of metaphysical thinking. The question of the primordial stuff of the universe at first sight contains a presupposition that there is an original stuff out of which everything was made off. What is this primary stuff? Is there an original stuff from which everything derives? If yes, what is it? Is it a single stuff or much stuff? These are some of the questions Anaximander and Anaximenes and their companions raised.
Thales answered the question in the affirmative. According to him, the source is one. There is the possibility that it could be many and this would imply pluralism. Here we are confronted with metaphysical problem of monism and pluralism. According to Thales, the primary stuff out which the universe derives is water.  Thales’ unique contribution to thought was his notion that in spite of the differences between the various changing things there is, nevertheless, basic similarity between them all, that the many are related to each other by the One. He assumed that that some single element, some ‘stuff’, a stuff which contained its own principle of action or change, lay at the foundation of all physical reality. To him this One, or this stuff, was water.
Aristotle writes that Thales might have derived this conclusion from observation of simple events, ‘perhaps from seeing that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat is generated from the moist and kept alive by it…He got his notion from this fact and from the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and water is the origin of the nature of moist things. Other phenomena such as freezing also suggest that water takes on different forms.
After Thales, we have Anaximander. He agreed with his teacher Thales that there is some single basic stuff out which everything comes. Unlike Thales however, he said that the primary substance out of which the specific things come is an indefinite or boundless. It may very well be, he thought, that water or moist is found in various forms everywhere, but water is only one specific thing among many other elements, and all these specific things require that there be some more elementary stuff to account for their origin. Thus Anaximander differentiated specific and determinate things from their origin by calling the primary substance the indeterminate, and whereas things are finite, the original stuff is infinite or boundless.
v    2nd November, 2009
-                     Parmenides and the situation of the metaphysical question.
Parmenides essentially perpetuates the basic assumption of Greek philosophy as posited by the Milesian philosophers. Both the Heraclitian and Milesian philosophers assumed that all things emerge out of something else, that although there is only one basic stuff in the world, this stuff is the source of a variety of things and that the process by which the One becomes many is the process of change.
Parmenides, on the other hand, rejected the very notion of change, resting his argument on at least two grounds: namely, that if there is a single substance behind all things, the concept of change is absurd logically, and that the phenomenon of change is basically an illusion. For him, the concept of change was logically neither thinkable nor expressible. He maintained that whatever exist “must be absolute, or not at all.” To exist in an “absolute” way meant for Parmenides that whatever is, simply is. We can never admit, he said, that “anything should come into being…out of not-being. According to him, something either “is or is not.” How can you say of anything that it came into being, that it changed from not-being to being? You cannot say about anything that ‘it’ ever had non-being, for if you can think of an ‘it’, it already exists and consequently, there is no process of change because there is no ‘non-being’.
According to Parmenides, to think is to think about something and for this reason you cannot think about anything changing or coming into being. To think about change required one to attempt to do the impossible; namely to think about something in terms of what it is not. Being or reality is what it is and not something else. For this reason it is impossible to think of change in any clear way since the only thing one can think about is being, or what actually is. It follows therefore that being absolute, that being is not divisible, and since all being is alike, all is full being. Therefore, it is altogether continuous, for being is close to being.
Speaking of all reality as It, Parmenides says that “one path only is left to us to speak of namely, that It is. In this path are very many tokens that what is, is uncreated and indestructible, for it is complete, immoveable and without end. There cannot be different shades of being, because either It is or It is not, and since there is no becoming, being is not divisible. There is as much being in one place as in another, and there is no empty space. From these considerations, Parmenides argued that the It or reality is material in nature and finite. Reality is a spherical, material, motionless, and fully occupied plenum, a continuous mass where there is no reality to emptiness and beyond which there is nothing. Because there is no change, reality is uncreated and is also indestructible and is, therefore, eternal and motionless.
v    November 9, 2009

·                     Plato’s Metaphysics and issues arising from Parmenian continuation.

With the intervention of each thinker, the issue of metaphysical thinking re-states itself in a different form. Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Parmenides all have different views as to what constitutes the fundamental principles of reality. In the case of Plato, the immediate background is Parmenides. The problem of metaphysical thinking restates itself in the form of permanence and change. For Parmenides, there is the need to reconcile two extremes: One and Many, Change and Permanence. The question here is whether reality is One and Many or Many and One; whether it is Change and permanence or Permanence and Change. This is the background in the wake of Plato’s intervention in the matter.

For Plato, it is neither One nor Many but One and Many. In Plato’s theory of metaphysical reality, there is room for One, and there is room for Many. There is room for Permanence and there is room for Change. The theory of Forms affirms that there are two spheres in reality – the world of Universals and the world of Particulars.

For Plato, the world of Universals are the world of Ideal essences, prototypes; unchanging world. It is the world of fullness of reality, perfect world, not open to change. On the other hand, the world of particulars is a changing world. It exhibits partial and not fullness of reality. In Plato’s scheme of metaphysical inquiry, the ultimate reality is the world of Universals and not the world of Particulars. Both Heraclitus and Parmenides sought to dissolve the paradox of change with extreme solutions. Heraclitus said that everything in the world of experience is changing and permanence is merely an illusion. Parmenides and his fellow Eleatics eliminated the problem by claiming that permanence is fundamental and change is merely an appearance. Although their positions were diametrically opposite, both assumed monism, the claim that reality is essentially one sort of thing.

If the Heraclitean position is correct, then knowledge is impossible because there is nothing stable about the world that we could know. Yet Parmenides’ solution is not satisfactory either, because change is obviously a fact of life. Plato believes that they are both wrong and they are both right. They are wrong in their monism, because they too quickly assume that all reality is one sort of thing. However, they are each right in describing one-half of the total picture. Plato adopted their insights but modified them to eliminate their weaknesses.

In seeking a compromise between Heraclitus and Parmenides, Plato embraces metaphysical dualism, the claim that there are two completely different kinds of reality. His solution is to propose that there is a world of constant flux, at the same time there is a world that is eternal and unchanging. The world of flux is the physical world that we encounter in sense experience. But it is constantly changing; we cannot have rational knowledge of it. The world that is eternal and unchanging is a metaphysical reality. It is not located in space and time. Plato sometimes refers to this as “intelligible world” because only this reality is intelligible to reason.

·                     The Relationship of Particulars to the Forms

At this point, Plato faces the problem of all dualism. Once you have separated reality into two different realms, how do you understand the relationship between them? For Plato, these two kinds of reality are not equal. The physical world is less real than the world of Forms and depends on the higher world. The reality that transcends experience produces whatever order and reality we find in the world of experience. For Plato, the relationship between the two worlds is by participation. The world of particulars participates in the world of the Universals.

The question now is: “How does the particular object participate in the life of its representative in the world of universals since the two worlds are said to be distinct from each other. As has been noted above, Plato’s attempted reconciliation of the metaphysical problem is predicted in his theory of Forms which represent his most significant philosophic contribution. The doctrine of Forms represents a serious attempt to explain the nature of existence.

·                     Aristotle and Metaphysics

Focusing on Aristotle provides an interesting case study of the way in which philosophical ideas developed. To understand his agenda, we need to understand the relationship between his vision of philosophy and that of Plato. Throughout his philosophical writings, Aristotle sought to give more coherent and satisfactory solution to the problems addressed by Plato.

According to Aristotle, metaphysics is the science of “Being qua being”, meaning by this, the science of “Being as Being”. This definition suggests that there are degrees of beings. It shows that metaphysics is concerned with the reality of being. Metaphysics deals with the “beingness” of being. It deals with the universals in the particular being – what makes a thing what it is. For Aristotle, to be is to be an individual and in the final analysis, reality is made up of particular realities. Every particular thing is a substance and reality is made up of particular things. In order to give an adequate explanation of a particular thing, we have to explain it in reference to the universal. It is therefore quite understandable that the preoccupation of metaphysics in investigating the nature of being is universal in the particular. Metaphysics for Aristotle deals with knowledge at the highest level of abstraction because it is about what is universal instead of what is particular. Metaphysics studies reality through the instrumentality of pure reason.

Plato argued that that Ideas or Forms, such as Man or Table, had a separate existence as the substratum or stuff out of which individual things were made. This was Plato’s way of explaining how there could be many individual things that all have one and the same, that is universal nature or essence while still being individual. This universal, Plato said, is the Form, which exists eternally and is separated from any particular thing and is found in each thing only because the thing (this table) participates in the Form (tableness, or Ideal Table).

Aristotle rejected Plato’s explanation of the universal Forms, rejecting specifically the notion that the Form existed separately form individual things. Of course Aristotle did agree that there are universals, that universals such as Man and Table are more than merely subjective notions. Indeed Aristotle recognised that without the theory of universals, there could be no scientific knowledge, for then there would be no way of saying something about all members of a particular class.

Having dismissed Plato’s extreme dualism, where does Aristotle locate the forms? But, said Aristotle, their reality is to be found not anywhere else than in the individual thing themselves. For Aristotle, there is no abstract Form of “Tableness” apart form this world. There are only individual tables exhibiting the form that identifies something as a table. For Aristotle therefore, the fundamental reality is the collection of substances we find in our everyday experiences. Substances, then, are the fundamental unity of reality.

·                     Matter and Form

Although Aristotle distinguished between matter and form, he nevertheless said that we never find matter without form or form without matter in nature. Everything that exists is some concrete individual thing, and every thing is a unity of matter and form. Substance therefore, is a composite of form and matter. The “whatness” of something refers to its form. Its “thisness” is its matter. In summary, every individual substance is made up of two dimensions, its form (whatness) and its matter (thisness). We may discuss each dimension separately, but this is always an abstraction. They are not two parts of a substance the way that the legs and the seat are two parts of a stool. We do not find bare matter to which form is added as an additional ingredient. However, one piece of formed matter can be the basis for a new object if it is recognised by means of different forms.

v    Conclusion

By way of conclusion of our examination of the development of metaphysical thinking during the ancient period up to Plato and Aristotle, our primary concern had be to discern whether there is development at this period in the history of metaphysics. Our review of this period will lead us to the conclusion that there is development both in content and method in the history of metaphysics. The problem at this period even though it remained basically the same, assumed different forms.

The best way of expressing this problem is that of substance as formulated by Aristotle. The question can be posed as follows: “What does it mean for a thing to be?” the full formation of problem comes to us from Plato and Aristotle though they depended heavily on their predecessors.

The second aspect of the question is that the history of metaphysics at this period demonstrated that there is progress in metaphysics. This is signified by the transition from traditional belief of cosmogony to logos.
v    November 22, 2009

·                     Medieval metaphysics:

-                    The question of the structure of medieval thinking
-                    Augustine and metaphysics
-                    Anselm and metaphysics
-                    Aquinas and metaphysics

Having completed the history of the development of metaphysical thinking during the ancient period, we now go to our next topic – metaphysics during the medieval period. Here we shall consider St. Augustine, St. Anselm, and St. Thomas Aquinas.

 The structure of metaphysical thinking at this period centred on God, Faith and Reason. The accompanying metaphysical problematic at this period centred on:

-                    The divine reality.
-                    Is there God?
-                    If there is God, what is his nature?
-                    Does God have any relationship with his creatures?
-                    If there is relationship between God and his creatures, what is the nature of this relationship?
-                    If there is God and He relates with his creatures, how do we examine this relationship? By what instrumentality?
-                    Through Faith or Reason?
-                    Through Faith and Reason?

During the ancient period various postulation were put forward as the primary source of reality:

-                    For Thales, it is water
-                    For Anaximander, it is an indeterminate boundless
-                    For Anaximenes, it is air
-                    With Heraclitus came the idea change and permanence
-                    For Parmenides, we have the idea of Being instead of becoming – Being or Reality is One, and there is no change
-                    With Plato, the metaphysical problematic metamorphosed into the theory of Forms or Ideas
-                    With Aristotle, we have the theory of Substance and Accidents, Matter and Form

v    Medieval metaphysics:

One of the oldest metaphysical questions is: does God exist? In discussing this question, we understand “God” in the classical philosophical sense of a being who is all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing (omniscient), and wholly good. The arguments in favour of God’s existence are known as the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments, though there are many versions of each argument. The argument against God’s existence is the argument from evil.


-                    God, Faith and Reason (Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas)

·                     Augustine and metaphysics

St. Augustine is a central figure in medieval philosophy. We cannot go into details as regards his philosophical enterprise for the reason of time factor. Our chief concern here however, is on his treatment of evil and the accompanying question here is “What does the problem of evil entails as a metaphysical problem? By answering this question, we are introduced into the heart of St. Augustine’s metaphysical thinking.

The issue here now is on how to explain the presence of evil in a world supposedly created by a good God, who is all loving, all powerful. To speak of the presence of evil in such a world calls for an explanation. It is a self-contradictory to speak of the presence of evil in a world created by a Good who is all good, all loving and all powerful.

There are two possibilities for the explanation:

1. It is either true that God is all good, all loving, and all powerful or he is neither of these. It is possible that he is all loving but not all powerful otherwise he could not allow evil in the world.

2. The second position is to insist that God is both all good and all powerful but then we need to provide reasons for the presence of evil in the world.

Augustine tired to provide a solution to the presence of evil in the world and his solution have become very paradigmatic from whatever angles it is viewed. He will not say that God is the originator of evil but attributes it to man’s free will. At this point, two categories of evils had to be made:

1. Physical or natural evil. This refers to such phenomenon as earthquake, tsunamis, hurricane and all forms of natural disasters. This category of evil is to be distinguished from the second category of evil called moral evil

2. Moral evil. This is referred to as sin and it implicated man’s moral will. The two categories of evil are rather intersected in moral evil and that is what investigates in his metaphysical doctrine on evil.

The first and second category of evil can be presented as metaphysical evil because every evil in the world raises questions about the universe and affects the human beings. The question of evil therefore implicates the nature of God and his relationship with his creatures.

·                     Augustine’s Solution.

Augustine is interested in this matter as has been noted from the standpoint of moral evil. According to him, the cause of evil in the world cannot be attributed to God. He is the creator, all powerful, all good and all loving. It follows therefore that all he created is good. What then is the cause of the evil we notice in the world? By way of negation, Augustine says the cause of evil is not man’s ignorance as Plato argues. Virtue for Plato is knowledge. By implication, evil is attributed to the lack of knowledge.

Augustine on the other hand, however, does not accept that ignorance was the cause of evil. He does not accept man’s powerlessness in the face of moral evil. This gives us a glimpse of the Manichaeism in St. Augustine. The Manichean solution to problem of evil in the world presupposes that there are two forces (the forces of good and evil) in the world that explains the problem of evil. These forces are at war with each other and it allows us to explain the natural happenings around us such as hurricane, earthquake, and tsunamis – the physical aspect.

The moral aspect of it is that man is exposed to these two opposing forces which are on equal par and which does not take place outside but within man – man has the good and bad demons inside himself and he cannot do anything about that. This implicate that man is helpless in the face of such opposing forces in him.

For Augustine however, the cause of moral evil must be attributed to man’s will. Having been rescued from the influence of Manichaeism, Augustine can make this claim and he affirms that God is in control of the universe and have endowed man with a capacity that allows him either to chose good over and above evil or chose evil over and above god. Augustine came to this standpoint through the influence of Divine Illumination. The conversion of Augustine is therefore the background to this solution to the problem of moral evil in the world.

God, according to Augustine, has endowed man with the capacity to discriminate between good and evil. He equally has the capacity to choose between good and evil. God has created man for good but man has the option to embrace the good or evil. For Augustine, there is a consequence for exercising the power choice. There is a consequence for choosing good or evil. Man’s happens is tied-up with the affirmation of the highest good. Man has the capacity to choose God. When man chooses good in the way God has intended, it leads man to God but when man chooses good contrary to God’s intention, it leads man away from God.

The cause of evil therefore is located in man’s free will. In this case, evil is not a metaphysical entity but an absence of the good as a consequence of man’s use of his free will. The attendant question to this position is: “What then is the cause of the physical evils such as earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, and other natural phenomena in the world since free will is the cause of evil in the world?  

The solution to the problem of evil is not knowledge as one may have knowledge but may not subject his will to God’s will. The solution of moral evil therefore is that man with the grace of God should submit his will to God in all things since this is the true source of his happiness.

From the foregoing, the question boils down to the love of God and love of self – whether man will use his will to love God or himself. This helps us to understand the clarification of the city of God. Those that are ruled by love of God are those that inhabit the city God while those that are ruled by the city of man are outside the city of God. For St. Augustine, people are looking for happiness in all they do. Hence he cried out that we are made for God and our hearts are restless until they rest in God. According to St. Augustine, the way to happiness is to live in the love of God. His main position is the concept of free will. He is saying that man is to blame not God for the presence of evil in the world because these evils arise from man’s misuse of his free will. Again the attendant question here is, since the misuse of free will is the cause of moral evil in the world, who or what takes full responsibility for the natural evils around us?

v    November 24, 2009.

By way of recapitulation, we should remind ourselves that medieval metaphysics is not the same with the ancient metaphysics. Medieval metaphysics begins with faith and tries to understand what one believes in and where pure reason cannot help, one turns back to faith. Hence the saying “Faith seeking understanding.” Already one believes, and then with the aid of pure reason, one seeks further understanding of what one believes and where reason fails to provide an answer, one relies on faith again. The medieval metaphysical progression therefore is: Faith – Reason - Faith. The contributions of Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas exemplify the structure of medieval thinking.

·                     Anselm and Metaphysics.

The problem that engages Anselm therefore is the problem of the existence of God. St. Anselm was a Benedictine monk. In his later years he became the Abbot of his monastery. It was at this period that he wrote a number of books on theological and philosophical topics.

St. Anselm is famous in the history of thought primarily for his celebrated ontological argument for the existence of God. For him there was not clear line between philosophy and theology. As Augustine before him, he was particularly concerned with providing rational support for the doctrines of Christianity, which he already accepted as a matter of faith. He was convinced that faith and reason leads to the same conclusions.

Anselm tries to discover the truth about God by employing reason in order to understand what he believed. His method therefore was faith seeking understanding; “I do not seek to understand in order that I may believe,” he said, “but I believe in order that I may understand.” He made it particularly clear that his enterprise of proving God’s existence could not even begin unless he had already believed in His existence.

·                     Highlights of Anselm’s Thoughts

1. Anselm believes that faith precedes reason – faith seeking understanding. This shows that he was influenced by Augustine as far as metaphysical problem is concerned.

2. The influence of Anselm’s Christian background. He begins his assumption that the doctrine of Christianity is true. As a Christian therefore, he accepts the existence of God in faith and by imploring reason, he is seeking understanding to the existence of God. Can we use reason to demonstrate that God exists? For him, we can use reason to demonstrate the existence of God.

·                     Works

1. Monologion
2. Proslogion

In his work, (The Proslogion), Anselm provides proof for the existence of God – the Ontological argument. By insisting that Faith and Reason must be combined, Anselm exemplified the medieval thinking. The ontological argument occupies chapter two to four of the Proslogion. The ontological argument tries to show that if one tries to conceive something which is greater than nothing can be thought implies that such a thing exists. If you think of God, it means that God exists. The second form of this argument is that God exists necessarily. The milieu for this argument is conversation with oneself; by implication, prayer – something than no greater can be thought.

The ontological argument therefore attempt to prove God’s existence by reason alone. It is a priori argument. The idea is simply by grasping the concept of God, together with an understanding of what that idea entails; we can prove that God exists. The ontological argument thus purports to be a deductively valid proof of God’s existence from a priori knowable premises. It is intended to be as cogent and compelling as any proof found in logic and mathematics.

The first thing to notice about this proof is that Anselm’s thought proceeds from within his mind, rather than starting with the assumption that each proof must begin with some empirical evidence from which the mind can then move logically to God. Anselm followed Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination, which gave direct access to certain truths.

Clearly, Anselm is assured of the existence of God before he begins, saying again, that “unless I believe, I shall not understand.”  There two forms to Anselm’s argument. The first form tries to establish that God exists necessarily. His entire argument is within the milieu of prayer; meaning that this is an argument but not just an argument.

The ontological argument in its first form says that God necessarily exists. We believe says Anselm, that God is “something than which nothing greater can be thought.” The question then is, does this something, than which nothing greater can be thought, really exists?

Anselm's argument goes like this. God is “that than which nothing greater can be thought”; in other words, he is a being so great, so full of metaphysical oomph that one cannot so much as conceive of a being who would be greater than God. The Psalmist, however, tells us that “The fool has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’ ” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1). Is it possible to convince the fool that he is wrong? It is. All we need is the characterization of God as “that than which nothing greater can be thought.” The fool does at least understand that definition.

But whatever is understood exists in the understanding, just as the plan of a painting he has yet to execute already exists in the understanding of the painter. So that than which nothing greater can be thought exists in the understanding. But if it exists in the understanding, it must also exist in reality. For it is greater to exist in reality than to exist merely in the understanding. Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be thought existed only in the understanding, it would be possible to think of something greater than it (namely, that same being existing in reality as well). It follows, then, that if that than which nothing greater can be thought existed only in the understanding, it would not be that than which nothing greater can be thought; and that, obviously, is a contradiction. So that than which nothing greater can be thought must exist in reality, not merely in the understanding.
Anselm's intention in the Proslogion was to offer a single argument that would establish not only the existence of God but also the various attributes that Christians believe God possesses. If the argument of chapter 2 proved only the existence of God, leaving the divine attributes to be established piecemeal as in the Monologion, Anselm would consider the Proslogion a failure. But in fact the concept of that than which nothing greater can be thought turns out to be marvellously fertile. God must, for example, be omnipotent. For if he were not, we could conceive of a being greater than he. But God is that than which no greater can be thought, so he must be omnipotent. Similarly, God must be just, self-existent, invulnerable to suffering, merciful, timelessly eternal, non-physical, non-composite, and so forth; for if he lacked any of these qualities, he would be less than the greatest conceivable being, which is impossible.

·                     11/01/2010

·                     Berkeley’s Background

George Berkeley is an Irish philosopher of the 18th century. He was born on 12th March 1685 into a family of English decent. As a young man, he studied Maths, Logic and Philosophy at Trinity College in Dublin where he was exposed to the philosophies f Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke, as well as the works of Newton and other leading scientists. In 1710, he was ordained as a priest in the Anglican Church. By the time he was 24 years old, Berkeley had obtained his B. A. Degree and developed his system of philosophy.

·                     Berkeley’s Task: Battling Skepticism and Unbelief (Reality and mind)

The main thrust of Berkeley’s philosophy is his denial of matter. This seeks to refute philosophical materialism which affirms the reality of matter. In denying matter, Berkeley seeks to affirm the spiritual nature of the universe.  Philosophical materialism is the view that ultimate reality is matter. Matter was thought to be an independently existing substance, without reference to God. From the belief in such a material world, it is a short jump to the conclusion that God is unnecessary.

Berkeley’s position on the other hand presupposes that the nature of ultimate reality is spiritual and he called it “Immaterialism”. This position claims that only two kinds of things exist in reality (1) minds (or Spirit) and (2) the ideas they perceive. Concerning the objects of our everyday, Berkeley’s famous formula is “Esse est percipi ut percipere” or “To be is to be perceived. Thus, the central thesis of his position is that:

“All the choir of haven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world, have not any subsistence without a mind – that their being is to be perceived or known”

v    Why is Berkeley concerned to refute philosophical materialism?

Berkeley’s reason for disagreeing with philosophical materialism is that he believes that upholding the reality of matter leads to a number of practical problems such as Atheism, Skepticism, and Irreligion. Since philosophical materialism promotes Atheism, Skepticism and Irreligion, it becomes necessary therefore that it should be rejected in order to establish the spiritual nature of the universe.
 


In his major work, Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710), Berkeley asserted that nothing exists except ideas and spirits (minds or souls). By “spirit” Berkeley meant “one simple, undivided, active being.” The activity of spirits consists of both understanding and willing: understanding is spirit perceiving ideas, and will is spirit producing ideas.
For Berkeley, ostensibly physical objects like tables and chairs are really nothing more than collections of sensible ideas. Since no idea can exist outside a mind, it follows that tables and chairs, as well all the other furniture of the physical world, exist only insofar as they are in the mind of someone—i.e., only insofar as they are perceived. For any non-thinking being, esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”).
The clichéd question of whether a tree falling in an uninhabited forest makes a sound is inspired by Berkeley's philosophy, though he never considered it in these terms. He did, however, consider the implicit objection and gave various answers to it. He sometimes says that a table in an unperceived room would be perceived if someone were there. This conditional response, however, is inadequate. Granted that the table would exist if it were perceived; does it exist when it is not perceived? Berkeley's more pertinent answer is that, when no human is perceiving a table or other such object, God is; and it is God's thinking that keeps the otherwise unperceived object in existence.
To say that colours, sounds, trees, dogs, and tables are ideas is not to say that they do not really exist, it is merely to say what they really are. Moreover, to say that animals and pieces of furniture are ideas is not to say that they are diaphanous, gossamer, and evanescent. Opacity, density, and permanence are also ideas that partially constitute these objects.
Berkeley supports his main thesis with a syllogistic argument: physical things—such as trees, dogs, and houses—are things perceived by sense; things perceived by sense are ideas; therefore, physical things are ideas. If one objects that the second premise of the syllogism is false—people sense things, not ideas—Berkeley would reply that there are no sensations without ideas and that it makes no sense to speak of some additional thing that ideas are supposed to represent or resemble. Unlike Locke, Berkeley did not believe that there is anything “behind” or “underlying” ideas in a world external to the mind. Indeed, Berkeley claims that no clear idea can be attached to this notion.
Berkeley's doctrine that things unperceived by human beings continue to exist in the thought of God was not novel. It was part of the traditional belief of Christian philosophers from Augustine through Aquinas and at least to Descartes that God not only creates all things but also keeps them in existence by thinking of them. According to this view, if God were ever to stop thinking of a creature, it would immediately be annihilated.
Background to Berkeley’s Critique of Philosophical Materialism
The background of Berkeley’s critique to philosophical materialism is located in Cartesian theory of mind-body dualism. Descartes maintained that body and mind are radically different entities and that they are the only fundamental substances in the universe.  He regarded the body as a physical entity and the mind as a spiritual entity, and believed the two interacted only through the pineal gland, a tiny structure at the base of the brain. This position became known as dualism. According to dualism, the behaviour of the body is determined by mechanistic laws and can be measured in a scientific manner. But the mind, which transcends the material world, cannot be similarly studied.

Descartes’ fundamental separation of mind and body, raised the problem of explaining how two such different substances as mind and body can affect each other, a problem he was unable to solve that has remained a concern of philosophy ever since. Descartes’ thought launched an era of speculation in metaphysics as philosophers made a determined effort to overcome dualism—the belief in the irreconcilable difference between mind and matter—and obtain unity. The separation of mind and matter is also known as Cartesian dualism after Descartes.

George Berkeley, like Spinoza before him, rejected both Cartesian dualism and the assertion by Hobbes that only matter is real. Berkeley maintained that spirit is substance, and that only spiritual substance is real. Extending Locke’s doubts about knowledge of an external world, outside the mind, Berkeley argued that no evidence exists for the existence of such a world, because the only things that we can observe are our own sensations, and these are in the mind. The very notion of matter, he maintained, is incoherent and impossible. To exist, he claimed, means to be perceived (“esse est percipi”), and in order for things to exist when we are not observing them, they must continue to be perceived by God. By claiming that sensory phenomena are the only objects of human knowledge, Berkeley established the view known as phenomenalism, a theory of perception that suggests that matter can be analyzed in terms of sensations.

v    12/01/2010

F    Kant and Metaphysics – Reality and Reason

After Plato, Kant ranks as one of the greatest philosophers in the Western tradition. Our concern however, is his contribution in the development of metaphysical thinking. A prolific writer, he wrote three major philosophical works: (a) The Critique of Pure Reason (b) The Critique of Practical Reason and (c) The Critique of Judgment. Of these three works, the one that is of most importance is the Critique of Pure Reason.

His contribution centers on the status of Pure Reason in the metaphysical enterprise. He tries to probe the metaphysical possibility of Pure Reason. The question here is: Can Pure Reason on its own know reality?”

In providing answer to this question, Kant was tussling with empiricism and rationalism of his day. Empiricism denies that pure reason could know reality. According the empiricists, all our knowledge derives from sense experience. Rationalism on the other hand holds that pure reason can furnish us with the knowledge of reality. Kant tries to reconcile these two opposing views.

Kant argued that synthetic a priori judgments are possible in mathematics and physics and that they serve the purpose of making sense of our experience. But are they possible in metaphysics? The discussion of his epistemology made it clear that Kant is pessimistic about the ability of the human mind to acquire theoretical knowledge of any reality lying beyond the boundaries of human experience. All our knowledge about the world is limited to what can be perceived in space and time and known through the categories of the understanding.

Because we are burdened by our finitude, to seek knowledge of reality that transcends these human forms is like trying to lift ourselves up by our own bootstraps or like attempting to jump out of our own skin. For this reason Kant called traditional metaphysics ‘transcendental illusion”.

In denying traditional metaphysics however, Kant nevertheless made provision for another kind of metaphysics – categorical metaphysics. For him pure reason alone cannot give us knowledge of reality as it is in itself. For it to achieve this, it must combine with sense experience. But then, it would not still afford us knowledge of reality as it is in itself butt as it appears. – Categorial metaphysics.

v    18/01/2010

F    Recapitulation

Kant’s project is to probe the possibility of pure reason’s ability of giving us cognitive access to reality as it is in itself – this being the original position of traditional metaphysics. Rationalism and empiricism were the two current of thoughts that occupy the era under which Kant operated. Rationalism affirmed the possibility of the knowledge of reality through the instrumentality of pure reason; empiricism on the other hand denied this possibility. To determine the possibility of the knowledge of reality by means of pure reason, Kant first of all had to probe the validity of knowledge. Kant’s metaphysical enterprise is therefore epistemic in nature.

In his Copernican revolution, Kant opines that pure reason alone cannot gives us knowledge of reality as it is in itself. According to him, all our knowledge begins with sense experience though it does not end there.  The central point in his Copernican revolution is the understanding of the relationship between the subject of knowledge and the object known. Kant avers that if there is no relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge, there can be no knowledge.

In Kant’s opinion, the object of knowledge must be dependent on the subject of knowledge before we can claim that we have any knowledge than the other way round. Furthermore, since the object of knowledge must depend on the subject of knowledge, it therefore follows that the subject of knowledge cannot know the object of knowledge as it is in itself but as it appears. This is because the subject can only know the object according to its own structures. There is therefore a limit to which the structure of the subject allows it to penetrate into the object. By invoking an epistemic premise therefore, Kant denies the traditional sense of metaphysics that affirms that the structure of reason and the structure of reality are the same.

Comments

Popular posts from this blog

SUMMARY OF PROVIDENTISSIMUS DEUS, ENCYCLICAL LETTER OF POPE LEO XIII ON THE STUDY OF THE HOLY SCRIPTURE.

summary and appraisal of chapters one, two and three of the book The African Origin of Greek Philosophy: An Exercise in Afrocentrism, by Innocent C. Onyewuenyi.

THE LAST THREE WAYS TO PROVES GOD'S EXISTENCE BY THOMAS AQUINAS