HISTORY AND THEORIES OF METAPHYSICS
v 6/10/2009
F Abstract:
The focus of this course is the
history and theories of metaphysics. The history of metaphysics is coterminous
with the history of philosophy. The history of metaphysics is defined by
the emergence and by the dialectical supposition of various theories which purports
to account for the nature of existence. These metaphysical theories express
various philosophical persuasions such as Idealism, Materialism,
Existentialism, Pragmatism and Naturalism. Our concern is to explore the
history of metaphysics by considering these theories.
In considering them, we shall
concentrate on representative thinkers on each of the epochs of the history of philosophy
with the aim of understanding the dynamics behind the formation and unfolding
of the history of metaphysics. We will consider the views of such thinkers as Parmenides,
Plato and Aristotle as representing the Ancient period of the history of
metaphysics. We shall also consider Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas as
representing the medieval period. We shall equally consider Berkeley, Kant and
Hegel as representing the modern period while Heidegger, Whitehead and Collingwood
represents the contemporary period
A critical look at these phases
of the list of metaphysical thinking reveals an important point, namely; that
in each phase mentioned, we can single out a fundamental issue behind the
unfolding of metaphysical thinking. In ancient period for instance, the central
issue which unifies the various epochs is the problem of substance. This
problem which has its humble beginning in the cosmological speculations of the
pre-Socratics, reached it climax (apogee) in the philosophy of Aristotle. Although
the medieval phase of the history of metaphysics significantly built on the
resources of the preceding phase, the metaphysical thinking here was between
faith and reason the various reasons were articulated in the philosophy of
Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas. All of these bear the trace in Platonic and
Aristotelian philosophy – two paradigms that defined the Ancient philosophical
inheritance.
In modern period, the focus
shifts to the question of the nature of Reason. Here we find various attempts
to develop different accounts of the nature of reason that legitimatise the
possibility of metaphysics. However, in contemporary phase, the reverse is the
case. The focus remained the problem of Reason but with a new emphasis with regards
to developing ideas that allows for the deconstruction of metaphysical
enterprise at least as traditionally understood as the science of Being qua
being. It is deconstructive because with the clarification of the problem, we
can say that there is nothing like metaphysics. The history of metaphysics is
made up of theories of the nature of existence.
·
The
question of the structure of modern thinking:
1. Berkley and metaphysics – Reality and Mind
2. Kant and metaphysics – Reality
and Reason
3. Hegel and metaphysics –
Reality and Dialectic
·
The
structure of the question of contemporary metaphysics.
1. Heidegger and metaphysics –
Being and Reason
2. Whitehead and metaphysics –
Reality and Reason
3. Collinwood and metaphysics –
Reality and Reason
F
Summary
of Abstract:
- The history of metaphysics is
coterminous with the history of philosophy
- History of metaphysics is made
up of theories which claim to explain the nature of existence.
- Representatives thinkers from
each of the phases of the history of philosophy
- Issues: The development of
metaphysical thinking in each of the phases.
- Problem of substance
- Problem of faith and reason
- The nature of reason and
justification of metaphysics
- Nature of reason and
deconstruction of metaphysics.
F
Course Outline
·
Preliminaries (Abstract)
·
The nature of metaphysics
·
Metaphysical thinking and its development
-
From the Pre-Socratic to Aristotle: Substance (
Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle)
-
Question of the beginning of metaphysical
thinking
-
From Thales to Parmenides
-
From Parmenides to Plato from Plato to Aristotle
·
Medieval metaphysics: God, Faith and Reason
(Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas)
-
The question of the structure of medieval
thinking
-
Augustine and metaphysics
-
Anselm and metaphysics
-
Aquinas and metaphysics
·
Modern metaphysics: Reality and Reason(Berkeley,
Kant and Hegel)
-
The question of the structure of modern thinking
-
Berkeley
and metaphysics (Reality and Mind)
-
Kant and metaphysics (Reality and Reason)
-
Hegel and metaphysics (Reality and Reason)
·
Contemporary metaphysics: Reason and Reality
(Heidegger, Whitehead, Collinwood).
-
The question of the structure of contemporary
thinking.
-
Heidegger and metaphysics (Being and Reason)
-
Whitehead and metaphysics (Reality and Reason)
-
Collinwood and metaphysics (Reality and Reason)
v 12/10/2009
·
The nature of metaphysics.
There is need to return to this
point as a way of recapitulation in order to lay the grounds for the treatment
of the history and theories of metaphysics. The central issue here is to
recapitulate the meaning of metaphysics. Metaphysics is the science of Being
qua Being. It has as it central focus the question of what there is – the
question as to the nature of ultimate reality. In our previous discussion, we
have seen the various ramifications of this fundamental concern of metaphysic.
We have explored it in terms of the various considerations such as the:
·
Etymological meaning of metaphysics
·
The Populist’s meaning of metaphysics
·
Editorial meaning of metaphysics
·
Chronological meaning of metaphysics
·
Philosophical meaning of metaphysics
In all these, we came to the
conclusion that where one has to be determined by way of clarification of the concept
of metaphysics is the meaning of “Meta ”, and
its overall significance for our understanding of the preoccupation of
metaphysics. There is no need to repeat all of that but it is certainly
important to keep them in mind for it reminds us of what the emphasis is with
regards to the concept of metaphysics namely: that metaphysics generally
understood is a form of discourse on the nature of reality, a form of thinking,
meaning, stepping aside from the issue of how to define the meaning of “Meta”
in that philosophical presentation of metaphysics. Metaphysics is a form of
thinking that is preoccupied with the nature of reality. It is not just
philosophizing in the air, it is philosophising about “What there is”, it
relies on reason as it resource. Thus there is a correlation between Reality
and Reason as far as the concerns of metaphysics are employed.
Metaphysical concern is to
understand the question of “what there is”. To do this, it relies on a certain
form of reason. Thus to explicate it, we can resolve the issue to the nature of
metaphysical thinking. If we can understand this metaphysical thinking, we can
claim to understand the nature of metaphysical thinking. To understand the
nature of metaphysical thinking is to set it apart from other forms of thinking.
Thus, we should consider what sets it apart from other forms of philosophical
thinking. Therefore, it brings us to the dynamics of metaphysics since it is
the dynamics that brings to fore, the nature of metaphysical thinking.
As we have seen earlier, the
beginning, the process and the terminus of metaphysical thinking helps us to
understand the peculiar nature of metaphysical thinking. And by the nature of
metaphysical thinking, it is explicable that we understand the nature of
metaphysics.
With regards to the beginnings,
by its very nature, metaphysical thinking begins with wonder. Though it begins
with wonder, metaphysical thinking does not stop at this point. Wonder is a
necessary condition but not sufficient. Thus, there is need to graduate from
wonder to something greater. This moves us into the domains of process. And the
way it proceeds from wonder is the raising of questions that hither to the
object of wonder - the object of raises question about the reality in question.
In order words, the reality in question raises problem from the mind. In its
perplexity, the mind asks questions because it is unsettled by the reality
before it. This is an indication that the mind in turn as part of its response
to the problematic responses to the reality before it must search for the
solution to the questions probed by reality. And to recall the reflection that
ensues from this conversation between the mind and reality assumes two basic
forms; namely, the analytic which attempts to break down questions into simple
contents.
As part of the mind’s attempt to
struggle in probing the questions raised by reality, it tends to analyse and
break it further into simple questions. Analytic sort of thinking is a part and
an important factor.
Of course, a part from analysis,
there is also the synthetic movement which is not only at the service of
understanding the matter at stake but above all, it attempts to draw from
various sources before the matter at hand. Synthesis tends to bring ideas
together to form one unified mode. In this moment, the metaphysician tends to
think together and this reality before him is more understood. By its very
nature, metaphysics proceeds by way of questions and answer. Questions provoked
by wonder in the mind and the mind analysing and synthesising is also able to
come to know what reality I behind it. There are certain dialectical questions
and answers implicated in the dynamics of metaphysical thinking.
It is important for us to see
that in approaching the question of the nature of metaphysics in this stand
point of the dynamics, this approach is not mainly theoretical but over and
above all, it is concrete and practical in the sense that it allows us to know
how metaphysics operates in practice. In approaching the concept of the nature
of metaphysics, our overall concern is to know how metaphysics has always
proceeded in practice – now and the future. To understand how it has proceeded,
how it proceeds and how it will proceed later.
Metaphysical thinking has various
moments – all the three moments are important. They throw light on the meaning
of metaphysics or perhaps they cannot be separated from one another. Though
they cannot be divorced from one another, from our standpoint however, the most
important moment is the terminus because it is the goal for which the whole
process began. The entire quest for answers removes or resolves the
dissatisfaction provoked by the reality before the mind. The mind is restless
until it finds the adequate explanation or answer to the questions provoked by
the object of reality.
·
19th , 20th and 27th
October 2009
v Metaphysical
thinking and its development
-
From the Pre-Socratic to Aristotle: Substance (
Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle)
-
Question of the beginning of metaphysical thinking
-
From Thales to Parmenides
-
From Parmenides to Plato, from Plato to Aristotle
In approaching this topic, we
should quickly remind ourselves that the history of metaphysics is coterminous
with the history of philosophy. The history of philosophy is divided into four
broad divisions – Ancient, medieval, modern and contemporary. Part of the
consequence of the thesis that the history of metaphysics is coterminous with
the history of philosophy is that we can trace the history of metaphysics to
these four epochs of the history of philosophy. It means that we can associate
the history of metaphysics respectively into the ancient, medieval, modern and
contemporary era.
In considering metaphysics in the
light of these four epochs, our cardinal objective is to access if there is a
development in the history of metaphysical thinking. We can throw light on some
peculiar nature that affects metaphysics and how metaphysics tend to resolve
its problems and finally the dynamics of metaphysics – how metaphysics access
itself concretely. It should be possible for us to trace from ancient
development to contemporary era of the history of metaphysics.
In considering this project, it
is evident that we are immediately confronted with the question of the
beginning of metaphysical thinking. Can we say that metaphysical thinking has a
beginning? How can we characterise that beginning and in terms of what can this
beginning be located. It is clear that the question here is a purely historical
question. It does not necessarily refer to how metaphysics is done in practice.
We have addressed that ontological question in the dynamics of metaphysics.
When the question is asked then,
we are asking rather whether the beginning of metaphysical thinking can be
associated with any historical point of the human consciousness. If man is
rational, then we can easily say that given the fact that A and X, if they are
human beings that is rational and is able to employ the use of its rational ability.
Metaphysics is said to exist wherever there are human beings. The answer to the
question whether metaphysics can be found in any of the four epochs is
therefore unequivocal affirmation. Wherever human being exists, there is
metaphysics because human beings are rational. It is one thing to have reason
and another to put it in practice.
It is usual to associate the
beginning of metaphysical thinking with the early Milesian thinkers of western
tradition. Specifically, the beginning of metaphysical thinking like the
beginning of philosophy itself is associated with Thales of Miletus. With this
association, it means that metaphysics or philosophy began in the west. This
fact does not suffice to account for the beginning of metaphysics given the
fact that it is associated with a particular tradition – western. African philosophers
will take issues with this thesis and argue that the history of metaphysics and
philosophy has a much earlier beginning and should not be dated with the early
Greek thinkers. The argument for this being that metaphysics or philosophy is
not the prerogative of any specific culture or tradition but rather, that it
has a universal character of being found in any place. This argument seeks to
problematise the question of the nature of metaphysics.
Metaphysical thinking can also be
as a result of other cultures. However, it is important to understand the
reason of ascription of the beginning of metaphysical thinking. The important
consideration is the issue of recorded evidence for such phenomenon. It is not
enough to claim that our for-fathers also had their own forms of metaphysics. In
philosophy, we look for evidence and justifications for our claims. It is not
sufficient therefore to cite oral tradition as accounting for metaphysical
thinking because it is clearly limited in nature. The only way is to appeal to recorded
evidence. Consequently, it is on the score of recoded evidence that the
beginning of metaphysics is traced back to the ancient Greek thinkers. As far as written tradition is concerned, the
earliest form of metaphysics is associated with Thales because there were
written evidence that supported the claim that he was involved in metaphysical
thinking.
The importance of recoded
evidence should not be underestimated in the ascription of the beginning of
metaphysical thinking to the early Greek philosophers. Even if we care to look
at the theory that metaphysics could be found anywhere, why then associated it
with a particular culture? There are objective criteria for this ascription. At
this period, something happened that witnessed to the emergence of metaphysical
consciousness. Consciousness has many ramifications. Man is a social,
religious, political, philosophical, economic, metaphysical, technological
being. And so we can speak of man as having social consciousness, religious consciousness,
political consciousness, philosophical consciousness, economic consciousness,
metaphysical consciousness, and technological consciousness. All these
consciousness are implicit in man but are not all developed at the same time.
They are therefore evolutionary - Something prompted philosophical
consciousness. Without prejudice to other cultures, the beginning of
metaphysical consciousness is ascribed to Thales because of written evidence.
The Greek tradition can be said
to be a transitional way of looking at things – it is the way of ‘Logos.’ The
term is derived from Greek for “word” or “reason” and was used in ancient and
medieval philosophy and theology. The 6th-century bc Greek philosopher Heraclitus was the first to use the
term Logos in a metaphysical sense. He asserted that the world is governed by a
fire-like Logos, a divine force that produces the order and pattern discernible
in the flux of nature. He believed that this force is similar to human reason
and that his own thought partook of the divine Logos. Contrasted with this is
the idea of mythos which was the old way of explaining things.
In the 6th century bc, however, Greek thinkers began to
question the validity of their culture’s traditional tales, and the word mythos
came to denote an implausible story. Greek philosopher Xenophanes, for example,
argued that much of the behaviour that the poets Homer and Hesiod attributed to
the gods was unworthy of divine beings. By the 5th century bc, serious Greek thinkers tended to
regard the old myths as naive explanations for natural phenomena or simply to
reject them altogether. Nevertheless, myths retained their cultural importance,
even after they had come under attack from philosophers. The ancient Greek
tragedies, which remained central to civic and religious life in Athens through the end of
the 5th century bc, drew their
subject matter largely from myths.
Mythos and cosmogony were the
predominant way of explaining reality in the ancient Greek society. It takes
the form of appealing to myths in order to explain natural events. This form of
thinking was supplanted by what Thales and his companions practiced which is the
way of Logos which explains reality in terns of their inner reason that drives
them. Cosmogony is associated with superstition, mythology and the gods. The
gods that people appealed to in mythology in order to explain nature is Olympus and Zeus.
The transition from the
cosmogonic/mythological approach to reality marked the beginning of
philosophical approach to reality in the world. To understand the nature of the
beginning of metaphysical thinking, we have to talk of mythos and logos. We can
amplify this discussion by interrogating further the specific contribution of
Thales to the beginning of metaphysical thinking. The question of the
primordial stuff of the universe at first sight contains a presupposition that
there is an original stuff out of which everything was made off. What is this
primary stuff? Is there an original stuff from which everything derives? If
yes, what is it? Is it a single stuff or much stuff? These are some of the
questions Anaximander and Anaximenes and their companions raised.
Thales answered the question in
the affirmative. According to him, the source is one. There is the possibility
that it could be many and this would imply pluralism. Here we are confronted
with metaphysical problem of monism and pluralism. According to Thales, the
primary stuff out which the universe derives is water. Thales’ unique contribution to thought was
his notion that in spite of the differences between the various changing things
there is, nevertheless, basic similarity between them all, that the many are
related to each other by the One. He assumed that that some single element,
some ‘stuff’, a stuff which contained its own principle of action or change,
lay at the foundation of all physical reality. To him this One, or this stuff,
was water.
Aristotle writes that Thales
might have derived this conclusion from observation of simple events, ‘perhaps
from seeing that the nutriment of all things is moist, and that heat is
generated from the moist and kept alive by it…He got his notion from this fact
and from the fact that the seeds of all things have a moist nature, and water
is the origin of the nature of moist things. Other phenomena such as freezing
also suggest that water takes on different forms.
After Thales, we have
Anaximander. He agreed with his teacher Thales that there is some single basic
stuff out which everything comes. Unlike Thales however, he said that the
primary substance out of which the specific things come is an indefinite or boundless. It may very well be, he thought, that
water or moist is found in various forms everywhere, but water is only one
specific thing among many other elements, and all these specific things require
that there be some more elementary stuff to account for their origin. Thus
Anaximander differentiated specific and determinate things from their origin by
calling the primary substance the indeterminate, and whereas things are finite,
the original stuff is infinite or boundless.
v
2nd
November, 2009
-
Parmenides and the situation of the
metaphysical question.
Parmenides essentially
perpetuates the basic assumption of Greek philosophy as posited by the Milesian
philosophers. Both the Heraclitian and Milesian philosophers assumed that all
things emerge out of something else, that although there is only one basic
stuff in the world, this stuff is the source of a variety of things and that
the process by which the One becomes many is the process of change.
Parmenides, on the other hand,
rejected the very notion of change, resting his argument on at least two
grounds: namely, that if there is a single substance behind all things, the
concept of change is absurd logically, and that the phenomenon of change is
basically an illusion. For him, the concept of change was logically neither
thinkable nor expressible. He maintained that whatever exist “must be absolute,
or not at all.” To exist in an “absolute” way meant for Parmenides that
whatever is, simply is. We can never admit, he said, that “anything should come
into being…out of not-being. According to him, something either “is or is not.”
How can you say of anything that it came into being, that it changed from
not-being to being? You cannot say about anything that ‘it’ ever had non-being,
for if you can think of an ‘it’, it already exists and consequently, there is
no process of change because there is no ‘non-being’.
According to Parmenides, to
think is to think about something and for this reason you cannot think about
anything changing or coming into being. To think about change required one to
attempt to do the impossible; namely to think about something in terms of what
it is not. Being or reality is what it is and not something else. For this
reason it is impossible to think of change in any clear way since the only
thing one can think about is being, or what actually is. It follows therefore
that being absolute, that being is not divisible, and since all being is alike,
all is full being. Therefore, it is altogether continuous, for being is close
to being.
Speaking of all reality as It, Parmenides says that “one path only
is left to us to speak of namely, that It is. In this path are very many tokens
that what is, is uncreated and indestructible, for it is complete, immoveable
and without end. There cannot be different shades of being, because either It
is or It is not, and since there is no becoming, being is not divisible. There
is as much being in one place as in another, and there is no empty space. From
these considerations, Parmenides argued that the It or reality is material in
nature and finite. Reality is a spherical, material, motionless, and fully
occupied plenum, a continuous mass where there is no reality to emptiness and
beyond which there is nothing. Because there is no change, reality is uncreated
and is also indestructible and is, therefore, eternal and motionless.
v
November 9, 2009
·
Plato’s Metaphysics
and issues arising from Parmenian continuation.
With the intervention of each
thinker, the issue of metaphysical thinking re-states itself in a different
form. Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, and Parmenides all have different views
as to what constitutes the fundamental principles of reality. In the case of
Plato, the immediate background is Parmenides. The problem of metaphysical
thinking restates itself in the form of permanence and change. For Parmenides,
there is the need to reconcile two extremes: One and Many, Change and
Permanence. The question here is whether reality is One and Many or Many and
One; whether it is Change and permanence or Permanence and Change. This is the
background in the wake of Plato’s intervention in the matter.
For Plato, it is neither One nor
Many but One and Many. In Plato’s theory of metaphysical reality, there is room
for One, and there is room for Many. There is room for Permanence and there is
room for Change. The theory of Forms affirms that there are two spheres in
reality – the world of Universals and the world of Particulars.
For Plato, the world of
Universals are the world of Ideal essences, prototypes; unchanging world. It is
the world of fullness of reality, perfect world, not open to change. On the
other hand, the world of particulars is a changing world. It exhibits partial
and not fullness of reality. In Plato’s scheme of metaphysical inquiry, the
ultimate reality is the world of Universals and not the world of Particulars. Both
Heraclitus and Parmenides sought to dissolve the paradox of change with extreme
solutions. Heraclitus said that everything in the world of experience is
changing and permanence is merely an illusion. Parmenides and his fellow
Eleatics eliminated the problem by claiming that permanence is fundamental and
change is merely an appearance. Although their positions were diametrically
opposite, both assumed monism, the claim that reality is essentially one sort
of thing.
If the Heraclitean position is
correct, then knowledge is impossible because there is nothing stable about the
world that we could know. Yet Parmenides’ solution is not satisfactory either,
because change is obviously a fact of life. Plato believes that they are both
wrong and they are both right. They are wrong in their monism, because they too
quickly assume that all reality is one sort of thing. However, they are each
right in describing one-half of the total picture. Plato adopted their insights
but modified them to eliminate their weaknesses.
In seeking a compromise between
Heraclitus and Parmenides, Plato embraces metaphysical dualism, the claim that
there are two completely different kinds of reality. His solution is to propose
that there is a world of constant flux, at the same time there is a world that
is eternal and unchanging. The world of flux is the physical world that we
encounter in sense experience. But it is constantly changing; we cannot have rational
knowledge of it. The world that is eternal and unchanging is a metaphysical
reality. It is not located in space and time. Plato sometimes refers to this as
“intelligible world” because only this reality is intelligible to reason.
·
The Relationship of Particulars to the Forms
At this point, Plato faces the
problem of all dualism. Once you have separated reality into two different
realms, how do you understand the relationship between them? For Plato, these
two kinds of reality are not equal. The physical world is less real than the
world of Forms and depends on the higher world. The reality that transcends
experience produces whatever order and reality we find in the world of
experience. For Plato, the relationship between the two worlds is by
participation. The world of particulars participates in the world of the
Universals.
The question now is: “How does
the particular object participate in the life of its representative in the
world of universals since the two worlds are said to be distinct from each
other. As has been noted above, Plato’s attempted reconciliation of the
metaphysical problem is predicted in his theory of Forms which represent his
most significant philosophic contribution. The doctrine of Forms represents a
serious attempt to explain the nature of existence.
·
Aristotle and Metaphysics
Focusing on Aristotle provides an
interesting case study of the way in which philosophical ideas developed. To
understand his agenda, we need to understand the relationship between his vision
of philosophy and that of Plato. Throughout his philosophical writings,
Aristotle sought to give more coherent and satisfactory solution to the
problems addressed by Plato.
According to Aristotle, metaphysics is
the science of “Being qua being”, meaning by this, the science of “Being as Being”.
This definition suggests that there are degrees of beings. It shows that
metaphysics is concerned with the reality of being. Metaphysics deals with the
“beingness” of being. It deals with the universals in the particular being –
what makes a thing what it is. For Aristotle, to be is to be an individual and
in the final analysis, reality is made up of particular realities. Every
particular thing is a substance and reality is made up of particular things. In
order to give an adequate explanation of a particular thing, we have to explain
it in reference to the universal. It is therefore quite understandable that the
preoccupation of metaphysics in investigating the nature of being is universal
in the particular. Metaphysics for Aristotle deals with knowledge at the
highest level of abstraction because it is about what is universal instead of
what is particular. Metaphysics studies reality through the instrumentality of
pure reason.
Plato argued that that Ideas or
Forms, such as Man or Table, had a separate existence as the substratum or
stuff out of which individual things were made. This was Plato’s way of explaining
how there could be many individual things that all have one and the same, that
is universal nature or essence while still being individual. This universal,
Plato said, is the Form, which exists eternally and is separated from any
particular thing and is found in each thing only because the thing (this table)
participates in the Form (tableness, or Ideal Table).
Aristotle rejected Plato’s
explanation of the universal Forms, rejecting specifically the notion that the
Form existed separately form individual things. Of course Aristotle did agree
that there are universals, that universals such as Man and Table are more than
merely subjective notions. Indeed Aristotle recognised that without the theory
of universals, there could be no scientific knowledge, for then there would be
no way of saying something about all members of a particular class.
Having dismissed Plato’s extreme
dualism, where does Aristotle locate the forms? But, said Aristotle, their
reality is to be found not anywhere else than in the individual thing
themselves. For Aristotle, there is no abstract Form of “Tableness” apart form
this world. There are only individual tables exhibiting the form that
identifies something as a table. For Aristotle therefore, the fundamental
reality is the collection of substances we find in our everyday experiences.
Substances, then, are the fundamental unity of reality.
·
Matter and Form
Although Aristotle distinguished
between matter and form, he nevertheless said that we never find matter without
form or form without matter in nature. Everything that exists is some concrete
individual thing, and every thing is a unity of matter and form. Substance
therefore, is a composite of form and matter. The “whatness” of something
refers to its form. Its “thisness” is its matter. In summary, every individual
substance is made up of two dimensions, its form (whatness) and its matter
(thisness). We may discuss each dimension separately, but this is always an
abstraction. They are not two parts of a substance the way that the legs and
the seat are two parts of a stool. We do not find bare matter to which form is
added as an additional ingredient. However, one piece of formed matter can be
the basis for a new object if it is recognised by means of different forms.
v Conclusion
By way of conclusion of our
examination of the development of metaphysical thinking during the ancient
period up to Plato and Aristotle, our primary concern had be to discern whether
there is development at this period in the history of metaphysics. Our review
of this period will lead us to the conclusion that there is development both in
content and method in the history of metaphysics. The problem at this period
even though it remained basically the same, assumed different forms.
The best way of expressing this
problem is that of substance as formulated by Aristotle. The question can be
posed as follows: “What does it mean for a thing to be?” the full formation of problem
comes to us from Plato and Aristotle though they depended heavily on their
predecessors.
The second aspect of the question
is that the history of metaphysics at this period demonstrated that there is
progress in metaphysics. This is signified by the transition from traditional
belief of cosmogony to logos.
v November 22,
2009
·
Medieval metaphysics:
-
The question of the structure of medieval thinking
-
Augustine and metaphysics
-
Anselm and metaphysics
-
Aquinas and metaphysics
Having
completed the history of the development of metaphysical thinking during the
ancient period, we now go to our next topic – metaphysics during the medieval
period. Here we shall consider St.
Augustine , St. Anselm, and St. Thomas Aquinas.
The structure of metaphysical thinking at this
period centred on God, Faith and Reason. The accompanying metaphysical
problematic at this period centred on:
-
The divine
reality.
-
Is there God?
-
If there is God,
what is his nature?
-
Does God have any
relationship with his creatures?
-
If there is
relationship between God and his creatures, what is the nature of this
relationship?
-
If there is God
and He relates with his creatures, how do we examine this relationship? By what
instrumentality?
-
Through Faith or
Reason?
-
Through Faith and
Reason?
During
the ancient period various postulation were put forward as the primary source
of reality:
-
For Thales, it is
water
-
For Anaximander,
it is an indeterminate boundless
-
For Anaximenes,
it is air
-
With Heraclitus
came the idea change and permanence
-
For Parmenides,
we have the idea of Being instead of becoming – Being or Reality is One, and
there is no change
-
With Plato, the
metaphysical problematic metamorphosed into the theory of Forms or Ideas
-
With Aristotle, we
have the theory of Substance and Accidents, Matter and Form
v Medieval
metaphysics:
One
of the oldest metaphysical questions is: does God exist? In discussing this
question, we understand “God” in the classical philosophical sense of a being
who is all-powerful (omnipotent), all-knowing (omniscient), and wholly good.
The arguments in favour of God’s existence are known as the ontological,
cosmological and teleological arguments, though there are many versions of each
argument. The argument against God’s existence is the argument from evil.
-
God, Faith and Reason (Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas)
·
Augustine and metaphysics
The issue here now is on how to
explain the presence of evil in a world supposedly created by a good God, who
is all loving, all powerful. To speak of the presence of evil in such a world
calls for an explanation. It is a self-contradictory to speak of the presence
of evil in a world created by a Good who is all good, all loving and all
powerful.
There are two possibilities for the
explanation:
1. It is either true that God is
all good, all loving, and all powerful or he is neither of these. It is
possible that he is all loving but not all powerful otherwise he could not
allow evil in the world.
2. The second position is to
insist that God is both all good and all powerful but then we need to provide
reasons for the presence of evil in the world.
Augustine tired to provide a
solution to the presence of evil in the world and his solution have become very
paradigmatic from whatever angles it is viewed. He will not say that God is the
originator of evil but attributes it to man’s free will. At this point, two
categories of evils had to be made:
1. Physical or natural evil. This
refers to such phenomenon as earthquake, tsunamis, hurricane and all forms of
natural disasters. This category of evil is to be distinguished from the second
category of evil called moral evil
2. Moral evil. This is referred
to as sin and it implicated man’s moral will. The two categories of evil are
rather intersected in moral evil and that is what investigates in his
metaphysical doctrine on evil.
The first and second category of
evil can be presented as metaphysical evil because every evil in the world
raises questions about the universe and affects the human beings. The question
of evil therefore implicates the nature of God and his relationship with his
creatures.
·
Augustine’s Solution.
Augustine is interested in this
matter as has been noted from the standpoint of moral evil. According to him,
the cause of evil in the world cannot be attributed to God. He is the creator,
all powerful, all good and all loving. It follows therefore that all he created
is good. What then is the cause of the evil we notice in the world? By way of
negation, Augustine says the cause of evil is not man’s ignorance as Plato
argues. Virtue for Plato is knowledge. By implication, evil is attributed to
the lack of knowledge.
Augustine on the other hand,
however, does not accept that ignorance was the cause of evil. He does not
accept man’s powerlessness in the face of moral evil. This gives us a glimpse
of the Manichaeism in St. Augustine .
The Manichean solution to problem of evil in the world presupposes that there
are two forces (the forces of good and evil) in the world that explains the
problem of evil. These forces are at war with each other and it allows us to
explain the natural happenings around us such as hurricane, earthquake, and
tsunamis – the physical aspect.
The moral aspect of it is that
man is exposed to these two opposing forces which are on equal par and which
does not take place outside but within man – man has the good and bad demons
inside himself and he cannot do anything about that. This implicate that man is
helpless in the face of such opposing forces in him.
For Augustine however, the cause
of moral evil must be attributed to man’s will. Having been rescued from the
influence of Manichaeism, Augustine can make this claim and he affirms that God
is in control of the universe and have endowed man with a capacity that allows
him either to chose good over and above evil or chose evil over and above god.
Augustine came to this standpoint through the influence of Divine Illumination.
The conversion of Augustine is therefore the background to this solution to the
problem of moral evil in the world.
God, according to Augustine, has
endowed man with the capacity to discriminate between good and evil. He equally
has the capacity to choose between good and evil. God has created man for good
but man has the option to embrace the good or evil. For Augustine, there is a
consequence for exercising the power choice. There is a consequence for
choosing good or evil. Man’s happens is tied-up with the affirmation of the
highest good. Man has the capacity to choose God. When man chooses good in the
way God has intended, it leads man to God but when man chooses good contrary to
God’s intention, it leads man away from God.
The cause of evil therefore is
located in man’s free will. In this case, evil is not a metaphysical entity but
an absence of the good as a consequence of man’s use of his free will. The
attendant question to this position is: “What then is the cause of the physical
evils such as earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, and other natural phenomena in
the world since free will is the cause of evil in the world?
The solution to the problem of
evil is not knowledge as one may have knowledge but may not subject his will to
God’s will. The solution of moral evil therefore is that man with the grace of
God should submit his will to God in all things since this is the true source
of his happiness.
From the foregoing, the question
boils down to the love of God and love of self – whether man will use his will
to love God or himself. This helps us to understand the clarification of the
city of God .
Those that are ruled by love of God are those that inhabit the city God while
those that are ruled by the city of man are outside the city of God . For St. Augustine , people are looking for
happiness in all they do. Hence he cried out that we are made for God and our
hearts are restless until they rest in God. According to St. Augustine , the way to happiness is to
live in the love of God. His main position is the concept of free will. He is
saying that man is to blame not God for the presence of evil in the world
because these evils arise from man’s misuse of his free will. Again the
attendant question here is, since the misuse of free will is the cause of moral
evil in the world, who or what takes full responsibility for the natural evils
around us?
v November 24, 2009 .
By
way of recapitulation, we should remind ourselves that medieval metaphysics is
not the same with the ancient metaphysics. Medieval metaphysics begins with
faith and tries to understand what one believes in and where pure reason cannot
help, one turns back to faith. Hence the saying “Faith seeking understanding.”
Already one believes, and then with the aid of pure reason, one seeks further
understanding of what one believes and where reason fails to provide an answer,
one relies on faith again. The medieval metaphysical progression therefore is:
Faith – Reason - Faith. The contributions of Augustine, Anselm and Aquinas
exemplify the structure of medieval thinking.
·
Anselm and Metaphysics.
The
problem that engages Anselm therefore is the problem of the existence of God.
St. Anselm was a Benedictine monk. In his later years he became the Abbot of
his monastery. It was at this period that he wrote a number of books on
theological and philosophical topics.
St.
Anselm is famous in the history of thought primarily for his celebrated
ontological argument for the existence of God. For him there was not clear line
between philosophy and theology. As Augustine before him, he was particularly
concerned with providing rational support for the doctrines of Christianity,
which he already accepted as a matter of faith. He was convinced that faith and
reason leads to the same conclusions.
Anselm
tries to discover the truth about God by employing reason in order to
understand what he believed. His method therefore was faith seeking
understanding; “I do not seek to understand in order that I may believe,” he
said, “but I believe in order that I may understand.” He made it particularly
clear that his enterprise of proving God’s existence could not even begin
unless he had already believed in His existence.
·
Highlights of Anselm’s Thoughts
1.
Anselm believes that faith precedes reason – faith seeking understanding. This
shows that he was influenced by Augustine as far as metaphysical problem is
concerned.
2.
The influence of Anselm’s Christian background. He begins his assumption that
the doctrine of Christianity is true. As a Christian therefore, he accepts the
existence of God in faith and by imploring reason, he is seeking understanding
to the existence of God. Can we use reason to demonstrate that God exists? For
him, we can use reason to demonstrate the existence of God.
·
Works
1.
Monologion
2.
Proslogion
In
his work, (The Proslogion), Anselm provides proof for the existence of God –
the Ontological argument. By insisting that Faith and Reason must be combined,
Anselm exemplified the medieval thinking. The ontological argument occupies
chapter two to four of the
Proslogion. The ontological argument tries to show that if one tries to
conceive something which is greater than nothing can be thought implies that
such a thing exists. If you think of God, it means that God exists. The second
form of this argument is that God exists necessarily. The milieu for this
argument is conversation with oneself; by implication, prayer – something than
no greater can be thought.
The
ontological argument therefore attempt to prove God’s existence by reason
alone. It is a priori argument. The idea is simply by grasping the concept of
God, together with an understanding of what that idea entails; we can prove
that God exists. The ontological argument thus purports to be a deductively
valid proof of God’s existence from a priori knowable premises. It is intended
to be as cogent and compelling as any proof found in logic and mathematics.
The
first thing to notice about this proof is that Anselm’s thought proceeds from
within his mind, rather than starting with the assumption that each proof must
begin with some empirical evidence from which the mind can then move logically
to God. Anselm followed Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination, which gave
direct access to certain truths.
Clearly,
Anselm is assured of the existence of God before he begins, saying again, that
“unless I believe, I shall not understand.”
There two forms to Anselm’s argument. The first form tries to establish
that God exists necessarily. His entire argument is within the milieu of
prayer; meaning that this is an argument but not just an argument.
The
ontological argument in its first form says that God necessarily exists. We believe
says Anselm, that God is “something than which nothing greater can be thought.”
The question then is, does this something, than which nothing greater can be
thought, really exists?
Anselm's argument goes like this. God is “that than
which nothing greater can be thought”; in other words, he is a being so great,
so full of metaphysical oomph that one cannot so much as conceive of a being
who would be greater than God. The Psalmist, however, tells us that “The fool
has said in his heart, ‘There is no God’ ” (Psalm 14:1; 53:1). Is it possible
to convince the fool that he is wrong? It is. All we need is the
characterization of God as “that than which nothing greater can be thought.”
The fool does at least understand that definition.
But whatever is understood exists in the
understanding, just as the plan of a painting he has yet to execute already
exists in the understanding of the painter. So that than which nothing greater
can be thought exists in the understanding. But if it exists in the understanding,
it must also exist in reality. For it is greater to exist in reality than to
exist merely in the understanding. Therefore, if that than which nothing
greater can be thought existed only in the understanding, it would be possible
to think of something greater than it (namely, that same being existing in
reality as well). It follows, then, that if that than which nothing greater can
be thought existed only in the understanding, it would not be that than which
nothing greater can be thought; and that, obviously, is a contradiction. So
that than which nothing greater can be thought must exist in reality, not
merely in the understanding.
Anselm's intention in the Proslogion was to
offer a single argument that would establish not only the existence of God but also
the various attributes that Christians believe God possesses. If the argument
of chapter 2 proved only the existence of God, leaving the divine attributes to
be established piecemeal as in the Monologion, Anselm would consider the
Proslogion a failure. But in fact the concept of that than which nothing
greater can be thought turns out to be marvellously fertile. God must, for
example, be omnipotent. For if he were not, we could conceive of a being
greater than he. But God is that than which no greater can be thought, so he
must be omnipotent. Similarly, God must be just, self-existent, invulnerable to
suffering, merciful, timelessly eternal, non-physical, non-composite, and so
forth; for if he lacked any of these qualities, he would be less than the greatest
conceivable being, which is impossible.
·
11/01/2010
·
Berkeley’s Background
George
Berkeley is an Irish philosopher of the 18th century. He was born on
12th March 1685
into a family of English decent. As a young man, he studied Maths, Logic and
Philosophy at Trinity
College in Dublin where he was
exposed to the philosophies f Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke, as well as the
works of Newton
and other leading scientists. In 1710, he was ordained as a priest in the
Anglican Church. By the time he was 24 years old, Berkeley had obtained his B. A. Degree and
developed his system of philosophy.
·
Berkeley ’s Task:
Battling Skepticism and Unbelief (Reality and mind)
The
main thrust of Berkeley ’s
philosophy is his denial of matter. This seeks to refute philosophical
materialism which affirms the reality of matter. In denying matter, Berkeley seeks to affirm
the spiritual nature of the universe.
Philosophical materialism is the view that ultimate reality is matter.
Matter was thought to be an independently existing substance, without reference
to God. From the belief in such a material world, it is a short jump to the
conclusion that God is unnecessary.
“All the choir of haven and furniture of
the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the
world, have not any subsistence without a mind – that their being is to be
perceived or known”
v Why is Berkeley concerned to
refute philosophical materialism?
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In his major work, Treatise Concerning the Principles of
Human Knowledge
(1710), Berkeley
asserted that nothing exists except ideas and spirits (minds or souls). By
“spirit” Berkeley
meant “one simple, undivided, active being.” The activity of spirits consists
of both understanding and willing: understanding is spirit perceiving ideas,
and will is spirit producing ideas.
For Berkeley , ostensibly
physical objects like tables and chairs are really nothing more than
collections of sensible ideas. Since no idea can exist outside a mind, it follows that tables and chairs, as
well all the other furniture of the physical world, exist only insofar as they
are in the mind of someone—i.e., only insofar as they are perceived. For any
non-thinking being, esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”).
The
clichéd question of whether a tree falling in an uninhabited forest makes a
sound is inspired by Berkeley 's
philosophy, though he never considered it in these terms. He did, however,
consider the implicit objection and gave various answers to it. He sometimes
says that a table in an unperceived room would be perceived if someone were
there. This conditional response, however, is inadequate. Granted that the
table would exist if it were perceived; does it exist when it is not perceived?
Berkeley's more pertinent answer is that, when no human is perceiving a table
or other such object, God is; and it is God's thinking that keeps the otherwise
unperceived object in existence.
To say
that colours, sounds, trees, dogs, and tables are ideas is not to say that they
do not really exist, it is merely to say what they really are. Moreover, to say
that animals and pieces of furniture are ideas is not to say that they are
diaphanous, gossamer, and evanescent. Opacity, density, and permanence are also
ideas that partially constitute these objects.


The background of Berkeley ’s critique to
philosophical materialism is located in Cartesian theory of mind-body dualism.
Descartes maintained that body and mind are radically different entities and
that they are the only fundamental substances in the universe. He regarded the body as a physical entity and
the mind as a spiritual entity, and believed the two interacted only through
the pineal gland, a tiny structure at the base of the brain. This position
became known as dualism. According to dualism, the behaviour of the body
is determined by mechanistic laws and can be measured in a scientific manner.
But the mind, which transcends the material world, cannot be similarly studied.
Descartes’ fundamental separation
of mind and body, raised the problem of explaining how two such different
substances as mind and body can affect each other, a problem he was unable to
solve that has remained a concern of philosophy ever since. Descartes’ thought
launched an era of speculation in metaphysics as philosophers made a determined
effort to overcome dualism—the belief in the irreconcilable difference between
mind and matter—and obtain unity. The separation of mind and matter is also
known as Cartesian dualism after Descartes.
George Berkeley, like Spinoza
before him, rejected both Cartesian dualism and the assertion by Hobbes that
only matter is real. Berkeley
maintained that spirit is substance, and that only spiritual substance is real.
Extending Locke’s doubts about knowledge of an external world, outside the
mind, Berkeley
argued that no evidence exists for the existence of such a world, because the
only things that we can observe are our own sensations, and these are in the
mind. The very notion of matter, he maintained, is incoherent and impossible.
To exist, he claimed, means to be perceived (“esse est percipi”), and in
order for things to exist when we are not observing them, they must continue to
be perceived by God. By claiming that sensory phenomena are the only objects of
human knowledge, Berkeley
established the view known as phenomenalism, a theory of perception that
suggests that matter can be analyzed in terms of sensations.
v
12/01/2010
F Kant and Metaphysics – Reality and Reason
After Plato, Kant ranks as one of the greatest
philosophers in the Western tradition. Our concern however, is his contribution
in the development of metaphysical thinking. A prolific writer, he wrote three
major philosophical works: (a) The Critique of Pure Reason (b) The Critique of
Practical Reason and (c) The Critique of Judgment. Of these three works, the
one that is of most importance is the Critique of Pure Reason.
His contribution centers on the status of Pure
Reason in the metaphysical enterprise. He tries to probe the metaphysical possibility
of Pure Reason. The question here is: Can Pure Reason on its own know reality?”
In providing answer to this question, Kant was
tussling with empiricism and rationalism of his day. Empiricism denies that
pure reason could know reality. According the empiricists, all our knowledge
derives from sense experience. Rationalism on the other hand holds that pure
reason can furnish us with the knowledge of reality. Kant tries to reconcile
these two opposing views.
Kant argued that synthetic a priori judgments
are possible in mathematics and physics and that they serve the purpose of
making sense of our experience. But are they possible in metaphysics? The
discussion of his epistemology made it clear that Kant is pessimistic about the
ability of the human mind to acquire theoretical knowledge of any reality lying
beyond the boundaries of human experience. All our knowledge about the world is
limited to what can be perceived in space and time and known through the
categories of the understanding.
Because we are burdened by our finitude, to
seek knowledge of reality that transcends these human forms is like trying to
lift ourselves up by our own bootstraps or like attempting to jump out of our
own skin. For this reason Kant called traditional metaphysics ‘transcendental
illusion”.
In denying traditional metaphysics however,
Kant nevertheless made provision for another kind of metaphysics – categorical
metaphysics. For him pure reason alone cannot give us knowledge of reality as
it is in itself. For it to achieve this, it must combine with sense experience.
But then, it would not still afford us knowledge of reality as it is in itself
butt as it appears. – Categorial metaphysics.
v
18/01/2010
F
Recapitulation
Kant’s project is to probe the possibility of
pure reason’s ability of giving us cognitive access to reality as it is in
itself – this being the original position of traditional metaphysics.
Rationalism and empiricism were the two current of thoughts that occupy the era
under which Kant operated. Rationalism affirmed the possibility of the
knowledge of reality through the instrumentality of pure reason; empiricism on
the other hand denied this possibility. To determine the possibility of the
knowledge of reality by means of pure reason, Kant first of all had to probe
the validity of knowledge. Kant’s metaphysical enterprise is therefore
epistemic in nature.
In his Copernican revolution, Kant opines that
pure reason alone cannot gives us knowledge of reality as it is in itself.
According to him, all our knowledge begins with sense experience though it does
not end there. The central point in his
Copernican revolution is the understanding of the relationship between the
subject of knowledge and the object known. Kant avers that if there is no
relationship between the subject and the object of knowledge, there can be no
knowledge.
In Kant’s opinion, the object of knowledge must
be dependent on the subject of knowledge before we can claim that we have any
knowledge than the other way round. Furthermore, since the object of knowledge
must depend on the subject of knowledge, it therefore follows that the subject
of knowledge cannot know the object of knowledge as it is in itself but as it
appears. This is because the subject can only know the object according to its
own structures. There is therefore a limit to which the structure of the
subject allows it to penetrate into the object. By invoking an epistemic
premise therefore, Kant denies the traditional sense of metaphysics that
affirms that the structure of reason and the structure of reality are the same.
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