INTRODUCTION TO ETHICS
Introduction
What is the measure of good and evil in the world? How can we know whether or not an act is
virtuous or vice? Is there in the very
nature of the universe a code of laws which determines good and bad or is
goodness and badness a matter of the relation of an act to other acts? “Open the book of the story of mankind
anywhere and you will find the question being asked over and over again: what
is good and what is evil? This has been
without doubt, one of the most persistent problems of philosophers throughout
the ages.”[1]d
Answer have been
given in abundance, answers which appeared to the particular philosopher giving
the particular answer to solve the problem for all times, but in a very few
years the problem has risen again in the thinking of others.
We do not automatically
act the right way in these matters as Aristotle says “none of the moral virtues
arises in us by nature, for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit
contrary to its nature,”[2]
morality has to do with developing habits. The habit of right thinking, right
choice and right behavior. In this work
we shall look at what is virtue and vice, virtue as golden mean moral virtue
and intellectual virtue; after which we shall evaluate and draw a conclusion.
1.0 The Meaning of Virtue
Etymologically,
virtue comes from Latin virus; Greek αpƐƮƞ designates moral strength and
moral excellence, virtue is a character strength and mortal excellence. A
virtue is a character trait or quality valued as being always good in and of
it.” The etymology suggests that virtue
is “mainly qualities.”
A virtue is a
disposition to act, not an entity build up within me and productive of behavior
not others. Virtue, unlike a mere habit,
is a disposition to act for reasons, and so a disposition which is exercised
through the agents practical reasoning; it is built up by making choices and
exercised in the making of further choices.
When an honest
person decides, not to take something to which he is not entitled, this is not
the upshot of a causal build up from previous decision, a choice which endorses
his disposition to be honest.
Virtue as a
disposition to behave in the right manner, is inculcated from a young age will
not only show confidence in the face of fear, but will think of this courage as
a good thing behaving courageously will made the virtuous person happy and will
be one part of living a generally good life.
By contrast, a person who has taken poorly brought up and exhibits the
vice of cowardice will find happiness in the avoidance of danger and thus will
have an imperfect view of the good life.
Vice, again is
either extreme, excess or defect and virtue is the mean.
1.1 Virtue as a Golden Mean
since the passion are capable
of producing a wide range of action, all the way from too little to too much, a
person must discover the proper meaning of excess and defect and thereby
discover the appropriate mean.
In the Nicomachean
Ethics, Aristotle defined a virtue as “a balance point between a deficiency and
an excess of a trait.”
The point of
greatest virtue lies not in the exact middle, but of golden mean sometimes
closer to one extreme that the other.
For instance, courage is the mean between cowardice and fool hardiness,
confidence the mean between self-deprecation and vanity, and generosity the
mean between miserliness and extravagance.
Thus he argued that each of the moral virtues was a mean between the
two vices of cowardice and fool hardiness.
Cowardice is the disposition to show act more fearfully than the
situation deserves, and fool hardiness is the disposition to show too little
fear for the situation, courage is the mean between the two, the disposition to
show the amount of fear appropriate to the situation. According to Aristotle, therefore, human virtue properly
speaking is “a state (an excellence, disposition, strength) that decides,
consisting in a mean, the mean relative to us which is defined by reference to
reason, ie to the reason by reference to which the intelligence person would
define it.”[3]
2.0 Types of Virtue
From our story of the NichomecheanEthics, it is evident that Aristotle’s investigation
into the nature of virtue is closely tied to his discussion on the nature of
human soul such that it is illogical to successfully distinguish between
different types of virtues without first investigating into the faculties of
the soul. For Aristotle, the soul is part rational and part irrational.[4]
The irrational part is further subdivided into the nutritive and the appetitive
soul. The nutritive soul is the cause of growth or reproduction while the
appetitive soul is inclined towards the emotions; though it (appetitive part)
can be controlled by reason and thus, considered rational. Hence, it is to this
appetitive part that ethical virtues and vices belong.
Moreover, the rational part of the soul is also
subdivided into the speculative (scientific) soul and the practical
(calculative) soul. The speculative soul aims simply at knowing while the
practical soul is geared towards particulars and contingent realities and aims
at actions or productions.[5]
However, the attainment of truth is the task of both the scientific and
calculative parts of the rational soul.
With these distinctions on the faculties of the soul,
Aristotle hereby adds that “virtue, too, is divided into classes in accordance
with this differentiation of the soul. Some virtues are called intellectual and
others moral…”[6]
With this, he makes a clear distinction between two types of virtue, virtue of
thought (Intellectual virtue) and virtue of character (moral virtue).
Intellectual virtue is acquired through learning or instructions. They are
qualities of the mind such as wisdom, understanding, judgement. Moral virtues
consist in the habit of always choosing the golden mean between two extremes,
directed thereto by the intellectual virtue of prudence or practical wisdom.
To begin with, it must be noted that virtue here for
Aristotle refers more particularly to the moral virtues such as generosity and
temperance. That is, virtues which are more practical than theoretical, like
the intellectual virtues of wisdom and intelligence. As it were, Aristotle
considers the moral virtues as having a more direct influence on our happiness
than the intellectual virtues.[7]
Since our topic is limited to Moral virtue, our discussion shall proceed with
it.
2.1 Moral Virtue
Aristotle defines moralvirtue
alongside its corresponding opposite, vice, as “… a quality disposing us to act
in the best way when we are dealing with pleasure and pain, while vice is one
which leads us to act in the worst way when we deal with them.”[8]
For him, to act in the best way is simply to act in accordance with reason and
to act in the worse way is to deviate from the dictates of reason. Hence, for
Aristotle, a harmonious interplay of emotions and reason leads to an excellence
of character. With this, Aristotle seems to have placed on reason a mark of
infallibility as though reason does not lead one to error or act viciously once
ones emotions are played out in accordance with reason, for reason moderates
the emotions.In addition, it is necessary to have the right disposition to the
right things and for the right actions.
Notably, habituationis the process through which one
receives the constant disposition to act virtuously;and it is given prime
importance in moral virtues, because ethical excellence arises from
habituation. These moral excellences are not born with humans nor are they developed
by nature, but are rather “adapted by nature to receive them and are brought to
perfection by habituation.”[9]
Aristotle however, insists that moral excellences are necessarily built up by
repetition of individual acts as in acquiring art: “we become just by doing
just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts…”[10]
It is only by behaving in the right way, that we train ourselves to be
virtuous. For him, we all are born with
the potential to be morally virtuous. Just as a musician learns to play musical
instrument, we learn virtue by constant imitation of a virtuous person/act,
practicing or repetition, until we reach our perfection through habit. When through habituation, one becomes a just
person, which is as a result of the repetition of a particular response in the
past; he/she equally attains the disposition to the same response in the
future. In other words, if an individual’s acts are constantly just, the
individual develops the moral excellence of justice, which is a fixed
disposition to respond in a just way in all situations. This is, however,
different from the case of an individual who is occasionally just. Such a
person cannot be said to possess moral excellence of justice. This obviously
poses a fundamental question; how can merely imitating a virtuous person result
to being virtuous? We can say that Aristotle tried to answer this question when
he explained that merely doing as a virtuous person does is not sufficient for
us to be virtuous. Rather, one must do what a virtuous person does in the way
he does it.[11]
Similarly, moral
evil or vice develops in the same way, by habituation, for one is said to be
vicious, if the person has a consistent and persistent disposition to act
viciously, that is, missing the ‘mean’ and inclining always either to the
excess or defect of a particular action or emotion. The same powers of emotion
and action which produce good acts also produce evil acts to develop
corresponding vices as Aristotle will put it: “it is from the same causes and
by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and
similarly in every art.” In fact, the goal of moral virtues is to rationally
organize the human passions.
For those who
presume that a particular virtuous act makes them virtuous, Aristotle explains
that to act virtuously is different from being virtuous. Consequently, he
proposes three criteria for making a distinction between acting virtuously (by
accident) and being virtuous:
Ø the person must know that he/she is doing virtuous actions, that is,
proper knowledge
Ø he/she intends toact virtuously for its own sake, that is, it is
chosen deliberately
Ø he/she does the actions from a well-established habit, firm and
certain disposition[12]
In addition, Aristotle goes further to discuss the role
of pleasure and pain in moral excellence. In a strictly Aristotelian sense, the
pleasures or pains that an action causes in the moral agent may serve as an
index of moral progress, since good conduct consists in a proper attitude
towards pleasure and pain. Expatiating, Aristotle gives this example:
A man
who abstains from bodily pleasures and enjoys the very fact of so doing is
temperate; if he finds it irksome, he is licentious. Again, the man who faces
danger gladly, or at least without distress, is brave; the one who feels distressed
is a coward.[13]
3.0 Virtue and Vice
According to H. Rackham,
“virtue therefore, is a mean state in the sense that is able to hit the
mean. Again, error is multiplication
(for evil is a form of the unlimited, as in the old Pythagorean imagery, and good
of the limited), whereas success is possible in one way only / which is why it
is easy to fail and difficult to succeed easy to miss the target and difficult to hit it); so this is another
reason why excess and deficiency are mark of vice, and observance of the mean a
mark of virtue.”[14]
Virtue then is a
settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions
consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being
determine by principle, that is, as the prudent man would determine it.
And it is a mean
state between two vices, one of excess and one of defect. Furthermore, it is a mean state in that
whereas the vices either fall short of or exceed what is right in feelings and
in actions, virtue ascertains and adopts the mean. Hence while in respect of its substance and
the definition that states what ir really is in essence virtue is the
observance of the mean, in point of excellence and righteous it is an extreme,
Thomson puts it that “human soul is conditioned in three ways. It may have feelings, capacities and
dispositions, so virtue must be one of these three. By ‘feelings’ I mean desire, anger, fear
daring, envy, gratification, friendliness, hatred, longing, jealousy, pity and
in general all states capacities’ I mean those faculties in virtue of which we
may be described as capable of the feelings in question –anger, for instance,
or pain, or pity. By ‘dispositions’ I
mean states of mind in virtue of which we are well or ill-disposed in respect
of the feelings concerned.”[15]
We have for
instance, a bad disposition where angry feelings are concerned if we are
disposed to become excessively or insufficiently angry, and a good disposition
in this respect if we consistently feel the due amount of anger, which causes
between these extremes, so with the other feelings.
Now, either the
virtues or vices are feelings we are not spoken of good or bad in respect of
our feelings but of our virtues and vices.
Neither are we praised or blamed for the way we feel. A man is not praise for being frightened or
angry, nor is he blamed just for being angry.
It is for being angry in a particular way. But we are praised and blamed for our virtue
and vices. Again, feeling angry or
frightened is something we cant keep, but our virtues are in a manner
expressions of our will, at any rate there is an element of will in their
formation. Finally, we are said to be
‘moved’ but to be disposed in a particular way.
A similar time of reasoning will prove that the virtues and vices are
not capacities either, we are not spoken of a good or bad, nor are we praised
or blamed, whereby because we are capable of feeling. Again, what capacities we have, we have by
nature; but it is not nature that makes us good or bad, so, if the virtues are
neither feelings nor capacities, it remains that they must be dispositions.
“There are then
three dispositions two vices, one of excess and one of defect, and one virtue
which is the observance of the mean; and each of them is in a certain way
opposed to both the others.”[16] For the extreme states are the opposite both
of the middle state and of each other, and the middle state is the opposite of
both extremes; since just as the equal is greater in comparison with the less
and less incomparison with the greater, so the middle states of character are
in excess as compared with the defective states and defective as compared with
the excessive states whether in the case of feelings or of actions. For instance, a brave man appears rash in
contrast with a coward and a cowardly in contrast with a rash man; similarly a
temperate man appears profligate in contrast with a man insensible to pleasure
and pain, hut incensible in contrast with a profligates' and a liberal man
seems prodigal in contrast with a mean man, mean in contrast with one is
prodigal. Hence either extreme character
tries to push the middle character towards the other extreme; a coward calls a
brave man rash and a rash man calls him a coward, and correspondingly in other
cases.
But while all three
dispositions are this opposed to one another, the greatest degree of
contrariety exists between the two extremes.
For the extremes are further apart from each other than from the mean,
just as great is father from small and small from great than either from
equal. Again, some extremes show a
certain likeness to the mean. For
instance rashness resembles courage, prodigality, liberality, whereas the
extremes display the greatest unlikeness to one another. But it is things farther apart from each other
those logicians define as contraries, so that the farther apart things are the
more contrary they are.
And in some cases
the defect, in the others the excess, is more opposed to the mean; for example,
cowardice, which is a vice of deficiency, is more opposed to courage than in
rashness which is a vice of excess; but profligacy, or excess of feelings, is
more opposed to temperance than is insensibility, or lack of teaching. This results from either of two causes.
Aristotle
categorized human virtues as moral and intellectual, that is, moral virtue or
virtue of character ethers which results from habit; all the moral virtues have
to be learned and practiced, and they become virtues only through action for
“we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, brave by
doing brave acts, the ‘cardinal’ moral virtues are courage, temperate and
justice and wisdom. In addition to these Aristotle considered also the virtues
of magnificence, liberality, friendship, and self-respect. Intellectual virtues are philosophical wisdom
and understanding, and they owe their birth and growth to teaching and
learning. He acknowledges the central
role of reason as a guide to practical and moral action. He never the less
concluded that philosophical wisdom is superior to practical wisdom, that
contemplation is most likely to lead to happiness.
Conclusion
Virtue is concerned with our
various feelings and actions for it is in them that there can be excess and
defect. For example, it is possible says
Aristotle to feel the emotion of fear, confidence, lust, anger, compassion,
pleasure, and pain too much or too little and in either case wrongly. While vice is either extreme, excesses or
defect, and virtue is the mean.
Bibliography:
Crisp, Rodger.Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle (Translated
and edited. St. Anns College, Oxford Cambridge University Press, 2004,
Frost, S.E. The Basic Teaching of Great Philosophers. New York: Golden City Publishing Company,
Inc. 1942,
Rackham, H. Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics with Translation London: William
Heinemann. Ltd. Harvard University Press, 1934.
Thomson, J.A.R. TheEthics of Aristotle, the Nicomachean Ethics. (Batimore,
Pengiun Books Ltd. 1955,
[1]Cf. S.E. Frost, The Basic
Teachings of the Great Philosophers (New York: Golden City Publishing Co.,
Inc.1942), p. 86
[2]Cf. Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle (Translated and edited by Roger
Crisp. St. Anns College, Oxford
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 3.
[3]Ibid, p. 4
[14]Cf. H. Rackham, Aristotle the
Nicomachean Ethics with an English translation (London: William Heinemann
Ltd. Harvard University Press, 1934). P. 95.
[15]Cf. J.A.K Thomson, The Ethics
of Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics.(Baltimore, Penguin books Ltd., 1955),
p. 62.
[16]OP.cit, H. Rackham, (London: William Heinemann Ltd Harvard
University Press, 1934), p. 107.
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