Jean-Paul Sartre’s conception of freedom
INTRODUCTION
The 19th century saw dominant
philosophical views which were heavily sated with speculations on universals at
the expense of particulars. It is very obvious that the emphasis on universals
threatens individuality, as in the case of individuals being able to make free
choices. Choice can be considered as a manifestation of freedom which also
serves as the basis of responsibility.
The themes of human freedom and moral
responsibility are the central principles of liberty, which are common to all
parts of the civilized world. Freedom nonetheless will not amount to any worth
if ii is not properly examined; unless critically controlled, the liberty
implicit in our nature becomes tyranny. Freedom points at that which makes it
possible for us to exercise our rights with responsibility in view of the right
of others. In terms of moral responsibility, persons are normally judged
morally responsible for their actions.
Sartre affirms that for any man to
live an authentic life, he must first realize that he is a free being condemned
to freedom. And that this problem leads to a realization of the inevitable
burden laid on man’s existential situation of constantly making choices and
accepting the responsibility, which in itself leads one to anguish.[1] Without this realization, one cannot claim to
be living or to have lived an authentic life.
The controversy of freedom and determinism
is a perennial problem in the history of philosophy. Looking at the trends of
philosophical cum epistemic voyage in the past histories and in our modern
society that is decked massive research to understand, one issue stands
perdurable and continues to endure and raises a perplexing question, namely; is
man capable of making a free choice? On the one hand, our common sense or
intuition tells us that we constantly face choices or that we make choices. On
the other hand, there are obvious things that inhibit our free choice-making.
Let us consider the existential examples; we are not free to choose our parents
at birth, family, nation or heredity. Thins has been a perennial classical
problem which many philosophers and bright minds of various epochs have given
their quota from their own perspectives and background. Some have argued that
man is not free, that all our actions are determined by antecedent conditions.
Those who advocate for freedom argued that man is free and capable of making
free choices. Nonetheless, no position has been deemed the better since each
one has its own laws and errors.
The principle aim of this essay is to
expose Jean-Paul Sartre’s conception of freedom. Sartre, one of the most
convinced advocates of freedom, is popularly known for one of his quotes that
man is condemned to be free; man is free. In other words, there are no limits
to man’s freedom. This expands the notion of the human condition as free being
who cannot escape from freedom and whose life is replete with absurdity and his
predicament (death) imminent.
Being aware that among all the
existential thinkers, Sartre is one of the most convinced and influential
advocates of freedom, his existentialism will also preoccupy us in the course
of this essay. In addition, since Sartre’s notion of freedom is embedded in his
existentialism, we would attempt a survey of some important aspect of Sartre’s
existentialism as the framework of his doctrine of absolute freedom.
1.0 THE CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
Man shares the same similarity of
life with other living beings. Yet through his reason, he is able to
distinguish himself from other animals and inferior beings also by the virtue
of his will with which he freely chooses that which enables him to strive
towards the realization of his own being. Man is considered a free being. Human
freedom is indeed a proper frame for looking into the mystery of man, with a
goal of acquiring more correct, complete and adequate knowledge of man. Thus,
it is pertinent to presently examine the concept of human freedom as an
essential condition for moral action.
Freedom in a loose nut general
conception means absence of constriction. The term ‘constriction’ can be in
various forms to determine various forms of freedom. There is physical freedom, moral freedom,
psychological freedom, political freedom and social freedom. Physical freedom,
as the name suggests, is the immunity from physical constriction. Moral freedom
is the absence of constriction from the oppressive forces of the moral order
which may be, punishments, laws, and threats. [2]
Psychological freedom is all about the absence of pressure on the part
of other human activities, of the will to perform these acts in a determined
way as it involves the intellect or the passion. More precisely, man is said to
be psychologically free when he has the ability to choose to do or not to do a
thing which when all conditions for actions are there. [3]
Political freedom consists in the absence of political imbroglio, while
social freedom is the absence of social determinism. [4]
In speaking about human freedom, we
refer to that faculty of man to make unconstraint actions and decision. It
makes man master over his own actions. Man’s ability to take responsible for
his action lies at the very core of human action. It is a sublime but dangerous
power; in the hand of man, it is a power of dual stature. Kit can be harnessed
for good or for evil. Because of the
nature of man which is rational and inherently free, we can suffice it to say
that freedom is proper to man.[5] Hence free human acts are acts that
are done deliberately and consciously and they include judgment and election.
The three moments of human acts are considered deliberate because it entails
exploring, researching and inquiry into actions to be taken. Judgment is a
phase where one evaluates and through election, one takes decision.[6]
But looking at the tremendous and
fantastic progress in science and technology in our today’s world, the problem
of freedom seems to take on a social dimension. Where can still be free in
present day society where political systems, the means of communication and
feats achieved through technoscientific inventions have all become instrument
of oppression. Therefore, freedom today is no longer compromised by
extra-worldly or infra-human forces, but by human, social forces created by man
himself which today are turning against him. The freedom is to find the way to
reconciling the progress in science with freedom.[7]
Looking at the various activities
that man engages himself on daily basis, it goes further to suggest to us that
the human person is not static but full of dynamism. Human activities are not
as such determined factors external to the individual. We cannot simply explain
the human activities by referring or relating it to the automatism of plants
and animals. One’s experience of one’s own behaviours includes an awareness of
one’s freedom, one’s own ability to decide for oneself, to deliberate about
what to do in any circumstance and to come to one’s own conclusion about what
to believe and what to do.
This is very well reflected in our
manner of judgment, especially of other people. In judging people we
consciously or unconsciously assume that, in some sense, they have freedom of
choice hence they chose freely the action they took. Even in our daily works
and activities, we cannot deny the vivid evidence of different choices we are
presented to make; we often have a choice between alternatives courses of
actions. We punish, condemn or blame individuals for making certain choices and
decisions and insist that they ought to have done otherwise, and if they had,
they would deserve rewards and praises. In other words, man’s action is a
consequence of his voluntary decisions since it is only to voluntary actions
that praise and blame are assigned. Man is, by nature, free. He moves because
he wants, eats because he wants. Freedom is, among other things, ability to
choose without which it would be unjust to hold one accountable for one’s
actions. It is that power to act or not to act, that is, the power of activity
and passivity; and so to perform deliberate action on one’s own responsibility
and in view of one’s fulfilment as a human being. Freedom, of course, could be
negative or positive, this is seen in Two Concepts of Liberty of Isaiah
Berlin.
2.0 THE NOTION OF NEGATIVE FREEDOM
In this sense of freedom comes the
question “what is the area within which the subject, a person or a group of
persons, should be left to do or be what he is able to be, without interference
by other persons?.”[8] Political liberty refers in this sense to
that boundary within which one may act unobstructed by others. If one is
prevented from doing what one can do by others, one is termed unfree and “if
this boundary is contracted by other men beyond a minimum, one can be described
as being coerced or enslaved.”[9] Isaiah goes further to clarify the term
‘coercion’ and this he says is the deliberate interference of other human
beings. So for him, negative freedom “presupposes an absence of constraint, one
is free from certain constraints which could be imposed.”[10] In this sense of freedom, one is free only
when one is not being interfered with by others, the wider the area of
non-interference from others, the wider the freedom.
Furthermore, Isaiah states that the
classical English political philosophers disagreed on how wide a person’s area
of freedom should be. The area could not be boundless or unlimited because if
it were to be unlimited, all men could limitlessly interfere with all other men
and this would lead to social chaos, men’s minimum needs would not be satisfied
or the liberations of the weak would be suppressed by the strong. Thus, there
must be a limitation to the area of men’s freedom. However, there should be an
area of one’s personal freedom which is not to be interfered with or violated
because if it is violated, one will find it impossible to develop those
faculties which make it possible for one to pursue those ends which one holds
sacred. So there must be a demarcation between private life and public
authority, but where this line is to be drawn poses a problem because “no man’s
activity is completely private as never to obstruct the lives of others in any
way.”[11]
More so, according to Isaiah, the
trouble of the Western Liberals is that the minority who possess the freedom
have achieved it by exploiting the majority who do not have the freedom. The
Western liberals believe in the equality of liberty for if individual liberty
is the ultimate end for human beings, then nobody should be deprived of it.
However, Isaiah argues that liberty is not the only goal of man and so one
could reject liberty in order to share in the sufferings of those whom liberty
have been deprived. Freedom is sacrificed for the sake of justice and equality.
The loss of freedom Isaiah says may be compensated for by a gain in justice or
in happiness but the loss of freedom is still a loss.
More so, Isaiah argues that
philosophers who have an optimistic view of the human nature believed that
“social harmony and progress were compatible with preserving a large area of
private life over which neither the state nor any other authority can be
allowed to trespass.”[12] Thomas Hobbes, according to Isaiah, also
believed that a centralized control greater than that of the individual would
create the perfect society. A common between him and the optimistic
philosophers is that they agree that “some portion of human existence must
remain independent of the sphere of social control.”[13] Thus, different liberty concepts share that
common feature; that a minimum area of personal liberty must be reserved.
However Isaiah presents the problem of knowing what this minimum must be and
this he says is a matter of infinite debate.
3.0 THE NOTION OF POSTIVE FREEDOM
Isaiah’s notion of positive freedom
means the “wish of an individual to be his own master.”[14] The wish of an individual to rule one’s life
without the influence of external forces. “I wish to be an instrument of my
own, not of other men’s, act of will; to be a subject moved by reasons, by
conscious purposes which are my own, and not by causes which affect me from
outside.”[15] According to Isaiah, this at least shows that
one is rational, distinct from other animals. These two concepts of freedom –
positive and negative – historically developed into divergent directions until
they both came into direct conflict with each other. Isaiah explains this with
the momentum the metaphor of self-mastery acquired. Men, he says, have
experienced liberating themselves from spiritual slavery, trying to acquire
freedom and in the course of acquiring this freedom, they become conscious of a
dominating self, a self-identified with reason; the feature of a higher nature,
a real self. This real self is now contrasted with the irrational impulse,
uncontrolled desires, a lower nature, a nature needing the discipline to be able
to reach the full height of its real nature. Isaiah further argues that these
two selves can presently be represented by a larger difference, the real self
may refer to something larger than the individual and this would involve a
tribe or a race or a state. This larger self is now seen as the true self and
by imposing what Isaiah calls ‘its collective or organic single’ on its
members; it achieves its own higher freedom and the higher freedom of its
members.
More so, Isaiah points out that this
can be used in justifying coercion of some men by others in order to raise them
to a higher level of freedom. He argues that it is sometimes justifiable to
coerce men towards the same goal which they would want to attain but cannot
because they are either ignorant or corrupt. Thus, this could be seen as
coercing others for their own sake or interest and one could claim that he
knows the need of the other better than they know it themselves.
4.0 SATRE CONCEPT OF HUMAN FREEDOM
Looking very closely to Sartre’s view
of freedom, one will not doubt that the glaring and obvious evidence that it
flows from his ontology.[16]
He maintains his position of absolute freedom on the causal independence of
consciousness. Consciousness is free from all forms of determinism because it
is nothing. Sartre identifies consciousness with freedom, thus, for his, freedom is the being of consciousness.[17]
Sartre devotes particular concern to emotion as a spontaneous activity of
consciousness projected onto reality.[18]
Consciousness is for-itself or for man. Sartre sees nothingness as the
foundation of freedom. Man is his own nothing, a being through whom nothingness
enters the world. Nothing comes into the world by the for-itself. Consciousness
as nothing is man and if man and if consciousness is independent of causal
laws, the for-itself is free from all determinations. The for-itself is free in
the sense that it is the being of freedom. Freedom is coterminous with man or
human reality. The very fact that man is conscious justifies his freedom.[19]
Sartre does not subscribe to the
notion of applying freedom to any faculty of the soul. Freedom as the requisite
condition for the annihilation of nothingness is not a property which belongs
among others to the essence of the human being. Sartre somewhat prefers to
assume the precedence of human freedom to the essence of man and in fact, it is
this freedom that, makes man’s essence possible.[20] What we call freedom is impossible to be
distinguished from the being of human reality.
In all his attempts to explain his
notion of freedom, he unambiguously maintained that man as consciousness is
free. Freedom is not a being; it is the being of man. It is impossible for man
to separate his being from his freedom.[21] He sees existence and freedom as a
simultaneous occurrence in the being of man. Man does not exist and then start
to be free. It is in the very nature of man to be free. It is in this sense
that Sartre affirms that man is condemned
to be free.[22] It is not given to the being of man not to be
free, that is to say, man is not free not to be free. He has chained to
freedom. His very being, the ontological structure of for-itself is freedom.
Freedom is identical with the human being.
I am condemned to exist forever beyond my
essence, beyond the causes and motives of my act. I am condemned to be free.
This means that no limit to freedom can be found except freedom itself or if
you prefer, that we are not free to cease being free.[23]
There is a sense of freedom Sartre
has that makes it somewhat difficult to understand his position. One finds it
difficult to evaluate whether he sees freedom as something worth having or not.
He goes further to say that man is free because it is nothing, that is, it is
empty. Human reality is a lack. Human reality is free because it is perpetually
wrenched away from itself and because it has been separated by a nothingness
from what it is and from what it will be. To be precise, Sartre goes further to
state that freedom is the nothingness which is made-to-be at the heart of man
and which forces human reality to make itself instead of to be. For human
reality, to be is to choose oneself.[24]
Furthermore, Sartre brings in another
aspect of freedom, he identifies freedom with negation and nihilation. Freedom
is conceived only as the nihilation of the given, and to that extent, it is as
internal negation. It is the perpetual escape from contingent; it is the
interiorization, the nihilation and the subjectification of contingency. If
negation comes into the world through human reality, the latter must be a being
who can realize a nihilating rupture with the world and with himself; and we
establish that the possibility of this rupture is the same as freedom. Freedom
can be nothing other than this nihilation.
We cannot talk about freedom without
choice, they are intricately related. Freedom has to do with the ability to
exercise one’s free will at choosing. But Sartre opines that this freedom is
not the freedom of not choosing. Not to choose is, in fact, to choose not to
be. In other words, freedom is man’s perpetual companion, not because he chose
it but because there is not alternative. It will seem perturbing to wonder what
man did to merit such existential condemnation; whatever answer he turns up
will result only from free-thinking process about freely defined choices.[25]
Sartre does not agree with the idea
that motives are the cause of actions. Bv the mere fact that man is aware of
the motives which solicit his/her action, these motives are already
transcendent objects for his/her consciousness, they are outside. Hence, man
tries not to cling to them. Man escapes from them by his/her very existence.
Like motives and ends, wills and passions are not given states of mind but are
constituted like the pour-soi
(for-itself) itself by separation from what is and projection towards what does
not yet exist.[26] Sartre refutes any attribution of essence to
freedom, for him, freedom is not subject to any logical necessity for in it
existence precedes essence. It is in the very nature of freedom to present or
rather make itself an act and we ordinarily attain it across the act which it
organizes with the causes, motives, and ends which the act implies.[27]
However, freedom should not be taken
as something capricious or arbitrary since Sartre’s position about freedom
being the being of man and limitless seems to suggest that. For according to
Sartre, freedom is not a pure, capricious, unlawful gratuitous and
incomprehensible contingency. He asserts thus; To be sure, each one of my acts,
even the most trivial, is entirely free in the sense which we have just
defined, but this does not mean that my act can be anything whatsoever or even
that it is unforeseeable. To be free does
not mean to obtain what one has wished, but rather to determine oneself to
wish.[28]
5.0 CRITICISMS OF
SARTRE’S CONCEPT OF FREEDOM
Sartre saw freedom as that which
constitute the very structure of the for-itself. And he goes on to posit that
this freedom is absolute, consisting of no qualification whatsoever – “I am
condemned to be free”. This simply means that no freedom to my freedom is to
found except freedom itself, or to put it in another way, that we are not free
to cease being free. Man cannot be free at one time and another slave, he is
either wholly free or he is not free at all.[29]
Although he allowed that each human
being exists and acts in a definite human situation and that the exercise of
freedom could be influenced by environmental, physiological and psychological
factors among others he still averred that limitation on human freedom are such
only because the individual, in his/her freedom, confers on them this
significance.
One crucial question we can pose is
this – if I am condemned to be free, am I then free at all? Am I truly free if
it is the case that I cannot but to be free? Again, if I am not free no to be
free, if I am not free to cease being free, can I still be said to be absolute,
wholly, infinitely free? Does this not establish that there is, at least, one
project at which my freedom fails miserably? Furthermore, given the fact that
man is a finite being,[30] does
it not suggest a contradiction to posit and affirm that he possess an attribute
infinitely? One indubitable fact is that we don’t just possess frailties and
weaknesses in us, there are limits to what we can become. One’s hereditary,
culture, family background, culture, the opportunities available to him
constitute real limits to his growth.
Marcel calls Sartre’s exaltation of
man and his freedom in the face of a meaningless universe, a technique of
vilification, a technique which results in the systematic vilification of man.
. to explicate further on this apparent paradox, he shows how the Fascist
dictatorship similarly exalted the masses, offering them a ceaseless and cheap
adulation. “Yet what contempt did not this adulation conceal, and to what
abject depth did they not reduce their citizens.”[31]
In Marcel’s understanding, to vilify
a thing is to take away its value, its price. This can be done to a merchandise
by flooding the market with it. This is what he considers Sartre to be doing to
human freedom. He debases it by putting it on every stores and kiosk. If we are
really condemned to be free, then freedom must be easy. And if this freedom
were easy, everything would surely come to grief at once. But if Sartre should
protest against the suggestion that, in his philosophy, freedom is easy, then
he must have to recant the statement “we are condemned to be free for that is
what we can understand from the statement.
Mounier admits the idea that freedom
is the life and source of personal being, and that an action is less than human
unless it transfigures the most obstinate data by the magic of its spontaneity,
he also averred that “human freedom is the person, moreover of this person,
thus and thus constituted, situated in the world and in the presence of
definite values.”[32] Following his argument, this simply means
that freedom is conditioned and delimited by the common laws of our concrete
situation. To be free, then, is to accept this fact and to base oneself upon
it. Not everything is possible and even if it seems so, not at any time. He
sees a lot of grave consequences in Sartre’s position. A freedom that gushes
out as absolute reality that is presented as a necessity is a blind force of
nature, a naked power.
Another philosopher that critiques
Sartre’s notion of absolute freedom is Merleau-Ponty. His critique surges from
the fact that Sartre ignores the effect of situation on freedom. According to
him, “the idea of situation rules out absolute freedom at the source of our
commitments, and equal indeed, at their terminus.”[33] Freedom is something that has to do with the
meeting of the inner and outer of consciousness and the world. An absolute
freedom cannot be embodied in any form of existence. At best, we can only
entertain it at the mental state.
6.0 CONCLUSION
The struggle and intellectual
excursions to understand and to decipher the code for human freedom are one
that has posed untenable and perplexing to man. Sartre is one of the
intellectuals who were very well influenced by their immediate environmental situations.
He lived and experienced the two most devastating wars in human history- the
World War I & II. He did not just wake up and start writing from nowhere,
he was actually writing in the context of his time. And as an existentialist,
he felt he was entrusted with the responsibility to express and emancipate
humanity from the fetters of self-pity and mediocrity. There is nothing that
will stop us from being free and it is not just being temporarily free but an
infinite freedom. This suggests that extent of his crave for freedom which
makes him see freedom as a sort of condemnation of man.
This essay has tried to explicate in
a subtle manner the very notion of Sartre’s idea of freedom. But before that,
we make a conceptual clarification of what freedom actually and basing our
research on some authority we dissected the two notions of freedom- negative
freedom and positive freedom. This thus led us naturally to Sartre’ notion of
freedom and as a consequence, we delved into some criticisms levelled against
his notion of absolute freedom. We do not, therefore, assume or suggest in any
way that this essay is exhausted rather it is meant to spur further research to
enrich and facilitate research.
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[1] Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism (lecture
given in 1946). Online (URL) https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/sartre/works/exist/sartre.htm.
Accessed: 30-05-2016.
[2] Cf. Battista Mondin, Philosophical Anthropology: Man: an Impossible
Project? (India: Theological
Publications, 1985), p. 102.
[3] Cf. Manuel Velasquez, Philosophy: A Text with Readings 13th
ed. (Boston: Cengage Learning, 2014), p. 206.
[4] Cf. Battista Mondin, Philosophical Anthropology (Bangalore: Theological Publication,
1991), pp. 102-103.
[5] Cf. Battista Mondin, Philosophical Anthropology, p. 166.
[8] Isaiah Berlin, “Two
Concepts of Liberty” In Philosophy: Basic Reading, edited by Nigel Warburton
(London: Routledge Publishers, 2003), p. 181.
[9] Isaiah Berlin, “Two
Concepts Of Liberty” In Philosophy: Basic
Reading, p. 181.
[10] Dipo Irele, Introduction
to Political Philosophy (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1998), p. 120.
[11] Isaiah Berlin, “Two
Concepts of Liberty” In Philosophy: Basic Reading, edited by Nigel Warburton
(London: Routledge Publishers, 2003), p. 182
[12] Isaiah Berlin, “Two
Concepts Of Liberty” In Philosophy: Basic Reading, edited by Nigel Warburton
(London: Routledge Publishers, 2003), p. 184
[13] Isaiah Berlin, “Two
Concepts of Liberty” In Philosophy: Basic Reading, edited by Nigel Warburton
(London: Routledge Publishers, 2003), p. 184
[14] Isaiah Berlin, “Two
Concepts of Liberty” In Philosophy: Basic Reading, edited by Nigel Warburton
(London: Routledge Publishers, 2003), p. 187
[15] Isaiah Berlin, “Two
Concepts of Liberty” In Philosophy: Basic Reading, edited by Nigel Warburton
(London: Routledge Publishers, 2003), p. 187
[17] Jean-Paul
Sartre, Being and Nothingness Hazel Estella Barnes, transl. (New York: Washington Square Press,
1984) p, 78
[19] Cf. Deal Wyatt Hudson & Matthew
Mancini eds. Understanding Maritain:
Philosopher and Friend (Macon: Merger University Press, 1987), p. 302.
[20] Cf. Art Berman, From the New Criticism to Deconstruction:
The Reception of Structuralism and Post-Structuralism (Illinois: Illini
Books Edition, 1988), p. 71
[21] Cf. Sytse
Ulbe Zuidema, Sartre: International
library of philosophy and theology
Modern thinkers series (Michigan: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1978), p. 10
Modern thinkers series (Michigan: Presbyterian and Reformed Pub. Co., 1978), p. 10
[22] Jean-Paul SartreJean-Paul
Sartre: Basic Writings, Stephen Priest ed. (New York: Routledge, 2001), p. 32.
[24] Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka Ed., Ontopoietic Expansion in
Human Self-Interpretation-in-Existence; The I and the Other in their Creative
Spacing of the Societal Circuits of Life: Phenomenology
of Life and the Human Creative Condition, Book 3 (Netherlands: Springer,
1998), p. 134
[25] [25] Cf. Joseph H. McMahon, Human Being in The World of Jean-Paul Sartre
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), p. 109.
[26] Cf. Joseph H. McMahon, Human Being in The World of Jean-Paul Sartre (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1971), pp. pp. 128-129.
[27] Cf. Raymond Van Over The Psychology of Freedom (California:
Fawcett Publications, 1974), p. 318.
[28] Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothuingness, Transl. by Hazel E. Barnes (New York:
Philosophical Library, 1956), p. 584.
[29] Cf. Thomas C.
Anderson, Sartre's Two Ethics: From Authenticity to
Integral Humanity (Chicago: Open Court, 1993), p. 20
[31] G. Marcel, The
Philosophy of Existentialism, p. 86.
[32] E. Mournier, Personalism, transl. P. Mairet
(London : Routledge & Regan Paul, 1952), p. 58
[33] Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, Transl. C. Smith (London: Routledge
and Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 454.
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