Justified True Belief
INTRODUCTION
The question of knowledge is as old as man. Man is being regard as a higher animal because of his high cognitive captivity. He is created with the capacity of intellection, understanding and knowledge. That is to say that knowledge is the primary fact of human life and experience. In all everyone, understands what it means 'to know' or 'to have knowledge', but we encounter many difficulties when we attempt to explain and analyse this concept.
The question of knowledge is as old as man. Man is being regard as a higher animal because of his high cognitive captivity. He is created with the capacity of intellection, understanding and knowledge. That is to say that knowledge is the primary fact of human life and experience. In all everyone, understands what it means 'to know' or 'to have knowledge', but we encounter many difficulties when we attempt to explain and analyse this concept.
We say that we know
something if we believe it and are justified in believing it. This led to the
traditional conception of knowledge as Justified-True-Belief.
More so a closer look at this conception of knowledge will reveal that this
traditional conception leaves much to be desired. Thus we can know a thing to
be true and may even believe it only to discover that we were mistaken in
thinking that we know it. The question here is: Is Justified-True-Belief Knowledge?. This question has aroused many arguments in
the minds of Philosophers. Many held that knowledge is justified true belief
while others questioned it. Edmund Gettier is one of the philosopher that
questioned this tripartite conception of knowledge[1]. He animadvert that the belief we have are necessary
not sufficient.
However the search
form the proper characterisation of the nature of knowledge has remained an
endemic problem in the field of epistemology. Its object is unlimited and this
gave rise to too many questions, which were the paramount concerns of
epistemology: what is Knowledge? Can we
have knowledge that is certain? These question are by no means an easy
questions. The Idea certainly becomes then an important qualification for
determining knowledge. The basic fact that our
human means can provide us with adequate information about the world.
These problems have caused a division among philosophers. Some are of the
opinion that knowledge acquisition is impossible, that we have are opinions of
how things are and what we think them to be. Some other philosophers argue that
some form of knowledge is possible and that we have certain knowledge about
reality. These groups are called skeptics and dogmatists or foundationists
respectively.
As a matter of
fact this paper shall base its write up on Gettier's analysis and arguments. By
way of methodology, this paper shall first and foremost, look into the meaning
of knowledge, the exposition of Gettier's argument, the response and finally
the critical evaluation and conclusion.
WHAT IS KNOWLEDGE
The understanding
of 'knowledge' presents itself as a
problem to an average person. He simply takes it for granted as something that
in some way puts him in contact with things other than himself[2]. There are more than one
way of defining knowledge. Knowledge has been defined in various ways:
Its define as
the act by which one becomes the other in an intentional way; also as the act
which one is aware of something in thought, with or without the aid of senses;
it is as the habit or ability to recall such an act; or the matter that is the
object of such an act or habit[3].
Knowledge is
defined by G.O. Ozumba as the act of being aware of the existence of a fact[4]. It is also define as the
state of awareness of a given fact information. It is also seen as the fact of
understanding, information acquired through learning or experience[5]. According to Bertrand
Russel in his book, 'the problem of philosophy', defined knowledge as true
belief[6]. On the other hand, Keith
Lehrer saw knowledge as a special form of competence[7].
However, the
standard of knowledge, around which all recent work has been done, defines
knowledge as Justified True Belief. It holds that-
'A'
knows that 'P' if and only if
i.
'A'
believes that 'P'
ii.
A's
belief that 'P' is true
iii.
And
A's belief that 'P' is justified.
Because that there
are three parts to this definition, that is why it is called 'tripartite
definition or the tripartite account'. Thus, the tripartite definition does not
define knowledge by acquaintance, but the knowledge that the first clause is
stipulative, the second clause seems minimal and the third prevents guesses.
This implies that
'to know' can mean to be aware of something; to be certain about it; to learn
or to remember something; to have an understanding and grasp of the object of
knowledge; to be familiar with something; to be able to recognise or identify
something; ability to distinguish between things; to have enough experience and
training; to be intimate with something. With these distinct of 'to know', we see the cause of the confusion
about the term 'knowledge'. There is then the difficulty of making a separation
between knowledge and non-knowledge. If knowledge is mere understanding, how
then do we differentiate it from learning, perception, awareness, beliefs,
opinion and many more?
Nevertheless, it
seems difficult and problematic to state the conditions under which knowledge
claims can be duly regarded as proper knowledge. This is so because of the fact
that many people consider it as merely the state of awareness, belief, opinion,
or the adequate judgment of our perception in terms of a supposed agreement
between what is out there and what we think we see. Thus, the problematic that
has characterised the nature of knowledge is linguistic, metaphysical,
psychological, and of course, epistemological. The questions that need to be
asked include: does the mere mention of knowledge satisfy the ground
expectation of having knowledge? Is it merely a linguistic term, having a
linguistic interpretation when somebody makes a claim to know something? Has it
any psychological import? Is he or she laying a claim to the reality of an
agreement between an external objects with its corresponding mental image? Does
knowledge claim always to involve existence? That is, the true existence of
what is claimed or does it at times transcends what is to include what is
created by language? How do we know that we know what we claim to know? These
are some of the salient question that need to be answered and clarified.
Therefore, it is important to ensure that what we claim to know exists, and
that we are in an adequate mental state to make such claims[8].
Knowledge cannot
be reduced to merely state of man's being. Thus, one condition of being said to
know something is that what one claims to know must be the case; if it is an
object that one claim to know, it must exist, and if what one claims to know is
formulable in a proposition, this must be true[9]. Furthermore , some
conditions for knowledge, based on the above assertions was enumerated:
- One
believes it
- One
has a good ground on which to base the belief
- The
belief is true[10]
It would seems
therefore that judging from this conditions stated above, that knowledge
involves a kind of claim to certainty. That was why the traditional conception
of knowledge views it as a justified true belief.
However, the
Sophist first posited the question of the possibility of human knowledge of
reality. The great Sophist, Protagoras, in this regard affirmed that man is the
measure of all things of those that are, that they are of those that are not[11]. From this confirmation,
it could mean that knowledge is relative in the sense that what appears to me
to be true is true for me. It is this
position that raised a lot of question in the minds of many philosophers; Can
knowledge be really justified? If knowledge is possible at all, is it
subjective or absolute? These questions leads us to the Edmund Gettier's
position and argument.
KNOWLEDGE AS JUSTIFIED TRUE BELIEF
The traditional
conception of knowledge holds that knowledge is a justified true belief.
Through the work of Plato, Decartes, and in the contempory times, Roderick
Chisolm. This view of knowledge as justified-true-belief, has to be the
criteria for knowledge.
The traditional analysis of knowledge has its roots in
Plato's Theaetetus and in more recent times, it has been endorsed by a number
of influential philosophers including C. I. Lewis and Roderick Chisolm, this
was expressed by George Pappas and Marshal Swain in their book, 'Essays on
Knowledge and Justification[12].
In another
development, Keith Lehrer and Thomas D. Paxon hold that if a man knows that a
statement is true even though there is no other statement to justify his
belief, then his knowledge is basic[13].
For them basic knowledge is Justified-True-Belief[14]. But if on the other hand,
a man knows that a statement is true because there is some other statement that
justifies his belief, then his knowledge is non basic because it is inferentially
known and dependent on other statements or propositions. This means that non
basic knowledge requires something in addition to justified true belief, to
fully justify it[15].
From the statement
above one can immediately infer that we have two types of knowledge: basic
knowledge and non basic knowledge. Both however must conform to the traditional
criteria of knowledge, of being justified true and believed. Nevertheless the
question still remains whether justified-true-belief is knowledge. Edmund
Gettier strikes out this conception in his argument.
Edmund Gettier's Argument
The traditional account
of knowledge used to be the acceptable definition of knowledge until it was
challenged by Edmund Gettier in his short essay, ' Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge'? His aim was to refute the
conception of knowledge as justified true belief. He immediately pointed out
that the three conditions of knowledge in the traditional account are not
sufficient conditions of knowledge. He says that one can have all the
conditions but still not possess knowledge. He thereafter proposed two original
counter-examples to show the possibility of having justified true belief
without having knowledge.
In the first case,
Edmund Gettier made us to imagine two applicants for a job: Mr. Smith and Mr
Jones. According to Gettier, the following proposition is made by Smith:
A Jones is the man who will get the job,
and Jones has ten coins in his pocket[16]
The first conjunct
in the proposition made by Smith is a product of a statement of the employer
that Mr Jones will be employed. The second conjunct is based on the first hand
experience of smith who counted the coins in Mr. Jones pocket. Guessing Smith
goes on to make an inference from this conjunctive proposition that:
B The man who will get the job has ten
coins in his pocket[17].
But if proposition
B is true, but the man who get the job is Mr. Smith himself, who accidentally
has ten coins in his pocket, can we say that proposition B, which is 'justified
true belief' is a knowledge claim?. Edmund Gettier argues that though
Proposition B satisfies the three conditions of justification, truth, and
belief, it is not a knowledge claim because it is an inference from a false
proposition, which proposition A is. That proposition B is true is a matter of
coincidence.
In the second
counter example given by Edmund Gettier, he imagined another proposition made
by an imaginary Mr. Smith to the effect that:
C Jones owns a ford car[18].
Edmund Gettier
continues that Smith's proposition is based on the evidence that Jones drives a
ford car, in which Smith once had a free ride. For instance Smith has another
friend named Brown whose whereabouts is unknown to Mr. Smith. Supposing Smith
constructs three sets of disjunctive propositions from the combination of
proposition and mere guessing of where his friend (Mr. Brown) may be living at
the same time he was making the propositions. These propositions are:
D Jones owns a ford car or Brown is in
Boston[19].
E Jones owns a ford car or Brown lives
in Barcelona[20].
F Jones owns a ford car or Brown lives
in Brest-Litovsk.[21]
Edmund Gettier
goes further to maintain that the propositions will be assumed true by Smith
because he feels that the first disjunction, which is common to the three
propositions is true. If it is discovered that proposition E is the only
correct proposition, not because the disjunction is true, but because by mere
coincidence the second disjunction Brown lives in Barcelona is true. But the
first disjunction is false, because Mr. Jones drives in a rented ford car. Can
we say that proposition E is knowledge?
Gettier agrees that proposition E is Justified true belief, but it is not
knowledge because it is a product of mere coincidence. Edmund Gettier concludes
that it is possible to have 'justified true belief' without knowledge. You can
have these conditions and still not posses knowledge. Therefore, the justified
true belief analysis of knowledge is insufficient and inadequate.
Following Edmund
Gettier's examples, its implication is that there is the need for a fourth
condition of knowledge. Furthermore, Gettier's counter examples and the demand
for a fourth condition of knowledge have generated many reactions in
epistemology. This we shall look into the responses to Gettier.
Responses to Edmund Gettier
Relevant Falsehood Presence
The first category
of attempts at repairing the traditional account of knowledge is based on the
claim that the definition of knowledge should clearly indicate that the
constituent's belief should not be inferred from false belief. An example of
this type of effort is in Michael Clark's article.[22] According to Clark the
fourth condition of knowledge is this: the believer's ground for believing a
claim does not include any false belief[23]. So might add to the
tripartite analysis the fourth condition that nothing can be known which is
inferred from a false belief, or from a group of beliefs of which one is false.
But differently, there should not be present in any set of beliefs that seeks
to graduate to knowledge relevant falsehood[24].
Defeasibility
The second
category of attempts or sets of post Edmund Gettier account of knowledge says
that the fourth condition of knowledge is that there should not be within the
system of beliefs certain truths, which would have destroyed the believer's
justification[25].
According to Lehrer and Paxton, this approach diagnoses the Gettier
counter-examples as arising because there are some truths which would have
destroyed the believer's justification, and he believed them[26]. Their claim is that
'justified true belief' can still be knowledge on the conditions that there is
no other that can defeat the justified belief.
Reliability:
The defeasibility
approach discussed above is related to these third sets of amendment, which
says that the fourth condition of knowledge is reliability. The reliability
approach to the definition of knowledge says that knowledge is justified true
belief derived from a reliable method[27].
Conclusive Reasons:
The 'conclusive
reason' is the last attempt at solving the Gettier Problem. It is the most
feasible approach. According to this attempt at repairing the traditional
definition of knowledge, justified true belief can still be knowledge if it is
based on conclusive reason. By conclusive reason, we mean that if P is the conclusive,
for Q, then P cannot be true if Q is false. In essence, if a particular
proposition is knowledge, then the reasons for making it knowledge must be
conclusive[28].
This can be so if and only if the reasons cannot be true while the conclusion
is false.
Evaluation
We have tried to
look at the various ways in which the term 'knowledge' may be defined. We have
also exposed the arguments of Edmund Gettier as against the tripartite
conception of knowledge. We also gave some brief responses to Gettier problem.
Despite the fact
that Gettier argued that the analysis to the tripartite definition is not
sufficient, but in his own counter examples did not resolve the difficulty of
justified true belief. Mark Kaplan in his theory 'it is Not What You Know that
COUNTS', says that hardly any of the literature on the Gettier problem has
attempted to show why justified true belief is not conclusive. In fact,
Gettier's negotiation of the justified true belief is irrelevant.
More so, Kaplan
begins making his point by addressing claims that prepositional knowledge of
justified true belief type is a platonic conception. Gettier indicates that
Plato himself considered such a definition at points in the Theaetetus and
Meno. Others have agreed, describing justified true belief as the 'classical
conception' and the 'traditional definition' of knowledge. Kaplan takes it upon
himself to examine Plato and comes to the conclusion that platonic knowledge is
not of prepositions, but non-propositional objects, or the external forms, which
are the object of reason, as opposed to opinion. Descartes, unlike Plato,
concerned himself with propositional knowledge; the Gettier counter-examples
would not be moot to Descartes, because knowledge for him was acquired by an
internal faculty, which WAS incapable of error. Thus, Gettier's argument fails
to be a crutch for 'justified true belief'.
In the responses
to Gettier's examples, the first response has been critiqued for being too
wrong such that it will be impossible for any of us to know anything[29]. With this new
suggestion, and also with Gettier's example, we any find it difficult to have
set of beliefs without the prevalence or relevant falsehood. Knowledge will
therefore be rare to get. Furthermore, following the 'conclusive reason'
approach, it will make knowledge a rare phenomenon.
I wish to state at
this point that all these objections and criticisms of post-Gettier attempt at
redefining knowledge merely point to the fact that the ghost Gettier counter
examples will continue to haunt epistemology for long. The various attempts at
repairing the Gettier traditional account of knowledge complicate rather than
improve the situation.
John L. Pollock
was right when he animadvert that, as the literature on the problem has
developed, the proposals have become increasingly complex in the attempt to
meet more and more complicated counter examples to simple analysis. The result
is that even some very complex analysis should turn out to be immune from
counter example. It would seem ad-hoc[30].
Conclusion
Therefore I wish
to state that Gettier's problem is one of the epistemological problems. The
desire of epistemology to justify human cognition makes it imperative for it to
be very critical of all ideas. This critical nature explains the reason why it
is nearly impossible for philosophy to arrive at the definition of concepts
including the most basic ones such as 'knowledge'. Such a definition needs to
be absolutely justifiable before it can meet the standard of philosophy. It
must be acceptable to the most critically minded philosophers, this may rather
be difficult. But that simply explains more on the reason why philosophy is a
critical and polemical enterprise.
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[2]
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[3]
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[4]
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[5]
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[6]
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Philosophy: (London: Cambridge University Press, 1903) p. 224
[7]
Keith Lehrer: Knowledge: Journal Of Philosophy; Vol. 66, (1969) p.1
[9]
Celestine Bittle: Reality and the Mind: (USA:
Yale University Press, 1950) p.7
[10]
Celestine Bittle: Reality and the Mind: (USA:
Yale University Press, 1950) p.7
[11]
Frederick Copleston: A History Of
Philosophy Vol. 1: (New York: Doubleday and Co. Inc, 1962)
[12]
Pappas G. S and Marshal Swain: Essays on
Knowledge and Justification: (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978) p.144
[13]
Keith Lehrer and Thomas D. Paxton: Knowledge
Undefeated True Belief: p.145
[14]
Keith Lehrer and Thomas D. Paxton: Knowledge
Undefeated True Belief: p.145
[15]
Keith Lehrer and Thomas D. Paxton: Knowledge
Undefeated True Belief: p.145
[16]
Gettier E.L: Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge: Analysis 23: 1965, p.122
[17]
Gettier E.L: Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge: Analysis 23: 1965, p.122
[18] Gettier
E.L: Is Justified True Belief Knowledge:
Analysis 23: 1965, p.122
[19]
Gettier E.L: Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge: Analysis 23: 1965, p.122
[20]
Gettier E.L: Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge: Analysis 23: 1965, p.122
[21]
Gettier E.L: Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge: Analysis 23: 1965, p.122
[22]
Michael Clark: Knowledge and Grounds: A
comment of Mr. Gettier's Paper. In Analysis, Vol. 24, 1963, pp46-48
[23]
Gettier E.L: Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge: Analysis 23: 1965
[24]
Gettier E.L: Is Justified True Belief
Knowledge: Analysis 23: 1965, p.122
[25]
Jonathan Dancy: An Introduction to contemporary Epistemology: (New York: Basil
Blackwell Limited, 1985) p.30
[26]
Lehrer and Paxson: Knowledge: Undefeated Justified True Belief:
Journal Of Philosophy; Vol. 66, (1969)pp
225-237
[27]
Jonathan Dancy: p. 31
[28] Kolawole
A. Owolabi ed: Issues and Problems in Philosophy: (Nigeria:
University Of Ibadan, 2001) p. 54
[29]John
L. Pollock: Contemporary Theories Of Knowledge; (Maryland: Rowman and
Littlefield publishers 1986) p. 81
[30]
John L. Pollock: Contemporary Theories Of Knowledge; (Maryland: Rowman and
Littlefield publishers 1986) p. 182
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