philosophy of language, linguistics and linguistic philosophy
Introduction
Language
is a veritable instrument of thought and communication. This thought cannot be
communicated properly without using a right language. Because our thought is
invisible and in order to bring people to the world of our idea that is contain
in our mind we need to have a medium by which we use in disseminating the idea
so that our audience can truly understand what we have communicated.
Communication entails the use of language and language is made with words. As
Locke rightly asserted that, words are sensible marks of idea. And the ideas
this word stand for are proper and immediate significant. Ideas are in thought
while word is language use to express what is in our mind.[1]
To
better express the ideas that contain in our mind, philosophers of language
preoccupy themselves in examine what the meaning of a statement uttered by
individual. Whether they actually mean what they have in mind and at the same
time to see if the audience really comprehend the message communicated. Further
philosophers of language then discover that, often time people misrepresent the
ideas in their mind because they lack proper word and proper construction of
the statement. Here linguistic arose to give a guard on how we can combine words
together in order to fit what we intend to communicate to our audience. Not
only how to combine to suit our ideas, rather linguistic philosophy emphases on
indication of our ideas in the world of experience. That there should be a
reference to everything we say. At this point we then have analytic philosopher
and positivist. For them, language can best be understood using facts, not idea
that abstracts statement.
Therefore
at this point, we shall examine the stands of philosophy of language,
linguistics and linguistic philosophy. In doing this we shall consider their
nature (through conceptual clarification), issues, and problem, further their
similarities (relationships) and differences.
Conceptual Clarification
What do we mean by the term
“Linguistic”? Linguistic can be defined as the scientific study of language.[2] Such study has, broadly
speaking, three aspects: language form, language meaning, and language in
context.[3] The earliest known activities
in the description of language have been attributed to Panini with his analysis
of Sanskritin Ashtadhyayi.[4] Panini was a Sanskrit
grammarian from ancient India.[5] Linguistics analysis human
language as a system for relating sounds or signed gesture and meaning.[6]
Some Aspects of Linguistic
·
Phonetics:
this an aspect that study acoustic and articulatory properties of the
production and perception of speech sounds and non-speech sounds. The study of
language meaning, on the other hand, deals with how languages encode relations
between entities, properties, and other aspects of the world to convey,
process, and assign meaning, as well as to manage and resolve ambiguity.
·
Semantics:
this aspect typically concerns itself with truth conditions, pragmatics deals
with how the context influences meanings.[7]
·
Grammar:
grammar comprises the system of rules which governs the form of the utterances
in a given language. It encompasses both sound and meaning, and includes
phonology (which is how sounds function and pattern together), morphology (the
formation and composition of words), and syntax (the formation and composition
of phrases and sentences from these words).[8]
Type of Grammar
·
Phonology:
this is a branch of linguistics concerned with the systematic organization of
sounds in languages. It has traditionally focused largely on the study of the
systems of phonemes in particular languages but it may also cover any
linguistic analysis either at a level beneath the word or at all levels of
language where sound is considered to be structured for conveying linguistic
meaning. Phonology is often distinguished from phonetics. While phonetics
concerns the physical production, acoustic transmission and perception of the
sounds of speech.[9]
Phonology describes the way sounds function within a given language or across
languages to encode meaning. For many linguists, phonetics belongs to
descriptive linguistics, and phonology to theoretical linguistics, although
establishing the phonological system of a language is necessarily an
application of theoretical principles to analysis of phonetic evidence.[10]
·
Morphology:
in linguistic, morphology is the identification, analysis, and description of
the structure of a given language’s morphemes and other linguistic units, such
as root words, affixes, parts of speech, intonations and stresses, or implied
context. In contrast, morphology typology is the classification of languages
according to their use of morphemes, while lexicology is the study of those
words forming a language’s word-stock. It is possible to use the concept of
functions to describe more than just how lexical meanings work: they can also
be used to describe the meaning of a sentence. For instance, the sentence “the
horse is red”. We may consider “the horse” to be the product of a propositional
function.
A propositional function is an operation of language
that takes an entity as an input and outputs a semantic fact. That is, the
proposition that is represented by “the horse is red”. In other words, a
propositional function is like an algorithm. The meaning of “red” in this case is
whatever takes the entity “the horse” and turns it inot the statement, “the
horse is red”.[11]
Along with clitics (clitics means, a morpheme that has syntactic
characteristics of a word, but depends phonologically on another word or
phrase)[12] are generally accepted as
being the smallest units of syntax. In most languages, if not all, many words
can be related to other words by rules that collectively describe the grammar
for that language. Therefore, morphology is the branch of linguistics that
studies patterns of word formation within and across languages and attempts to
formulate rules that model the knowledge of the speakers of those languages.
·
Syntax:
this is the study of principles and processes by which sentences are
constructed in particular languages.[13] Syntax is also used to
refer directly to the rules and principles that govern the sentence structure
of any individual language. These rules also extend in governing the behaviour
of mathematical system, such as formal languages used in logic. However, many
aspects of the problem of the composition of sentences are addressed in the
field of linguistics of syntax. For philosophical semantics tends to focus on
the principle of compositionality to explain the relationship between
meaningful parts and whole sentences. The principle of compositionality asserts
that, a sentence can be understood on the basis of the meaning of the parts of
the sentence (that is word, morphemes) along with an understanding of its
structure (that is syntax and logic).[14]
Having
considered the aspects of linguistic, Ferdinand de Saussure in the early 20th
century distinguished between the notions of
langue and parole. In his
formulation of structural and linguistics, he said, parole is the specific
utterance of speech, whereas langue refers to an abstract phenomenon that
theoretically defines the principles and system of rules that govern a
language.[15] This distinction can be likened to Noam
Chomsky’s competence and performance. In which, competence is said to be an
individual’s ideal knowledge of a language, while performance is the specific
way in which it is used.[16]
Types of Linguistics
·
Psycholinguistics:
this kind of linguistics explores the representation and function of language
in the mind.
·
Neurolinguistics:
this is the study of language processing in the brain and language acquisition
which investigates how children and adults acquire a particular language.
·
Sociolinguistics:
linguistics also includes non-formal approaches to the study of other aspects
of human language, such as social, cultural, historical and political factors,
majorly is the concern of sociolinguistic.[17] This type of linguistics
looks at the relation between linguistic variation and social structures, as
well as that of discourse analysis, which examines the structure of texts and
conversation. Research on language through historical and evolutionary
linguistics focuses on how languages change, and on the origin and growth of
growth of languages, particularly over an extended period of time.
·
Corpus
linguistics: this type of linguistics takes naturally
occurring texts as its primary object of analysis, and studies the variation of
grammatical and other features based on such corpora. Under this kind of
linguistics we have style. The stylistics involves the study of patterns of
style: within written as well as within spoken discourse.[18] Whereas language documentation combines anthropological inquiry
with linguistic inquiry to describe languages and their grammars. Also
lexicography covers the study and construction of dictionaries.
·
Computational
linguistics: this applies computer technology to
address questions in theoretical linguistics, as well as to create applications
for use in parsing, data retrieval, machine translation, and other areas.
Linguistic Philosophy
Linguistic
philosophy describes the view that philosophical problems are problems which
may be solved either by reforming language, or by understanding more about the
language we presently use.[19]
The history of the philosophy of language in the analytical tradition begins
with advances in logic and with tensions within traditional accounts of the
mind and its contents at the end of the nineteenth century. A revolution
of sorts resulted from these developments, often known as the "Linguistic
Turn" in philosophy. Much of the stage-setting for the so-called
"Linguistic Turn" in Anglo-American philosophy took place in the mid
nineteenth century. Attention turned to language as many came to see it as
a focal point in understanding belief and representation of the world. Language
came to be seen as the "medium of conceptualization," as Wilfrid
Sellars would later put it. [20]
Idealists
working in Kant's wake had developed more sophisticated
"transcendental" accounts of the conditions for the possibility of
experience, and this evoked strong reactions from more realist philosophers and
those sympathetic to the natural sciences. Scientists also made advances in the
1860s and 70s in describing cognitive functions like speech production and
comprehension as natural phenomena, including the discovery of Broca's area and
Wernicke's area, two neural centers of linguistic activity. Mill's empiricism
led him to think that for meaning to have any significance for our thought and
understanding, we must explain it in terms of our experience. Thus, meaning
should ultimately be understood in terms of words standing for sets of sense
impressions.[21]
Not all those
concerned with language shared Mill's empiricist leanings, though most shared
his sense that denotation, rather than connotation, should be at the center of
an account of meaning. A word denotes something by standing for it, as my name
stands for me, or "Baltimore" stands for a particular city on
America's East Coast; a word connotes something when it "implies an
attribute" in Mill's terms, as "professor" generally implies an
expert in an academic field and someone with certain sorts of institutional
authority.[22]
Thus,
(1) The cat sat on the
refrigerator.
should be understood as a
complex arrangement of signs. "The cat" denotes or refers to a
particular furry domesticated quadruped, "the refrigerator" denotes
something, and so forth. Some further elaboration would be needed for verbs,
logical vocabulary and other categories of terms, but most philosophers took
the backbone of an account of meaning to be denotation, and language use to be
a process of the management of signs. These signs might denote objects
directly, or they might do so indirectly by standing for something within our
minds, following Locke, who described words as "signs of ideas".[23]
Problem: Accounts that emphasized the
reference of terms as constitutive of the meaning of most expressions faced two
serious problems, however. First, they failed to explain the possibility of
non-referring terms and negative existential sentences. On such a referential
picture of meaning, the meaning of most expressions would simply be their
bearers, so an existential sentence like
(1) John Coltrane plays
saxophone. was easy to analyze. Its subject term, "John Coltrane,"
referred to a particular person and the sentence says of him that he does a
particular sort of thing: he plays saxophone. But what of a sentence
like
(2) Phlogiston was thought to be
the cause of combustion.
Assuming that there is not and
never was such a thing as phlogiston, how can we understand such a sentence? If
the meaning of those expressions is their referent, then this sentence should
strike us as meaningless.
The
second serious problem for referential theories of meaning, noted by Frege, was
the informativeness of some identity sentences. Sentences of self-identity are
true purely in virtue of their logical form, and we may affirm them even when
we do not know what the expression refers to.[24]
For instance, anyone could affirm
(3) Mt. Kilimanjaro is Mt.
Kilimanjaro.
even if they do not know what
Mt. Kilimanjaro is. Making this statement in such a case would not inform our
understanding of the world in any significant way. However, a sentence like
(4) Mt. Kilimanjaro is the
tallest mountain in Africa.
would certainly be informative
to those who first heard it. But remember that according to referential
theories of meaning, "Mt. Kilimanjaro" and "the tallest mountain
in Africa" refer to the same thing and hence mean the same thing according
to these theories; therefore, (3) and (4) say the same thing and one should be
no more or less informative than the other. Where we grasp the meaning of an
expression or a sentence, philosophers have traditionally taken it that this
should make some sort of cognitive difference, for example, we should be able
to perform an action, make an inference, recognize something, and so on. Thus differences in the meanings of
expressions should be reflected by some difference in cognitive
significance between the expressions. But if expressions refer to the same
thing, and their meaning consists solely in their picking out a referent, then
there should be no such cognitive difference even if there is apparently a
difference in meaning. Simple referential theories do not offer us an obvious
solution to this problem and therefore fail to capture important intuitions
about meaning.[25]
To
address these problems, Frege proposed that we should think of expressions as
having two semantic aspects: a sense and a reference. Rudolf
Carnap would later replace the term "sense" with
"intension" and "reference" with "extension."[26] The sense of an expression would be its
"mode of presentation," as Frege put it, that conveyed information to
us in its own distinct way. That information would in turn determine a referent
for each expression. This led to a credo pervasive in analytical philosophy: sense
determines reference. This solved problems of reference by shifting the
emphasis to the sense of expressions first and to their reference later.[27]
Negative existential sentences were intelligible because the sense of an
expression like "largest prime number" or "Atlantis" could
be logically analyzed or made explicit in terms of other descriptions, even if
the set of things specified by this information was, in fact, empty. Our belief
that these sentences and expressions were meaningful was a consequence of
grasping their senses, even when we realized this left them without a referent.
However, Russell wondered how
(9) The present King of France
is bald.
could be meaningful, given the
absence of a present King of France. Russell's solution was to analyze the
logical role of such descriptions. Although a select few expressions referred
directly to objects, most were either descriptions that picked out a referent
by offering a list of properties, or disguised abbreviations of such
descriptions. Russell even suggested that most proper names were abbreviated
descriptions. Strictly speaking, descriptions would not refer at all; they
would be quantified phrases that had or lacked extensions.[28]
Philosophy of Language
Philosophy
of language is concerned with four central problems: the nature of meaning,
language use, language cognition, and the relationship between language and
reality. For the continental philosophers, however, the philosophy of language
tends to be dealt with, not as a separate topic, but as a part of logic. This
an approach to philosophical problems used especially by certain British and
American philosophers, inspired by G. E. Moore, and marked by the elucidation
of difficult and controversial concepts by resolving them into their elements.[29]
Meaning:
firstly, philosophers of language prioritise their inquiry on the nature of
meaning. They seek to explain what it means to “mean” something. Topics in that
vein include the nature of synonymy, the origins of meaning itself, and how any
meaning can ever really be known. Another project under this heading of special
interest to analytic philosophers of language is the investigation into the
manner in which sentences are composed into a meaningful whole out of the
meaning of its parts. This idea theories of meaning, most commonly associated
with the British empiricist tradition of Locke, Berkeley, Hume. They claim that
meanings are purely mental contents provoked by signs.[30] Although this view of
meaning has been beset by a number of problems from the beginning interest in
it has been renewed by some contemporary theorists under the guise of semantic
internalism.[31]
In semantic internalism there is what is called
truth-conditional theories. These theories hold meaning to be the conditions
under which an expression may be true or false.[32] This tradition goes back
at least to Frege and is associated with a rich body of modern work,
spearheaded by philosophers like Alfred Tarski and Donald Davidson.[33] For Davidson, the most
basic is that we are finite beings whose mastery of the indefinitely many expressions
of our language must somehow arise out of our mastery of finite resources.
Otherwise, there would be an unbounded number of distinct things to learn in
learning a language, which would make language learning impossible for finite
beings like ourselves. The linguistic competence of a finite being of our sort
must be the result of the interaction of a finite number of basic competencies.[34]
This point led Davidson to emphasize what he called a finite
primitives constraint, namely, that there cannot be an unbounded
number of primitive meanings of expressions in our language. Davidson argued
that this constraint was incompatible with certain proposals of the time. It
ruled out Israel Scheffler’s proposal that intentional verb phrases be treated
as primitive unstructured units.[35] In Scheffler’s view, the
verb phrase, believes that Socrates was a philosopher, was to be
treated as a primitive unstructured predicate—believes-that-Socrates-was-a-philosopher.
Since this proposal would entail infinitely many primitive expressions, it
violated the finite primitives constraint.[36]
Davidson argued in addition that the finite primitives
constraint ruled out certain versions of Frege’s proposal that words used in
intentional contexts do not have their ordinary senses but instead have a
special oblique sense, and have different still doubly oblique senses in doubly
intentional contexts, and so on for deeper intentional contexts. Frege’s whole philosophy
of language – and that of much philosophy of language in the analytic tradition
– is shaped by the conception of validity which is implicit in his system.[37]
The basis of
Frege’s mature account of language is his theory of Bedeutung. There are two
striking things about this. First, he takes Bedeutung to account for what
matters about meaning for the purposes of logic, and perhaps for science in
general. And, secondly, he understands Bedeutung in a way which the German word
makes natural, but would seem odd to us if we took it to be simply equivalent
to ‘meaning’. The German word is sometimes used to speak of meaning a thing by
a word, or even of the thing meant by a word. In his account of the Bedeutung
of expressions, Frege seems to follow this suggestion, and to look for a kind
of thing which might be assigned to a word as its Bedeutung.[38]
In this sort of view, philosopher has its
ordinary sense in Socrates was a philosopher, an oblique sense in Mary
thinks that Socrates was a philosopher, a doubly oblique sense in Jack
says that Mary thinks that Socrates was a philosopher, etc. If an oblique
sense of an expression is not determined by the regular sense of the
expression, and similarly for the doubly oblique and higher order senses, then
this view appears to be committed to indefinitely many primitive senses, which
violates Davidson’s finite primitives constraint. These and other similar early
arguments of Davidson had a major impact at the time and it is now widely
agreed that any acceptable analysis in these areas must respect some version or
other of the finite primitives constraint.[39]
Given that there is no bound to the
number of expressions in a language, the finite primitives constraint implies
that most expressions in the language are not primitive. Non-primitive
expressions are themselves composed of primitive expressions and it seems that
their meanings must somehow be determined by the expressions out of which they
are composed, the meanings of those expressions, and the way they are put
together. Davidson’s positive proposal was that an explanation of how the
meanings of complex expressions in a language depend on the meanings of their
parts could be achieved though a theory of truth for the whole language or at
least for a fragment containing the relevant expressions. The theory was to be
modeled on Tarski’s theory of truth for a certain formal language L. It was to
satisfy a version of Tarski’s Convention T, allowing proofs of relevant
T sentences of the form, x is true in L iff p, where x was to be
replaced by something that referred to a sentence of the language and p was to
be replaced by that sentence or a translation of that sentence.[40]
Language use: philosophers
of language seek to better understand what speakers and listeners do with
language in communication, and how it is used socially. Specific interests may
include the topics of language learning, language creation, and speech acts.
This theory of language use, for example theories by the later Wittgenstein,
helped inaugurate the idea of “meaning as use”, and a communitarian view of
language. Wittgenstein was interested in the way in the which the communities
use language, and how far it can be taken.[41] Wittgenstein rejected
many of the assumptions of the Tractatus,
arguing that the meaning of words is best as their within a given
language-game.[42]
Language cognition: philosophers
like to know how language relates to the minds of both the speaker and the
interpreter. This specific interest is the grounds for successful translation
of words into other words. Through logical analysis, Wittgenstein held that we
could arrive at a conception of language as consisting of elementary
propositions related by the now-familiar elements of first-order logic. Any
sentence with a sense could have that sense perspicuously rendered in such a system,
and any sentence that did not yield to such analysis would not have a sense at
all. "Everything that can be thought at all can be thought clearly.
Everything that can be said can be said clearly."[43]
The
relationship between language and reality: philosophers of
language investigate how language and meaning relate to truth and the world.
They tend to be less concerned with which sentences are actually true, and more
with what kinds meanings can be true or false. A truth oriented philosopher of
language might wonder whether or not a meaningless sentence can be true or
false, or whether or not sentences can express propositions about things that
do not exist, rather than the way sentences are used.
To be a realist about the
subject matters of these discourses is to think that our thought about them
aspires to reflect an objective reality, and sometimes succeeds in this aim.
Thus, when I judge that there are three chairs in the room, I express a belief
which aims to reflect an objective fact; and beliefs such as this
often do succeed in reflecting the objective facts of the matter,
so that the judgement in question is true. Likewise in the case
of moral discourse: when I judge that killing is wrong, I am expressing
a belief which aims to reflect an objective fact and which is successful
in this aim.[44]
For example, if I say that if it is raining, the
streets will be wet, I am not thereby accepting that it is actually raining.)
The question for the non-cognitivist is therefore this: what is the semantic function
of the occurrence of “Murder is wrong” in the antecedent of the above
conditional? Since I am not there expressing disapproval of murder, the account
of its semantic function must be different from that given for the
straightforward assertion that murder is wrong. But now we are going to have a
problem in accounting for the following apparently valid inference:
(1)
Murder is wrong.
(2)
If murder is wrong, then getting your little brother to murder people is wrong.
Therefore:
(3)
Getting your little brother to murder people is wrong.[45]
If the semantic function of “murder is wrong” as it
appears in (1) is different from its semantic function as it appears in (2),
isn’t someone arguing in this way simply guilty of equivocation? In
order for the argument to be valid, the occurrence of “murder is wrong” in (1)
has to mean the same thing as the occurrence of “murder is wrong” in
(2). But if “murder is wrong” has a different semantic function in (1) and (2),
then it certainly doesn’t mean the same thing in (1) and (2). So the above
argument is apparently no more valid than:
(1)
My beer has a head on it.
(2)
If something has a head on it, then it must have eyes and ears.
Therefore:
(3)
My beer must have eyes and ears.
This
argument is obviously invalid, because it relies on an equivocation on two
senses of “head”, in (1) and (2) respectively.[46]
Problem:
it
cannot be said that, philosophy of language is restricted to conceptual
analysis, to clarifying the basic concepts dealing with language. In some the
tasks philosophers of language involve themselves are classification of
linguistic acts, of “uses” or “functions” of language, of types of vagueness,
of types of terms of various sorts of metaphor.[47] Language has a problem a
word can mean several thing in different context. For instance, the word grasp,
in a sentence like; I grasp what you saying”. Because in this sense grasp could
mean possessing something with hand but statement is an object to be possessed.
So in essence, to talk all about things which are not perce3ived by the senses,
we are forced to use language metaphorically.[48]
Similarities
There is a common ground on how to
communicate properly without vagueness. This proper communication of language
must be base on good construction. And to see how this language depicts
reality, for example, every newspaper reporter went to a local bar to hear the
news. Stanley argues that, the statement above contains a covert location
variable that is semantically and hence syntactically bound on the natural
reading of, and that is a fortiori present as a syntactically articulated
element of the sentence.[49] Stanley also suggests
that covert pronouns associated with expressions such as ‘local’ are
responsible for weak crossover effects, restrictions on binding easily observed
in sentences containing overt pronouns. For instance, one cannot hear a reading
of, on which the overt pronoun ‘her’ is bound by the lower quantifier ‘every
reporter’: Heri local bar sponsored every reporter. Stanley argues that one can
see the same effect in viz. the absence of a reading that says that every
reporter was sponsored by a bar local to that reporter: A local bar sponsored
every reporter. In other words, the same syntactic constraints on binding seem
responsible for the absence of the intended bound readings of statements above.[50] In this aspect
linguistics, linguistic philosophy and philosophy of language are
interconnected.
Differences
The major difference is that, their emphasis
and what they intend to solve are quite different. Philosophy of language
emphasis more on meaning of a word and to see whether this word is truth when
use, while, linguistics emphasis more on structure of a statement and how it is
pronounced. Linguistic philosophy in its own enterprise engaged in how
linguistics term can have a reference in the world, to see if any way
linguistic concept can be empirically verifiable.
Conclusion
Having considered the nature and
issues of philosophy of language, linguistic and linguistic philosophy, we are
able to understand that, in doing philosophy well one need language and how to
use it. Language helps us to shape our idea and to be refined in our
expression. In which linguistic really helps to have a good knowledge on how to
construction of our statement in order to suit the idea we intend to
communicate at the same time to know the etymology of each word. A philosopher
cannot philosophise well without a good grasp of language because language is
the tool of philosophy.
Knowing a language and how to use it
well is quite different from whether what we are saying using language can be
comprehend by the audience through references to the reality out there. On this
ground, the linguistic philosophy helps to understand that, it is not just
saying so many thing but we should to understand that, whether what we are
saying can be found in the world of experience because human being learn fast
through experience referring to concrete thing in the world. So in this
enterprise every philosophical utterance should point to something in the
world.
Gazing at what is done above,
clarification of concept of linguistic, philosophy of language and linguistic
philosophy and their enterprise we are to discover that, the three enterprises
are interdependence or interwoven. One cannot stand without others, and because
of this complementary we then say philosophy use linguistic concept to express
the ideas in the mind as well concrete thing that is contain in reality.
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