PHILOSPHY OF SCIENCE
·
28/10/10
Course outline
1.
What is science?
2.
What is philosophy of science?
3.
History of science and the philosophy of
science
4.
Major orientations and personalities in
the philosophy of science
·
Logical positivism
·
Hume
·
Karl Popper
·
Kuhn
§
Philosophy is the queen of all sciences.
Philosophy is able to present its subject-matter: epistemology, ethics, logic,
and metaphysics – this is called first order of inquiry/analysis/investigation.
§
Auto-criticism: Philosophy is
self-critique
§
Philosophy also criticizes other disciplines
– this is called second order of investigation or analysis.
§
First order analysis in philosophy of
science concerns the various aspects of science such as biology, chemistry,
physics etc.
·
Term Paper: Discourse the
major theme(s) in the theories of: 5 – 8
pages
·
Galileo
·
Feyerabend
·
Lakatos
·
Laudan
·
Bacon*
v
22/10/10
·
Defining
Philosophy of Science.
The distinctive
features of philosophy of science include the very fact that philosophy is a
normative discipline. Whereas philosophy aims at justification, the sciences
aims at explanations given the multitude of things in the universe.
Any attempt to define
philosophy of science will necessarily call for the question: “What is
science?” whereas the question ‘what is science can easily be raised, once we
attempt on straight answer, we soon discover that like most questions in
philosophy, a simple answer wouldn’t be forth-coming.
The
received dominant view on the nature of scientific activity and its definition
in western culture would include rationality, objectivity and truth. This view
was admirably defended by the logical positivists who characterises science as
dealing with facts, through precision, experiments based on laid-down procedures
– a known method. Science is also viewed as operating in an open system and
providing un-biased value-free-knowledge. This implies that one does not bring
his personal feelings into the picture. For these reasons, the logical
positivist became sure that science was the standard rational activity, the
surest route to the truth there is.
Their
further claim is that science is well-founded such that its method and findings
are beyond reproach. A lexical definition has it that science is knowledge
ascertained by observation and experiment, critically tested, systematised and
brought under general principles, especially in relation to the physical world.
However, this basic assumption has since come under severe attacks from
contemporary philosophers of science. Some of the issues generated by this
crisis of confidence in the method of science itself, the relationship between
science, philosophy and technology; and the dispute about how to demarcate
science and pseudo-science as well as the problems of induction.
v
23/10/10
The
dominant view about science is that it deals with facts. Scientific activity
involves explanation, prescription and control. This implies that science is
different from the humanities. Scientists are not biased; they go into the
field using scientific method to discover realities as they are. The common
belief that science deals with fact has however come under attack from earliest
times by philosophers.
v
25/10/10
·
4
views on philosophy of science.
There are several ways in
which philosophy of science can be defined. However, we wish to identify 4 here
namely:
1.
Philosophy of science is
the formulation of world-views that are consistent with, and in some sense
based on, important scientific theories. Here it is assumed that the task of
philosophy of science is to evaluate the wider implication of science and its
theories on language on the one hand and on human behaviour on the other. But
this view of philosophy of science will be of no concern to us here.
2.
A second view is that
philosophy of science is an exposition of the presuppositions and prediction of
scientists. The scientists’ readiness to accept that there is such a thing as
uniformity in nature, his preference for deterministic rather than statistical
laws, or for mechanistic rather than teleological explanation. But this view
tends to assimilate philosophy of science to sociology.
3.
A third view is that philosophy of science
is a discipline in which the concepts and theories of the sciences, for
example, particles, waves, relativity theory and universal gravitation are analyzed
and clarified. But one could argue correctly, as Gilbert Ryle does, that it is
either the scientist does understand the concept he uses, in which case, no
further clarification is needed. Or he does not, in which case he could be in
the best position to determine the correlation of such concepts to other
concepts and measurement, and its eventual meaning. However, certain types of
the analysis of scientific concepts may pass as philosophy of science.
4.
But we could identify a fourth view of
philosophy of science. We can say that philosophy of science is a second order
criteriology/discipline. The philosopher of science seeks answer to such
questions as:
I.What
characteristics distinguish scientific inquiry from other types of
investigations?
II.What
procedures should scientists follow in investigating nature?
III.What
conditions must be satisfied for a scientific explanation to be correct?
IV.What is
the cognitive status of scientific laws and principles?
Thus, philosophy
of science can broadly be viewed as the second order analysis of the scientific
method as different from any other method to explain facts.
Level Discipline Subject
matter
|
2
|
Philosophy
of science
|
Analysis
of the procedures and logic of scientific explanation
|
|
1
|
Science
|
Explanation
of facts
|
|
0
|
|
Facts
|
·
6/11/10
F History of science and the philosophy of
science
A group of
scientists among who are Moritz Schlick, Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap, Alfred
Ayer and Hans Reichenbach, in the 1920s were convinced that science and its
methods presented the only authentic means of acquiring reliable knowledge.
They were also interested in the demarcation problem on how to make the
distinction between science and non-science, science and pseudo-science,
science and metaphysics, science and religion, science and logic and
mathematics, science and ethics.
These scientists
argue that for anything to be meaningful, it must be verifiable; otherwise, it
is nonsense. These scientists are what we call today the logical positivists.
They are scientists mainly from the Vienna Circle with a flair for philosophy
who wanted to make philosophy respectable by making it scientific. It was
however, Ernst Mach, Jules Poincare and Einstein who gave the technical
inspiration to positivism. Their main aim seems to be the resurrection and
updating of Hume’s Fork.
Due to the success
of great experimenters like Galileo, and later, Newton, scientist and
philosophers alike came more and more to regard experience as the source of
knowledge. The idea is that scientific knowledge is borne out of scientific
theories which are themselves derived from organised collection and observation
of facts. In other words, scientific knowledge is derived from experience and
experimentation. Organised empirical science was taken to be one of the
accredited candidates for knowledge. It was said to provide the most impressive
result of human rationality, thus, ascribing to empirical science the status of
the “paradigm of rationality”.
F Logical Positivism
The 20th
century positivist movement is usually identical as logical positivism. The
major tendency to which it belongs is empiricism. In other words, it is a
variant form of empiricism along with phenomenalism, operationalism,
pragmatism, and empirico-criticism. Logical positivism is an important school
in the 20th century philosophy of science. It is associated with a
group of philosophers who were active in the 1920s in Vienna. They were called
members of the Vienna circle.
In the context of
methodology, it shared the preoccupations, and utilised the techniques produced
by the advancing science of mathematical logic. The school held that most of
the traditional philosophical issues are either ‘meaningless’ or are
‘pseudo-problems’, and that philosophers ought to turn attention to more
legitimate problems such as the nature of the goal and method of the empirical
science. Given their interest in the philosophy of science, the logical
positivist produced a persuasive conception of the scientific enterprise; a conception
that has been adopted by many philosophers and scientists alike.
Characteristic of
logical positivism are doctrines such as the rejection of metaphysics and
theology; the emotive theory of moral judgement, the verifiability theory of
meaning; the unity of science; and the claim that legitimate philosophy
consists solely of logical analysis. It is generally believed that most of these
doctrines stem from Oxbridge (Oxford and Cambridge) philosophers who belong to
analytical tradition.
The most important
of the doctrines for the logical positivists is the theory of meaning according
to which cognitive meaning of a sentence is its method of verification. If a
sentence is not verifiable or is not true-value tautology then it is
cognitively meaningless. Logic, mathematics, and the physical sciences are
regarded as legitimate, because they satisfy the verifiability criterion.
The entire
programme of logical positivism in the light of its theory of meaning can be
summed up in the singular objective of attacking what positivists have referred
to as the pretension of the idealist philosophers who believe they had a unique
metaphysical supra-access to truth; one not available to the scientists. Indeed
metaphysics has been said to be concerned with the truth about the nature of
things including those principles which served as the ultimate of scientific
system. Science, to this extent, was supposed to be dependent on metaphysical
principles which are said not to be subject to empirical scrutiny, but are a
priori truths.
Truths that are
established independently of experience such as are contained in the
assertions: “Every event has a cause”, “the future resembles the past”, space
and time are absolute”, etc. These claims they say have a ring of necessity and
go beyond the evidence of the senses. This was rejected by the logical
positivists. A pure scientific theory, they maintained, should be an algorithm
(a logical step-by-step procedure for solving a mathematical problem in a
finite number of steps, often involving repetition of the same basic operation)
for the codification of experiences.
v 8/11/10
For Carnap, once
psychology has been correctly established as an empirical science, and
metaphysics recognised as art form, philosophy is then seen as nothing but
logic. If metaphysics is seen as an art form, its current deceptive nature
would be removed. Metaphysics pretends to give knowledge without actually doing
so. Hume had argued that there was no good reason to believe that any event
ever caused another event, because there was no sense datum representing any
cause, only sense data representing series of events.
But for M.
Schlick, Hume’s search for an entity to correspond to the name “cause”, was
itself suspect. For Schlick, the word ‘cause’ as used in everyday life implies
nothing but regularity of sequence. This is because nothing else is used to
verify the propositions in which it occurs. The criterion of causality is
successful prediction. That is all we can see.
From here, we see
that for logical propositions, the meaning of a proposition is in its method of
verification. Also the language of verification will have to be reduced to
“protocol sentence.” Protocol sentences were to be assertion which expressed
simplicity. These sentences would be the absolute indubitable starting point of
all knowledge – Schlick.
·
Example
of protocol sentence:
1.
Moriz Schlick perceived red on the 6th
of May 1934 at 3:30 pm in the room numbered 310 in the philosophy hall at
the University of Vienna.
But even protocol
sentences were not enough to ensure incorrigibility, so the logical positivists
sort for confirmation sentences which would help them designate the simplest
fact – example “Red here now.” But again, the very act of writing the above
example down produced meanings not identical with the actual pointing to place
when the confirmation sentence was uttered. And to call a thing red surely
implies that there is a class of red things to which it belongs – and this
class is not present in this case of red.
Ultimately, it was
suggested that certainty could only be found in the act of pointing and
grunting. From here we can see that something has gone very wrong with logical
positivism. This part of their programme was now hopeless.
|
F Why was the principle of verification very
important to the logical positivists?
1.
They were interested in the criteria of
meaningfulness
2.
They were interested in making a
demarcation between science and non-science
3.
They wanted to ground science on a firm
foundation
v 15/11/10
The principle of
verification simply states that “a sentence has literal meaning if and only if
the proposition it expresses was either analytic or empirically verifiable.”
Ayer shows that this is the outcome of realising that no real distinction could
be made between strong and weak senses of verifiability as a result. The
verification principle can only be stated in a weak sense. According to this
weak sense, a statement is weakly verifiable and therefore meaningful if some
possible sense experience would be relevant to the determination of its truth
or falsehood. However, Ayer finally says that “a statement is verifiable and
consequently meaningful if some observation-statement can be deduced from it in
conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from other
premises alone.
But this is too literal
in Ayer’s view since virtually all statements would become meaningful here. He
however makes a further restatement of verification principle “as requiring of
a literally meaningful statement which is not analytic and should be either
directly or indirectly verifiable.”
v 19/11/10
F David Hume
David Hume is
regarded as the most important philosopher before the 20th century.
He inspired the most important school in the philosophy of science of the 20th
century – the logical positivist. After World War1, Hume is regarded as one of
the most important philosopher to have written in English. He organised much of
his epistemology and his discussions on issues around the analysis of
causation. All reasoning for him concerning matters of fact seems to be founded
on the relation of cause and effect.
v 22/11/10
F Induction
Induction is a
form of reasoning that argues from the truth of a particular instance to the
truth of the universal. In induction, it is assumed that we can predict the
future from the past and the present.
·
Deductive
argument:
All men are mortal
Socrates is a man
Therefore, Socrates is mortal
·
Inductive
argument
Socrates was a man and is mortal
Abacha was a man and is mortal
Therefore, all men are mortal
In deductive argument, we can logically
deduce the conclusion from the premises. If the premises are true, the
conclusion (logically) must be true. Inductive arguments on the other hand are
not deductively valid, and the conclusion doesn’t logically follow from the
premises. The premises only provide evidence for the conclusion; they make the
conclusion more probable than certain. The fact that something has occurred
repeatedly in the past is not taken as evidence that it will continue to occur
in the future.
·
The principle of induction (causality)?
says that all events have a cause. It also holds the principle of uniformity in
nature. This principle says that there is regularity in nature such that what
we know to be true in the past always turn out to be true in the future.
·
The principle of induction says that all
events have a cause because there is regularity in nature such that what we
know to be true in the past, always turn out to be true in the future. In other
words, the future resembles the past.
F Aristotle and Epagoge
According to
Aristotle, is it possible to recognise the structure of reality. We do this by
means of First Principle. First principles enable us to understand the world as
it is. First Principle according to him is acquired through experience or
induction and intuition. Knowledge is acquired when we recognise the structure
of the universe through experience. Aristotle’s conviction is based on his
three laws of nature, namely:
1.
The law of Non-contradiction.
This law says that A cannot be and not be
at the same time. In other words, Peter cannot be a human being and at the same
time not a human being.
2.
The law of Excluded Middle
This law says that
B can either be B or not B
3.
The law of Identity
This says that A
is A
·
Induction serves as the demarcation between
science and non-science or pseudo-science.
·
Induction is a criterion for acquiring
observable knowledge.
F What
are Universals?
Universals are general characteristics or
properties that will help us to describe things that belong to a particular or
given class. For instance, what are the characteristics of the human person?
Dogs, cats, goats etc. these characteristics are such that whenever we see them
in any of these classes or species, we immediately recognize that such is a
human being or dogs etc. According to Aristotle, things have their general
characteristics that do not change.
Note that induction is a form of reasoning
whereby we argue from what is true of the state of fact t o what is true of
other facts of the same kind. But that the principle of induction is that every
event must have a cause and that is also the principle of causality (which in
turn derives from the notion of the principle of uniformity in nature) and as a
result what is true of a state of fact would remain true of further sets of
facts of the same kind. This comes up in the principle of induction that
induction is true.
In the past we have always found out that
the future was like the past. Bit this past experience cannot guarantee that
this will always be true in future unless one again simply assumes that the
future will be like the past, that is, the principle of induction. According to
Hume, there is clearly no logical connection in imagining that certain things
in nature say fire for instance, could not change its properties and produce a
cooling effect. For Hume, induction is not based on reason since neither is it
based on empirical grounds since our limited experience at present is not
enough to guarantee that what we know now about reality may not change in the
future.
When we say that things cause the other,
we are only reporting our expectation, we can never be certain of what will
happen in the future. What is it that makes us certain that the future will
behave like the past? If we answer because it has always done so in the past,
we are begging the question because the real question is: must it do so in the
future just because it has always done so in the past? Nor can we appeal to the
laws of nature because then, the question is: what Guarantees that the laws of
nature will hold tomorrow? And there is no analytic or synthetic guarantee for
this. Hume concluded that there is no necessary connection between the past and
the future or any two events in the universe or what one philosopher has called
‘dust bowl empiricism’ – the universe made up of discrete particles but
causality, but not causally associated with one another.
v 29/11/10
Hume’s effort
consists in reviving Leibniz’s analytic – synthetic distinction of truth of
reason and matters of fact as a process of acquiring authentic knowledge. For Leibniz,
the truths of analytic statements are discovered through reason and that of fact
through empirical analysis. According to him, ‘any statement that does not fall
within the rubrics must be altogether nonsensical. Hume’s attack on induction
therefore has its bases on Leibniz’s analytic – synthetic distinction. Hume
replaces Leibniz’s truth of reason and truth of facts by his relations of idea
and matters of fact.
According to Hume,
analytic propositions are expressed by sentences:
a.
Whose negation leads to self-contradiction
b.
Which are a priori
c.
Which are true by definition
d.
Are necessarily true.
On the other hand
synthetic propositions are the very opposite of analytic sentences. Synthetic
propositions are such that:
a.
Their negation does not lead to self-contradiction
b.
Which are a posteriori
c.
Which are not true by definition
d.
When they are true, they are not
necessarily true, they can be false.
According to
Leibniz:
Analytic propositions are
synthetic proposition are
|
1.
True by definition (True merely by
virtue of the meaning of the word as contained in the sentence.
|
1.
Not true by definition (Their truth or
falsity depends not on meaning but on facts on the world.
|
|
2.
Necessarily truths: Their opposites are
contradictory. They cannot be rue
|
Not
necessary, rather they are contingent. They could be false if facts are
different.
|
|
3.
A priori: (Their truths are known
independently of observation
|
A
posteriori: (Their truths or falsity is known by observation.
|
But in other to
create a wide berth/gap from rationalism, Hume claimed that analytic statements
expressing relationships between matters of facts are tautologies, that is, are
redundant, repetitive, merely verbal truths which provide no new information
about the world only about meaning of words. For instance:
1.
3+5 = 8
2.
Sisters are siblings
3.
It is not the case that it is raining and
not raining at the same time.
Synthetic
statements according about matters of facts can correctly describe reality in
an a posteriori manner, that is, all knowledge about the world must be based on
observation; i.e., all true knowledge of the world must be based on
observation.
“When we run over libraries,
persuaded of this principle, what havoc must we make? If we take in our hand
any volume of divinity or school of metaphysics – for instance, let us ask, dos
it contain any abstract idea concerning quantity or number – (Analytic truths)?
No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matters of fact or
ideas (Synthetic truths)? No. Then, commit it to the flames for it contains
nothing but sophistry and illusion.”
v 10/1/2011
F Hume, Causality and the Philosophy of
Science.
Following Newton
in the modern era, the causal relations between entities became the hub of
science. But then to undermine the notion that every event has a cause will
wreck the base of science. Science is based on the causal principle and the
uniformity of nature. But Hume attacked both principles.
From which
impression does the concept of induction arise? asked Hume. When we see a flame
touch us and feel a pain, all we can actually account for is the impression of
flame and pain. Where, Hume asks, is the impression of causality? What we
mistakenly referred to as cause is contiguity: the relationship of priority in
time and constant conjunction which in all is based on observation.
But from what impression
do we get the idea of necessary connection?[1] It appears that there is
none. Events only seem conjoined but never actually connected. In the end,
causality is merely an idea we add to our priority and constant conjectures.
v 17/1/2011
If we try to critique
Hume and claim that people at times make false causal inferences, we do not
know exactly what kinds of event exhibits genuine causal relationship such as
flame on your body being followed by a pain – and not that smile should be
followed by thunder. But for Hume, this argument is circular. Our belief about
what kinds of events have causal connection depends on what has been true in
the past, and what has been true in the past depends on what kinds of events we
believe have causal connection.
In other words,
causality depends on the uniformity of nature and the uniformity of nature
depends on causality. And this is the fallacious ground upon which the
principle of induction is based. So in other to prove the principle of
induction, we assume the principle of induction of which neither experience nor
reason is the bases of our belief in induction. Where then, does such belief
arise from, asks Hume? It is from our custom or habit, our psychological
dispositions to believe something without evidence that one thing often causes
another.
v 21/1/2011
F Karl R. Popper: Conjectures and
Refutation.
The major task
Popper aims at is to demarcate science from non-science and also to critique
Hume on the ground of approving induction on psychological ground. Popper says
that the psychological ground of Hume fall is not just contradictory.
For Popper, we
live on trial and error elimination method. Popper says no one lives his life
on the ground of thinking that the future will resemble the past. On this
ground Popper says that we live on our survived ideas. Popper says that if we
assume a certain belief and hold on to it, we are likely to hold on to such
belief but as soon as we anti-case we refute our assumption. For Popper,
science grows because of wide and bold conjectures. He says that what we do is
based on trial and error. Popper’s project was to create a demarcation of
science and to refute Hume and his problem. His view on science is based on
testability otherwise it is not science.
F Popper’s theory of falsificationism
Popper says – show
us how that your position can be falsified otherwise it is nothing but pseudo-science.
Scientists in the modern era beginning from Bacon, has stressed the role of
observation but Popper would say that scientific hypothesis and theory are not
derived from observed facts but devised to observe them. But we never start
from observation but theory and practical.
F Popper’s rejection of Hume’s theory.
Theories should
not be given up easily before you.
The logical aim of
Hume’s problem is to ask whether we are justified to reason from what we have
experienced to what we have not experience.
Popper refuses to
accept that induction is our daily life but calls it.....
For popper,
neither animals nor men uses induction nor any argument based on past
experience but rather we are all based on trial and error – conjectures. If his
view are accepted (Popper’s), there will be no need to separate Hume’s problem
from his psychological state.
If
Popper’s programme succeeds, he would have shown that induction could not
answer the traditional belief in providing ground for valued knowledge in
induction. Also, if his programme succeeds, he would have shown that induction
is not enough to show the demarcation between science and non-science. In other
words, Popper debunked Hume’s claim that nature is strong enough to provide
grounds for human nature. But Popper rather accepts in use of logic in the
process. Popper goes further therefore to provide a new system to his demarcation
process. Popper started by saying that there is a proper way of stating the
problem of induction (contra against) Hume.
F Kuhn: Advocate of changing Paradigms
An
American historian (Ph D) became a philosopher of the history of science. In
his book, The Scientific Revolution became one of the highly rated philosophers
of science in the 20th century. The logical positivism is the
traditional foundation of science.
Their
views too are traditional and form the bedrock of the views of science. With
the emergence of Popper therefore, there was a counter thesis in this regards
as he says that hypothesis precedes observation. That we have got to make
tentative hypothesis before observation after which these are tested to prove
their truth or falsity. However, this is out, the logical positivists would
speak of here and now in science as against tracing the history of science.
Consequently,
a Belgian scientist by the name Kekule in 1865 discovered the hexagonal
structure of the Benzene molecule through a dream where he saw a snake biting
its own tail. Now, this view of Kekule challenged the received view of the
logical positivists. With this rejection of the received view, the function of
science ab initio started tracking in its foundation.
As a result of this,
Thomas Kuhn also challenged this received view of science. According to Kuhn,
beyond testing and disconfirming of already existing theories which as a result
causes changes in the scientific world says Kuhn is quite different.
F Kuhn’s reason for denying the traditional
view of science
According to Kuhn,
there is a pre-scientific stage, normal science. In his thinking, the time of
pre-science is when everybody does its own without standards.
The period of
normal science is the period when scientists would not just agree on what the
relevant problems are but rather how also to solve them and what likely
solution the problem is. He says that a normal science began to emerge and this
normal science is the period when there arose mismatches. He says further that
when scientists started discovering these ‘anomalies’ and mismatches started
emerging in small amounts, scientists have ways of dismissing and developing
these anomalies. When these anomalies started coming up in large amounts, Kuhn
says that the ‘burgeoning’ sense of crises envelops the scientific community.
Consequently,
there comes a time when there was conversion experience in science through what
Kuhn calls ‘peer pressure’, political will etc. According to him, this pressure
or political will comes to play as a result of particular theoretical pressure
by a particular scientist. Such pressure for him gives way to other theories as
against the accumulation of data by the positivists.
F Kuhn on Theory Leadenness of Data and The
Incommensurability Theses
The Kuhnian
project was to debunk the traditional view that science grows based on
accumulation of data/facts. Kuhn says that that is not what happens but rather
that scientists abandon such paradigms because they no longer explain what
exactly is required further. This he calls anomalies. He went further to say
that there was a time when such anomalies grow profusely such that they do not
explain the present existing.........
For him, anybody
comes with new paradigms. Furthermore, he says not just anybody but by pressure
placed on him from political will. This political will pressure come as a
result of the mismatches of anomalies that had developed. This pressure from
political will is known as ‘mob psychology’. This in turn according to Kuhn
means that science is no longer rational.
F Theory Leadenness of Data.
Nobody goes there
into the field to observe data in an objective manner. Kuhn says this is not
true because scientists go into a paradigm and determine beforehand what the
problems may be, the result, and what likely the solution such problem might
turn out to mean. In other words, scientists do not go out there into the field
without some predisposition as to what the existing problem might be and what
the likely solution might turn out to be. Put simply, there is no independent
readiness of data but rather the data before you are only loaded by
confirmation or confuteness.
F The Incommensurability Theses
It states that it
is not possible to compose theories of different paradigms and as such no
meaningful endeavour will take place because what X means by mass is not what Y
means by mass. Kuhn says therefore that obviously there would be difference in
the meaning of concepts. As a result therefore, if one scientists from one
epoch and another from another epoch come together to compare their theories,
that the endeavour will not be successful or rather meaningful because the
meaningfulness of a scientists position on the formal epoch is not the same as
that of the latter meaningfulness. Rather both have equal right and as such no
ground whatsoever for commensurability caused by the presupposition of
scientists or rather pressure of pressure will.
F Criticisms
The pertinent
critique levelled against Kuhn is that if it is not the case that Kuhn was
making commensurability between several paradigms, how he would have possibly
arrived at such conclusions as incommensurability thesis. So it is the case
that Kuhn actually understood Aristotelian physics and Newtonian physics.
v 1/2/2011
F P. K.
Feyerebend: Advocate of Methodological Anarelusim
Feyerebend is a
German philosopher with the worry of our knowledge in science. According to
him, what we find in the history of science is mistakes, errors of the past. He
asks therefore: “If we find out that what we hold as standard theory in science
later turns out to be mistakes or error of the past and more seriously
irrational, it will just be pertinent to say no need to hold on to such claims
rather we only allows for “anything”. Anything goes.
F Revision
Traditional notion
of science, in the gains, claims and thesis, the philosophers started taking
interest.
Philosophy of
science is a second order criteriology.
The logical positivists pursuit this point by saying that there is no
need to say how do we know. Rather we say how do scientists pursue their
inquiry so as to gain knowledge. This is what is then known as philosophy of
science as epistemology.
The issue of what
constitute knowledge within the rubrican of science and its conflicting thesis.
These conflicting theses will eventually lead to the debate of science and
religion and indeed their manifestation. Eventually this led to the question of
what is science or what is a science. For to say what is a science is to say
that there is a unified science. But properly posed, it should be what is
science? So the central question in the study of philosophy of science is what
is science?
F The distinction between induction and
scientific induction as proposed by Hume
Hume’s problem is
based on the nature of the question he raised, namely; “How do scientists
arrive at their assumptions concerning knowledge? According to Hume, scientists
make a generalisation of their theory based on universal causal laws.
Scientists believe in the uniformity of nature according which things continue
to happen as it had been in the past. Hume was concerned about the rationale
for making this sort of claim. In his thinking, there is no rational ground for
universal causal law.
ü Logical
Positivism
ü Protocol
sentences
ü Conclusive/weak
sense of verifiability
ü Red
here now, pointing and grunting
v 04/02/2011
ü Scientific
induction is the scientific method of arriving at a general conclusion from the
observation of particular instance.
ü Induction
is the process of thinking or reasoning from particular instance to general
conclusion.
ü Kuhn –
According to Kuhn, there is no algorithm or standard for theory choice in
science because of the incommensurability of data.
Following the
scientific revolution, there was a shift from the belief in the metaphysical
grounding of reality to the scientific approach. Rather than basing our
knowledge on metaphysical or conjectures, there was a shift to the scientific
method of investigation. At a point there was the need to draw a distinction
between what could be called science and non-science, science and religion,
science and pseudo-science, science and metaphysics.
A major effort was
made to make this distinction and this was by the logical positivists whose
ambition was to ground science as the bases of knowledge using the principle of
verification. However, the verifiability principle could not be stated without
self-contradiction in the sense that it is either too broad or too narrow. It
eventually lead to protocol sentences and pointing and grunting.
[1] By necessary connection we mean that
only certain kinds of causes would bring certain kinds of effect. We would not
expect that scratching would bring thunder.
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