QUALIA

INTRODUCTION

The term “qualia” (singular: quale) was introduced into the philosophical literature in its contemporary sense in 1929 by C.I Lewis in a discussion of sense-data theory. He used it to refer to the properties of sense-data themselves but in contemporary usage, it is more widely known to mean the subjective properties of experience. What it feels like, experientially, to see a red car is different from what it feels like to see a green car. Likewise for hearing the same musical note played differently by a piano and a tuba. It is the qualia of these experiences that confer on them its characteristics “feel” and also what distinguishes them from one another.

According to the Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, qualia was referred to as the phenomenal properties of experience and experiences that have qualia are referred to as being phenomenally conscious. Typical examples of experiences with qualia are perceptual experiences (hallucinations), bodily sensations (like pain, hunger and itching), emotions (such as anger, envy), and moods (like euphoria, anxiety). There is often a contrast between phenomenal consciousnesses with intentionality (which is the representational aspects of mental states). Some mental states like perceptual experiences have both phenomenal and intentional aspects. My visual experience of a chair in a room represents the chair and also has an experiential feel. But it is quite unclear whether all phenomenal states also have intentional aspects and whether all intentional states also have phenomenal aspects and the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and intentionality.

ARGUMENTS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF QUALIA

From the definition of qualia, there arises a difficulty in relating them and consequently in demonstrating them in an argument. Therefore, in order to arrive at a conclusion that qualia exist, argument for qualia come in the form of thought argument.

a.    The What’s It Like To Be Argument

Thomas Nagel¹ argues that consciousness has a what-it-is-like aspect. For him, an organism has conscious mental states if and only if there is something it is like for the organism. Nagel opined that the physical theory of the mind cannot sufficiently account for the subjective character of experiences because there is no presently available conception that gives us a clue on how this could be achieved.

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      ¹Nagel, T.  What Is It Like to Be a Bat? 'The Philosophical Review', Vol. 83, No. 4, pp. 435–450, (1974)

b.    The Inverted Spectrum

This thought experiment developed by John Locke² invites us to imagine that we wake up one morning and discover that all the colours in the world have been inverted for some unknown reason and without any physical changes in our brains or bodies that could have possibly led to this inversion. Supporters of the existence of qualia are of the opinion that if this thought experiment is conceivable, then it is possible and if it is possible for qualia to have a different relationship to physical brain-states, it cannot be said to have the same identity to brain states. Therefore, qualia cannot be reduced to anything physical

c.    The Knowledge Argument

In one of his article³, Frank Jackson attempts to explain what he calls the “knowledge argument” for qualia. To properly explain this, he gives the following example: Mary a colour scientist knows all the physical facts about colour, including every physical fact about the experience of colour in other people through their behaviour. However, she has been confined from birth to a room that is black and white and is only allowed to observe the outside world through a black and white monitor. When she is allowed to leave the room, it must be admitted that she learns something about the colour red the first time she sees it, that is she learns what it is like to see that colour.

Jackson carried out this thought experiment first, to prove that qualia exists because Mary acquired knowledge of a particular thing that she did not possess before. Jackson believed that this is knowledge of quale that corresponds to the experience of seeing red and it must be agreed that qualia are real properties, since there is a difference between a person who has access to quale and one who does not. Secondly, this argument is to refute the physicalist account of the mind and to prove that there are truths about other people's color experience that are not physical.

CRITIC OF QUALIA

 Daniel Dennett⁴ offers an argument against qualia that attempts to show that the above definition of qualia breaks down when one tries to make a practical application of it. He identifies four properties that are commonly ascribed to qualia: It is ineffable (cannot be communicated or apprehended except through

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²Locke, John Essay Concerning Human Understanding, II, xxxii, 15. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975)

 ³Jackson, Frank "Epiphenomenal Qualia", Philosophical Quarterly, 32, 127–36. (1982),

⁴ Dennett, Daniel Consciousness Explained, London: Penguin Books, pp. 101–138. (1991), 

experience); private (all interpersonal comparisons of qualia are systematically impossible); intrinsic (non-

relational and unanalyzable) and non-physical⁵.

Dannett argues that if qualia of this sort exist, then a normally sighted person who sees red would be unable to describe the experience of this perception in such a way that a listener who has never experienced colour will be able to know everything there is to know about that experience. He therefore concludes that there are no qualia.

PROPONENT OF QUALIA

David Chalmers⁶ in his definitive paper "Absent Qualia”  argued for what he called "The principle of organizational invariance." In this paper he argues that if a system such as one of appropriately configured computer chips reproduces the functional organization of the brain, it will also reproduce the qualia associated with the brain.

CONCLUSION

It is often supposed that qualia has all sorts of wonderful functions, promoting flexibility and creativity. Block⁷ suggests that the main function of qualia is promoting access to mechanisms of short term memory, perceptual categorization, reasoning and decision-making. Qualia are red flags that representations wave at intelligent processors. The intelligent processing that results is a product of three things: the pre-conscious mechanisms that determine what representations are to acquire qualia, the post-conscious mechanisms that actually do the intelligent processing, and finally, the qualia that helps to make the representations accessible to the intelligent mechanisms. To give the qualia itself the credit for creativity, flexibility, etc., is like giving the printing press the credit for the ideas that are printed.

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⁵ Dennett, D. Quining Qualia. Ase.tufts.edu. (1985-11-21).

⁶Chalmers, David, The Conscious Mind. Oxford University Press: New York (1996)

⁷Block, N. “On a Confusion about the Function of Consciousness”, Behavioral and

  Brain Sciences, 18, 227-247, (1995)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Block, N. Consciousness, Function, and Representation. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, (2007).

Shoemaker, S. Functionalism and Qualia.” Philosophical Studies 27, 291-315, (1975).