review of relevant literatures on the subjects of logical positivism and Falsificationism.
Introduction
The
point at issue here is the question of what demarcates science from what is not
science. Logical positivism or logical empiricism[1] proposes that a synthetic proposition
is scientific just in case it is, in fact or in principle, empirically
verifiable, in which case it is also meaningful. Karl Popper proposes rather
than a criterion of meaning, the criterion of falsifiability or refutability.
Accordingly, a proposition is scientific just in case it is falsifiable or
refutable; “a theory is falsified only if we have accepted basic statements
which contradict it.”[2] Our task here is to briefly
discuss logical positivism and Popper’s falsificationism. Therefore, this essay
would consist largely in a review of relevant literatures on the subjects of
logical positivism and Falsificationism.
Logical Positivism: Its Origin and Foremost Exponents
To
say that something is real is to say that certain data are observed, that
certain facts are the case.[3]
The above formulation captures the logical positivist mindset. For Albert
Blumberg and Herbert Feigl, logical positivism is better described as a “union
of empiricism and a sound theory of logic.”[4]
Logical Positivism originated in the 1920s with the
coming together of a group of scientists, logicians and physicists. They paid
much attention to logic, mathematics and the linguistic characteristic of
classical philosophical problems.[5] This
is such that it can be comfortably stated that:
Logical Positivism…is
a theory in Epistemology and Logic that developed out of Positivism and the early Analytic
Philosophy movement,
and which campaigned for a systematic reduction of all human knowledge to logical and scientific foundations. Thus, a statement is meaningful only if it
is either purely formal (essentially, mathematics and logic)
or capable of empirical verification.[6]
In addition, it seems plausible to
corroborate the assertion of Blumberg and Feigl when they aver that:
Logical positivism retains the fundamental principle
of empiricism but, profiting by the brilliant work of Poincare and Einstein in
the foundations of physics and Frege and Russell in the foundations of
mathematics, feels it has attained in most essentials a unified theory of
knowledge in which neither logical nor empirical factors are neglected.[7]
This group of scientists, logicians
and physicists later came to be known as the Vienna Circle, having been formed
in Vienna, Austria.[8]
In fact, Logical positivism is seen as the most influential philosophy of
science of the 20 century.[9]
Though it has been abandoned by most philosophers of science, its’ impact is
still felt in other fields of study.[10]
Furthermore, this
school of thought thrives on the empirical, positivist, scientific and logical
presuppositions and conclusions that:
All knowledge, with the exception of
the analytic truths of mathematics and logic, is derived from experience; Metaphysical
claims are meaningless since they cannot be verified empirically; the methods
of scientific demonstration are the only way to true knowledge; Logical
construction plays an important role in relating fundamental data to objects of
scientific theories of higher order.[11]
Understandably, Bertrand Russell
avows that:
A philosopher is a logical positivist if
he holds that there is no special way of knowing that is peculiar to
philosophy, but that questions of fact can only be decided by the empirical
methods of science, while questions that can be decided without appeal to
experience are either mathematical or linguistic.[12]
Some of the earliest members of the
logical positivist school are Schlick,
Hans Hahn, a mathematician, Philipp Frank, a physicist, Otto Neurath, a social
scientist, Olga Hahn-Neurath, a mathematician, Viktor Kraft, a philosopher,
Theodor Radacovic and Gustav Bergmann, both mathematicians, the philosopher and
logician Rudolf Carnap, Schlick's students to include Friedrich Waismann,
Herbert Feigl and Marcel Natkin, Hahn's students, to include Karl Menger and
Kurt Gödel, just to mention a few.[13]
A. J. Ayer and Hans Reichenbach are known to have introduced logical positivism
into England and Berlin respectively.[14]
The Canon of Logical Positivism: A Simple Outline
The avowed commitment of
logical positivism is argued to be the decontamination and sanitization of
language.[15]
With them then, philosophy was assigned the character of clarifying language.[16] Little wonder Russell
would agree with Rudolf Carnap that the clarification of language is necessary
for the solution of the many problems of philosophy.[17] Logical positivism is seen
therefore as philosophy coming to rescue humanity from the fetters of bad
science and especially, metaphysics.[18] Accordingly, David
Weissman describes the logical positivist attitude such that “metaphysics could only be a corrupting confusion.
Cutting it off, like a gangrenous foot, would be an exercise in honorable
self-denial.”[19] By “basing its assertions upon recent developments in
factual and formal sciences,” logical positivism “holds that factual
(empirical) propositions though synthetic are a posteriori, and that logical and mathematical propositions though
a priori are analytic.”[20] Mathematical and logical
propositions lack empirical content and being simply analytic, they are
tautological, in that they do not tell us anything new.[21] Synthetic propositions on
the other hand, are factual and report the empirical. They carry content; can
be true or false when tested against experience. For the logical positivists
then:
The synthetic statements of the empirical
sciences…were held to be cognitively meaningful if and only if they were
empirically testable in some sense. They derived their justification as
knowledge claims from successful tests.[22]
Consequently, metaphysical
assertions would be ultimately meaningless since they are neither synthetic nor
analytic. Same goes for the assertions of normative ethics. The propositions of
both metaphysics and normative ethics are not verifiable. That is, there are no
conditions upon which they can be proven to be true or false.
More so, the logical positivist
conception of knowledge is that knowledge is “the communicable.”[23] Moreover, “what knowledge communicates is structure; this it
does by means of a symbolism or language.”[24] Language here is instrumental for the
communication of facts. This communication is made possible by the use of selected
language rules such that the “relations of words in the proposition
represent the relations of elements in the fact.”[25]
Accordingly, this reasoning presumes an isomorphism between language and fact
and the claim is that this isomorphism is inexpressible in any system of
language. Wittgenstein for example is said to have noted that this isomorphism
between language and fact is simply self evident.[26]
Russell puts it this way: “He (Wittgenstein) had
maintained that the form of a sentence can only be shown, not stated.”[27]
In the logical positivist view then, what we should concern ourselves
with are the sorts of things that are communicable. The sorts of things that
are communicable are expressed in a system of language. Communication is done
through language and language expresses facts and those things are factual
which are empirical and experiential.[28]
The factual is also the meaningful. Thus,
To know the meaning of a proposition is to know what
must be the case if the proposition is true. The meaning of a complex proposition
is revealed when we analyze it into its component atomic propositions. The
meaning or sense (Sinn) of an atomic
proposition is the "being-the-case" or the
"not-being-the-case" of the fact which it expresses. The meaning (Bedeutung) of a complex word or concept
is given by explicit definition; that of a simple word or name by pointing to
what it stands for in experience.[29]
It is based
on this, the criterion of meaning
that the logical positivists distinguish between science and non science. In
order to know the meaning of a proposition, we ask, under what conditions can
this proposition be true? These conditions constitute the procedure of
verification through experience. A proposition is true just in case what it
asserts is really the case and false on the contrary. The truth or falsity of a
proposition is ascertained by comparing the said proposition with
reality/experience. If experiential conditions cannot be established, whether
in practice or in principle, then the proposition is meaningless; if they can
be established, then the statement is meaningful.
Following
from this, scientific propositions are meaningful because they can be verified
– there are established conditions upon which they can be proven to be true,
whereas, non scientific propositions are meaningless because they cannot be
verified. Blumberg and Feigl are quick to add that “the meaningfulness of a
proposition shows itself when we ask whether it is verifiable.”[30]
It seems that science would depend more on reported facts from experience
to substantiate clearly logical claims deductively arrived at and embellished
in a given theory.[31]
We have noted earlier that the logical positivists assumed isomorphy between
syntax and matter of fact. Indeed, this is the basis of their acceptance of the
fact that true knowledge is based on experience and analytic/ tautologous
propositions. Consequently, there is a distinction made between observational and theoretical terms;
between synthetic and analytic statements; between theoretical axioms and rules
of correspondence; the deductive nature of scientific theories. Thus:
Rules of correspondence give an
empirical meaning to theoretical terms and are analytic, while theoretical
axioms express the observational portion of the theory and are synthetic. A
theory must be a deductive system; otherwise, a formal distinction between the
various kinds of sentences and terms is impossible.[32]
But we might want to ask, what is the status of observational language? Are
all synthetic propositions therefore empirically verifiable? What language is
adequate for the formulation scientific theories? Undeniably, the language of observation is,
for the logical positivists, as also for other philosophers of science. For any
theory to be verifiable it must be such that it can be observed
inter-subjectively.[33]
It is curious however, how John Loose notes in his Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science how George
Berkeley critiqued Newton’s system of thought noting as he did that Newton
talks about forces as if they are more than terms in equation. Forces in
mechanics are analogous to epicycles in astronomy; the mathematical
formulations are useful in calculating the motions of bodies. Berkeley says
that it is therefore a mistake to attribute to those formulations real
existences in the world.[34]
So one may ask, what does the scientist observe when Berkeley is watching him?
The
Supposed Impact of Logical Positivism
As earlier stated,
with their insistence on the criterion of meaning or cognitive significance[35]
based on verifiability, the logical positivists intended to singlehandedly
stage manage the death of metaphysics and normative ethics while underpinning
true knowledge, as we have noted, with the empirical, scientific thrust.
Indeed, if the criterion of meaning is applied to the systems of metaphysics
and normative ethics, they would not survive. Metaphysics dies with the
application of the criterion of meaning because “since their propositions are admittedly incapable of empirical verification,
they have no meaning as knowledge.”[36]
And normative ethics faces the same fate because “experience reveals what is,
never what ought to be.”[37]
However, John Passmore has some candid opinion for the metaphysician as he
notes that the logical positivist criterion of meaning undercuts logical positivism
itself. Thus:
The
proposition that ‘The meaning of a proposition is the method of its
verification’ is not a scientific proposition. Should it therefore be rejected
as meaningless? Faced with this difficulty, the logical positivists argued that
it ought to be read not as a statement but as a proposal, a recommendation that
propositions should not be accepted as meaningful unless they are verifiable…
the metaphysician could escape their criticism simply by refusing to accept
their recommendations.[38]
It is instructive to note that A. J.
Ayer in his Language, Truth, and Logic argues
that all ethical and aesthetic judgments such as saying that ‘this is bad’ or
‘that is beautiful’, are mere emotional expressions that cannot be attributed
any objectively valid judgment; rather, these can be scientifically treated by
ascertaining the general causes and milieu from which these judgments are
formed.[39]
Criticism
of Logical Positivism
Concerning the verifiability
principle, Bertrand Russell vehemently observes with certain suspicion:
That a proposition is verifiable is
itself not verifiable. This is because to state that all the future
consequences of a general proposition are true is itself a general proposition
of which the instances cannot be enumerated, and no general proposition can be
established on purely empirical evidence except one applying to a list of
particulars all of which have been observed.[40]
Moreover, the
very criterion of meaning or cognitive significance espoused by logical
positivists is the nemesis of logical positivism. It has been widely argued
against them that empirical science, which they sought to set free from the
entanglements of the high sounding language of metaphysics, dies with the
verifiability principle. As indeed, the scientific method advanced by the
logical positivists stressed the meaningfulness of propositions, it left the
propositions of science vulnerable to the same criterion. One could not agree
more with Bruce Caldwell in his interpretation of Popper’s critique. Thus for
Popper,
"Unicorns exist." Th(is) sentence can be
verified by finding a unicorn. But it cannot be falsified, even if it is false:
The failure to find a unicorn does not establish that none exists. If verifiability
is used as the demarcation criterion, the statement "unicorns exist"
would have to be considered a part of science.[41]
Again, since scientific propositions are of universal form: All Bs are x,
critics argue that such propositions are not empirically verifiable. Earlier,
David Hume in his critique of induction had noted the invalidity of universal
statements, and consequently, their lack of empirical significance or meaning.
Thus,
It was Hume who first pointed out, and with all
his customary lucidity, that from no finite number of observations, however
large, could any unrestrictedly general conclusion be drawn that would be
defensible in logic…. their unrestricted generality makes it permanently
impossible to verify them empirically, by no matter how many
observations—trillions, zillions, any number anyone cares to name. So, said
Popper, from the Verification Principle it follows that scientific laws are
meaningless statements, and are empty of informational content. The
Verification Principle rules out all scientific laws, and therefore the whole
of science.[42]
Seeing that this principle of verifiability is self destruct
to logical positivism modifications were advanced by some logical positivists
leading to the lessening of the hold on strict verification via experience.
This is clearly evident in Rudolf Carnap, an intransigent adherent of the
logical positivist tradition. It does
then follow as Thomas Uebel puts it that
While Carnap's focus on the reduction of
descriptive terms allows for the conclusive verification of some statements, it
must be noted that his criterion also allowed universally quantified statements
to be meaningful, provided they were syntactically and terminologically correct.[43]
Subsequently,
the verifiability criterion was reduced to confirmability
or testability with Carnap. Thus, a proposition
should at least be testable for it to pass as scientific. Thomas Kuhn takes
logical positivism to task on this confirmability principle, arguing as George
Reisch notes that Kuhn denied “the
notion that theories can simply be judged according to how well they fit the
facts, or, for logical empiricism, according to their measure of empirical
confirmation.”[44] However, Reisch posits
that Carnap’s contribution to the philosophy of science is identical to Kuhn’s
and does not see much reason why Kuhn could stand up against logical positivism
which Carnap seem to ably represent.[45]
It seems pertinent at this point to point out Karl Popper’s take on the
demarcation problem.
Karl Raimund Popper: On
the “Problem of Demarcation”[46]
Karl R. Popper is considered one of the most eminent philosophers of
science of the twentieth century. He vehemently opposed the Baconian
observationalist-inductivist method of science, appraised the logical
positivist criterion of verifiability and proposed the falsifiability criterion
demarcating between science and non science.[47]
His main concern in the philosophy of science is evidently the demarcation
problem; hence he notes in his The Logic
of Scientific Discovery that:
My business, as I see it, is not to bring about the
overthrow of metaphysics. It is, rather, to formulate a suitable
characterization of empirical science, or to define the concepts of ‘empirical
science’ and ‘metaphysics’ in such a way that we shall be able to say of a
given system of statements whether or not its closer study is the concern of
empirical science.[48]
This
confessed philosopher of science denied that verifiability is a better
principle for demarcation since certain propositions could be verified but not
falsified. Moreover,
Popper shared the logical positivist concern with
demarcation, but he did not accept the meaningful-meaningless dichotomy. His
demarcation criterion separates the scientific from the nonscientific, or
metaphysical. (Thus for Popper some statements can be nonscientific but still
meaningful.)[49]
Furthermore, James
Ladyman observes that one of the important reasons for acquiring the method of
scientific theory is the ability to determine the justification of scientific
knowledge claims, as well as distinguishing genuine scientific theories from
those that either claim or seem to be scientific.[50]
Therefore, the grounds and criteria through which science is demarcated from
non-science is referred to as ‘falsificationism’, which is Karl Popper’s method
of scientific theory.[51]
It is expedient to note that theory was more accepted amongst the scientists
than amongst philosophers.[52] According
to Ladyman, Popper is bothered by the idea that vague theories are acclaimed
scientific just because they attain popular confirmation. He thus argues that
theories such as these are most likely to be false science because their
vagueness gives them a great explanatory power which makes them to appear
scientific. Furthermore, Popper asserts that the confirmation of any theory
would only be credible if its prediction of phenomena occurrence entails risk
that would ultimately falsify such theory in its failing.[53]
In addition, James
Ladyman is quick to add that “science does not depend on induction at all”[54]
because induction does not justify scientific knowledge. Moreover, the greatest
problem of induction is that it takes just one contrary instance to falsify a
generalization. For example, the proposition- “All lions are brave”, only
requires a single case of a lion that is not brave to falsify it. Popper
therefore argues that only theories that are falsifiable by experience can be
termed scientific; for, “it is falsification and not confirmation that is at
the heart of the scientific method.”[55]
According to Popper, the empirical contents of theories are authentically
measured if such theories could be categorized according to their degrees of
falsifiability, because it enables theories to make predictions on various
observable occurrences.[56]
Furthermore, A. F.
Chalmers attempts to tamper the enthusiasm of Popper and his falsification
criterion noting that that a hypothesis should not just be falsifiable but more
falsifiable than the one for which it is offered as a replacement. This
perspective Chalmers calls sophisticated falsificationism.[57]
The
Limitations of Falsificationism
First,
falsificationism is undermined by the fact that observation statements are
theory-dependent and fallible. Falsificationism argues that if true observation
statements are given, then it is possible to logically deduce from them the
falsity of some universal statements; whereas it is not possible to deduce from
them the truth of any universal statements. Chalmers argues that this is an
unexceptional point based on the assumption that perfectly secure observation statements
are available. However, this is not the case since all observation statements
are fallible. Thus, if a universal statement constituting a theory or part of a
theory clashes with some observation statement, it may be the observation
statement that is faulty. Hence, a fallible observation statement might be
rejected and the fallible theory with which it clashes retained. So, conclusive
falsifications of theories are impossible.[58]
Secondly, the
statement “All swans are white” is certainly falsified if an instance of a
non-white swan can be established. However, simplified illustrations of the
logic of a falsification such as these disguise a serious difficulty for
falsificationalism that arises from the complexity of any realistic test
situation. A realistic scientific theory consists of a complex of universal
statements rather than a single statement. A theory that is to be
experimentally tested requires more than those statements that constitute the
theory under test. The theory will need to be augmented by auxiliary
assumptions, such as laws and theories governing the use of any instruments
used. More so, to deduce some
prediction, the validity will be necessary to add initial conditions. If a
prediction that follows from a number of premises turns out to be false, then
all that the logic of the situation permits us to conclude is that at least one
of the premises must be false. It does not enable us to identify the faulty
premise. Thus, a theory cannot be conclusively falsified, because the possibility
that some part of the complex test situation other than the theory under test,
is responsible for an erroneous prediction cannot be excluded.[59]
In addition,
historically, if the falsificationism methodology had been strictly adhered to
by scientist then those theories generally regarded as being among the best
examples of scientific theories would never have been developed because they
would have been rejected in their infancy. Chalmers argues that given any
classic scientific theory, although it is possible to find observational claims
that were generally accepted at the time and were considered to be inconsistent
with the theory; those theories were not rejected. For instance, when Newton’s
gravitational theory was falsified by observations of the moon’s orbit,
scientists did not abandon it. It turned out that it was never possible to
explain away this falsification in a way that protected Newton’s theory.[60] Furthermore,
in 1543, Copernicus revolutionized astronomy. In contrast to Aristotelian and
Ptolemaic system, Copernicus posits that the earth is not stationary at the
centre of the universe but revolves around the sun along with the planets. With
this emergence, neither the inductivists nor the falsificationsts give an
account of science that is compatible with it. Early formulations of the new
theory, involving imperfectly formulated novel conceptions, were persevered
with and developed in spite of apparent falsifications.[61]
Conclusion
We
have briefly surveyed the intellectual contributions of the logical positivists
and the falsificationist criterion of Karl Popper in the demarcation of science
from non science and pseudo science. We have noted that the logical positivists
offer the verifiability criterion of meaning, thus the meaning of a proposition
is its method of verification. However, we did try to show, with some literatures,
how this claim is self undercutting; for the proposition that the meaning of a
proposition is its method of verification is itself not verifiable. Besides, we
noted the difficulty of verifying universal statements, upon which,
unfortunately, scientific theories are built. More so, we tried to highlight
Karl Popper’s criterion of falsifiability for science, consequent upon which a
proposition is scientific if it is falsifiable. We noted, nevertheless, that
falsification is not without its own drawbacks. It could seem then to go
without saying that the logical positivists and Popper have really left a
legacy in the development of thought. Notwithstanding, their efforts have not
been completely irrefutable. Indeed, we noted earlier that at some point, the
logical positivist saw their verifiability principle as merely a recommendation. Karl Popper himself notes that “I do not
demand that every scientific statement must have
in fact been tested before it is accepted”[62]
and calls his principle of falsifiability as proposal.[63]
Bibliography
Books
Ayer, A. J. Language,
Truth, and Logic. New York: Dover Publications, 1952.
Chalmers, A.F. What
is this thing Called Science? Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990.
Ladyman, James. Understanding
Philosophy of Science. New York: Routledge, 2002.
Lawhead, William F. The Voyage of Discovery. Belmont: Wadworth Group, 2002.
Loose, John. Historical
Introduction to Philosophy of Science. New York; Oxford University
press, 1972.
Popper, Karl R. The
Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1975.
Encyclopedias
Nickles, Thomas “Problem of Demarcation” The Philosophy of Science, An Encyclopedia
Sahotra Sarkar and
Jessica Pfeifer (eds.). New York: Routledge, 2006. s.v.
Passmore, John
“Logical Positivism” The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, vols 5 & 6, Paul Edwards
(ed.). New
York: Macmillan Publishing Co. Inc & The Free Press, 1967. s.v.
Thornton, Stephen P. “Karl Raimund Popper” The Philosophy of Science, An Encyclopedia
Sahotra Sarkar and
Jessica Pfeifer (eds.). New York: Routledge, 2006. s.v.
Journals
Blumberg, Albert E. and Feigl, Herbert “Logical
Positivism” The Journal of Philosophy,
Vol.
28, No. 11 (May
21, 1931), pp. 281-296
Caldwell, Bruce J. “Clarifying Popper” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 29,
No. 1 (Mar.,
1991), pp.1-33
Hempel,
Carl G. “Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning” Revue
Internationale
de Philosophie,Vol. 4, No. 11 (Janvier 1950), pp. 41-63.
Reisch,
George “Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?” Philosophy
of Science, Vol. 58, No. 2
(Jun., 1991), pp. 264-277
Russell,
Bertrand “Logical Positivism” Revue
Internationale de Philosophie, Vol. 4, No. 11
(Janvier 1950), pp. 3-19
Weissman, David “Logical Positivism: A Retrospective” The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 88,
No. 10, (Oct., 1991), pp. 520-521
Internet Materials
Accessed on
12/4/15
Magee, Bryan “The Confessions of a Philosopher” Philosophy Lovers,
Mastin, Luke “Logical Positivism”
Uebel, Thomas, "Vienna
Circle", The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring
2014
Edition),
Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/vienna-circle/>.
Accessed on 10/4/15
[1] Cf. William F. Lawhead,
The Voyage of Discovery (Belmont:
Wadworth Group, 2002), p.506
[2] Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1975), p.86
[3] Albert E. Blumberg and
Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 28, no. 11 (May 21, 1931), p.295
[4] Albert E. Blumberg and
Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The
Journal of Philosophy, p.282
[5] Cf.
Bertrand Russell “Logical Positivism” Revue
Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 4, no. 11 (Janvier 1950), p.3
[6] Luke Mastin “Logical
Positivism” http://www.philosophybasics.com/branch_logical_positivism.html
accessed on 8/4/15
[7] Albert E. Blumberg and
Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The
Journal of Philosophy, p.282
[8] Cf. “Logical
positivism”. http://www.cs.utk.edu/-mclennan/Classes/UH267/handouts/WFI/c8.pdf.
accessed on 12/4/2015 p.311
[9] Cf. “Logical
positivism” p.303
[10] Cf. “Logical positivism”
p.315
[11] “Logical positivism”
p.311
[12]
Bertrand Russell “Logical Positivism” Revue
Internationale de Philosophie, vol. 4, no. 11 (Janvier 1950), p.3
[13] Cf. Uebel, Thomas, "Vienna Circle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Spring
2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/vienna-circle/ accessed on 10/4/15
[14] Cf. William F. Lawhead,
The Voyage of Discovery (Belmont:
Wadworth Group, 2002), p.506
[15] Cf. Albert E. Blumberg
and Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The
Journal of Philosophy, p.292
[16] Cf. Uebel, Thomas, "Vienna Circle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
[17] Cf. Bertrand Russell
“Logical Positivism” Revue Internationale
de Philosophie, pp.6-7
[18] Cf.
Bertrand Russell “Logical Positivism” Revue
Internationale de Philosophie, p.3
[19] David Weissman “Logical Positivism: A Retrospective” The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 88, no.
10, (Oct., 1991), p.520
[20] Albert E. Blumberg
and Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The
Journal of Philosophy¸ p.282
[21] Cf. Uebel, Thomas, "Vienna Circle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
[22] Uebel, Thomas, "Vienna Circle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
[23] Albert E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The Journal of Philosophy, p.286
[24] Albert E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The Journal of Philosophy, p.286
[25] Albert E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The Journal of Philosophy, p.287
[26] Cf. Albert E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl “Logical
Positivism” The Journal of Philosophy,
p.287
[27] Cf. Bertrand Russell
“Logical Positivism” Revue Internationale
de Philosophie, p.7
[28] Cf. Bertrand Russell
“Logical Positivism” Revue Internationale
de Philosophie, p.17
[29] Albert E. Blumberg and Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The Journal of Philosophy, p.287
[30] Albert E. Blumberg and
Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The
Journal of Philosophy, p.296
[33] Cf. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1975), p.47
[34]John Loose, Historical Introduction to Philosophy of
Science (New York; Oxford university press, 1972), p.144
[35] Carl
G. Hempel corroborates the use of the term “cognitive significance.” See his
“Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning” Revue Internationale de Philosophie,
vol. 4, no. 11 (Janvier 1950), pp. 41-63.
[36] Albert E. Blumberg and
Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The
Journal of Philosophy, p.293
[37] Albert E. Blumberg and
Herbert Feigl “Logical Positivism” The
Journal of Philosophy, p.293
[38] John Passmore “Logical
Positivism” The Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, vols 5 & 6, Paul Edwards (ed) (New York: Macmillan
Publishing Co. Inc & The Free Press, 1967), p.55
[39] Cf. A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (New York:
Dover Publications, 1952), p. 112-113.
[40] Bertrand Russell
“Logical Positivism” Revue Internationale
de Philosophie, p.12
[41] Bruce J. Caldwell
“Clarifying Popper” Journal of Economic
Literature, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), p.2
[42] Bryan Magee “The
Confessions of a Philosopher” Philosophy
Lovers, http://www.basicincome.com/bp/whatwasalmost.htm accessed on 12/4/2014.
[43] Uebel, Thomas, "Vienna Circle", The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy
[44] George
Reisch “Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?” Philosophy
of Science, vol. 58, no. 2 (Jun., 1991), p.268
[45] Cf. George Reisch “Did
Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?” Philosophy
of Science
[46] This is Karl Raimund
Popper’s favored way of characterizing the task of differentiating science from
non science. See Thomas Nickles “Problem of Demarcation” The Philosophy of Science, An Encyclopedia Sahotra Sarkar and
Jessica Pfeifer (eds.) (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp.188-197
[47]Cf. Stephen P. Thornton
“Karl Raimund Popper” The Philosophy of
Science, An Encyclopedia Sahotra Sarkar and Jessica Pfeifer (eds.) (New
York: Routledge, 2006), pp.571-572
[48] Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1975), p.37
[49] Bruce
J. Caldwell “Clarifying Popper” Journal
of Economic Literature, Vol. 29, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), p.2
[50] Cf. James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science (New
York: Routledge, 2002), p. 62
[51] Cf. James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, p.
64.
[52] Cf. James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, p.
65.
[53] Cf. James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, p.
68.
[54] James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, p.
69.
[55] James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, p.
69.
[56] Cf. James Ladyman, Understanding Philosophy of Science, 73.
[57] Cf. A.F. Chalmers, What is this thing Called Science? (Buckingham:
Open University Press, 1990), p. 50.
[58] Cf.
A.F. Chalmers, What is this thing Called
Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), pp. 60-6.
[59] Cf.
A.F. Chalmers, What is this thing Called
Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), p 64.
[60] Cf.
A.F. Chalmers, What is this thing Called
Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), p. 66.
[61] Cf.
A.F. Chalmers, What is this thing Called
Science? (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1990), p.67-74.
[62] Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1975), p.47
[63] Cf. Karl R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery
(London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd, 1975), p.78
Comments
Post a Comment