Russell’s idea of mind and matter from his concept of neutral monism.

INTRODUCTION

The questions, “what is man” and “how is he like or unlike the rest of nature?” have been asked ever since the dawn of self-consciousness. These questions are formulated and reformulated in every age. Thus, one major element that has characterized the entire studies in the discipline known as the Philosophy of Mind has been the mind-body problem. From the time Plato[1] asserted that man is not entirely material to this moment, man has been thrown into a mire of confusion. It is against this backdrop of the solutions proffered to the mind-body problem that philosophers like Bertrand Russell, have tried to propound theories that are meant to provide an explanation to what the mind is or what constitutes it.

The primary intent of this paper is to expose Russell’s idea of mind and matter from his concept of neutral monism. According to Russell, what is called mind is a series of events. Thus, mind and mental are merely approximate concepts. In a complicated science the word mind and matter would both disappear, and would be replaced by causal laws concerning events.[2]

RUSSELL’S POSITION ON MIND AND MATTER

Russell rejects the three traditional principal options in the philosophy of mind, namely: the dualism, materialism and the idealism. As known, Hobbes being a materialist thinks everything that exists is ultimately physical. Locke a dualist thinks there are ultimately two kinds of substance in the universe: mental and physical. And Berkeley, an idealist, thinks everything that exists is ultimately mental. For Russell, ‘mind’ and ‘matter’ are naive concepts, to be subjected to rigorous philosophical and scientific criticism. Indeed, Russell believes both idealism and materialism are inconsistent with the findings of modern science. The universe is not fundamentally composed of minds or physical objects for Russell, but events. Events are intrinsically neither mental nor physical, and minds and physical objects are logical constructions out of those events called the sense data.[3] Similarly, the concept of mind is logically dependent upon the concept of a percept, and percepts are events. Indeed, a percept counts as mental only because a certain knowledge relation called introspection is possible with regard to it. Events to which a knowledge relation of this sort occurs are mental, and there can only be percepts if there are items perceived: sense data, which are in turn events.

NEUTRAL MONISM

In broad historical perspective, neutral monism is a metaphysical doctrine of the early twentieth century. It was intended to sub-plant the two traditional and more familiar forms of monistic doctrine: Idealism, which prescribes a world consisting of minds and their contents, and Materialism, which sees the identity of everything (persons and minds included) to consist in configurations of material particles of some pre-defined type. Although the doctrine is often associated with Russell, its origin, as Russell himself attested, lies in the work of Ernst Mach (the nineteenth century Austrian philosopher) and William James, as well as in the writings before World War I of a group of American philosophers who called themselves the New Realist.[4]

RUSSELL’S NEUTRAL MONISM

Russell's doctrine of neutral monism is not widely known among philosophers. Many who do know something about the doctrine hardly esteem it, while those commentators who have examined it more fully rejected over its essential meaning. We must admit that Russell himself does not provide tremendous help. What we mean here is that, for instance, when Russell explicitly mentions neutral monism, it is as a particular theory held by others, such as William James, so that his eventual conversion to it may give the impression of being merely the acceptance of their views instead of the commencement of a long period in which he consolidated and developed those views.

Bertrand Russell’s neutral monism sought to dissolve centuries-old disputes about the nature of mind and matter by denying ontological primacy to both of them. Reality he claimed is ultimately neither material in nature nor mental.[5] He tries to construct both the mental world and the physical world out of components which are in themselves neither mental nor physical but neutral. Like idealism (the view that there exists nothing but the mental) and physicalism (the view that there exists nothing but the physical), neutral monism rejects dualism (the view that there exist distinct mental and physical substances).[6] Russell believed mental and physical events to be compresent. Events are compresent when they have at least some shared spatiotemporal location. Mental and physical event identity is the usual way of characterizing monism. These two events evidently have identical spatiotemporal locations so they are compresent. Consequently, Russell asserted that they are clearly not identical events in any credible sense, even though the same substance is the subject of the two events. One event essentially involves a change in temperature while the other does not. Russell questioned, that if these two events can be compresent without being identical, why cannot mental and physical events be so? And if they need not be identical, neutral monism is not established.[7] In Russell's words, neutral monism maintains that "the things commonly regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded as physical do not differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessed by the one set and not by the other, but differ only in respect of arrangement and context". From its monistic standpoint, "the whole duality of mind and matter is a mistake. There is only one kind of stuff out of which the world is made, and this stuff is called mental in one arrangement, physical in the other"[8]

However, unlike both idealism and physicalism, neutral monism holds that this single existing substance may be viewed in some contexts as being mental and in others as being physical. As Russell puts it,

Neutral monism as opposed to idealistic monism and materialistic monism, is the theory that the things commonly regarded as mental and the things commonly regarded as physical do not differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessed by the one set and not by the other, but differ only in respect of arrangement and context.[9]

To help understand this general suggestion, Russell likened neutral monism’s approach to the double sorting of names in the (old style) London postal directory, the same names being arranged alphabetically as well as being listed geographically by their street addresses. Another simile is that of columns and rows. The very same item can be located by either its vertical or its horizontal position. It falls within two different series of items to which it has definably different relations. Since the item is assumed to occur only within these two series, its identity is determined by these relations.[10] Another analogy can be found in the division of the country’s population into groups living in different areas and its division into the categories used by tax collectors.[11] Hence, we can liking the mind and matter like the lion and the unicorn fighting for the crown; the end of the battle is not the victory of one or the other, but the discovery that both are only heraldic inventions. The aim of the neutral monism is to show that the difference between the physical and the mental is not a difference of components but only a difference in the way in which the components are put together.

SENSE DATA AND THE PROBLEM OF MATTER

An interest in questions of what we can know about the world, about objects or matter is a theme that begins to colour Russell’s work. In 1912 Russell asks whether there is anything that is beyond doubt. His investigation implies a particular view of what exists, based on what it is we can believe with greatest certainty.

Acknowledging that visible properties, like colour, are variable from person to person as well as within one person’s experience and are a function of light’s interaction with our visual apparatus (eyes, and so forth). Russell concludes that we do not directly experience what we would normally describe as coloured or more broadly, visible objects. Rather, we infer the existence of such objects from what we are directly acquainted with, namely, our sense experiences. The same holds for other sense-modalities, and the sorts of objects that we would normally describe as audible, scented, and so forth. For instance, in seeing and smelling a flower, we are not directly acquainted with a flower, but with the sense-data of colour, shape, aroma, and so on. These sense-data are what are immediately and certainly known in sensation, while material objects (like the flower) that we normally think of as producing these experiences via the properties they bear (colour, shape, aroma) are merely inferred.

These epistemological doctrines have latent metaphysical implications: because they are inferred rather than known directly, ordinary sense objects (like flowers) have the status of hypothetical or theoretical entities, and therefore may not exist. And since many ordinary sense objects are material, this calls the nature and existence of matter into question. Like Berkeley, Russell thinks it is possible that what we call “the material world” may be constructed out of elements of experience, not ideas, as Berkeley thought, but sense-data. That is, sense-data may be the ultimate reality. Although Russell thought this was possible, he did not at this time embrace such a view. Instead, he continued to think of material objects as real, but as known only indirectly, via inferences from sense-data. This type of view is sometimes called “indirect realism.”

Although Russell is at this point willing to doubt the existence of physical objects and replace them with inferences from sense-data, he is unwilling to doubt the existence of universals, since even sense-data seem to have sharable properties. Russell argues, that aside the sense data and inferred physical objects, there must also be qualities and relations (that is, universals). Since in “I am in my room,” the word “in” has meaning and denotes something real, namely, a relation between me and my room.[12]

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIND AND MATTER

The problem of the relationship of mental and physical aspects of reality has long been a key one, especially in Western philosophy. Descartes gave a particularly clear formulation of the essential difficulties when he considered matter as extended substance (spatiotemporal) while mind was regarded as thinking substance (immaterial). He pointed out that, in mind, there can be clear and distinct thoughts that correspond in content to distinct objects that are separated in space. But these thoughts are not in themselves actually located in separate regions of space, nor do they seem to be anything like separate material objects.

It appears that the natures of mind and matter are so different that one can see no basis for a relationship between them. This point was put very clearly by Descartes[13] when he said that there is nothing included in the concept of body that belongs to mind, and nothing in that of mind that belongs to body. Yet, experience shows that they are closely related. Descartes solved the problem by assuming that God, who created both mind and matter, is able to relate them by putting into the minds of human beings the clear and distinct thoughts that are needed to deal with matter as extended substance. It was also implied by Descartes that the aims contained in thoughts had somehow to be carried out by the body, even though he asserted that thought and the body had no domain in common.[14] It would seem that nothing is left but to appeal to God to arrange the desired action. However, since that time, such an appeal to the action of God has generally ceased to be accepted as a valid philosophical argument. But this leaves us with no explanation of how mind and matter are related.

A CRITIC OF RUSSELL’S THEORY OF NEUTRAL MONISM

Russell’s theory of “neutral stuff” differs from both that of William James and the American neo-realists. James included what Russell calls sensations. According to a purely neutral monistic theory of the world there is nothing either in mind or in matter which is not wholly constructed out of the neutral stuff. Russell departs from this formula in two respects. In the first place, although sensation, which is the neutral stuff, is the most important component of mind, it is not the only component.

Consequently, mental phenomena are not reduced to sensations, but to sensations and images. Thus, images are not part of neutral stuff. They are never found in the physical and are purely subjective.[15] In a pure neutral monism, there should be nothing which is purely subjective. However, it is true that images are like sensations and may be derived from them. However, as being found solely in the realm of the mind, they constitute a departure from neutral monism. On the other hand, it is doubtful whether in Russell’s theory, matter can be said to be composed solely of the neutral stuff of sensation. 

Neutral-monist theories have equally been criticized as inadequate in their account of either mind or body. For Hume, his concept of mind as a bundle of perceptions, inadequately accounts for the identity and simplicity of the mind. Others have criticized the notion that physical bodies comprise some sort of primary experience as implicitly idealistic. Hence, the central problem for neutral monism is seen as that of specifying clearly the nature of the neutral stuff without qualifying it in an exclusively mental or physical fashion.

CONCLUSION

Through centuries, the discourse on mind and matter in the philosophy of mind has remained a very controversial one. It however, seems almost impossible to arrive at a conclusive end to the question of “what is mind?” Among other philosophical position, Russell neutral monism informs us that, matter as an entity does not exist, what has been regarded as matter up till now is in fact event. Thus the aim of the neutral monism is to show that the difference between the physical and the mental is not a difference of components but only a difference in the way in which the components are put together. Matter therefore, is a mental construction, a postulate made to explain events.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bohm, David. 'A New Theory of the Relationship of Mind and Matter', Philosophical Psychology. United kingdom: Birkbeck College, 1990.

Carey, Rosalind (2008), “Russell’s Metaphysics”, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (Ed.). URL =  http://www.iep.utm.edu/russ-met/#SH3g

Irvine A. D. (2012), "Bertrand Russell", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (Ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/russell (4 Nov. 2012)

Lowe, Jonathan. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Mind. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Omoregbe, Joseph. Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction To Philosophical Psychology. Lagos: Joja Press Ltd., 2001.

Priest, Stephen. The British Empiricists. USA: Routledge, 2007

Robert Tully, Russell’s Neutral Monism. http//digitalcommons.msmaster.ca/cgi/veiwcontent

Thomas Knierim, Mind and Consciousness – http://www.thebigview.com (3 Jan. 2013)

Russell, Bertrand. My Philosophical Development. New York: Reehl Litho Co., 1959

Stace W. T., “Russell’s Neutral Monism” The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, edited by Paul Schilpp. USA: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963, pp. 361-362

Tully, Robert. "Russell’s Neutral Monism" The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russel, edited by Nicholas Griffin. USA: Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 332 - 370

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[1]  Plato, in his theory of Forms suggests that (1) the world of Forms is separate from the world of  perceptible objects (the two-world view), (2) perceptible objects are images or copies of the Forms and (3) perceptible objects are unreal or “less real” than the Forms.

[2]  Joseph Omoregbe, Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction To Philosophical Psychology (Lagos: Joja Press Ltd., 2001), p. 19

[3] Stephen Priest, The British Empiricists (USA: Routledge, 2007), pp. 220 - 221

[4] Robert Tully, "Russell’s Neutral Monism." In The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Ed. Nicholas Griffin, (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 335

[5]  Robert Tully, "Russell’s Neutral Monism." In The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Ed. Nicholas Griffin, (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 335.

[6]  A. D. Irvine (2012), "Bertrand Russell", In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/russell (4 Nov. 2012)

[7] Stephen Priest, The British Empiricists (USA: Routledge, 2007), pp. 225

[8] Robert Tully, Russell’s Neutral Monism. pp 209 - 211

       http//digitalcommons.msmaster.ca/cgi/veiwcontent

[9] A. D. Irvine (2012), "Bertrand Russell" In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N.   Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/russell (4 Nov. 2012)

[10] Robert Tully, "Russell’s Neutral Monism." In The Cambridge Companion to Bertrand Russell. Ed. Nicholas Griffin, (USA: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 336

[11]  A. D. Irvine (2012), "Bertrand Russell" In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL =   http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/russell (13 Nov. 2012)

[12] Rosalind Carey (2008), “Russell’s Metaphysics” In Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, James Fieser & Bradley Dowden (Ed.). URL= http://www.iep.utm.edu/russ-met/#SH3g

[13] David Bohm (1990) 'A new theory of the relationship of mind and matter', Philosophical Psychology, (United kingdom: Birkbeck College, 1990), p. 271

[14]  David Bohm (1990), p. 272

[15] Cf. Stace W. T., “Russell’s Neutral Monism.” In The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Ed. Paul Schilpp (USA: Harper & Row Publishers, 1963), pp. 361-362