scepticism as captured by Michel de Montaignec



Introduction
Can humans truly know? What can they truly know? In what way can one effectively verify this knowledge of humans? These questions always give rise to variant and often conflicting positions as to the possibility and the content of knowledge of humans. Thus, Sceptics, investigating this, have maintained that it is impossible for humans to have true and accurate knowledge of things.
This paper seeks to analyse scepticism as captured by Michel de Montaignec, a 16th century French renaissance philosopher. This paper shall proceed in this format: definition and history of scepticism, a brief account of the life of the philosopher, Michel de Montaigne, Michel de Montaigne and scepticism, evaluation and conclusion.
Definition of Terms
The \Shorter Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy describes scepticism as the view that humans fail to come to knowledge of things. It is essentially the denial of knowledge; stating that none of our beliefs is certain, just, or reasonable, and that none of our beliefs is more reasonable than its denial.[1] Scepticism, simply put, is the philosophical view that it is impossible to know anything with absolute certainty. According to Jonathan Dancy,”the sceptical conclusion is that knowledge is impossible, no one does know, because no one can know.”[2]  Scepticism is thus the doctrine that knowledge is not possible, either about some particular topic or in general. Scepticism entails a suspension of judgement in a bid to get to the truth. This suspension of judgement arises because of the fact that the arguments on both sides of any given question are of equal weight.
History of Scepticism
Among the ancients, the two dominating and popular schools of scepticism were those of the Academics, championed by the leaders of Plato’s academy, Ancesilaus and Carneades, and those of the Pyrrhonists, championed by Pyrrho. Sextus Empiricus, a disciple of Pyrrho, was also very influential in this period. He presents us with the most comprehensive account of Pyrrhonist scepticism. In fact, it is noted that Sextus’ work on scepticism (Outlines of Scepticism) is our basic source for ancient skepticism.[3] While the Pyrrhonists doubted the ability to know anything, and thus the ability to come to truth, the Academic sceptics maintained a more practical approach, positing that they can come to knowledge of near-truths. While the Pyrrhonists doubted the truths of all claims, the Academic sceptics noted that they know one truth, that is, that they know nothing. Timon, maintaining the stance of Pyrrho, posited that we cannot assign a general quality to things, but that things are as they appear to us. He used the example of a honey to illustrate: he rejected the proposition that honey is sweet, and affirmed that honey only appears to be sweet in his mouth. One implication of the above position is that there will be no objective way of measuring the nature of things, thus making certain knowledge unattainable. Protagoras is reported to have said that man is the measure of all things, of things that are, that they are, of things that are not, that they are not - that is, human beings tell what the world is. This would imply that there is no standard or objective reality out there; things exist as they are determined by humans. Knowledge is thus relative, thereby denying the possibility to know things as they truly are. Gorgias is also reported to have said that nothing exists; if anything does exist, it cannot be known; if anything exists and can be known, it cannot be communicated..
In the medieval period,, Augustine and Henry of Ghent were important figures in the discussion of scepticism. Augustine refuted the position of the Academic sceptics in his work Contra Academics. He is famous to have said that to say that one cannot know is itself knowledge. Henry of Ghent, following Augustine, also refuted the sceptic’s position that knowledge is impossible.[4] Scepticism was renewed in the Renaissance period when the works of ancient sceptics, especially that of Sextus Empiricus, were discovered and made available. It is also noted that scepticism in the renaissance period had the touch of fideism, that is, that faith is the basis of all knowledge. In this period, important sceptics included Michel de Montaigne and Francesco Sanchez. The scepticism of Montaigne was very popular, and had important influences on Rene Descartes.[5] In the modern period, we find instances of scepticism in the works of David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Fredrick Nietzsche. Hume refuted the idea of causation in nature, stating that causation is an invention of humans, that nature does not operate by the idea of causation. Nietzsche is considered a sceptic following from some of his statements concerning truths. For example, Nietzsche describes truth as illusions that we have forgotten as illusions. For him, facts are precisely what they are not, what exist are only impressions.



The Life and Works of Michel de Montaigne
            Michel de Montaigne (1533-1592) was born in France. He studied at the college de Guyenne in Bordeaux, France, and served in the cabinet of King Charles IX. Montaigne wrote three books of essays. He began these writings in 1572, and published the first two essays in 1580. In 1585, he published the third.  His literary genre was the essay type. They consist of 107 essays with topics cutting across knowledge, education, love, the body, death, politics, and so on.[6] Montaigne was a practicing catholic, and wrote to defend the Catholic Church during the period of religious crisis between Catholics and Protestants. Michel de Montaigne, the inventor of the essays, has always been acknowledged as a great literary figure and a vibrant representative of Renaissance scepticism.[7] He is regarded as. a Pyhronian sceptic because of his emphasis on total ignorance. Montaigne's scepticism is largely confined to the Apology of Raymond Sebond. This Apology forms the twelfth chapter of Book II of the Essays. Richard Popkin asserts that the Apology was “the best known statement of scepticism in the European intellectual world.”[8]  The Apology was a defence of some of the teachings of the Monk, Raymond Sebond. Sebond was a Spanish theologian of the 15th century. He wrote a book titled “Natural Theology, or Book of Creatures” This book was given to Montaigne’s father, who asked his son to translate it from the Latin into French


Michel de Montaigne and Scepticism
The sceptic position of Montaigne is beautifully captured in his motto, “What do I know?”[9] His motto has the resemblance of the scepticism of the pyrrhonists, who had posited that they cannot know anything, including the claim that they cannot know anything. The position of the pyrrhonists made a great impression on Montaigne, to the extent that he was forced to cast a glance of doubt on all he had known hitherto. The basic tenet of Montaigne’s scepticism was geared towards showing that all our knowledge is subject to doubt as long as they come to us through our senses and reasoning. He maintained that man do not have true, accurate and certain knowledge of things.
He posited that
The knowledge of what we touch with our hands and have among us is far from us and above the clouds as that of the stars…whatever is told us, and whatever we learn, we should remember that it is man that delivers and man that receives, it is a mortal hand that presents it and a mortal hand that receives it. Only things which come to us from heaven have right and authority of persuasion and maker of reality.[10]

Montaigne presented his sceptical stance using two approaches. First, he defended pyrrhonism and its complete rejection of knowledge. For Montaigne, pyrrhonism is at the centre of all our achievement and at the peak of all human wisdom. This is because, according to him, pyrrhonism frees us from all forms of illusions and falsehood. Second, complete doubt, for Montaigne, is also very compatible with religion. This is so because pyrrhonism presents humans as being empty, s being a clean slate,, as being in a state of total ignorance, and therefore open and ready to receive any message that God desires to inscribe on it. Thus, adopting the scepticism of the pyrrhonists makes one submissive to divine assistance, refrain from taking any incorrect position , and thus accepts the laws and teachings of the church, which is regarded as the custodian of divine truth.
            . He wrote
There is nothing of man’s invention that has so much verisimilitude and usefulness [as Pyrrhonism]. It presents man naked and empty, acknowledging his natural weakness, fit to receive from above some outside power; stripped of human knowledge, and all the more apt to lodge divine knowledge in himself, annihilating his judgment to make more room for faith; neither disbelieving nor setting apathy doctrine against the common observances; humble, obedient, teachable, zealous; a sworn enemy of heresy, and consequently free from the vain and irreligious opinions introduced by the false sects. He is a blank tablet prepared to take from the finger of God such forms as he shall be pleased to engrave on it.[11]

Montaigne adopted pyrrhonism precisely because he felt it accurately captured the nature of the knowledge of human beings. Pyrrhonists had argued as false the claim that humans are able to come to knowledge whether through their senses or reasoning. The senses may not be able to truly understand reality, and they could be deceptive. This is because it would seem that humans are not able to accurately explain what it is they do experience, and whether they possess the ability to experience what they think they actually experience.  Thus, distrusting the objectivity of the senses, Montaigne maintained that “certain it is that our apprehension, our judgement, and our souls’ faculties in general do suffer according to the bodies’ motion and alterations which are continual.”[12]  This position is similar to that of Rene Descartes who noted that the imperfection of the senses often beclouds man from obtaining a true and accurate knowledge of reality. It is not certain for instance to tell the exact nature of the mind in humans. In fact, there are diverse and opposing theories that try to explain the nature of the mind.  
Montaigne further observed that for many years, it was believed that the sun moves round the earth, however, later works saw Cleanthes stating that it the earth that moves round the sun. Copernicus supported Cleanthes, and with the use of Galileo’s telescope showed that indeed it is the earth that moves round the sun. Thus, Montaigne maintained that in the future it is possible to come up with a third option which might overthrow the preceding two. He therefore advocated that we distrust a new doctrine because it is possible that before this new doctrine its opposite was in vogue, and since it is overthrown by the new one there may arise in the future a better one that will rubbish the one we now hold.[13] Many other issues about reality lack certainty. It was in recognition of situations like this that caused the pyrrhonists to posit that certain knowledge is impossible. The only way out of this predicament, Montaigne maintained, would be a recourse to the divine; thus, the source of any genuine knowledge and understanding is God. Humans come to true and certain knowledge only with the assistance of God.
Montaigne wrote that “our reason and human discourse is as the…matter, and the grace of God is the form thereof…all our wisdom is but folly before God …, man, who presume of his knowledge does not yet know what knowledge is, and that man, who is nothing, if he thinks to be something, seduces and deceives himself.”[14] Montaigne taught that man cannot know anything without the assistance of divine grace. He posited that reason does nothing but goes astray in everything, and especially when it comes in contact with the Divine.[15]

Evaluation
            Michel de Montaigne’s position on scepticism, as could be seen from the above discussion, has a Christian background. His stance on scepticism flows from his beliefs of the existence of the Christian God. It is obvious that Montaigne’s position will not be accepted by an atheist, since he/she does not believe in the existence of God, let alone in the assistance of the Divine in his/her quest to know things.  Furthermore, some would claim that to assert that humans cannot gain knowledge unless they are aided by grace would be to deny the rationality of humans. This, they claim, would reduce humans to animals. It is my position however, following the teachings of St Thomas Aquinas, that human beings can come to true knowledge of some things even if they are  not aided by grace. Thomas Aquinas notes that knowledge is an activity of the intellect. The intellect is moved by the First Mover, who is God, not out of necessity, but by His providence. The nature of the intellect is such that it is capable of knowing certain intelligible things (things we can know by our senses), but not higher intelligible things, unless it is aided by a stronger light (The light of faith or prophecy). Aquinas thus concludes that in the quest for knowledge, the intellect is moved by God as the first mover, however, the intellect does not need a new light added to its natural light to enable it to know all things. The intellect needs this added light only in those that surpass its natural knowledge.[16] Therefore,, I do not agree with Montaigne that we need the assistance of the Divine before we can know all things. We need Divine assistance only when it comes to knowing higher untellable things.


Conclusion
            We have, in this work, shown how and why Michel de Montaigne is regarded as a sceptic. His scepticism, as we have seen, has a Christian orientation. Montaigne doubts the possibility for human reason to truly know without the assistance of God. He likened the capacity to reason in man to that of animals, and claimed that man, unaided by grace, is not better than animals. My evaluation of Montaigne’s sceptic position was that humans can actually come to the knowledge of some things (sensible things) without the grace of the divine. We need the assistance of God when it comes to the knowledge of super intelligible things.  The philosophical discourse of skepticism remains a daunting one, and shall continue to pose serious questions to humans as we attempt to get knowledge.











BIBLIOGRAPHY
Ann Hartle, Michel de Montaigne, Accidental Philosopher Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003      

Jonathan Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology, Cambridge, Basil Backwell Inc., 1991

Charles Bolyard, “Medieval Skepticism”, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/medievalscepticis,/2013. Accessed 25/5/2015   
           
Joseph Omoregbe, Epistemology: A Systematic and Historical Study, Ikeja, Joja Education Research and Publishers Ltd., 1998

Michel de Montaigne, Essays, Book II, Chapter XII, An apology of Raymond Sebond, Trans. by Ben R. Schneider, Lawrence University, Wisconsin, 1998

Renata Zeiminska, Descartes’ Meditations in the history of scepticism, Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, Vol. 15, 2000

Richard Hopkins, The Philosophy of the 16th and 17th centuries, Toronto, Cullier-Manmillian Ltd, 1966                              

Sextus Empiricus, Against the Logicians, Trans. by R.G. Bury (Loeb edn) London: W. Heinemann, 1935

Stewart Cohen, “Scepticism”, Edward Craig (ed.), The Shorter  Routledge Encyclopedia of philosophy, 2005 edition, New York, Taylor and Francis

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Aquinas, Vol. 1, Trans. By Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Bew York, Benzinger Press, 1948

Tilde A. Sankovitch, “Michel de Montaigne” Encyclopædia Britannica, http//:www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/390476/Miche. Accessed on 12/5/15 

Curley E.M., “Scepticism and Toleration, The Case of Montaigne” http://www.sitemaker.umich.edu/emcurley/files/montaigneforosemp.pdf
                                                                                                                        

Foglia, Marc, "Michel de Montaigne”, Edward N. Zalta (ed.),The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/montaigne/2014. Accessed 25/5/2015
                                                                                                    



[1] Cf. Stewart Cohen, “Scepticism”, Edward Craig (ed.), The Shorter  Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2005 edition, New York, Taylor and Francis, p.934
[2] Jonathan Dancy, An Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology (Cambridge:Basil Backwell Inc., 1991),  p. 7
[3]  Cf. Renata Zeiminska, Descartes Meditattion in the history of skepticism, Stu dies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, Vol. 15,2000
[4]   Cf. Charles Bolyard, “Medieval Skepticism”, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/medievalscepticism/2013. Accessed 25/5/2015                          
[5]  Cf. Renata Zeiminska, Descartes Meditattion in the history of skepticism, Stu dies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric, Vol. 15,2000
[6] Cf. Foglia, Marc, “Michel de Montaigne”, Edward N. Zalta (ed.),The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, , http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/montaigne/2014. Accessed 25/5/2015  
[7] Cf.Ann Hartle, Michael de Montaigne, Accidental Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 1``                                                                                                                              
[8] Richard Hopkins, The Philosophy of the 16th and 17th centuries, (Toronto:Cullier-Manmillian Ltd, 1966), p.67
[9]   Cf.Ann Hartle, Michael de Montaigne, Accidental Philosopher (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 2`                                                                                                                               
[10]   Michel de Montaigne, Essays: Bk. II, XII
[11]   Michel de Montaigne, Essays: Bk. II, XII
[12]   Michel de Montaigne, Essays: Bk. II, XII
[13]   Cf. Ann Hartle, Michel de Montaigne, Accidental Philosopher,  p. 14`                                                                                                                                         
[14] Michel de Montaigne, Essays: Bk. II, XII
[15] Cf. Michel de Montaigne, Essays: Bk. II, XII
[16] Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1, q. 109, a. 1

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