SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT
SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT
According to Aquinas, substances are what are primarily said to
exist, and substances are what have existence but yet are not identical with
existence. And all change is either a change of one substance into another
substance, or a modification of an already existing substance. Given that
essence is that which is said to possess existence, but is not identical to
existence, substances are essence/existence composites; their existence is not
guaranteed by what they are, they simply have existence as limited by their
essence.
A substance is what is
predicated neither of nor in anything else. This captures the fundamental
notion that substances are basic, and everything else is predicated either of
or in them. Now, if we transpose this logical definition of substance to the
realm of metaphysics, where existence is taken into consideration, we can say
that a substance is that whose nature it is to exist not in some subject or as
a part of anything else, but what exists in itself. Thus, a substance is a
properly basic entity, existing “per se” (though of course depending on an
external cause for its existence).
On the other hand
Accidents, modify substances in some way. Sensibly speaking, accidents are
predicated of or in some substance; metaphysically speaking, accidents cannot
exist in themselves but only as part of some substance. As their name suggests,
accidents are incidental to the thing, and they can come and go without the
thing losing its identity; whereas a thing cannot cease to be the substance
that it is without losing its identity.
Accidents only
exist as part of some substance. It follows then that we cannot have
un-exemplified properties as if they were substances in themselves. Properties
are always exemplified by some substance, whereas substance itself is
un-exemplified. For example, brown is always predicated of something, we say
that x is brown, in which case brown is an accident. However, brown is never
found to be in itself, it is always exemplified by something of which it is
said.
Within Aquinas’s
metaphysical framework, substances can be both material (cats, dogs, humans)
and immaterial (angels), but as noted above, the paradigm instances of
substances are material substances, and the latter are composites of matter and
form; a material substance is neither its matter alone nor its form alone,
since matter and form are always said to be of some individual and never in
themselves.
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