the dialectics of secularization on reason and religion according to Habermas and Ratzinger.
Introduction
The marriage between
faith and reason does not only create a balance in the life of a Christian but
also a compass for a free society. For a thorough going secular person, this
might be senseless as he would consider reason as being opposed to faith and should
not be married. For a more relaxed mind, it makes sense to marry faith with
reason although with thorough examination of the possibility of their
compatibility. It is easier to convince one who is not so knowledgeable about
certain views than one who is. But when the one who is knowledgeable is
eventually convinced, his conviction becomes re-sounding as that will bring
about others convictions as well, those who may share his sentiments.
At the invitation of the Catholic
Academy of Bavaria, on the 19th of January, 2004, Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Cardinal
Ratzinger participated in a debate on the “pre-political moral foundations of
the free-state.” This debate centres on the aspects of
secularization and the role of reason and religion in a free society. Their
contributions showed slight agreement on the role of religion in today’s
Western secular state and on areas of collaboration and mutual enrichment
between Modernity and Christianity in Europe and the West. Notably, they
diverged regarding the need or not of a common cultural background prior to the
existence of the polity. Their divergence becomes all the more fascinating to
the extent that the matter requires wider empirical, analytical and normative
research before it can be settled.
The central thrust of the argument between
Ratzinger and Habermas is whether or not a political democratic state is
sustained on religion or constitution. Indeed, what provokes this discourse is
Ernst Wolfgang Bockenforde’s question: “does the free, secularized state exist
on the basis of normative presupposition that itself cannot guarantee?”[1] The
responses of Habermas and Ratzinger seem to be from two divides: reason
(secularism) and faith (religion). Hence, it is our aim in this paper to
undergo an exposition of the dialectics of secularization on reason and
religion according to Habermas and Ratzinger. To achieve this, we shall begin
with a brief biography of Habermas and Ratzinger; then proceed to expose
Habermas’ and Ratzinger’s positions on the debate over the
pre-political moral foundations of the free-state. Later, an evaluation of the two positions will
follow, before we conclude.
1.0 The Biography of Jurgen Habermas
Jurgen Habermas is one of
the world’s great philosophers. He was born in 1929 in Düsseldorf, following
the Nuremberg trials and the release of documentary films depicting the moral
and political decadence under the National Socialism. Habermas had a political awakening:
"All at once we saw that we had been living in a politically criminal system." This horrific realization
was to have a lasting impact on his philosophy, creating a vigilance against
the repeating of such politically criminal behaviour. In Heidegger’s Introduction to Metaphysics, Habermas
saw elements of National Socialism being exalted; and thereupon, sensed the
failure of the German philosophical tradition in providing the intellectuals
with the expedience to subject National Socialism to constructive scrutiny.
This negative relation between philosophy and politics in Germany subsequently
led to his search for conceptions which eventually led to his theory of
Communicative Action in which he argued that human interaction in one of its
fundamental forms is “communicative” rather than “strategic” in nature, insofar
as it is aimed at mutual understanding and agreement rather than at the
achievement of the self-interested goals of individuals. Such understanding and
agreement however are possible only to the extent that the communicative
interaction in which individuals take part and resist all forms of non-rational
coercion.[2]
In 1954 at the University
of Bonn, Habermas completed his dissertation on the conflict between the
absolute and history in Schelling’s thought. His first public recognition in
the world of the academia was with his 1962 publication of Strukturwandel der Offentlichkeit (Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere; English ed., 1989).
His theory of Communicative Action was given a core normative standard in this
work. Habermas’ interest in the political affairs prompted his long-term
research in philosophical and critical-social analyses. This gave rise to many
publications from 1962 till date. Some of his works include: Toward a Rational Society (1970) where
he reflected on the history of philosophy; Theory
and Practice (1973) where he attempted to apply his emerging theory of
rationality to the critical analysis of contemporary society; Knowledge and Human Interests (1971;
German ed., 1968) in which he defended his concept of philosophical
anthropology; and The Theory of
Communicative Action (1984, Germany ed., 1981) mentioned above.
1.1 The
Frankfurt School
The Frankfurt school is a
group of researchers associated with the Institute for Social Research in
Frankfurt and Main, who applied Marxism to a radical interdisciplinary social
theory. The Institute for Social Research (Institut fur Sozialforschung) was
founded by Carl Grunberg in 1923 as an adjunct of the University of Frankfurt;
it was the first Marxist-oriented research centre affiliated with a major
German university.
The members of the
Frankfurt school tried to develop a theory of society that was based on Marxism
and Hegelian philosophy but which also utilized the insights of psychoanalysis,
sociology, existential philosophy, and other disciplines. They used basic
Marxist concepts to analyse the social relations within capitalist economic
systems. This approach, which becomes known as “critical theory” yielded influential
critiques of large corporations and monopolies, the role of technology, the
industrialization of culture, and the decline of the individual within
capitalist society. Fascism and Authoritarianism were also prominent subjects
of study. Much of this research was published in the institute’s journal,
Zeitschrift fur Sozialforschung (1932-41; “Journal for Social Research”).
Most of the institute’s
scholars were forced to leave Germany after Adolf Hitler’s accession to power
(1933), and many found refuge in the United States. The Institute for Social
Research thus became affiliated with Columbia University until 1949, when it
returned to Frankfurt. In the 1950s the critical theorists of the school
diverged in several intellectual directions. Most of them disavowed orthodox
Marxism, though they remained deeply critical of capitalism. Jurgen Habermas
emerged as the most prominent member of the Frankfurt School in the post-war
decades. Habermas tried to open critical theory to developments in analytic
philosophy and linguistic analysis, structuralism, and hermeneutics.
1.2 Habermas
and Religion
On
the topic on religion, Habermas has assumed a nuanced position that continues
to develop. At first, he treated religion from a sociological point of view, as
an archaic mode of social integration. In considering the role of religion in
politics, and the relationship between religious and philosophical modes of
discourse, he writes: “indispensible potentials for meaning are preserved in
religious language” –potentials that, at least so far, have not been fully
reduced to philosophical and secular reasons. Hence, to the surprise of the
audience he dared to state, during this debate, that Western philosophy owes
much to its Christian heritage.
2.0 The Biography of Joseph
Ratzinger
His original name is Joseph Aloisius Ratzinger. He was born on April 16, 1927 in a small
town of Marktl am Inn, in Lower
Bavaria Southern, Germany. This future 265th Pope of the Roman
Catholic Church was six years old when the Nazis[3] regime of Adolf Hitler took power
in Germany in 1933. His parents, who were staunch Catholics, were hostile to the
regime. Ratzinger entered the seminary in 1939. In 1941, he was compelled to
join the Hitler Youth Movement. During the World War II in 1943, he was drafted
into the German military, serving in an anti-aircraft unit in Bavaria before
being sent to Hungary to set tank traps in 1945. He deserted in April of that
year and was captured by American troops and held prisoner for a brief period.[4]
After the war, Ratzinger continued
his education in the seminary. He was ordained a priest in June 1951 at the age
of 26. In 1953, he was awarded a doctorate in theology at the University of
Munich. It is worthy of mention here that his doctoral thesis was titled, “The
People and House of God in St. Augustine’s Doctrine of the Church.” After earning his teaching license in 1957, he taught
dogma and theology at the higher school of philosophy and theology in Freising
until 1959. Later, he moved to the University of Bonn (1959–69) and taught at
the universities of Munster (1963–66) and Tubingen (1966–69) at the invitation
of the theologian, Hans Kung.
In 1969, he moved to University of Regensburg to teach Dogmatic Theology where
he later became vice president.[5]
2.1 Ratzinger’s
Publications and Significant contributions
During his long academic career, Ratzinger wrote a number of
important theological works. Among them are: Introduction to Christianity
(1968) and Dogma and Revelation (1973). He headed the papal commission
that compiled the Catechism of the Catholic Church. His work in theology
attracted the attention of the archbishop of Cologne, Joseph Frings, who asked
Ratzinger to serve as his expert assistant at the Second
Vatican Council (1962–65). As one of the more progressive figures at
the council, Ratzinger opposed those who hoped to limit reform. He contributed
to a document that severely criticized the Sacred Congregation of the Holy
Office and that eventually led to its reorganization by Pope Paul VI (1963–78) as the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith. Ratzinger's teaching years at the university, however, brought about a
transformation of his views. The students’ protests and denunciations of
Christianity that he witnessed while teaching at Tubingen reminded him of the
tactics of the Nazis and gradually
led him to adopt a more conservative theological perspective.
In March 1977, Ratzinger was
appointed archbishop of Munich and Freising by Paul VI,
who bestowed the cardinal’s hat on him three months later. On November 25,
1981, he was made prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith by
Pope John Paul II
(1978–2005), whom he had known well since 1977. The pope and his prefect shared
a similar history, both having lived under totalitarian regimes, and their
views concerning the church were substantially the same. For more than two
decades, Ratzinger was the Pope John Paul II’s closest adviser. As prefect of
the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, the Vatican office responsible for preserving Catholic doctrine and
evaluating according to canon law the warrant for disciplinary action against clergy,
Ratzinger earned a reputation as a hard-liner. He condemned liberation theology and suppressed more-liberal theologians such as the
Brazilian Leonardo Boff and the American Charles Curran. Despite his
reputation, even his harshest critics recognized his intelligence and his ability
to discuss controversial matters in an objective and disinterested spirit.
Although Ratzinger insisted on the superiority of the Catholic faith to other
religions, which he deemed insufficient as means to salvation, he was also
closely involved in John Paul II’s historic efforts to reach out to other
faiths, especially Judaism and Islam.[6]
On Tuesday April 19, 2005, Ratzinger was elected at the age of 78 as Pope
Benedict IV and resigned in February 2013 due to age and health concerns.[7]
3.0 Habermas:
On the Concept of Secularization
Habermas begins by asking
if the law can work in a hundred percent secular environment, without support
from notions of religious origin. Put differently, is the state itself, the
source of truth and morality? Can it produce the normative basis of human
rights from its own self through democratic process? Must the state recognize a
higher norm? Or do human beings govern only by participation in the higher law,
by sharing in the care of divine providence for the common good?
Habermas accepts that the
free, secular states have arisen from a “common religious background and a
common language;”[8]
but instead of being too concerned with the past, Habermas is more concerned
with whether such states as they exist presently can produce its normative
presuppositions, that motivate them to moral practices. His concern is if the
free states can have its own democratic process which strictly makes use of the
non-religious principles of reason without falling into the safe arms of that
which they tried to free themselves from. For him, this is possible in virtue
of two reasons that make up the practice of democratic self-determination.
First, he argues that the democratic process is legitimate because it depends
not on a religious or metaphysical claim, but on the constant, corrective
communication between the collective decisions of citizens and legislation
which guarantees those citizens basic liberal and political rights.[9] Its
foundations are post-metaphysical. In his perspective, what the state cannot
generate through laws is the solidarity essential for its political life, for
the participation of citizens on the making of laws and discussion of the
common good of that society. Hence, the equal participation of all
citizens in the democratic process guarantees the basis of mutual respect among
them as free and equal members of the political community. This, for him, is
the core of civic solidarity that interconnects democracy and human rights from
the very outset. Secondly, the epistemic dimension of constant deliberations
among the citizens which leads to a free society can only be justified in the
light of generally accessible reasons which ground the presumption of
rationally acceptable outcomes. Hence, for Habermas, the bases of the
legitimation of a state authority with a neutral world view are derived from
reason.[10]
Hence, Habermas
highlights two factors, the interior and exterior factors as foundations of democracy.
He presents that the legislating citizens and the law itself, together, satisfy
the secular, democratic conditions of both inclusivity and reason. This is what
he calls “constitutional patriotism.” Hence, against those who see religion as
necessary to sustain the constitutional state, Habermas argues that, “systems
of law can be legitimated only in a self-referential manner, that is, on the
basis of legal procedures born of democratic procedures.”[11] In other words,
legitimacy comes from legality. He recognizes that solidarity among the
citizenry is needed for secular society to sustain itself. But religious or
metaphysical traditions need not be the providers of this solidarity.[12] Justifying
secularization, Habermas states with enthusiasm that “the
constitution of the liberal state can satisfy its own need for legitimacy in a
self-sufficient manner, that is, on the basis of the cognitive elements of a
stock of arguments that are independent of religions and metaphysical
traditions.”[13]
Instead, the democratic process itself can serve as the “uniting bond” that
mobilizes the participation of its citizens.[14] The
citizens, gathered in deliberation, give themselves a constitution, from which
state authority emanates and which is subjected to the rule of law as its most
inner core. Political power is totally permeated by the law. In the
constitutional state ‘there is no ruling authority derived from something
antecedent to the law’ such as religion or some other fundament of its validity.[15]
Habermas does not claim democracies are perfect or that they eliminate
inequality altogether; he simply says that they can maintain legitimacy without
having to ground themselves in any singular world-view or metaphysical
understanding. Likewise, patriotism can sustain solidarity once the principles
of justice enshrined in the law have time to penetrate the culture’s ethics.[16]
Habermas warns about
external threats to secular society. He says that democracies demand the
solidarity and commitment of their citizens to the process itself. And as
society has increasingly become a global society beyond the boundaries of
particular political systems, and as the global economy is only minimally
constrained by the political system, citizens are losing hope in the process itself.
There is, currently, no law which can guarantee human rights in the global
sphere. Therefore, the secular state is beginning to break apart as people
increasingly feel compelled to act in their own self-interest. Once citizens
act in isolation based solely upon self-interest, they use their subjective
rights against one another.[17] And the external threat
of states and citizens not committed to democracy only increases this
de-stabilization. Habermas does not give in at this point, though. He does not
say that the secular forces of communicative reason do not work in a global,
plural society. He simply says that the forces should be treated
“undramatically, as an open, empirical question.”[18] And, he also says, reason
has its limits and must become aware of them. As the markets and the power of
bureaucracy continue to weaken social solidarity, Habermas recognizes the need
for a bridge to certain religious traditions.[19]
Habermas advices that in
the face of the uprooting effects of technology and the global market, the
liberal state should “treat with care all cultural sources on which the
normative consciousness and solidarity of citizens draws.”[20] Religion is pre-eminent
among such sources. For him, although the civic bond is not based upon
pre-existing religious ties, it should treat them with the greatest delicacy,
recognising them as important allies in its own struggle against the alienating
forces of the modern world. He admits that there is something to learn from
religious traditions, something which reason does not provide, something with
substance. Religions, he says, have kept alive and continue to reformulate
contextual interpretations of redemption, of “salvitic exodus from a life that
is experienced as empty of salvation;”[21] this, he says, is impossible for experts of
secular reason alone. What secular society must learn to do with these
contextual interpretations is make “the substance of biblical concepts
accessible to a general public that also includes those who have other faiths
and those who have none.”[22]
According
to him, religious insights become available to the secular world through a
process of what he calls “saving translation.”
He believes philosophy can translate religious terms into secular
principles without completely emptying them of their substance. Thus the
Biblical version of man as made in the “image and likeness” of God finds a
profane expression in the principle of the equal worth of all human beings.[23] When secular systems can
learn to do this, that is, to internalize contributions of religious traditions
and to not ignore the individual voices which claim religious convictions, then
they can begin the process of having those individuals trust in the democratic
process, even if in doing so they have to give up the idea of a post-metaphysical
society in favor of a post-secular one. For the uniting bond of the secular
democratic process depends on the faith and commitment of the people to that
process. Such translations are not, as Habermas himself has admitted, always
successful. However, although imperfect these translations may be, he maintains
that the translation of religious into secular language still remains our best
hope of avoiding the savage conflicts that so often beset the passage of
modernity.
4.0 Ratzinger’s
Approach as a Response to Jürgen Habermas
Having discussed the position of Habermas on the dialectics of
secularization in the previous chapter, we shall now proceed to discuss the
argument of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger on the same issue. Ratzinger opens his discussion with a brief analysis on the
dynamics of power and law, as the two factors responsible for accelerating
rapid development in today’s world:[24]
Ø A global community in which the individual political,
economic and cultural powers of each country depend on one another in their
various existential sphere.
Ø The human possibilities, capabilities and power to
make and to destroy which poses the question of legal and ethical controls on
power.
The law, he
says, cannot be the arm of the strong; for law is the only thing built strong
enough to oppose those with power. It offers strength to those that are weak;
it is the antithesis of violence because the true function of the law is
equality for all. Law needs a just, legitimating force, according to Ratzinger,
because “revolt against the law will always arise when law itself appears to be
no longer an expression of a justice that is at the service of all but...the
product of arbitrariness and legislative arrogance”.[25]
Democratic systems of law, he says, are now under suspicion, not because they
have never had legitimating force but because those veteran forces are no
longer suited to what he sees are new vulnerabilities in society.
Proceeding from there, Ratzinger presents that the modern period has
formulated a number of normative elements in the various declarations of human
rights, unjust laws that lack majority decision, values that are not accepted
in every culture and various catalogues of human rights are springing up.[26]
He argues that these societal concerns are built on a wrong conception of power
and the law. This view is built upon the aftermath of the experience of Second
World War were fear of a new destructive power because of the invention of
atomic bomb and weapons of mass destruction had been placed in the hands of
men.[27]
Man therefore sought for a political mechanism to prevent this destruction.
Consequently, competition was built up between the opposing power blocs leading
to an established political structure. The pace of
global interconnectedness is quickening; world views are colliding at an
alarming rate and with those collisions come a fear of losing what is most
precious to each world view. Thus,
Ratzinger seeks for a synthesis of cultures especially in right ethical
blending in order to have a structure that can tame and order power in the
society.
Hence, this established political structure on one hand, and the
Christian realm on the other, seems to consider itself as universal. This is
exemplified that Western rational tradition and the Christian realm consider
itself as able to discuss basic questions of human existence separately.[28]
Thus, this has led the Western and European cultures to now center on
secularization (secular rationality) which tries to persuade rational or
ethical or religious formula to all cultures of mankind leading to tension and
reactions.[29] To this end, Ratzinger suggests that the classic debate between a
“neutral” secular reason and a Christian-dominated world view in the West is
not a universal debate. Western rationality and universal claims of Christian
revelation must both be called into question. Both are global in their reach
but are “de facto not universal...
[Western culture] as a whole comes up against its limitations when it attempts
to demonstrate itself”.[30]
Notably, Ratzinger acknowledges the advancement of science in the
society. He however laments that science
cannot give adequate answers about the purpose and existence of man but only
partial answers.[31]
Hence, he calls for the use of philosophy to complement scientific
explanations. Thus, all these scientific and philosophical endeavours are built
on reason. Reason therefore seems to be the answer to these ethical, cultural
and power concerns.
However, the problematic is in
the evil activities carried out in recent times which have become a major
challenge to the society. Terrorist activities are portrayed as the defense of
religious traditions against the godlessness of western society. This raises
the question, “what are the sources on which terror draws.”[32]
From what source are the various ethical ills in the society coming from?
Responding to these questions, Ratzinger highlights that the two sources are
religion (faith) and reason (sciences). With these, he notes the different
pathologies inherent in religion and reason.
4.1 Pathologies
of Religion and Reason
Ratzinger proceeds in this debate by noting the
pathologies in religion and reason. For him, religious fanaticism is one of the
sources of terrorism.[33]
This is a kind of religion depending on faith alone without reason. Given this,
it is considered that religion has failed in its duty of healing and saving.
Thus, if religion has failed, can it be considered an archaic and dangerous
force that builds up false universalisms, thereby leading to intolerance and
acts of terrorism? Should we consider the general abolishment of religion or
place religion under the guardian of reason?[34]
However, Ratzinger also points out
the pathologies of reason. He reiterates that the production of atomic bombs,
nuclear weapons, breeding and selection of human beings is something thought by
reason.[35]
He laments that reason has taken humanity not
just as far as the atomic bomb, but even further, to the point where “man is
now capable of making human beings, of producing them in test tubes...man [has
become] a product...he is no longer a gift”.[36] With these errors, we must now doubt the reliability
of reason. He points out that science and reason alone have
proved insufficient as an ethical foundation for society. In fact, can we not say “that it is reason that ought
to be placed under guardianship? Or should perhaps religion and reason restrict
each other and remind each other where their limits are, thereby encouraging a
positive path?”[37]
4.2
Ratzinger’s Position on the Way
Forward
Thus, considering these pathologies,
Ratzinger responds that “I am in broad agreement with Jürgen Habermas’ remarks about a post secular society, about
the willingness to learn from each other, and about self-limitation on both
sides.”[38]
Hence, he summarizes his views in this way:
Ø Since pathologies exist in religion that is extremely
dangerous, religion must continually allow itself to be purified and structured
by reason as a controlling organ.[39]
Ø Also, since there are pathologies of reason, “reason,
too must be warned to keep within its proper limits, and it must learn a
willingness to listen to the great religious traditions of mankind.”[40]
These views present Ratzinger as championing a new beginning whereby
reason and religion can start afresh. Therefore, Ratzinger insists on “a
necessary relatedness between reason and faith and between reason and religion,
which are called to purify and help one another. They need each other, and they
must acknowledge this mutual need.”[41]
Reason should guide faith and faith should guide reason. In fact, reason and
faith must come together and work for none can be without pathologies on its
own. Let
religion be continually purged and structured by reason as a controlling organ.
Also, reason must keep within its proper limits, and be willing to listen to
the great religious traditions of mankind. This does not necessarily mean a
“return to faith”; rather it means “that we free ourselves from the blindness
typical of our age, that is, the idea that faith has nothing more to say to
contemporary man because it contradicts his humanistic idea of reason,
Enlightenment, and freedom”.[42]
It is pertinent to note that
it is impossible to suppress ethics and religion. To this end, Ratzinger
posits that both reason and genuinely authentic religious belief are necessary
for the maintenance of the moral bulwark of society. He enjoins for a concrete form of the mutual relationship
in faith and reason especially in practice in the intercultural context of the
present day. Western cultures should include the other cultures to form a
genuine relatedness, in which they are receptive to the common unitary aspects
of reason and faith. A mutual relatedness should exist between the Christian
faith and Western secular rationality in order to produce the essential values
and norms that are in some way known or sensed by all men so that, that which
holds the world together can renew its effective force in mankind.[43]
5.0 EVALUATION
It is surprising to see Ratzinger
and Habermas finding common ground on the role of religion in secular society.
Both of them see the need for religion and reason to listen and learn from one
another. But despite the similarities in their practical solutions, there are
several substantive differences in their outlooks which should not be
overlooked.
First, Ratzinger is right
to point out that it is unfair to speak only of pathologies of religion without
considering the danger of “pathologies of reason.” This tendency for reason to
be unaware of its limitations is demonstrated in Habermas’ essay. Consider
Habermas’ proposal that we translate religious concepts into the language of
secular principles. Surely some good can come from such a proposal. But it is
clearly one-sided for Habermas to see the need for religion to be translated
into secular terms without ever advocating that secular principles be
translated into religious terminology. His view presupposes the superiority of
rationalism over religion, and this sense of secular superiority is demonstrated
by his view that religious principles should shed their religious connotations
in order to better suit secular society. The example that Habermas uses is the
religious concept of “the image of God in man” being spoken of as “the
identical dignity of all men that deserves unconditional respect.”[44] It is true that this kind of conversion from
sacred to secular terms can be helpful to some extent. But this kind of
conceptual conversion cannot avoid “emptying” religious concepts of their
significance. Indeed, the equation of “the image of God in man” with “human
dignity” translates the horizontal aspect of the “divine image” teaching quite
well. But the secular form does not grapple with the God in whose image we are
made. When Christians affirm that human beings are created in the image of God,
they are indeed speaking of the dignity and worth of all human life, but they
are also affirming something about God. When religious language is translated
into rationalist, secular terms, it is inevitable that the religious teachings
will be emptied of their vertical dimension. Thus, the translation process
advocated by Habermas subjugates religiosity to rationalism.
Secondly,
it is encouraging to read that Habermas believes religion can serve as a
support for secular democracy. This affirmation is a move in the right
direction in that it notices a certain pragmatic value in religion – religion’s
power to sustain the solidarity of the citizenry. But Habermas never addresses
the current crisis taking place in non-religious Europe. European birth rates
are falling in secular societies, as citizens apparently cannot find sufficient
reasons to put family and children ahead of their own self-interests. This
rampant individualism is causing secular society to crumble before our eyes.
Habermas is right to recognize the role that religion can play in supporting
and sustaining democracy, but he fails to see that the presence of religion is
a necessity for society. Religion provides the impetus for self-sacrifice and
personal communication that marriage and family need in order for society to
survive.
Conclusion
Our aim from the beginning of this paper
was to undergo an exposition of the dialectics of secularization on reason and
religion according to Habermas and Ratzinger. Hence, in this paper, we presented
how one of the world’s great philosophers and Neo-Marxist social critic, Jürgen
Habermas
upholds that secular reason provides grounds for a democratic constitutional
state although it has a history of religion. Afterwards, we saw how one of the
world’s great thinkers cum theologian, Joseph Ratzinger argues for the
necessity of certain moral principles for maintaining a free state, and for the
importance of a mutual relationship between genuine reason and authentic
religion in order to uphold the states moral foundations. With this, they propagate a dialectics of
secularization that began with metaphysics (religion) as its beginning (thesis),
which led to reason (antithesis) and now back to metaphysics (synthesis), (metaphysics-reason-metaphysics).
With all these in mind, we want to
maintain that although reason is a necessity in a free, secularized state, religion
cannot be ruled out. In as much as constitution is the bedrock on which
democratic state is built upon, religion is the watchdog that guards, motivates,
and checkmates its compilation, excesses, abuses and misinterpretations. Thus,
it is imperative to have a mutual relationship between reason and religion in a
secular democracy to enable societal development and morality to endure.
By and large, another
interesting point to note here is that, although Habermas and
Ratzinger pursue different lines of argument in their papers, and partly employ
different vocabularies of analysis, yet, it is interesting to see the
remarkable degree of convergence on the operative level. This is evident such
that Habermas who has been known as a clear critic of contemporary society for
some time, and has never been afraid of challenging dominant values, albeit
from different premises than those of Ratzinger, in this debate had a
relatively new‐found
interest in religion as complementary supplier of rationalities, and this
points to an interesting development in his thinking.
Finally, Whether Habermas and Ratzinger
really answered the question on, “does a free, secularized state exist on
the basis of normative presupposition that itself cannot guarantee?” or not,
the main thing is that they have alerted thinkers and leaders not to be
submerged in the tide that reason and religion are not possible in a democratic
free state. But the question is, if there is a mutual relationship between
reason and religion in a free secularized state, is it possible that the state
can no longer experience pathologies emanating from reason and religion? This
is a question for our reflection.
[1] E. W. Bockenforde, ‘’Die
Entstehung des Staates als Vorgang der Sakularisation’’ (1967), in Rech, Staat,
Freiheit (Frankfurt am Main, 1991), pp. 92ff.
[2]
Jürgen Habermas,
Encyclopedia Britannica Ultimate Reference Suite. Chicago: Encyclopedia
Britannica, 2014.
[3]
Nazis is a totalitarian
German movement led by Adolf Hitler
as head of the Nazi Party in Germany. In its intense nationalism, mass appeal, and dictatorial rule, National Socialism
shared many elements with Italian fascism.
However, Nazism was far more extreme both in its ideas and in its practices. In
almost every respect, it was an anti-intellectual and anti-theoretical
movement, emphasizing the will of the charismatic dictator as the sole source
of inspiration of a people and a nation, as well as a vision of annihilation of
all enemies of the Aryan Volk as the one and only goal of Nazi policy.
[4] Cf. Aidan Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI (New
York: Burns and Oates, 2007), pp. 1-2.
[5] Cf. Aidan Nichols, The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI, p. 14.
[8] Jürgen Habermas
and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of
Secularization: On Reason and Religion (San Francisco: Ignatius Press,
2006), p. 32.
[9] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 30.
[10] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 24.
[11] Jürgen Habermas
and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of
Secularization: On Reason and Religion, p. 27.
[12] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 29.
[13] Jürgen Habermas
and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of
Secularization: On Reason and Religion, p. 29.
[14] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 32.
[15] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 28.
[16]
Cf. Jürgen Habermas
and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of
Secularization: On Reason and Religion, pp. 33-34.
[17] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 35.
[18] Jürgen Habermas
and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of
Secularization: On Reason and Religion, p. 38.
[19] Jürgen Habermas
and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of
Secularization: On Reason and Religion, p. 42.
[20] Jürgen Habermas
and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of
Secularization: On Reason and Religion, p. 46.
[21] Jürgen Habermas
and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of
Secularization: On Reason and Religion, p. 43.
[22] Jürgen Habermas
and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of
Secularization: On Reason and Religion, p. 45.
[23] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 45.
[24] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 55.
[25] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 58.
[26] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, pp. 60-61.
[27] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 62.
[28] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 73.
[29] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, pp. 75-76.
[30] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, pp. 75-76.
[31] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 57.
[32] Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 63.
[33] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 64.
[34] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 64.
[35] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, pp. 65-66.
[36] Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 65.
[37] Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 66.
[38] Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 77.
[39] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 77.
[40] Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 78.
[41] Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 78.
[42] Jürgen Habermas and Ratzinger
Joseph, The Dialectics of Secularization:
On Reason and Religion, p. 78.
[43] Cf. Jürgen Habermas and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of Secularization: On Reason
and Religion, p. 79-80.
[44] Jürgen Habermas
and Joseph Ratzinger, The Dialectics of
Secularization: On Reason and Religion, p. 45.
Comments
Post a Comment