THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
Introduction
St. Anselm of Canterbury was an
outstanding Christian philosopher and theologian of the eleventh century. He is
best known for his celebrated ‘ontological argument’ for the existence of God.
In this argument, he presupposes that all human beings at least have the
knowledge of the word “God”, and by “God” he means “a being than which nothing
greater can be conceived.” The major aim of this ontological argument is to
refute the fool who says in his heart that there is no God. The fool, he says,
understands the claim that God exists yet he contradicts himself by denying the
existence of God.
In line with this, we shall in this
essay critically expose St. Anselm’s ontological argument. To achieve this, we
shall divide the essay into four major parts: firstly, we shall give a brief
account of Anselm’s life and works; secondly, we shall expose his ontological
argument; thirdly, we shall look into Gaunilo’s criticism of Anselm’s argument;
and lastly, we shall analyze Anselm’s reply to Gaunilo’s criticism.
1.0
A
Brief Biography of St. Anselm
Anselm was born in Italy about 1033. His father,
Gundulf, was from Lombardy who had become a citizen of Aosta, and his mother,
Ermenberga, came from an old Burgundian family. Like many other saints, Anselm
learnt the first lessons of piety from his mother, and at a very early age he
was fired with the love of learning. In 1060 he entered the monastery of Bec in
Normandy to study under Stephen Lanfranc, whom he succeeded in office, first as
prior of Bec, and later as Archbishop of Canterbury. As Primate of England he
resisted with extraordinary firmness, the encroachments of secular power.[1] His
works while at Bec include the Monologion, the Proslogion, and his four
philosophical dialogues: De Grammatico,
De Veritate, De Libertate Arbitrii, and De
Casu Diaboli. In 1093, Anselm was enthroned as the Archbishop of
Canterbury. His works as Archbishop of Canterbury include the Epistola de Incarnatione Verbi, Cur Deus Homo, De Conceptu Virginali, De
processione Spiritus Sancti, and many others. He died on the 21st
of April, 1109 A.D.
2.0
Anselm’s
Ontological Argument
The Monologion,
a prequel to Anselm’s Ontological Argument in the Proslogion, was written at the request of some monks of Bec who
wanted a formula for meditation on the existence of God that would rest solely
on reason and be devoid of all scriptural authority.[2]
Therein, Anselm proceeded by presupposing the acceptance of some principles:
first, sense experience tells us that things are unequal in perfection.
Correspondingly, things that posse’s perfection in varying levels all
participate in the same perfection raised to the highest degree. Thus,
everything which is more or less good participates in absolute goodness, which
alone is good in itself.[3]
The second principle is that everything that exists
has a cause. The question immediately arises, do they all have one single cause
or different causes. If things have different causes, says Anselm, either they
look back to a single cause or exist by themselves. If they lead back to a
single cause then that cause is the cause of the universe. But should they
exist by themselves then they must have one common faculty which makes them to
exist; thus, they still would come under one cause. The third possible option
is to say that things cause each other. Anselm rejected this one because it
would be absurd to say that things exist through that which it gives being.[4]Thus,
in the Monologion, serving as a
prequel to his Ontological Argument, he established one plausible hypothesis:
that anything, which exists, does so in virtue of a single cause which he calls
God.[5] These
arguments, however, did not satisfy his curious mind.
Consequently, after much thought and meditation,
Anselm came up with a new argument, his Proslogion,
where the only presupposition was the knowledge of the word “God”.[6] Here,
he assumes the word “God” to mean “a being than which nothing greater can be
conceived.” Bearing this in mind, he introduced his argument with imagery of the
hypothetical fool who, according to the Psalmist (cf. Psalm 14: 1) had said in
his heart, “there is no God.” The logic of Anselm in this argument is quite
plain and simple. Although, the fool said to himself “there is no God above”,
Still, if one should tell the fool: “God is that being than which nothing
greater can be conceived, the fool would understand what we say because such
idea exists in his understanding, even though, he does not know it exists in
reality. He proceeded to buttress his line of argument with an imagery of a
famous painter. The analogy shows that it is possible (as in the case of the
fool who understands the word “God” but does not know it exists in reality) for
a thing to exist in the intellect without one knowing that it actually exists
in reality. Before a painter paints pictures he has it in the intellect but he
is not conscious of its existence as he has not yet painted it. When he has
painted it, he then has it both in the intellect and in reality.
Given that we have finally convinced
the fool that the intellect can understand a concept and yet deny its existence
in reality, Anselm moved to the next proceeding. Unfortunately for the fool,
said Anselm, he may deny the dual existence of other things in the mind and
reality but not the highest conceivable good than which nothing greater can be
thought. Indeed, to exist in reality and the intellect is greater than to exist
in the intellect only. Thus, it would be contradictory to say that “that which
is such that one can conceive nothing greater than exist only in the intellect.”[7]
Suppose Anselm questions the fool
saying: “now, from the analogy of the painter you can see that one can have a
thing in the intellect without believing it to exist in the real world”. He continues:
“imagine a thing which exists in your mind without believing it to exist in the
real world- name it A”. “Imagine another thing which exist in your mind and
also exist in reality- name it B”. Anselm would then say “that which exist as B
must necessarily be greater than A which can only exist in the mind”. Now, the
fool might want to say that he pictures A, which exists in his mind only and
not reality, as a mountain of gold; and he pictures B, which exist in his mind
as well as reality, as the mound of dung over there. Thus, how can Anselm say
that the mound of dung (B) is greater than a mountain of gold (A)? Anselm would
reply saying that however exotic and resplendent the mountain of gold is, it is
nothing more than a fantasy and as such cannot be greater than even a mound of
dung which is real. Now, since the fool had initially accepted that the word
“God”, that than which nothing greater than can be conceived, exists in his
mind for he understands it. It follows, then, that we must posit the reality of
a being which nothing greater than can be thought of, and this we must do
because of the principle and necessity of a single cause discussed in Anselm’s Monologion, which is plausible because such a being would not be the greatest unless
it can exist both in the mind and in reality.
3.0
Gaunilo’s
Criticism of Anselm’s Ontological Argument
Gaunilo of Marmoutier, a monk and contemporary of
Saint Anselm, was responsible for one of the most important criticisms of
Anselm's argument. He criticized the argument in his work entitled: Liber Pro Insipiente. Here, Gaunilo did
not identify any specific fault with the argument, but argued that there must
be something wrong with it, because if there is not, then we can use its logic
to prove things that we have no reason to believe to be true. For instance,
Gaunilo argued, it is possible to construct an argument with exactly the same
form as the ontological argument that claims to prove the existence of the
perfect island: the perfect island must exist, for if it does not then it would
be possible to conceive of an island greater than that island than which no
greater can be conceived, which is absurd.[8]
If the ontological argument works, then according to
Gaunilo; the argument for the existence of the perfect island works too. The
two arguments have the same logical form and so they stand or fall together.
The argument for the existence of the perfect island though is clearly
spurious; we have no reason to believe that the perfect island exists. Unless
the theist can point to some relevant difference between his argument for the
existence of God and Gaunilo’s argument, for the existence of the perfect
island then he will have to abandon the ontological argument for the existence
of God.[9]
4.0
Anselm’s
Response to Gaunilo’s Criticism
Anselm replied Gaunilo in a work entitled Liber Apologeticus contra Gaunilonem
respondentem pro Insipiente. Here, he defended his arguments in two ways. On
the one hand, he said that we, alongside the fool, have the ability to conceive
an idea of “that than which there is no greater.” For Anselm, we do this each
time we compare different degrees of perfection in things and thus are able to ascend
to the maximum perfection, than which there is no more perfect.[10]
On the other hand, Anselm argued that Gaunilo’s reference to a perfect Island is
a clear proof that he had missed the point of the argument. He posits further
that there is only one case where we can move from an idea to its necessary
existence, and that is the case of a being whose non-existence cannot be
thought.[11]
In other words, there is only one thing through which every other thing has its
being, and that thing, in itself, has its existence necessary from itself, that
thing is what we call God. However, it should be noted that Anselm later
praised his adversary, Gaunilo, and thanked him for his useful criticism.[12]
5.0
Evaluation
and Conclusion
This has been a critical exposition of Anselm’s
ontological argument. We began by taking a general look at St. Anselm’s life
and works, noting that he is best known for his celebrated ‘ontological
argument’ for the existence of God.
Thereafter, we proceeded to expose Anselm’s ontological argument, and
this was followed by a critique of the ontological argument made by Gaunilo.
Lastly, we also looked into Anselm’s response to Gaunilo’s criticism.
In this argument, Anselm characterized God
as "a being than which nothing greater can be thought of.” In formulating
this argument, he refuted the fool who, according to the psalmist, had said in
his heart: there is no God. The fool, says Anselm, understands the claim that
God exists yet he contradicts himself by denying the existence of God. This argument, however, was criticized by
Gaunilo in a work entitled, Liber Pro
Insipiente. Here, Gaunilo argued that we could, by means of a similar line
of reasoning, “prove” that a perfect island (an island as perfect as it is
possible for any island to be) exists. He goes further to add that Anselm still
needs to prove that God is really that being who is greater than all other
beings; for how can Anselm prove that God exists in reality by simply assuming
the claim that God is a being greater than all other beings? In response to
this, Anselm defended his argument with two major claims, firstly: he posits
that we, alongside the fool, have the ability to conceive an idea of “that than
which there is no greater.” Secondly, he argued that Gaunilo’s reference to a
perfect Island is a clear proof that he had missed the point of the argument.
Be that as it may, the crux of the matter here is that whether or not Gaunilo
has identified a flaw in Anselm’s reasoning, his ‘Lost Island Argument’
presents a serious challenge to the defender of the ontological argument.
Hence, the defender of Anselm’s position must find some difference between the
two arguments, that is, he must find that which makes Gaunilo’s argument unsound,
but does not affect Anselm’s ontological argument.
[1] Cf. William Turner, History
of Philosophy (Boston: Athenaeum Press, Ginn and Company, 1929), p. 272.
[2] Cf. Etienne Gilson, History
of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1954),
p. 129.
[3] Ibid., p. 133.
[4] Ibid., p. 132.
[5] Ibid., p. 131
[6] Cf. Anne Fremantle, The Age of Belief ( New York: A Mentor Book,
1954), p. 88.
[7] Cf. Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Philosophy:
History and Problems ( New York: McGraw Hill, 1994), p. 167.
[8] Cf. Jeff Speaks (2006), http://www.nd.edu/jspeaks/courses/mcgill201/gaunilo.pdf
(10 Jan. 2006).
[9] Cf. Loc. cit.
[10] Cf. Samuel Enoch Stumpf, op.
cit., p. 168.
[11] Cf. . Samuel Enoch Stumpf, Loc.
cit.
[12] Cf. William Turner, Op. cit.,
p. 276.
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