Thomas’s thought on the De Trinitate of Boethius, q. 2 “Concerning the manifestation of knowledge of divine truth”.
“I will seek
her out from the beginning of her birth, and bring the knowledge of her to
light” (Wis. 6:24). According to St. Thomas Aquinas, as the principle of our
cognition is naturally the knowledge of created things, obtained by means of
the senses, so the principle of supernatural cognition is that knowledge of
First Truth conferred upon us, infused by faith; and hence it follows that in
advancing one proceeds according to a diverse order. For philosophers, who
follow along the way of natural cognition, place knowledge about created things
before knowledge about divine things: natural science before metaphysics: but
among theologians the procedure is in reverse order, so that study of the
Creator comes before that of creatures.
Accordingly,
Boethius intended to treat of those things which are of faith, he took as the
starting point of his study that highest origin of things, namely, the Trinity
of the one, simple God. Whence it is that the above-quoted words are applicable
to him: “I will seek her out from the beginning of her birth, and bring the
knowledge of her to light.”(Wis. 6: 24). However, in this Essay, we shall
expose Thomas’s thought on the De
Trinitate of Boethius, q. 2 “Concerning the manifestation of knowledge of
divine truth”. This question contains four articles which will be discussed.
Conclusion follows afterwards.
Article 1
Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Treated of by the Method of Inquiry
According to
Aquinas, since the perfection of man consists in his union with God, it is
right that man, by all the means which are in his power and in so far as he is
able, mount up to and strive to attain to divine truths, so that his intellect
may take delight in contemplation and his reason in the investigation of things
of God, according to the saying of Ps. 72:28, “It is good for me to adhere to
my God.”[1] Aquinas, referred to Aristotle’ Ethics which says:
“One ought to be wise in regard to man, however, not according to those
treating of human affairs alone, as a mortal knowing only mortal things; but,
inasmuch as it is fitting for a mortal man to do so, he ought to do all things
according to the best of those powers that are in him.”
For Aquinas, there are three possible ways man may err in inquiring about
divine truths. Firstly, by presumption, since one might enter upon such
investigation as if he could attain a perfect comprehension, and it is this
kind of presumption that is denounced in Job 11:7: “Do you think you can
comprehend the steps of God, and find out the Almighty perfectly?” secondly,
error arises if, in matters of faith, reason has precedence of faith and not
faith of reason, to the point that one would be willing to believe only what he
could know by reason, when the converse ought to be the case. Thirdly, error
results from undertaking an inquiry into divine things which are beyond one’s
capacity. Wherefore it is said in Rom. 12:3, “Not to be more wise than it
behaveth to be wise, but to be wise unto sobriety and according as God hath
divided to everyone the measure of faith.”[2]
Whether There Can Be Any Science of Divine Truths Which Are Matters of
Faith
For
Aquinas, since the essence of science consists in this, that from things known,
knowledge of things previously unknown is derived, and this may occur in
relation to divine truths, evidently there can be a science of divine things. Knowledge of Divine things for
Aquinas, can be thought in two ways: firstly, according to our mode of
knowledge, in which knowledge of sensible things serves as the principle for
coming to a knowledge of divine; and it was in this way that the philosophers
handed down a traditional science of divine things, calling first philosophy a
divine science.[3]
Secondly,
according to that of divine things themselves as they are understood in
themselves. This is, indeed, a mode of knowledge which we cannot possess
perfectly in this life; but there is for us, even in this life, a certain
participation and assimilation to such a cognition of divine truth, inasmuch as
through the faith which is infused into our souls we adhere to the very First
Truth on account of Itself. Hence, divine science is of a higher order than
that which the philosophers traditionally termed divine, since it proceeds from
higher principles.[4]
Whether in the Science of Faith, Which Is Concerning God, it Is
Permissible to Use the Rational Arguments of the Natural Philosophers Objections
In answering this question, Aquinas
replies that gifts of grace are added to those of nature in such a way that
they do not destroy the latter, but rather perfect them; wherefore also the
light of faith, which is gratuitously infused into our minds, does not destroy
the natural light of cognition, which is in us by nature.[5]
For although the natural light of the human mind is insufficient to reveal
those truths revealed by faith, yet it is impossible that those things which
God has manifested to us by faith should be contrary to those which are evident
to us by natural knowledge. Otherwise, God would be the author of error, a
thing which is impossible. If, however, anything is found in the teachings of
the philosophers contrary to faith, this error does not properly belong to
philosophy, but is due to an abuse of philosophy owing to the insufficiency of
reason. For just as those things which are of faith cannot be demonstratively
proved, so certain things contrary to them cannot be demonstratively shown to
be false, but they can be shown not to be necessary.[6]
Thus, in sacred doctrine, Aquinas posits
that we are able to make a threefold use of philosophy: First, to demonstrate
those truths that are preambles of faith and that have a necessary place in the
science of faith. Such are the truths about God that can be proved by natural
reason—that God exists, that God is one; such truths about God or about His
creatures, subject to philosophical proof, faith presupposes. Secondly, to give
a clearer notion, by certain similitudes, of the truths of faith, as Augustine
in his book, De Trinitate, employed any comparisons taken from the
teachings of the philosophers to aid understanding of the Trinity. In the third
place, to resist those who speak against the faith, either by showing that
their statements are false, or by showing that they are not necessarily true.
Whether Divine Truths Ought to Be Concealed by New and Obscure Words
Aquinas
answer that the words of a teacher ought to be so moderated that they result to
the profit and not to the detriment of the one hearing him. Now, there are
certain things for him which on being heard harm no one, as are the truths
which all are held responsible to know: and such ought not to be hidden but
openly proposed to all. But there are others which, if openly presented, cause
harm in those hearing them; and this can occur for two reasons: in one way, if
the secret truths of faith are revealed to infidels who oppose the faith and so
come to be derided by them.[7]
On this account, Aquinas quotes Matt. 7:6, “Give not that which is holy to
dogs.” And Dionysius (II Coel. hierar.) who says, “Listen reverently to
these words, to this doctrine given for our instruction by the divinity of
divinities, and hide these holy teachings in your minds, shielding them from
the unclean multitude so that you may keep them as uniform as possible.”
Secondly, if any subtleties are proposed to uncultivated people, these folk may
find in the imperfect comprehension of them matter for error; wherefore, in 1
Cor. 3:1 it is said: “And I, brethren, could not speak to you as unto
spiritual, but as unto carnal.[8]
Here,
St. Thomas speaks on the need why it is important to hide certain truths to
people, especially infidels because by their opposition to the faith, they
could misconstrue the teachings of the faith and teach it falsely. Thus
Augustine says in his De doctrina Christiana: “Where certain truths are, by reason of their own character,
not comprehensible, or scarcely so, even when explained with every effort on
the part of the speaker to make them clear, these one rarely dwells upon with a
general audience, or never mentions, at all: but in writing, the same
distinction cannot be adhered to, because a book, once published, can fall into
the hands of any one at all, and therefore some truths should be shielded by
obscuring words so that they may profit those who will understand them and be
hidden from the simple who will not comprehend them.”
CONCLUSION
From
the above discussion, we can conclude that Concerning the manifestation of
knowledge of divine truth, it ought to
be treated of by the method of Inquiry so that his intellect may take
delight in contemplation and his reason in the investigation of things of God.
Secondly, since it proceeds from higher principles, there can be a divine
science founded upon faith. Thirdly, it is permissible to use the rational arguments of the natural philosophers
objections to demonstrate those
truths that are preambles of faith and that have a necessary place in the
science of faith; to give a clearer notion, by certain similitudes, of the
truths of faith. Finally, ought to be
concealed by new and obscure words if the secret truths of faith are
revealed to infidels who oppose the faith and so come to be derided by them and
if any subtleties are proposed to uncultivated people
REFERENCE
Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius,
q. 2, a. 4. Transl. By Rose E. Brennan, S.H.N. (Herder, 1946)
[1]
Commentary
on the De Trinitate of Boethius, q. 2, a. 1. Transl. By Rose E. Brennan,
S.H.N. (Herder, 1946)
[3] Commentary
on the De Trinitate of Boethius,
q. 2, a. 2. Transl. By Rose E. Brennan, S.H.N. (Herder, 1946)
[5] Commentary
on the De Trinitate of Boethius,
q. 2, a. 3. Transl. By Rose E. Brennan, S.H.N. (Herder, 1946)
[7] Commentary
on the De Trinitate of Boethius,
q. 2, a. 4. Transl. By Rose E. Brennan, S.H.N. (Herder, 1946)
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