VIRTUE
INTRODUCTION
As
Socrates says “… The most important thing is not life, but the good life”.[1]
This very statement explicitly illustrates the rejection of all kinds of
immoral actions and institutes the invitation to live a virtuous life.
Nevertheless, it is not just sufficient to encourage someone to live a virtuous
life without definitively pointing out what virtuous life actually comprises.
This very task has been the crucial question which has unfolded in different
dimensions to virtue ethicists. Such questions like what is virtue? How is
virtue acquired? How is it applied in various life instances? Why should we
live a virtuous life?
Irrespective
of how direct these questions are, they pose great difficulties to be answered
conclusively. Thus it is worthy to note that these same questions have been
repetitively asked from the ancient time as it is evident in Plato’s republic
and Aristotle’s nicomachean ethics. It further extends through the medieval
time as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas attempts to provide a tenable response to
it and thus presently in our contemporary period. However these questions which
are raised in virtue theory present much difficulty to answer because of their
practical undertone i.e. it is quite useless to know all the virtues in this
world and not practice any of them but it would be very useful that one
practice as much or little virtues one knows. More so, it is difficult to
answer because it is not sufficient to theoretically conceptualize myriads of
human virtues without applying them to various life instances.
In
the light of this ongoing problematic posed by virtue theory, it brings us to
the proper subject of our discourse; ‘virtue theory in the thought and teaching
of Aristotle, Augustine and Aquinas. In order of procedure, an overview of
virtue theory would be given especially of how it relates to our course.
Furthermore, Aristotelian conception of virtue theory follows immediately; then
the Augustinian and Aquinas notions of virtue theory respectively. Having
presented their distinct conceptions, an analysis of them would follow suite paying
particular attention to their similarities and dissimilarities as well as
considering how they answered the questions posed by virtue theory.
1.0
THE
NOTION OF VIRTUE THEORY
The
Greek word ‘arete’ which means ‘excellence’
is the direct correlative of the term virtue. Thus in relation to the course
ethics, it could be known as ‘aretaic ethics’[2]
which is a term that relates to the normative ethical theories. Nonetheless, it
would be worthy to note that the terms ‘virtue theory and virtue ethics implies
the same concept and could be used interchangeably.[3]
The term virtue was expressively seen in the works of Plato and Aristotle but
Aristotle in his metaphysics points out Socrates as the first Greek virtue
philosopher.[4]
1.1 Definition of virtue
The
term virtue can be generally agreed to be a character trait, such as a habitual
action or settled sentiment. Specifically, it is an excellence of character, a
trained behavioral disposition and a positive trait that makes its possessor
good and acts well out of spontaneous goodness and serves as examples to
inspire others.[5]
The distinction between a virtue and a single action can be illustrated as
Rosalind Hursthouse says:-
A virtue such as honesty or
generosity is not just a tendency to do what is honest or generous, nor is it
to be helpfully specified as a desirable or morally valuable character trait.
It is, indeed a character trait - that is, a disposition which is well entrenched
in its possessor, something that, as we say “goes all the way down”,
unlike a habit such as being
a tea-drinker — but the disposition in question, far from being
a single track disposition to do honest actions, or even honest actions for
certain reasons, is multi-track. It is concerned with many other actions as
well, with emotions and emotional reactions, choices, values, desires,
perceptions, attitudes, interests, expectations and sensibilities. To possess a
virtue is to be a certain sort of person with a certain complex mindset. Hence,
it is extreme recklessness to attribute a virtue on the basis of a single
action.[6]
Virtue
ethicist seems to agree that when it comes to virtue, it is not sufficient to
be justified by doing the right thing alone, but also having the proper
dispositions, motivations, and emotions in being good and doing right thus it
is also about character and moral habit.[7]
In the
application of virtue, practical wisdom is an acquired trait that enables its
possessor to identify the things to do in any given situation.[8]
As John McDowell puts it, practical wisdom involves perceptual sensitivity to
what a situation requires.[9]
1.2 Classifications of virtues
Traditionally,
virtues are classified into two categories;-
a. Moral
virtues: they are closely related with those things that are essential and
instrumental for one to live a moral life and are grossly incompatible with
immorality. Such virtues like honesty, benevolence, fairness, kindness,
conscientiousness, gratitude etc.
b. Non-moral
virtues: they are those kinds of virtues that are not essential to living a
moral life however; they also contribute to morality but can be easily misused
for immorality. Such virtues include courage, rationality, self-control,
patience, endurance, industry, musical talent, cleanliness, wit, etc.
However,
this traditional categorization of virtues is quite debatable because of their
overlapping nature, i.e. a particular virtue might fall in both categories in
respect of its application.[10]
2.0 VIRTUE THEORY IN ARISTOTLE
2.1 Definition and nature
of virtue
In
the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle defined a virtue as a balance point between a
deficiency and an excess of a trait. He further describes it as a certain sort
of habit or disposition of thinking, feeling, and acting. According to his ‘doctrine of the mean’, virtuous individuals act and feel in a way
that lies in a mean between extremes excess and deficiency. However, where
the mean lies is not given mathematically, it must not be an exact halfway
point between vices, but of the golden mean sometimes closer to one extreme
that the other.[11] For instance, courage is the mean between
cowardice and fool hardiness, confidence the mean between self-deprecation and
vanity, and generosity the mean between miserliness and extravagance.
Thus
Aristotle argued that each of the moral virtues was a mean between the two
vices of cowardice and fool hardiness.
Cowardice is the disposition to act more fearfully than the situation
deserves, and fool hardiness is the disposition to show too little fear for the
situation, courage is the mean between the two, the disposition to show the
amount of fear appropriate to the situation. According
to Aristotle, thus, human virtue properly speaking is “a state (an excellence,
disposition, and strength) that decides, consisting in the mean, and the mean
relative to us which is defined by reference to reason, that is, to the reason
by reference to which the intelligent person would define it.”[12]
However,
it is worthy to note that Aristotle readily underlines certain actions and
passions which are inherently bad and that the mention of their names indicates
vice. Therefore to such passions and actions, it is futile to apply the concept
of the mean to it because either their excessiveness or deficiency makes them
neither virtuous nor moral. Such passions and action includes spite, envy,
adultery, theft and murder. Aristotle claims that one can never be right in
such action because using adultery for example; its goodness cannot be
justified by committing it with the right woman, at the right time and in the
right way.[13]
2.2 Kinds of virtue
From
the Nichomechean Ethics, it is
evident that Aristotle’s investigation into the nature of virtue is closely
tied to his discussion on the nature of human soul such that it is illogical to
successfully distinguish between different types of virtues without first
investigating into the faculties of the soul. For Aristotle, the soul is part
rational and part irrational.[14]
The irrational part is further subdivided into the nutritive and the appetitive
soul. The nutritive soul is the cause of growth or reproduction while the
appetitive soul is inclined towards the emotions; though it (appetitive part)
can be controlled by reason and thus, considered rational. Hence, it is to this
appetitive part that ethical virtues and vices belong.
Moreover,
the rational part of the soul is also subdivided into the speculative (scientific)
soul and the practical (calculative) soul. The speculative soul aims simply at
knowing while the practical soul is geared towards particulars and contingent
realities and aims at actions or productions.[15]
However, the attainment of truth is the task of both the scientific and
calculative parts of the rational soul.
With
these distinctions on the faculties of the soul, Aristotle hereby adds that
“virtue, too, is divided into classes in accordance with this differentiation
of the soul. Some virtues are called intellectual and others moral…”[16]
With this, he makes a clear distinction between two types of virtue, virtue of
thought (Intellectual virtue) and virtue of character (moral virtue).
Intellectual virtue is acquired through learning or instructions. They are
qualities of the mind such as wisdom, understanding, and judgment. Moral
virtues consist in the habit of always choosing the golden mean between two
extremes, directed thereto by the intellectual virtue of prudence or practical
wisdom.
To
begin with, it must be noted that virtue here for Aristotle refers more
particularly to the moral virtues such as generosity and temperance. That is,
virtues which are more practical than theoretical, like the intellectual
virtues of wisdom and intelligence. As it were, Aristotle considers the moral
virtues as having a more direct influence on our happiness than the
intellectual virtues.[17]
Since our topic is limited to Moral virtue, our discussion shall proceed with
it.
2.3 Moral Virtue and how
they are acquired
Aristotle
defines moral virtue alongside its corresponding opposite, vice, as “… a
quality disposing us to act in the best way when we are dealing with pleasure
and pain, while vice is one which leads us to act in the worst way when we deal
with them.”[18]
For him, to act in the best way is simply to act in accordance with reason and
to act in the worse way is to deviate from the dictates of reason. Hence, for
Aristotle, a harmonious interplay of emotions and reason leads to an excellence
of character. With this, Aristotle seems to have placed on reason a mark of
infallibility as though reason does not lead one to error or act viciously once
ones emotions are played out in accordance with reason, for reason moderates
the emotions. In addition, it is necessary to have the right disposition to the
right things and for the right actions.
Notably,
habituation is the process through which one receives the constant disposition
to act virtuously; and it is given prime importance in moral virtues, because
ethical excellence arises from habituation. These moral excellences are not
born with humans nor are they developed by nature, but are rather “adapted by
nature to receive them and are brought to perfection by habituation.”[19]
Aristotle however, insists that moral excellences are necessarily built up by
repetition of individual acts as in acquiring art: “we become just by doing
just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts…”[20]
It is only by behaving in the right way, that we train ourselves to be
virtuous. For him, we all are born with
the potential to be morally virtuous. Just as a musician learns to play musical
instrument, we learn virtue by constant imitation of a virtuous person/act,
practicing or repetition, until we reach our perfection through habit. When through habituation, one becomes a just
person, which is as a result of the repetition of a particular response in the
past; he/she equally attains the disposition to the same response in the
future. In other words, if an individual’s acts are constantly just, the individual
develops the moral excellence of justice, which is a fixed disposition to
respond in a just way in all situations. This is, however, different from the
case of an individual who is occasionally just. Such a person cannot be said to
possess moral excellence of justice. This obviously poses a fundamental
question; how can merely imitating a virtuous person result to being virtuous?
We can say that Aristotle tried to answer this question when he explained that
merely doing as a virtuous person does is not sufficient for us to be virtuous.
Rather, one must do what a virtuous person does in the way he does it.[21]
Similarly,
moral evil or vice develops in the same way, by habituation, for one is said to
be vicious, if the person has a consistent and persistent disposition to act
viciously, that is, missing the ‘mean’ and inclining always either to the
excess or defect of a particular action or emotion. The same powers of emotion
and action which produce good acts also produce evil acts to develop corresponding
vices as Aristotle will put it: “it is from the same causes and by the same
means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly in every
art.” In fact, the goal of moral virtues is to rationally organize the human
passions.
For
those who presume that a particular virtuous act makes them virtuous, Aristotle
explains that to act virtuously is different from being virtuous. Consequently,
he proposes three criteria for making a distinction between acting virtuously
(by accident) and being virtuous:
a. The
person must know that he/she is doing virtuous actions, that is, proper
knowledge.
b. He/she
intends to act virtuously for its own sake, that is, it is chosen deliberately.
c. He/she
does the actions from a well-established habit, firm and certain disposition.[22]
2.4
Why we should be virtuous
From the onset of the nicomachean ethics, Aristotle established
the teleological aspect of every human art and inquiry. He further demonstrated
that the ultimate end in which every human action is directed is happiness.
Aristotle defines happiness as that end which is sought for itself and not for
the sake of something else, and to this kind of end he identified virtue to be
among. Nevertheless, he points out that we also choose virtue for the sake of
happiness, because virtues are sure means that leads to happiness.[23]
3.0 VIRTUE THEORY
IN AUGUSTINE
3.1 Augustinian
moral philosophy
Influenced by the platonic school and Christian
tradition, Augustine develops his moral philosophy towards the attainment of
happiness. He recognizes the significance of ‘love’ (especially of God) as the
focal point of virtue.[24] Augustine defines his moral philosophy as an
investigation into the ‘supreme good’ (summum bonum) which affords the
happiness which person seeks. He further equates happiness with the achievement
of wisdom; therefore the objects of desire such as wealth, earthly power,
honors, physical beauty etc. do not guarantee happiness, or moral goodness.
In the hierarchical structure of things, Augustine
holds God to be the highest point, therefore as material objects that are
pulled by its weight towards the center of the earth so also is our desire
drawn towards God and for this reason he says “my weight is my love. Wherever I
am carried my love is carrying me.” (Confessions 13.9.10) Therefore, to live
with the purpose of achieving authentic happiness, is nothing but the love of
God with all our heart, with all our soul with the entire mind.
3.2 Definition and
nature of virtue
Augustine
defines virtue as the perfect love of God which is the love by
which one desires that which should be loved. He further gives the definition
of the opposite of virtue which is vice; he defines it as the hideous
expression of disorderly love. Augustine like Aristotle is of the view that
virtues are supposed to lead us to a happy life. Nonetheless, he deviates from
Aristotle where attributes the true happiness in God. Thus, he further
expresses virtue as the beauty of true love ordered towards God because in his
view, to live virtuously is to evaluate and order love in accordance with their
true worth, that is, it is the art of living well and rightly.[25]
More so, Augustine’s attribution of virtue as an ‘art’ indicates that he conceives
virtue and what we acquire and habituate through constant practice.
3.3 Kinds
of virtue
In
pointing out the kinds of virtue, Augustine almost deviated from the virtues
already established by the ancient philosophers. He adopted and gives emphasis
on the Pauline virtues of faith, hope and love; however, he assigns the highest
significance to love. Augustine rates love highest among all the virtues
because he believes that all the virtues find their unity in love God and thus
all other virtues are reducible to this highest virtue. Having already
summarized all ethical truths into one dictum which is “love God”, Augustine then
gives credence to the four cardinal virtues already established in Plato’s
republic as he relates to how they are unified in love. The four cardinal
virtues are prudence, justice, courage and temperance. And he relates them to
love where he says;-
"For these four
virtues (would that all felt their influence in their minds as they have their
names in their mouths!), I should have no hesitation in defining them: that
temperance is love giving itself entirely to that which is loved; fortitude is
love readily bearing all things for the sake of the loved object; justice is
love serving only the loved object, and therefore ruling rightly; prudence is
love distinguishing with sagacity between what hinders it and what helps it."
(De moribus eccl., Chap. xv)
Augustine
depicts the prime virtue of love by the ‘double love’ command taught in the Bible.
Jesus decreed us to love not only God but also our neighbor as ourselves. To
love our neighbors involves not harming them but promoting their good instead.
Love of God thus entails charity, and God, in the end, will judge us on the
basis of our reaction to this double love command.
4.0 VIRTUE THEORY IN AQUINAS
Aquinas
dealt with various aspects of virtue, which includes the nature of virtue, the
seat of virtue, intellectual virtues, the difference between moral and
intellectual virtues, the cardinal virtues, the theological virtues, the cause
of the virtues, the mean of virtues, reciprocity among the virtues, comparison
of virtues and other aspects of virtues. In the course of dealing with these
topics, Aquinas answered some important questions concerning virtues. First he
answered the question of the meaning of virtue, second he showed that there are
different kinds of virtues, third he showed how the virtues are connected, how
they are acquired and which virtue is the most important. For the purpose of
this work, only three aspects of virtues as discussed by Aquinas would be
examined.
4.1 The nature of virtue
Aquinas
in dealing with the nature of virtue approached it with raising four important
points or questions, first, is human virtue a habit? Second, is it an operative
habit? Third, is it a good habit? And fourth, the definition of virtue.
Responding to these points Aquinas posited that virtue is habit because it
concerns the rational powers proper to a man and these rational powers are not
determined to one act but through habits they set towards acts.[26]
He goes on to explain further that human virtue is an operative habit because
it relates to activities or actions. Since it relates to action it is operative
as well as not a being. This he posit to counter the idea which can be deduced
from Cicero’s statement that as health and beauty belongs to the body, so
virtue belongs to the soul and since health and beauty are not operative virtue
is not also operative.[27] On the point dealing with whether human
virtue is a habit, he proceeds by stating the view which is found in the
scriptures, that the virtue of sin is the law, which gives a notion that virtue
is not always a good habit and also to support this view he points out the idea
from St Paul which says that virtue is made perfect by infirmity and since
infirmity is an evil, it would seem that virtue is not always a good habit.
Aquinas is of the opinion that virtue is a good habit and product of good just
as Augustine says that virtue is what makes its possessor good and his work
likewise.[28]
The fourth article dealing with nature of virtues, the objections gives reasons
why good should not be added in the definition of virtue but Aquinas has a
contrary opinion which he believes that the formal component of virtue is
gathered from the genus and difference. When virtue is defined as good quality,
he says that quality is the genus and good the difference but he prefers that
quality be exchanged with habit. In the long run, Aquinas has it that the
definition of virtue, following in the direction of Augustine, is a good habit
by which we live righteously, of which no man can make bad use, which God works
in us without us.[29]
4.2 Difference between
moral and intellectual virtues
Before
we begin the comparison between moral and intellectual virtues, let us briefly
consider what moral and intellectual virtues are. Intellectual virtue as the
name suggests, perfects the intellectual powers of human being. The intellect
has both theoretical and practical activities. The theoretical deals with
truths while the practical concerns truths about actions performed. There are
three kinds of theoretical intellectual activities and one practical activity.
On the moral virtue, Aquinas has it that moral virtues perfects the appetitive
powers of the soul, for example the virtue of temperance which concerns
pleasures perfect the concupiscible appetite, the virtue of courage perfects
the irascible appetite, and the virtue of justice perfects the will.[30]
In
making the distinction between moral and intellectual virtues, five questions
were raised. First, whether every virtue is a moral virtue? Second, whether
moral virtue differs from intellectual virtues? Third, if virtue is adequately
divided into moral and intellectual virtues? Fourth, if there can be virtue
without intellectual virtue? And fifth, whether there can be intellectual
virtue without moral virtue? To the first question, although it seems that
every virtue is a moral virtue, Aquinas has the view that all virtue are not
moral virtue. Following Aristotle, in talking of man's morals, we speak of a
gentle or sober man, but wisdom and understanding are virtues yet they are not
morals so we can have virtues that are not moral virtues. Only virtues in the
appetitive powers are moral virtues.[31]
On the second question, he says that moral virtues differ from the intellectual
virtues, for in the nicomachean ethics where he subscribes to Aristotle writing
that moral virtues differ from the intellectual virtues. To confirm this,
Aquinas made an assertion that for a man to act well, it is requisite that not
only his reason be well disposed through a habit of intellectual virtue but
also that his appetite be well disposed through a habit of moral virtue. [32]
Concerning the third, Aquinas would believe that the division of the virtue
into moral and intellectual captures the whole activity of man. For if the
virtue perfects his appetite, it is moral virtue if it perfect man's
speculative of practical intellect in order that his activity maybe good, it
will be intellectual virtue.[33]
Aquinas debunked all the other opinions suggesting that moral and intellectual
virtue is not adequate. Concerning the fourth which asks if there can be moral
virtue without intellectual virtue, he answers that moral virtue goes along
with prudence and prudence is considered as an intellectual virtue. He says
that even through moral virtues are habits which have become more like second
nature needs prudence and understanding and these two belong to the realm of
the intellect. Concerning the fifth question, he says, that other intellectual
virtues but not prudence can exist without moral virtue for prudence is right judgment
about things to be done.
4.3 Virtue as the Mean
Just
as Aristotle discussed virtue as the mean, so also did Aquinas. He did it by
addressing these four questions. First all moral virtues observe a Mean?
Second, is the mean of moral virtue an objective measure or a measure in
thought? Third do the intellectual virtues observe a mean? And fourth, do the
theological virtues? Concerning the first Aquinas says that moral virtues
observe a mean for between excess and deficiency is the mean which is
conformity or equality. For Aquinas moral virtue consist in mean. Concerning
the second he responds to the objection raised by stating that the mean of
moral virtue is a mean of reason and not a real mean. To the third question he
affirms that intellectual virtues observe a mean, for even Aristotle classified
art as an intellectual virtue, with observes mean and since 'art' as an
intellectual virtue observes mean the intellectual virtue can observe a mean.
Concerning the fourth article, Aquinas has it that theological virtues do not
consist in a mean. He gave an example that there can never be an excess of hope
or excess of faith neither can there an excess of love.
4.4 The source of virtue
Aquinas
posited that something is said to be natural to man in two ways; first is
according to his specific nature and second according to his individual nature.
These two aspects are made relevant in man through his rational soul and
material body. In both these ways virtue
is natural to man inchoately. This is so in respect of the specific nature, in
so far as in man's reason are to be found instilled by nature certain naturally
known principles of both knowledge and action, which are the nurseries of
intellectual and moral virtues, and in so far as there is in the will a natural
appetite for good in accordance with reason. It is therefore evident that all
virtues are in us by nature, according to aptitude and inchoation, but not
according to perfection, except the theological virtues, which are entirely
from without.[34]
5.0 ANALYSIS OF VIRTUE THEORY IN ARISTOTLE,
AUGUSTINE AND AQUINAS
As it is
evident from the ongoing discussion, the conception of virtue which was set out
by Aristotle in the ancient period was continued and enhanced in the medieval
period especially in the philosophies of Augustine and Aquinas. Aristotle in
constructing his moral theory gives it an aspect of teleology in which every
human action is directed towards an end. Furthermore, he posited happiness to
be the ultimate end and virtue being the necessary means to this happiness.
This Aristotelian view was Christianized by Augustine and Aquinas where they
identified the beatific union with God as the ultimate happiness in which every
human action is directed. However, despite the fact that their Christianization
of Aristotelian teleology was as a result of their Christian disposition, it
could also be debatable that it was hinted by Aristotle where he examines the
possibility of asserting if one can be said to be entirely happy as he lives,
owing to the fact that happiness can be affected by vicissitudes of life.
Aristotle
posited that virtue is the excellence of character or habit which makes one
disposed to constantly choose the right act because it is rational and
contributes to happiness. Augustine however follows Aristotle to posit the
contribution of virtue to happiness but enhances his position where he asserts
that the happiness every virtue is directed is God and the love for God drives
us to him. Augustine illustrates his position where he exemplifies how all
other virtues are unified in love and serves love to glory of God.
However,
a slight dissimilarity could be seen in Aristotle and Aquinas. Aristotle seems
to be of the view that virtues are not born with human but are acquired through
learning and habituation. To this view Aquinas seems to deviate where he
establishes that every humans are not totally devoid of virtues from birth; he
posits the potentiality of virtuous acts which are inchoate in human and is
then perfected through habituation.
CONCLUSION
The aim
of this work which is to discuss virtue theory as discussed by Aristotle,
Augustine and Aquinas has to larger extent achieved. From the onset, we set out
the questions posed by virtue ethics. What is virtue? How is it applied? What
is the source of virtue? Why should we live a virtuous life? We went on to see
the various ways these philosophers defined it. Aristotle defined it as a habit
of always choosing the mean between two extremes; he further explains how
virtue is needed because it is a necessary means to happiness. Augustine and
Aquinas being influenced by Christian theology adopts Aristotle conception of
virtue; nevertheless, the tailored it towards their Christian heritage.
However, as much as could be discussed in virtue theory, we are stilled faced
with the reality of always identifying the golden mean between two extreme,
since it is not given mathematically. Moreover, as the introduction points out
of how useless a life would be if it is not a good life, it encourages us to
strive to our possible to always habituate virtuous acts so as to always act as
a virtuous person should do because it is rational and leads to the supreme
happiness.
[1] Eds. John M. Cooper and D. S. Hutchinson, Plato complet works: Crito (Hacket publishing company, 1997) p. 42
[2] David Carr and Jan Steutel (eds), Virtue ethics and moral education, (routledge 1999). P.22
[3] Cf.
Louis P. Pojman, James Fieser, Ethics:
Discovery right or wrong ( USA,
Wadsworth, 1976) P.147
[4] Cf. W. D. Ross (trans) Aristotle metaphysics book 6. P. 2221
[5] Cf.
Louis P. Pojman, James Fieser, Ethics:
Discovery right or wrong ( USA, Wadsworth,
1976) P.147
[6] Rosalind Hursthouse, (ed.) Edward Zalta, virtue ethics (fall 2013)
[7] Cf.
Louis P. Pojman, James Fieser, Ethics:
Discovery right or wrong ( USA,
Wadsworth, 1976) P.147
[8] Edmund Pincoffs, Quandary
ethics, mind (1971) pp. 552-571
[9] John McDowell, virtue and
reason, the monist 1979
[10] Cf.
Louis P. Pojman, James Fieser, Ethics:
Discovery right or wrong ( USA,
Wadsworth, 1976) P.147
[11] Michael Slote, (eds) John Skorupski, the Routlege companion to ethic: virtue ethics. (Routledge publication
2010) p. 481
[12] Cf. Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle (Translated and edited by Roger
Crisp. (St. Anns College, Oxford
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 3.
[13] Cf. W. D. Ross (trans) Aristotle Nicomachean ethics book 6. P. 2571
[14]Cf. Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle
(Translated and edited by Roger Crisp.
(St. Anns College, Oxford Cambridge University Press, 2004), Bk. I, Ch. 13, 1102a 17.
[15] Cf. Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle (Translated and edited by Roger
Crisp. (St. Anns College, Oxford
Cambridge University Press, 2004) Bk. 6, Ch. 2, 1139a16-b2.
[19] Cf. Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle (Translated and edited by Roger
Crisp. (St. Anns College, Oxford
Cambridge University Press, 2004), Bk. II, Ch. 1, 1103a14-b1.
[22] Cf. Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle (Translated and edited by Roger
Crisp. (St. Anns College, Oxford
Cambridge University Press, 2004), Bk. II, 1105 a, 30.
[23] Cf. W. D. Ross (trans) Aristotle Nicomachean ethics, book 7. P.
2545
[24] Ourhappyschool.com/philosophy/augustines-moral-philosophy-analysis
[25] Ourhappyschool.com/philosophy/augustines-moral-philosophy-analysis
[26] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Translated by the
Fathers of the English Dominican Province, I-II, q 55, a 2
[27] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province,
I-II, q 55, a 2
[28] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province,
I-II, q 55, 3
[29] People.uwplatt.edu
[30] People.uwplatt.edu
[31] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Translated by the
Fathers of the English Dominican Province, I-II, q 58, a 1
[32] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province,
I-II, q 58, a 2
[33] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa
Theologiae, Translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province,
I-II, q 58, a 3
[34] St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Translated by the
Fathers of the English Dominican Province, I-II, q 63, a 1
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